00036052

THE
ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BOMBAY
Town Hall, Bombay.

00036052

Digitized with financial assistance from

HT Parekh
FOUNDATION

An Initiative by
HDFC
WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 27 November, 2018

# THE · RISEN · SUN

# THE RISEN SUN

BY

BARON SUYEMATSU

36052
aC

LONDON
ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE & CO LTD
16 JAMES STREET HAYMARKET
1905

BUTLER & TANNER,
THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS,
FROME, AND LONDON.

# Contents


| | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | PREFACE AND DEDICATION | vii |

*BOOK I*

ANTECEDENT TO THE WAR

| CHAP. | | |
|---|---|---|
| I | AN ANGLO-JAPANESE VIEW OF THE FAR-EASTERN QUESTION | 3 |
| II | JAPAN AND RUSSIA | 13 |
| III | HOW RUSSIA BROUGHT ON WAR, 1898–1900 | 36 |
| IV | HOW RUSSIA BROUGHT ON WAR, 1901–1903 | 64 |
| V | FIRST HOSTILITIES. JAPAN AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR | 92 |

*BOOK II*

A NATION IN TRAINING

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| I | THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION INTO JAPAN | 105 |
| II | LEGAL STATUS OF FOREIGNERS IN JAPAN | 112 |
| III | MORAL TEACHING IN JAPAN | 119 |
| IV | THE JAPANESE CHARACTER | 130 |
| V | THE MAKING OF A SOLDIER IN JAPAN | 144 |
| VI | WOMAN'S EDUCATION | 155 |

## CONTENTS


| CHAP. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| VII | HARA-KIRI: ITS REAL SIGNIFICANCE | 163 |
| VIII | THE POLICE SYSTEM OF JAPAN | 171 |
| IX | THE ETHICS OF JAPAN | 177 |
| X | RELIGIONS OF JAPAN | 195 |
| XI | ARTS AND LETTERS | 208 |
| XII | THE GREAT CHANGE IN JAPAN | 239 |
| XIII | HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR, RULER AND POET | 248 |


### *BOOK III*

### EXTERNAL RELATIONS


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| I | CHINESE EXPANSION HISTORICALLY REVIEWED. | 269 |
| II | JAPAN AND FRANCE | 298 |
| III | JAPAN AND A WAR INDEMNITY | 312 |
| IV | TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND WOUNDED BY THE JAPANESE. | 317 |
| V | AN ANSWER TO CERTAIN UNFAIR CHARGES AGAINST JAPAN | 329 |
| VI | EAST AND WEST AFTER THE WAR | 336 |
| | EPILOGUE | 342 |
| INDEX | | 347 |

# Preface and Dedication

I LEFT Japan for Europe on the 10th of February, 1904, namely, less than two days after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war; partly for recuperation of my health after a long ailment, and partly in order to do whatever I could in the West for promotion of good-will between the Western nations and my fatherland at this momentous hour of war.

The day after my departure from Yokohama, on board the *Iyo-Maru*, Nippon-Yushen-Kwaisha steamship, namely February the 11th, happened to be one of our three national festive days, and it was celebrated on board the steamer. I made a speech in English on that occasion, which was followed by two more somewhat similar celebrations before we arrived at Victoria, on which I made corresponding speeches. While passing through America I gave my views on the situation to many American interviewers, and my observations were reported in the papers. Since my arrival in Europe I have continued to give my views to numerous interviewers and have made speeches. Most of these views and speeches, though necessarily in curtailed forms, have been reported widely in Continental as well as in English papers—indeed, all over the world. I have also contributed, sometimes by request and sometimes voluntarily, many articles and letters both to English and also to Continental Reviews.

The majority of these articles and letters, together with some of my speeches and addresses which have been written out, have been recently compiled by my secretaries in book form, and this volume is the result. This has been done because there are many friendly persons who take much interest in my writings and who have earnestly recommended me to collect them, on the ground that they may be of some use to many people who take interest in the war, and in things Japanese in general. I shall be most grateful if the prediction of these friends should prove to be well founded.

I have divided the resulting papers roughly into three books. Those in Book I deal with the inception of the situation of crisis in the Far East and the commencement of the war. Those in Book II are more general in character, and endeavour to explain, among other things, that reserve of vital energy in resistance to aggression for which the Japanese nation has been indebted to its temperament and its moral and intellectual training. The papers in Book III are mainly concerned with ulterior views as to the relations of the Japanese Government with foreign Powers, the question of the indemnity, and other matters of speculation that have arisen in regard to the course which destiny has traced for Japan in the history of Asia.

For this arrangement, I am wholly indebted to the valuable suggestion of Messrs. Archibald Constable. As to the title of the book, too, I have accepted the suggestion from the same source, though somewhat with diffidence. In completing the task of combining several articles, written separately at different times, in book form, some slight alteration and revision of the original was thought necessary. That part of the work has been entirely undertaken by

Messrs. Constable, with my complete approval and satisfaction.

My sincere thanks for the permission to reprint these articles and addresses are due to the Society of Arts, the Ethological Society, the Central Asian Society, and to the proprietors and editors of different periodicals, and of the book entitled "Japan by the Japanese," in which the originals appeared. I may mention, among others, the names of the *Nineteenth Century and After*, the *Independent Review*, the *Fortnightly Review*, the *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, *La Revue*, and the *Deutsche Revue*.

I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to six persons, amongst others, and I dedicate this book to them collectively. The first is my teacher in my boyhood, Murakami Bussan, a great poet and scholar well known in Japan, who has been gone from this world now already more than two decades. It was he who instructed me in Oriental learning, in classics and poetry, and gave the main foundation in the formation of my character. The second is Dr. Waraker, who took much pains during my stay at Cambridge in teaching me English and Roman laws, as well as the law of nations. It was mainly due to his exertions that I graduated with honours in the second class of the Law tripos. The third is Mr. Ernest Schuster, who taught me the German laws out of a sheer love of legal study. I remember how, day after day, we discussed together the German laws, taking Dernburg and Laband for our chief text books, the important parts of which I had translated into English under his direction, and which we made our points of discussion. The other three are Marquis Ito, Marshal Marquis Yamagata, and Count Inouye, three of our elder statesmen. It was they who entrusted me from time to time with many important

tasks, political or otherwise, in one way or another, and my present visit to Europe is also mainly due to the suggestion of these eminent men, who, I believe, thought that my stay here at this important phase in the history of our nation could not fail to be productive of some good.

K. S.

QUEEN ANNE'S MANSIONS, LONDON,
*August*, 1905.

## *POSTSCRIPT*

BEFORE the printing of the following pages was quite finished, peace has been concluded at Portsmouth (America) between Russia and Japan. This will bring an end not only to the anxiety felt in many ways by the whole world, but also to certain strains and uneasiness caused to the commerce and peaceful relations of many nations. Whatever may be the views about the peace terms, one thing seems certain, that Japan has shown a great moral heroism in the cause of humanity and civilisation. Now that peace is assured, the time seems to have arrived for the world to reflect more calmly than ever upon the origin of one of the greatest wars ever recorded in history; and upon the ideals and notions, as well as training and aspirations, of the Japanese, that one of the belligerent parties which had not, perhaps, been sufficiently known to the world before the war. And above all the time has come to observe how faithfully Japan has maintained her ambition of deserving the name of a civilized nation, and to reflect how securely we may take her steady progress of the past, and especially during the last ten years, as a guarantee of her continued advance in the future. Time was when she was

looked down upon by many as a petty, infantile, imitative, shallow, bellicose, and aggressive nation. Our sincere hope is that misconceptions of that kind may now be totally dispelled, and that the world may look upon Japan as a country deserving friendship. For all such purposes I hope that this book of mine may be of some service.

K. S.

PARIS,
*September* 1, 1905.

# BOOK I

## Antecedent to the War

# CHAPTER I

## AN ANGLO-JAPANESE VIEW OF THE FAR-EASTERN QUESTION [1]

FOR many years to come the war now being waged between Russia and Japan will probably be regarded as pivotal in the history of Eastern Asia and the Pacific. The subject, even as we can envisage it at the present day, is a wide and far-reaching one, and there are already many ways of approaching it. But one of the surest keys to the situation, in my opinion, will ever be found in the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and it will not be inexpedient, nor will it be thought unbecoming on my part, if I treat it as the keynote of the following attempt at a solution of the Far-Eastern Question.

Japan is now in alliance with Great Britain; she may not perhaps be worthy of that alliance, but you may be assured that she is doing and will always do her best to deserve it. Some people might regard the alliance as a mushroom affair and the outcome of mushroom growths. On the contrary, it marks the climax of a gradual process of evolution, the fruit of a tree with a deep-rooted trunk.

For a long time English policy in the Far East, though subject in the normal course of things to the tidal influence of diplomacy, has had a trend in the direction of which we are speaking, and almost every act of Britain in this sphere has resulted eventually in benefit to Japan.

It was in 1854, just fifty years ago, that Japan first opened her ports to America, which was soon followed by England, Russia, France, and other Occidental nations, one after the

[1] The substance of a speech delivered at the Constitutional Club on May 5, 1904.

other, in the course of a few years. It was in that year, 1854, that England, together with France, fought against Russia near home, in the Black Sea, and, as a consequence, the combined fleets of England and France in the Far East chased the Russian fleet and attacked the fortified port of Petropavlovsk on the coast of Kamchatka. In its course you lost your commodore by a most tragical ending of life; in its course also you once met with a heavy repulse, sustaining a loss of two hundred men. At last, with reinforcements, the English captured and demolished the fort, but, taking advantage of fog, the Russian fleet had escaped a month before. The Russian fleet which thus escaped met with grievous shipwreck; the survivors sought the helping hand of Japan. We did not know what was passing between you and Russia, neither were we concerned in the matter, but from motives of compassion we received these survivors well. We gave them shelter at a secluded place called Hetta, in the province of Idzu; there they wished to build some new ships, in order to return home. We gave materials, we lent them our ship-builders, our artisans, and they succeeded in building two schooners, on board of which they sailed away from Japan, their departure taking place, if I remember correctly, after the conclusion of peace.

In 1861 the so-called Tsushima affair took place. Tsushima is, as you well know, an island (famous in history henceforth as the scene of Togo's victory over the Baltic fleet) situated in the straits of Korea—a most important strategic point for Japan. In the year in question the Russian fleet suddenly came to that island and landed marines, and occupied part of it, with the evident intention of seizing the island. This was done without any cause or reason whatever, without any prior notice or diplomatic negotiations, and in spite of the fact that Russia had entered into friendly intercourse with us by treaty several years previously, and in spite of our giving them a helping hand in their hour of calamity. Remonstrances were of course made by the island authorities, followed by those of the Central Government, but the Russian Foreign Office took no heed. It was then and there that the English fleet made its appearance on the scene, and demanded the instant retirement of the Russians, a demand which was obeyed; and thus the Island of Tsushima was saved to Japan.

In 1868 the new *régime* of the Imperial Government was inaugurated. For some years previous to that Japan was divided into two great parties, one for the Imperial cause, the other for the Shogunate cause. At that time England was represented in Japan by the energetic and sagacious Sir Harry Parkes; there were also men like Glover, Lowther and Ernest Satow, now Sir Ernest, Britain's present worthy representative in China; they all followed the lead of Sir Harry Parkes in espousing the Imperial cause in opposition to the strenuous support of the Shogunate cause by a certain foreign Power, headed by the equally energetic and adventurous representative of that country. Most of these facts are contained in the unwritten pages of the Secret History of Diplomacy, so that they are not much known even in Japan, still less in Europe. But one thing is certain, that England has done much towards the consolidation of our empire.

In 1874 we had the so-called Formosa affair, arising from the Formosan aborigines murdering a number of Japanese subjects, which ultimately led to some complication between Japan and China. That complication was amicably settled at last through the good offices tendered by the then British representative in China.

In 1885 the Port Lazareff—Port Hamilton, affair took place. The affair, as you know, was briefly this: Russia attempted to snatch Port Lazareff from Korea. You, England, entertaining a strong objection to this Russian action, instantaneously occupied Port Hamilton as a counter-check, and thus at last succeeded in compelling Russia to abandon her project. This object effected, which was all you wanted, you naturally gave up occupation of Port Hamilton soon after. This affair did not directly concern Japan herself, but she derived benefit from it all the same.

In our war with China, during 1894 and 1895, Great Britain maintained her neutrality, and was, on the whole, friendly with Japan. Some say England might have gone a step further at the time of the intervention of the three Powers, but *we* do not complain of that; your keeping aloof was sufficient for us.

During that war was effected the revision of our old treaties with Occidental nations, which placed Japan on an equal footing with other countries, admitting her for the first time into the comity of civilized nations. In this affair

it was you, Great Britain, that took the lead and initiative over other Powers. When Port Arthur was occupied by Russia, Great Britain occupied Wei-Hai-Wei. This was intended as nothing else but a counter-check to the Russian aggression, and the lease was expressly made co-existent with Russian occupation. This is itself a striking proof of the opposing interests of Russia and Great Britain.

Then came the Boxer rising and the march on Peking by the allied forces to the rescue of their several Legations. The history of this is too fresh to reiterate here. It is enough to say that we, the Japanese, spoken of as the pagans, fought side by side with the troops of Western nations, especially keeping up the best relations with the British and Americans. It is not for me here to dwell in detail upon what passed in diplomacy in the Far East, or what was done by Russia after the rescue of the various Legations. It will be necessary for me to give you merely a brief resumé.

Russia gave repeatedly to other Powers the pledge that she would relinquish her occupation of Manchuria—an occupation which had been effected by her during the Boxer trouble as a part of the common action of the allied Powers which went to the rescue of Peking, and for which she directly afterwards had received from China, for the trouble she had taken, a compensation to an amount far exceeding its value. At the same time in another direction she had been trying to exact from China humiliating concessions, which were quite contrary to, and irreconcilable with, the pledges given by her to the other nations. From the beginning to the end the chief efforts of diplomacy in the Far East were directed to check the clandestine attempts of Russia, and make her keep her pledge. In this effort England, America, and Japan, stood fast together. Then came the Treaty of Alliance between England and Japan in 1902—the Manchurian question had not then come to an end, and it was still the pending theme. England was perfectly aware of the fact. Looking back over the long history of more than forty years, looking at what England has done in the Far East in connexion with Japan, as I have related above, I cannot but hold that it has resulted in solid benefit to Japan, and it goes without saying that we feel deeply indebted for the aid thus rendered by the English.

I do not doubt but that much of this has been done out

of kindness, and from a sense of justice; but was this all? Was there not also something else behind? Upon looking at the map you will easily see why England had adopted her policy in the direction described. You have great commercial interests in the Far East, no small political ones as well. It is necessary for you to protect those interests. Although only parts of the interests of your great empire lie in the Far East, you could not afford to lose those interests, any more than a man could afford to lose a part of his buildings, which loss might prove detrimental to the whole construction. These interests which you have to protect are identical with those of Japan. Japan has to do exactly the same thing as England in guarding and protecting her interest and safety. Such being the case, I venture to say that the Treaty of Alliance between England and Japan is, as I said before, the climax of a long evolution, having for its basis the mutual interests of the two countries. So far, this is a matter of plain fact as concerns the political aspect. There are, however, insinuations abroad to discredit Japan in some quarters—fomented mischievously I fear.

In the first place, they say that Japan's modern civilization is only outward, and that there is every possibility of a reaction setting in. Nothing can be farther from the truth than this assertion, I can assure you. We have strenuously striven to civilize our country by assimilating certain European methods and ideas, and we have, I believe, succeeded to some extent. It has cost us many lives and much money. We have eaten Western apples and found them delicious—they are not the apples of the Seladon, and we are not likely to give them up. No; we are even going to make further improvements, and so keep pace with those nations with whom we have friendly intercourse. Of the material side of civilization which we have adopted I can at once convince you that we shall not be likely to give it up. We have electric light in Japan, as in this room; you will not doubt when I tell you that we shall never return to oil or wax. We have railways; do you think we can ever go back to pedestrianism? Shall we cut the telegraph wire and again employ messengers?

With regard to the intellectual parts of civilization, it may not be so easy to convince you, but with us it is exactly the same. The introduction of Western civilization into

Japan is not limited to the material side only. In laws, in science, in art, and in all the other branches of human activity, we have striven to introduce your ideas—just in the same degree as we have done in material objects. All this we shall never give up: they have already taken deep root in the Japanese mind, and they have already become essential elements in the making of a compact nation. Sometimes people express amazement at the changes made in Japan in so comparatively short a period as thirty or forty years, as though doubting its genuineness. It is true that Japan has effected a great transformation; but, without in the least entertaining any idea of self-glorification, I may say that Japan has always had some kind of unique national civilization and conditions of social organization which, together with a considerable precursory preparation, gave her a special power of adaptability when she came to adopt this new phase of Western enlightenment, and it will be, I venture to say, a fallacy to think that any aborigines or tribes scattered in different parts of the globe could, emulating Japan, raise themselves, in the same way, as she has done at a moment's notice.

Some comments have also been made about difference of race and religion. Well, the difference of race is a matter we cannot transform except perhaps by gradual intermixture. That difference, however, seems to me not very important—not certainly of a kind to preclude the maintenance of friendly relations, so long as other assimilation could be thoroughly effected. I may also say the same thing with regard to religion. Our moral precepts and ethical rules are exactly the same as yours, though some of their points might be more developed in Japan, while some points might be more developed in Western nations. Just let me illustrate this. Where any matters of charity or virtue are concerned, the Japanese entertain the same ideas, and act in the same way, as do their Western brethren. For instance, the organization of the Red Cross Society is working very well in Japan; its members consist of about one million, and its annual subscriptions amount to about two millions. It is under the direct patronage of the Emperor and Empress; and of course all this is done irrespective of any religion, Japan being a most tolerant country as regards religion. Perfect freedom of conscience is guaranteed by

the Constitution, and not the slightest difference is made in the eyes of law on account of religion: and in social intercourse it is the same. Here perhaps I might relate an instance: Mr. Kataoka, who died last autumn, was a Protestant, and yet was one of the leaders of the largest political party. He was President of the House of Representatives for several terms, and he died while still holding that office. There was a hymn which he liked the best, and on his dying bed he asked his friends and relatives to sing it, and he passed away as he listened to it. Even the Salvation Army is parading our streets under the command of its English officers. Nay! even the Mormons are allowed to preach, under conditions, *bien entendu*, which bind them not to attempt to proselytize as regards polygamy, which is contrary to our laws. With these facts in view, one might even say that we, as a nation, are almost too tolerant.

At all events, I am of opinion that if Englishmen continue to regard us as brothers, we shall get on very well.

People speak of the Japanese being brave in war, and fighting well. Perhaps it is true; but we should be sorry if we were considered only as a fighting nation. We aspire to be at least as energetic and as clever in other branches of human activity as in war; in fact, our endeavour has always been directed to that end.

Here I might add a few more words. The general tendency in Japan is that the more one is versed in the Western ideas, the more chance one has of becoming a prominent figure in all directions, more especially in politics and official occupations, but also in our army and navy. It amounts to the same thing as saying that the brain, as it were, of Japan, which regulates the wheel and the motion of the empire, is, and will continue to be, animated by the Western modes of thought and reasoning. These Western proclivities will serve to protect Japan from the danger of acting upon some unconsidered impulse and will cause her as a nation to feel her international responsibilities the more.

Some fear has been entertained that the Japanese soldiers might become restless and unruly after achieving great success over their formidable foe. But of that there is no fear. Our army is founded upon the universal service system; the soldiers are patriotic and fight gallantly when ordered to advance, but they are

not bellicose by nature, rather preferring peace, and, moreover, perfect order and discipline prevail among them. It was just one day after the rupture of diplomatic relations with Russia that I met with General Count Katsura, the Premier of Japan, when he told me that during that long, protracted negotiation with Russia not one of our military or naval officers or men had come to him to disturb him with their opinions on diplomacy or politics. This will perhaps give you some idea of what are the characteristics of our army. It appears also that some apprehensions have been entertained lest some kind of amalgamation might be effected between China and Japan which might cause danger to the Western Powers. But I am far from believing this! China is a very nice country. The Chinese, however, are not a warlike or aggrandising nation. China is and has always been, and will be, a good market for all civilized nations so long as she is left undisturbed and her integrity is respected. The characteristics and notions in general in China and Japan represent such marked differences that it is a matter of impossibility to amalgamate these two nations; nor does Japan ever entertain such ambitious ideas. All that Japan wishes is to maintain a peaceful, commercial intercourse with China, in common with other civilized nations; and Japan's policy will always be worked on these lines. I am confident that this policy of Japan is in accord with English ideas, and I do not believe that the direction of English policy differs from ours in any way. This is again satisfactory evidence that British and Japanese interests are identical, and hence the necessity of maintaining a close and cordial relationship, which is the same thing as continuing the actual status of the present alliance. I said in the beginning of my discourse that the present state of things marked the climax of a long evolution; I might almost say that it is an outcome of English policy in the East, which may be considered as already traditional. In its long course it was sometimes adopted by the Liberal Government and sometimes by the Conservative, which you can easily discover by peeping into the pages of history; and, besides, I am happy to notice that it is backed by almost all the subjects of the great British Empire. Hence I may affirm that it is your national policy. An alliance of this kind does not involve the thwarting of other nations; on

the contrary, we wish also to keep up friendly relations with them, which I presume is also the intention of Great Britain, and hence the Japanese are not jealous of Great Britain making an *entente cordiale* with any of these nations. In fact, I do not doubt that among these nations too, even in France or Germany, there is many a heart which is beating in sympathy with Japan at this trying hour of hers. It must be understood, however, that in these friendships all round there must be some difference of degree. Amongst these other nations we desire the best friendship with the United States of America. Almost all the sentiments I have expressed relating to your country are also applicable to the United States, and, besides, there is no difference in the Far East in the interest and policy of England, the United States, and Japan. The Americans have shown their sympathy with Japan at this momentous hour in no less degree than Great Britain. I would fain that America would advance a step farther and enter upon a more concise relationship. I understand that it is the policy of both the English and American Governments that they should keep up a close and friendly relationship, and I also understand this aspiration to be that of the thinking parts of both nations, an aspiration towards which they have already succeeded in converting the vast bulk of their fellow-countrymen. There may, perchance, be some trifling difference of feeling now and then between some few particular individuals; but if there be such, they are, after all, like little differences of opinion between brothers and sisters or cousins. You cannot permanently or irrevocably cut the natural bonds of Anglo-Saxon blood. Let then Great Britain and America be closely united, and allow Japan to stand by their side—it will be a sight worth seeing! Were England, America and Japan, I say, to stand thus together in the Far East, that fact alone could not but be a great bulwark for the preservation of permanent peace and the furtherance of civilization, without in any way prejudicing the equitable rights and interests of other civilized nations.

I am told, and I also know, that Britishers are difficult to make friends with, but we also know that when once they become friends their friendship is constant and enduring, and so it is with the British nation at large. The present Treaty

of Alliance is terminable after five years; but I would fain it were made perpetual. Nor is this merely for the interests of Japan. Suppose Japan were worsted in the war now waging, and Northern China fell into the hands of a certain other Power, what would be the result? British interests in the Far East would soon, I fear, be an obsolete expression. Japan has now embarked on a great task. She thoroughly recognizes its magnitude and gravity. She is, however, convinced that she is not fighting merely for personal political aims, but that she is fighting also in the interests of civilization and humanity. She is fighting for her own sake of course, but at the same time she is carrying on the contest at the mandate of England and America, as it were, in the cause of civilization and humanity. And, therefore, from the point of view of justice, humanity, interest and friendship, I earnestly ask you to continue your warm sympathy with Japan.

## CHAPTER II

### JAPAN AND RUSSIA [1]

IN the following pages an effort has been made to trace the course of events and negotiations precedent to the outbreak of hostilities in the Far East. The most trustworthy sources of information have been drawn upon, viz., the Blue Book issued by the British Government, entitled "Correspondence regarding the Russian Occupation of Manchuria and Newchwang" [2] and the White Book concerning "The Negotiations between Japan and Russia, 1903–1904," presented by the Government of Tokio to the Imperial Diet this year. These official records have been supplemented by references to acknowledged facts in the recent history of the Extreme East, and if the account now given is somewhat lengthy, though compressed as much as possible, the circumstance is to be ascribed to the wide area which, geographically and historically, it was needful that the statement should be made to embrace.

The anxiety felt in Japan about Russian methods had its origin at least as far back as the eighteenth century, when the encroachments of Russian settlers began in the Kurile Islands, which are Japanese territory, and extend in a prolonged chain from Yeso (now officially termed Hokkaido) to Cape Lopatka. There were frequent intrusions by Russians early in the last century, moreover, upon Yeso and the neighbouring islands, and Russia seized the opportunity, when the opening of the Empire to foreign intercourse had caused internal dissensions in Japan itself, to take possession of the northern half of Saghalien, an island which up to that time had been regarded as wholly

[1] *The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, July, 1904.
[2] China, No. 2, 1904.

Japanese property. In the end, at a later date she succeeded in depriving Japan of the southern half also, and thus acquired for herself possession of the entire island. In 1861 the Russians attempted the annexation of Tsushima, Japan's outpost in the Straits of Korea, having landed men surreptitiously from the cruiser *Posadnik* and quartered them ashore. This design was, however, frustrated by the vigilance of the British Admiral, Sir James Hope, who, on learning of the Russian descent upon the island, took, together with Mr. Oliphant, Secretary of the British Legation in Japan, such strenuous action as left the intruders no option but to retire from the position which they had illegally taken up. The opportunity presented by China's difficulties with France and Great Britain over events in North China had at this time been seized by Russia to exact from the Peking Government the cession of the entire Eastern littoral of Manchuria down to the Korean frontier, with its bays and harbours, including the site of Vladivostock. In 1885 the Russians attempted to snatch Port Lazareff from Korea, and although that attempt was thwarted by the prompt action of England, Russia's ambitions in respect of her progress southward never ceased to be active. Thus in 1891 she began that gigantic undertaking, the Trans-Siberian Railway, and immediately on the conclusion of the Chino-Japanese war she wrested from China, by successive machinations, concessions and subordinate privileges in connexion with the so-called Eastern Chinese Railway, which spread itself not only across the whole width of Manchuria to Vladivostock, but likewise through its entire length from Harbin to Port Arthur and Dalny. By degrees the Russian interest was made to predominate, and to all intents and purposes the railways in Manchuria were to become part and parcel of Russia's own railway system, administered by her officials.

Korea, which had for centuries virtually acknowledged the suzerainty of Japan as well as of China, by periodically despatching a tribute-bearing mission to the Japanese capital in the same way that she had sent envoys from Seoul to Peking, began to omit this courtesy, and mistrusting the effects of the radical changes introduced into Japan under the new *régime*, chose to exhibit in other ways an indifference to the preservation of good relations with the

Japanese Empire. The successive Envoys whom Japan sent to Korea were arrogantly treated, and finally, in 1875, a Japanese surveying vessel, the *Unyokan*, was fired upon. Japan demanded explanations, and eventually a treaty was signed between Japan and Korea in 1876, in which Korea was placed on the footing of an independent State, and certain of her ports were opened to Japanese commerce. Owing to the continued interference, however, of the Chinese in Korean politics, and conflicts having occurred between the soldiers guarding the Japanese Legation and the Koreans, China was remonstrated with, and finally a treaty was negotiated at Tientsin in 1884, whereby a pacific settlement was brought about for the time being. In effect, it was China's breaches of this treaty that led to the subsequent Sino-Japanese war. China's unwillingness to relinquish the hold upon the peninsular kingdom which she claimed to enjoy by virtue of suzerainty, and her antagonism to Japan's growing influence at Seoul, exerted solely in the interests of beneficial reform, culminated in her taking those hostile measures that brought about the war of 1894–1895.

In the negotiations for peace which were entered upon at Shimonoseki in the summer of 1895, China ceded the Liao-tung peninsula to Japan. But Russia had long before fixed her gaze upon the fortress of Port Arthur, and with the view of preventing its transfer, together with the territory named, to Japan, she thought fit to address to the Government of Tokio the following remonstrance, with the consent and approval of France and Germany :—

> The Government of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias in examining the conditions of peace which Japan has imposed on China, finds that the possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East. Consequently, the Government of his Majesty the Emperor would give a new proof of their sincere friendship for the Government of his Majesty the Emperor of Japan by advising them to renounce the definitive possession of the peninsula of Liao-tung.

Japan, as is well-known, was obliged to yield to the pressure thus exerted by the three Western Powers, and

when, in 1897, Germany obtained from China a lease of Kiao-Chau in Shantung, Russia seized the moment to demand from the Peking Government the virtual cession of Port Arthur and Talien Wan, thereby setting at nought all those objections to the occupancy of this part of the Chinese Empire by another Power to which she had attached such immense weight only a few years previously. Russia's next move was to obtain from the Koreans a lease of Masampho, in Korea, an important harbour directly facing Tsushima, Japan's westernmost outpost. To this the opposition of Japan and Great Britain was successful. Korea merely granted facilities for the establishment of a Russian coaling dépôt.

The Boxers' outbreak in China led to the almost universal expression of a desire that Japan should send troops to the rescue of the members of Foreign Legations in Peking, and Japan, ever mindful of the principles of humanity, and anxious to prove her entire sympathy with the sufferers by the Boxers' depredations, at once expressed her readiness to despatch an adequate army. The Peking Relief Expedition was promptly organized, and the forces of Japan took their places in line with those of Occidental nations in a supreme effort to avert the peril which overshadowed all the subjects of foreign Powers then dwelling in the Chinese capital. In this expedition the Japanese troops greatly outnumbered those of any other country. Russia sent 4,000 men to Chihli to take part in the march to Peking, but she at the same time sent large bodies of troops into Manchuria on the pretext that there too a general rising was imminent, and threatened the existence of the railway, then in course of construction and nearing completion. Ostensibly the Russians continued to find employment for their troops in Manchuria in the suppression of brigandage, but meanwhile they demanded and received their share of the indemnity paid by China not upon the basis of the contingent which had been sent to join the Peking Relief Force, but upon that of the entire number of men which it was alleged it had been found needful to send into Manchuria as well. The numerical strength was, however, greatly exaggerated, for Russia's share in the indemnity was actually calculated upon the footing of her having provided 170,000 troops, whereas in reality the sum total could not at the very utmost

have exceeded 50,000. Even at that time Russia's behaviour in Manchuria had been such as to arouse suspicion, and had become matter for general comment. It is sufficient here to point out that Russia was more than amply repaid by China for such assistance as she could claim to have rendered.

A passing reference must be made to the Anglo-German Agreement of October, 1900. It was expressly laid down in that document that should any other Power seek to make use of the complications in China to extort advantages calculated to impair the undiminished territorial condition of the Chinese Empire, Germany and Britain would reserve it to themselves to come to an understanding as to the steps to be taken to protect their own interests in China. To this agreement all the Powers adhered in respect of its principles, and Japan actually accepted the position of a signatory. Thus there was a substantial basis for action in the event of China's territorial integrity being assailed; but, strangely enough, when the Manchurian question reached an acute stage, Germany alone (besides Russia, of course) somewhat abruptly showed a reluctance to admit its application to Manchuria, yet at the same time continued to give a general adhesion to the policy of the other Great Powers in regard to the Chinese Empire. Japan and Great Britain found in this policy a basis, later on, as we shall see, for a formal declaration of alliance in respect of Chinese and Korean affairs.

On the last day of the year 1900 a memorable despatch was sent by cable to the *Times* newspaper in London by its correspondent in Peking, which drew the attention of the world to the part Russia was really playing, and which was diametrically opposed to her protestations of an unalterable desire to act in unison with all the nations concerned in the East. That despatch set forth the terms of an agreement which it was declared had been surreptitiously concluded between China and Russia, whereby Russia consented to the resumption of the civil government of Mukden and the Feng-tien province only on condition that—

1. The Tartar General Tseng should undertake to protect and pacify the province, and to assist in the construction of the Russian railroad.

2. That he should treat kindly the Russians who were then and were to remain in military occupation, providing them with lodging and provisions.

3. That he should disarm and disband the Chinese soldiery, transferring to the Russians all munitions of war in arsenals which they had not already occupied.

4. That all forts, etc., not needed by the Russians should be dismantled.

5. That Newchwang (a treaty port) and other places then occupied by Russians should only be restored to Chinese civil administration when the Russian Government might be satisfied that the pacification of the province had actually been accomplished.

6. That the local Chinese police should maintain law and order under the control of the Tartar General.

7. That there should be a Russian political Resident at Mukden, whom it would be obligatory upon the Tartar general to consult.

8. That should the local police be anywhere insufficient to cope with an emergency, Russian reinforcements should at once be called for, through the Russian Resident.

The functions conferred upon the Russian Resident were similar, it will be seen, to those of British Residents in the Native States of India, or of the Russian Resident at Bokhara. It was, moreover, made clear that this agreement would necessarily be followed by similar agreements relative to the other two provinces of Manchuria—viz., Kirin and Hé-lung-chiang—and that, inasmuch as Russia had under a pre-existing agreement secured the right to maintain troops in Manchuria for the protection of the "Eastern Chinese Railway," this province of the Chinese Empire would become to all intents and purposes a Russian Protectorate.

Pressure was then put upon China by Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and Japan, not to commit the stupendous folly of entering upon any separate negotiations with Russia or any single Power, and the Emperor of China, on his part, likewise sought the conjoint mediation of these Powers. In the meantime a more trustworthy and even more disquieting draft of the Russian demands came to light. Diplomatic communications were exchanged with great activity between the Powers, chiefly directed against Russia, whilst Russia herself, with her accustomed craftiness, did her utmost to gain her point. At last, however, she had to give way, at all events for the time, and on April 5, 1901, the Government of St. Petersburg, in an official *communiqué* on the subject of its policy in China,

published in the *Official Messenger*, positively stated that though the course of events in Pechili, and a series of acts of aggression committed by Chinese insurgents on the frontier of Russia, had rendered necessary the occupation of the port of Newchwang and the entry of the Russian troops in Manchuria, these were to be considered temporary measures; that as soon as order had been permanently restored in Manchuria, and everything possible had been done to safeguard the railway, Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from the territory of the Chinese Empire on her borders, provided that no obstacle was placed in her way by the action of the other Powers and of China herself. The introduction of this qualifying phrase was due, as was subsequently to be seen, to the sinister intention of withdrawing with one hand the benefits conferred by the other, since it would be at any time practicable for Russia to construe this clause as inapplicable by reason of the prolongation of disturbances in Manchuria which the Russian agents might themselves, if they chose, foment. The *communiqué* went on to state, with reference to the secret agreement previously alluded to as that which Russia surreptitiously sought to impose upon China, that that agreement was only intended to serve as a starting-point towards the realization of the declared intention of the Russian Government to restore Manchuria to China, it having only been occupied by Russia in consequence of the alarming events of the previous year. Russia complained that, owing to obstacles having been put in the way of the conclusion of this secret agreement, it was impossible for her *immediately* to take the measures contemplated for the gradual evacuation of Manchuria, but in a closing paragraph the Russian Government announced that, whilst maintaining the then existing *temporary* form of government in Manchuria with the object of insuring order in the neighbourhood of the Russian frontier, but remaining unalterably true to its original programme as repeatedly formulated, it would quietly await the further progress of events.

In April, 1901, a week after the publication in the *Official Messenger*, Count Lamsdorff personally assured Sir Charles Scott, the representative of Great Britain, that it was entirely an erroneous conclusion that had been reached in some quarters that the Russian Government, by dropping

the negotiations for an early evacuation of Manchuria, as indicated above, evinced their intention of occupying that province indefinitely. The Emperor of Russia, said Count Lamsdorff, adhered unswervingly to his intention, so frankly and frequently declared, to withdraw the Russian troops of occupation and restore the province to its former Chinese administration as soon as a normal state of affairs in China and the reinstatement at Peking of the legitimate and independent central Government, capable of maintaining order in the empire, admitted of this being done. Count Lamsdorff volunteered the statement, moreover, that the separate negotiations with China concerning the early evacuation of Manchuria had been dropped, and that nothing beyond a programme for the negotiations had ever been discussed. Sir Charles Scott found that his German and American colleagues at St. Petersburg had been by Count Lamsdorff similarly assured.

Four months later the British Minister in Peking found himself obliged to charge the Russian Government with a breach of faith, in that he had been informed, from a thoroughly trustworthy source, of Russia's resumption of negotiations with China to bring about the signature of a Manchurian agreement.

The Russians, telegraphed Sir Ernest Satow, denied this; but the accuracy of the British Minister's report was demonstrated before long, for seven months after the Peking Protocol was signed—viz., on September 7—a separate agreement was signed between Russia and China on April 8, 1902. This agreement was made public in the *Official Messenger* four days afterwards, and in a Government communication preceding the text of the document it was declared in so many words that the Russian Government had assured the Chinese Emperor that Russia had no hostile intentions towards China, whose independence and integrity were the foundation of Russian policy in the Far East. Admitting, moreover, that the pacification of China had progressed with notable success, and repeating the assurances that the only object with which Russian troops were sent into the Celestial Empire was the reinstatement of the lawful Government of China, with which friendly relations had existed from time immemorial, it was announced that the conditions of the recall of the Russian forces from Man-

churia had been embodied in the agreement in question. At first it might be thought that Russia was actuated solely by good faith in regard to her treatment of China, but in reality her ascendancy at the Chinese capital was procured either by bribery or coercion in some form or other, and the officials went in constant fear of the aggressive attitude of the Russian agents and representatives. So much was this the case that whilst the Chinese felt themselves compelled to agree to Russia's terms, they often complained to other Powers of the pressure to which they were thus subjected, and constantly appealed for assistance in resisting the Russian demands, which, as a matter of fact, had undergone much change, to China's advantage, in consequence.

Under that agreement Russia bound herself within six months from the date of signature (April 8, 1902) to clear the south-western portion of the province of Mukden of Russian troops up to the river Liao-che, and to hand the Shanhai Kwan and Newchwang railway over to China. She further undertook within the next six months to clear the remainder of the province of Mukden and the province of Kirin of Russian troops; and, finally, within the six months following, to remove the remaining Russian troops from the province of Hé-Lung-Chiang.

On the other hand, the Chinese Government bound itself to protect the railways of Manchuria in general by all means in its power, and to secure the safety in Manchuria of Russian subjects and their undertakings. The obligation to afford protection to the Shanhai Kwan and Newchwang railway was laid exclusively upon China, and it was a condition that she should not invite other Powers to participate in its protection, construction, or working. Nor might she embark upon any extension of this railway, nor execute new works in connexion therewith, notwithstanding that the line ran wholly through her own territory, without first consulting Russia. Further, she might not increase or diminish the number of her troops in Manchuria without notifying Russia, nor allow any other Powers to occupy the territory evacuated by the Russians.

Lord Lansdowne, in conversation with M. de Staal, the Russian Ambassador in London, on April 30, referred to this agreement, and explained that in Great Britain there was a disposition to criticise those provisions which limited

China's right to dispose of her military forces and to construct railway extensions within her own territory. But as it was hoped that the evacuation of the province would be completed within the appointed time, and that the agreement would be loyally and considerately interpreted, Lord Lansdowne was indisposed to examine its provisions too microscopically.

In the Russian Government's communication prefacing the announcement of this agreement of April 8, 1902, it was expressly stated that the only object with which Russian troops were sent into the Celestial Empire was the reinstatement of the lawful Chinese Government and the re-establishment of order, and that as Russia had received China's written guarantee for the maintenance of order, and had been repaid the material expenses to which she was put by her military operations in China, the Russian Government saw no necessity for leaving armed forces within the confines of Manchuria.

So far Russia appeared to be in earnest, as far as evacuation was concerned, and to be acting in good faith, so much so that in October, 1902, Prince Ching informed the British Minister in Peking that the railways outside the Great Wall, as far as the Liao River, had been handed back to China by Russia, and that the south-west portion of Mukden province, as far as the river named, had been completely evacuated by Russian troops. But Russia still retained in her own hands the administration of the treaty port of Newchwang, the Russian Consul combining with his ordinary duties those of civil administrator, and the Customs dues collected at the port were being paid into the Russo-Chinese Bank.

Meanwhile, the similarity of the interests of Great Britain and Japan in respect of the Far East had been manifested in so many ways that the desirability of the two countries uniting in a formal agreement was fully recognized, and in January, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Convention was signed in London.

April 8, 1903, passed by, and still Newchwang was held by Russia, Admiral Alexeieff making the excuse that German and English gunboats were at or off the port, and that he wished to obtain a guarantee from China that no foreign force would be permitted to occupy it. Some uneasiness

being felt in London as to Russia's real intentions, Lord Lansdowne received on April 22 Count Beckendorff's assurances that if the retirement from Newchwang had not taken place it was only delayed for some special and sufficient cause.

Suddenly, as a bolt from the blue, in the latter part of April, 1903, the Russians made seven demands upon the Chinese Government at Peking, as conditions precedent to the evacuation of Manchuria, these demands preventing—

(*a*) The opening of any free port or establishment of a consulate of any other Power in the evacuated district.
(*b*) The employment of other than Russians "in the North."

The demands also included :

(*c*) The retention of the same status at Newchwang as regards administration as during occupation.
(*d*) The continued payment of the Customs dues into the Russo-Chinese Bank.
(*e*) The control of Newchwang sanitary affairs by Russians.
(*f*) The use of Chinese telegraph-poles throughout Manchuria for Russian wires ; and
(*g*) A final stipulation that no portion of the three provinces of which Manchuria consists should ever be alienated to any foreign Power.

The British Government, as also Japan and the other Powers, regarded these demands as quite inadmissible, and the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking was instructed to inform the Chinese Government that they would by Great Britain be resented as an infraction of Article 54 of the Treaty of Tientsin (1858), which stipulated that the British Government and its subjects should be allowed free and equal participation in all privileges, immunities, and advantages that might have been or might thereafter be granted by China to the Government or subjects of any other nation.

The Chinese Government was assured by both Japan and Britain that it would receive similar support in resisting Russia's demands to that accorded to China at the time that the Manchurian Convention was being negotiated. The United States directed their Minister at Peking to urge upon the Chinese Government the advisability of refusing the Russian demands, and telegraphed to the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg to request explanations from the Russian Government.

Lord Lansdowne, on April 28, telegraphed to Sir Claude Macdonald at Tokio to assure the Japanese Government that Britain was supporting the representations made at St. Petersburg by the United States Government, and that the British Government was desirous of keeping in line with Japan during these negotiations.

On that day, April 28, 1903, the United States Ambassador at St. Petersburg was most positively assured by Count Lamsdorff that no such demands as those referred to had been made by the Russian Government. He was much surprised that Russia should have been suspected in any quarter of not wishing to observe the published conditions of evacuation, confirmed as they had been by the solemn assurances of the Tsar. The denial was accepted by the United States Ambassador, who reported to Washington that the Russian Government further declared that there was no intention of seeking exclusive privileges for Russians in Manchuria, or of keeping the subjects or citizens of other Powers out of the advantages there enjoyed by Russians. Machiavellian diplomacy was never more completely illustrated than on this occasion.

The question of the opening of Antung, Tatungkau, and Mukden, afterwards provided for by commercial treaties between the United States and China, and between Japan and China, was at this time under consideration, and the prohibition contained in the first and second of Russia's conditions, put forward on or about April 20, 1903, was calculated to destroy the effect of the concessions which, in the interest of all nations, the Treaty Commission sitting at Shanghai was on the point of securing.

Simultaneously a movement of Russian troops was reported in the direction of Feng-whang-cheng and the Yalu River, which led to inquiries being made by Prince Ching, who was told by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Peking that the movement had been carried out in order to counteract a threatened Japanese movement. On June 17 Lord Lansdowne heard that the Chinese Government was being pressed by Russia to consent to the conditions which the Russian Government had endeavoured to attach to the evacuation of Manchuria, and particularly the first and second of the seven clauses, relative to foreign Consuls and the establishment of open ports in the districts to be evacu-

ated. Prince Ching admitted that it was quite true that the Russian Legation at Peking had presented a Note containing quite unacceptable conditions, and which infringed China's sovereign rights, but the Chinese Government had refused to discuss them.

The Russian denials, made by Count Lamsdorff to the United States Ambassador at St. Petersburg, of any demands embodying the conditions named having been presented to China, and Count Lamsdorff's expressions of surprise that Russia should be suspected in any quarter of departing from the published and solemn assurances given by the Tsar, created in Tokio the greatest astonishment, not unmingled with amusement, inasmuch as on the very day news was received there of Russian activity at the Yalu, and of coals and ammunition having been conveyed thither in vessels specially chartered by the Russian military authorities. Besides many aggressive measures Russia had begun to take in Korea, a large number of Russians, mostly soldiers, had settled down at Yongampho, ostensibly to establish a station in connexion with the somewhat nebulous right relating to the timber-cutting concession exacted from Korea. Thereupon a proposal had been put forward by the United States and Japan, to which England fully assented, that Yongampho should be opened as a port for the trade of all nations: but Russia had exerted the utmost pressure upon the Koreans to prevent this being accomplished. This affords ample indication of the real trend of Russian policy in respect of Korea.

Several fresh demands were made by Russia to China in September, all of which were pregnant with selfishness, including the projects of constructing wharves on the Sungari with military protection, of establishing a separate inspectorate of customs for Manchuria, prejudicing the treaty rights of England, as well as of establishing new postal stations from Tsitsihar to Blagovestchensk, and the permanent rejection of any creation of foreign settlement at the towns in Manchuria which were to be opened under the new treaties soon to be signed with America and Japan. Japan, England, and America all made vigorous remonstrances with China for no less interest of her own than theirs, and the Chinese Government finally rejected the Russian demands. In the next month the American and Japanese treaties

were signed, on the 8th and 9th respectively. Simultaneously with this the Russians began to re-occupy rapidly the places they had once evacuated, and showed fresh and ever-increasing activity under the most exorbitant pretexts.

At the end of November Lord Lansdowne further discussed with the Russian Ambassador in London the affairs of Manchuria, and pointed out that it was essential that treaty rights in all parts of the Chinese Empire should be respected, and that British trade should receive equal treatment in those regions. Lord Lansdowne further dwelt upon the deplorable effect produced by the neglect of the Russian Government to fulfil its pledges, and expressed his hope that the Russians were then in a position to fix a date for the evacuation, or at any rate to explain why this was not done.

On January 8, 1904, Count Beckendorff called upon Lord Lansdowne and made a specific declaration to the effect that Russia had no intention whatever of placing any obstacle in the way of the continued enjoyment by foreign Powers of the rights acquired by them in virtue of the treaties then in force. Lord Lansdowne said that he regretted that Russia should have found it impossible to take even a single step in pursuance of the policy which she thus prescribed for herself, and frankly told the Russian Ambassador that in Great Britain people were looking for some concrete evidence of Russia's intention to make good her promises.

We must now go back to July 28 of the same year (1903) briefly to review the steps taken by the Japanese Government itself. On that date Baron Komura telegraphed to Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, directing him to place before the Russian Government a suggestion that the two Powers should enter upon an examination of the condition of affairs in the Extreme East where their interests met, with a view to a definition of their respective special interests in those regions. The Japanese Government was prepared, on its suggestion meeting with approval, to present to the Russian Government its views as to the nature and scope of the proposed undertaking. Mr. Kurino was directed to state that Japan's purpose was entirely friendly, but that great importance was attached to the subject.

In proof of its ardent wish to remove all causes of mis-

understanding, the Japanese Government, only six days later, telegraphed to Mr. Kurino the text of six propositions which it was desired to put forward as the basis of an understanding between Japan and Russia; and as everything may be said to have hinged upon the acceptance or non-acceptance of these spontaneous offers of the Japanese Government to negotiate a satisfactory settlement, it is well to give the proposals in detail:

1. Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Empires, and to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in those countries.

2. Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea, and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea, and of Russia to take in Manchuria, such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however to the provisions of Article 1 of this agreement.

3. Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities respectively of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article 1 of this agreement. Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines.

4. Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article 2 of this agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are in no case to exceed the actual number required, and are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.

5. Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance in the interest of reform and good government in Korea, including necessary military assistance.

6. This Agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.

Mr. Kurino was directed to say, in presenting these proposals, that they were offered in the firm belief that they might serve as a basis upon which to construct a satisfactory arrangement between the two Governments, and that Count Lamsdorff might be assured that any amendment or suggestion that he might find it necessary to offer would receive the immediate and friendly consideration of the Japanese Government.

These instructions were sent to Mr. Kurino in the anticipation that Russia's response to the Note Verbale presented by him six days before would be favourable. On August 5 Baron Komura was informed by Mr. Kurino that Count Lamsdorff had been authorized by the Tsar to open negotiations, and the Japanese Government, in directing its Minister to present the project in detail, as above quoted, took the opportunity to express its appreciation of the friendly spirit in which the Russian Government had received the proposal to open negotiations.

There was a loss of one week, owing to Count Lamsdorff being very much occupied, and unable, it was said, to receive Mr. Kurino; but on August 12 the project, in English, was duly handed to the Russian Foreign Minister, with a request that he would hasten the matter as much as possible. Twelve days passed, and Mr. Kurino saw Count Lamsdorff again, the delay being then ascribed to the absence of the Emperor at military manœuvres. A copy of the project had been sent by the Russian Government to Admiral Alexeieff, who was newly made the Viceroy, at Port Arthur, and an effort was made to transfer the negotiations to Tokio. Japan resisted this, on the plea that the negotiations related to principles rather than to details, and that Mr. Kurino was duly authorized. The point was made by Russia the subject of prolonged discussion; but in order not to waste more time the Japanese Government consented, on September 9, to have the negotiations transferred to Tokio, trusting that the Russian Minister there would be able to present Russia's counter-proposals without delay, and to proceed immediately with the negotiations.

After Baron Rosen had visited Port Arthur to confer with Admiral Alexeieff, he handed to Baron Komura at Tokio a memorandum of Russia's counter-proposals, which amounted to an acceptance of Japan's suggestions only as regarded Korea, and completely ignored Japan's interests in Manchuria. Clause 7 was worded, in fact, as follows :—

7. Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as in all respects outside her sphere of interest.

The Russian counter-proposals resolved themselves, indeed, into a one-sided bargain, by which Russia was to

have an entirely free hand in Manchuria and yet be allowed to place restrictions on Japan's action in Korea.

In the ensuing negotiations at Tokio the Japanese Government objected to the Russian Clause 7, quoted above, and in lieu therefor proposed :—

7. Engagement on the part of Russia to respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity in Manchuria, and not to interfere with Japan's commercial freedom in Manchuria.

8. Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Manchuria, and of the right of Russia to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of those interests, so long as such measures do not infringe the stipulations of the preceding article.

9. Mutual engagement not to impede the connexion of the Korean Railway and the East China Railway when those railways shall have been eventually extended to the Yalu.

On October 22 it was stated by Baron Komura that no agreement could be reached as regards the Russian Clause 7, the Russian view being that the question of Manchuria was one that concerned exclusively Russia and China, admitting of no interference on the part of any third Power. Japan, on the other hand, insisted that she possessed in Manchuria her treaty rights and commercial interests, and that she must obtain from Russia a guarantee for the security of those rights and interests, as well as of the independence of Korea, which would be constantly menaced by Russia's definitive occupation of Manchuria.

It should here be stated that in the course of the pourparlers between Baron Rosen and Baron Komura the idea was broached of the establishment of a neutral zone ; and as there then seemed to be no serious impediment to this course, Japan was willing that a strip of territory, measuring fifty kilometres in depth, on either side of the Yalu river should be marked off as neutral ground, which was agreed by Baron Rosen *ad referendum*. When the counter-proposal was received, however, Russia insisted that the neutral zone should wholly be in Korea, south of the Yalu, and should comprise that part of the empire north of the 39th parallel. This meant that more than a third of the Korean Empire, including Port Lazareff and Gensan on the east coast, the large commercial centre of Ping-Yang, and the mining districts—in a word, some of the most valuable and strategical portions of the peninsula—should be neutralized

at Russia's will and pleasure. This most outrageous proposition evoked in Japan a perfect storm of indignation and protest.

On the last day of October Baron Rosen seems to have found it needful to telegraph to St. Petersburg the full text of Japan's amendments, stating that they went beyond his instructions, and accordingly Mr. Kurino was directed to point out to Count Lamsdorff that, whilst Japan was prepared to admit that the Manchurian question, so far as it did not affect Japanese rights and interests, was purely a Russo-Chinese question, Japan had extensive and important rights and interests in that region, and that, if Japan were to be called upon to declare Manchuria to be outside her sphere of interest, she was at least entitled to ask for a correlative engagement on the part of Russia not to interfere with the commercial and residential rights and immunities belonging to Japan, in virtue of her treaty engagements with China.

A further delay of a fortnight was caused by Count Lamsdorff's absence from St. Petersburg, and then Mr. Kurino ascertained that it was still the Manchurian question which divided the two parties, Russia always regarding it as one exclusively concerning Russia and China, while Japan, in repudiating any intention of ignoring the special interests which Russia possessed in Manchuria, was, nevertheless, resolved that the independence and territorial integrity of China should be respected, and the rights and interests of Japan in that region formally guaranteed. Count Lamsdorff assured Mr. Kurino that Russia's objection related to the form rather than the substance of Japan's proposal, and Mr. Kurino thereupon expressed his sorrow that an understanding could not be reached merely for lack of a suitable formula by which to bring the two Governments to an arrangement, and ardently begged Count Lamsdorff to use his influence to bring about a satisfactory solution according to the principles already admitted by Russia.

On November 21, Baron Rosen declared himself to be without instructions, and Mr. Kurino was directed to see Count Lamsdorff and urge the importance of expedition. A week passed, during which Count Lamsdorff was supposed to have had audience of the Tsar, and it then appeared that

the audience had been postponed owing to the illness of the Empress. Meanwhile Count Lamsdorff was understood to be in constant communication with Admiral Alexeieff. On various pretexts the issue of definite instructions to Baron Rosen, in spite of Mr. Kurino's repeated applications, was delayed, and at last, on December 9, it was said that orders had been sent to continue negotiations in Tokio on the basis of counter-proposals originating with Admiral Alexeieff. The nature of these became apparent when Baron Rosen, on December 12, called to see Baron Komura at the Tokio Foreign Office. Manchuria was completely ignored as before, and the proposals were found to have reference solely to Korea. On December 21 Japan asked Russia to reconsider the position, and begged for an early response.

There was again a waste of time by Russia, and not until January 6 could anything in the nature of a reply be extracted, and then Japan was once more invited to declare Manchuria and its littoral as being outside her sphere of interests. Japan exerted herself in making her last and utmost concession, and, on January 13, virtually agreed to do this, provided Russia engaged herself to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria, and not to impede Japan nor other Powers in the enjoyment of rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China—Russia to acknowledge, on the other hand, as was only fair, that Korea and its littoral were beyond the Russian sphere of interest. Japan was even willing to recognize Russia as having special interests in Manchuria, and as enjoying the right to take measures necessary for the protection of those interests. At the same time, Japan intimated to Russia that these were the results of "the most careful and serious consideration," and were "proposed entirely in a spirit of conciliation," and that she expected them to be received "with the same spirit." Ten days passed, and Mr. Kurino was directed to sound Count Lamsdorff respecting the probable nature of Russia's reply to this note, and when the reply would be delivered. The answer was that there were certain points to which Count Lamsdorff could not agree, but he hoped to send a reply before long. Baron Komura directed Mr. Kurino to urge that the situation admitted of no further delay. At this interview Count Lamsdorff complained, while regretting

his inability to say when the answer would be ready, of Japan having sent troops and munitions of war into Korea, which was absolutely untrue. Baron Komura, on hearing of this, promptly instructed Mr. Kurino to give the statement an emphatic contradiction, and to inquire at the same time if it were true that Russian troops were being concentrated on the Korean frontier. Count Lamsdorff accepted the Japanese Government's assurance, and denied that Russian troops were near the Yalu. Count Lamsdorff was further urged to name a date when the reply would be sent, and on January 28 he explained that, though he could not give the exact date, he thought that an answer would be sent on February 2. Mr. Kurino continued to press upon Count Lamsdorff the urgency of the case, adding in so many words that further prolongation of the then existing conditions was "not only undesirable, but rather dangerous." "All the while the world was loud with rumours," he added, and expressed the hope that Count Lamsdorff would take special steps to have an answer sent at an earlier date than February 2. Count Lamsdorff repeated that he would do his best to send the reply on the date specified. Being directed by Baron Komura, Mr. Kurino once more urged Count Lamsdorff for an early reply in the evening of January 31, when he was told by the Count that it was impossible, and the exact date could not be fixed. Mr. Kurino's report reached Tokio the next day, and the position was gravely considered by the Government.

In the evening of the 4th, at 8 p.m., Mr. Kurino saw Count Lamsdorff, who told him that the substance of the Russian answer had just been sent to Admiral Alexeieff to be transmitted to Baron Rosen. From the hint given Mr. Kurino by the Count, it was plain that there was no material change in the Russian attitude, even if the answer reached Japan in time, but it never did. Mr. Kurino's report about this interview reached Tokio February 5, 5.15 p.m.

Meanwhile, at Tokio, February 2 came, but no Russian reply arrived, as was expected, and after further patient waiting, on February 5, at 2.15 p.m., Mr. Kurino was directed to address a signed note to Count Lamsdorff in the following terms :—

The undersigned has the honour, in pursuance of instructions

from his Government, to address his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs in these words :—

The Government of Japan regard the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Korea as essential to their own repose and safety, and they are consequently unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the position of Korea insecure.

The successive rejections by the Imperial Russian Government, by means of inadmissible amendments of Japan's proposals respecting Korea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regarded as indispensable to assure the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating interests in the Peninsula, coupled with the successive refusals of the Russian Government to enter into engagements to respect China's territorial integrity in Manchuria, which is seriously menaced by their continued occupation of the province, notwithstanding their treaty engagements with China and their repeated assurances to other Powers possessing interests in those regions, have made it necessary for the Japanese Government seriously to consider what measures of self-defence they are called upon to take.

In the presence of the delays which remain largely unexplained, and naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised in the depending negotiations a degree of forbearance which they believe affords abundant proof of their loyal desire to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding. But finding in their efforts no prospect of securing an adhesion either to Japan's moderate and unselfish proposals, or to any other proposals likely to establish a firm and enduring peace in the Extreme East, the Imperial Government have no other alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations.

In adopting that course the Japanese Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests.

Diplomatic relations were therefore severed, another Note being addressed to the Count as directed by Baron Komura, and Mr. Kurino withdrew from St. Petersburg. Soon after the last instruction was given to Mr. Kurino, on the 5th, the Japanese fleet was ordered to proceed from Sasebo, its base, to its objectives, and in the night of the 8th the war, which was thus forced upon Japan, commenced at Port Arthur.

In conclusion, it may be mentioned that the Japanese Government, in its genuine desire to avoid hostilities, went so far in the matter of concessions to Russia as directly to run the risk of arousing popular antagonism in Japan itself, and of jeopardizing the respect entertained for the nation

in other lands. Yet all the time, Russia, whilst pretending to carry on negotiations which should make towards a lasting peace, was sending to the Orient all the warships she had ready, and brigade upon brigade of troops, in defiance of her promises given to all the Powers of the world. Russia's policy throughout was cynically and outrageously insincere. Perhaps no more flagrant disregard of public opinion can be imagined than that of which Russia was guilty when, at the very moment when she ought, in fulfilment of her repeated pledges to Japan and the nations at large, to have been proceeding with the evacuation of Manchuria, an Imperial ukase appeared (August 13, 1903) conferring upon Admiral Alexeieff absolutely full powers over the army and navy and all branches of the administration as the Tsar's Viceroy in the Far East. The whole course of Russia's treatment of these grave matters was marked by a complete disregard of international courtesy and diplomatic usage, inasmuch as though the Government of Tokio endeavoured throughout to carry on its negotiations in the customary way with the Government of St. Petersburg, the Russian tactics were to introduce on all possible occasions an intermediary in the person of this "Viceroy in the Far East"—tactics which Japan, in her desire for peace, was willing to ignore, notwithstanding the natural resentment felt at their adoption by Russia.

Russia's insincerity becomes more and more glaring when it is remembered that at the time of the Boxer troubles, Japan being about to send her troops to the relief of the Legations in Peking, Russia, in common with other Powers, expressed her gratification that Japan should do this, and went on to enlarge, in a Note to her representatives abroad, to be handed to the Governments to which they were respectively accredited, on the propriety of making it clear that the accomplishment of the task should not confer upon Japan the right to an independent solution of matters at Peking, or any other privileges, save, perhaps, to a larger indemnity should the Powers, later on, consider it necessary to demand one. The Note proceeded to enunciate the fundamental principles, which Russia considered, as having already been accepted by the majority of the Powers, to form the basis of their policy in China; these principles were the maintenance of the union between the Powers, the preservation of

the existing system of government in China, the exclusion of anything that might lead to the partition of the Empire, and, finally, the re-establishment by common effort of a legitimate central power, itself capable of securing order and security to the country; adding also that the firm establishment and strict observance of these principles were, in her opinion, absolutely indispensable to the attainment of the chief object—the maintenance of a lasting peace in the Far East.

Despite all these solemn protestations, as has been amply demonstrated, Russia was ready at the first opportunity to cast all such assurances to the winds.

## CHAPTER III

### HOW RUSSIA BROUGHT ON WAR[1]

### *THE HISTORY OF SIX YEARS*

### Part I. 1898–1900

IN this and the ensuing chapter an attempt will be made to furnish a complete history of the course of events which led to the gigantic war now being waged in the Far East. As I shall endeavour to show, it was brought about solely by the action of Russia. I have sought to make my narrative concise, but if it should strike the reader as being here and there a trifle tedious, I must earnestly crave indulgence for the sake of the important bearing which the events recorded have had, and must continue to have, on the common interest of the civilized world. As regards the thorough accuracy of the statements herein made, I need only explain that they are based throughout upon the numerous State papers of the Powers concerned, and that my facts have one and all been gathered from these incontestable sources of information.

It is scarcely necessary to reiterate how Russia deprived Japan of her legitimate prize of war, the Liao-Tung Peninsula, in 1895, and how, after the lapse of only a few years, she appropriated to herself the most important and strategically valuable portion of that peninsula; nor is it essential that I should relate how, in doing this, Russia outwitted England, and how the British Government was driven to exact from China a lease of Wei-Hai-Wei in consequence as a set-off to Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur and adjacent territory. It will suffice to remember that the lease of Port Arthur to Russia as a naval station was viewed by the British Government, and so declared in its diplomatic correspondence, as a "serious disturbance of and menace

[1] *The Nineteenth Century and After*, September, 1904.

to the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili," and that as regard Wei-Hai-Wei the step taken by England was considered by her as having been forced upon her by the actions of Russia.

It is also perhaps needless to state that this acquisition of territory at Port Arthur was a direct self-contradiction of the theory that Russia had advanced, less than three years before, when she had urged Japan to give up that region, on the plea that the "possession of the peninsula of Liao-Tung, claimed by Japan, would be a constant menace to the capital of China, would at the same time render illusory the independence of Korea, and would henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the permanent peace of the Far East."

The agreement for the cession of the "Kwantung Peninsula" and Port Arthur was first signed in Peking on March 27, 1898, and was afterwards supplemented by another agreement signed in St. Petersburg on May 7 of the same year.[1] On the day that the first agreement was signed the Russian Government suddenly made the following communication to the Powers :—

In virtue of the Agreement signed on the 15th (27th) March in Peking by the Representatives of Russia and the members of the Tsung-li Yamên, as respective Plenipotentiaries, Port Arthur and Talien-Wan, as well as the adjoining territory, have been ceded by the Chinese Government for the use of Russia.

You are instructed to communicate the above to the Government to which you are accredited, and to add that the above-mentioned ports and territory will be occupied without delay by the forces of his Imperial Majesty, our august Monarch, and that the Russian flag, together with the Chinese, will be hoisted in them.

You can at the same time inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Port Talien-Wan will be opened to foreign commerce, and that the ships of all friendly nations will there meet with the most wide hospitality.

These Agreements provided for the cession of Port Arthur and Talien-Wan, as well as of the adjacent territory, for the use of Russia during a term of twenty-five years, which might be prolonged indefinitely by mutual arrangement, and for the construction of branches of railways

[1] A secret treaty was also signed then between Russia and China the aim of which was against Japan, and the newly contemplated Eastern Chinese Railway was to be used for that purpose.

to connect the ports with the main Trans-Siberian Railway. No vessels, whether warships or merchantmen, of any nations but Russia and China were to be allowed access to Port Arthur; no subjects of other Powers were to be granted concessions for their use in the "neutral ground," which included the territory forming part of the Liao-Tung Peninsula to the north of the portion actually leased to Russia, as far as Kai-chau on the north coast, and the mouth of the Ta-Yang River—i.e. Takushan—on the south coast. No ports on the seacoasts east or west of the neutral ground were to be opened to the trade of other Powers, nor might any road or mining concessions, industrial or mercantile privileges, be granted in the neutral territory without Russia's consent first being obtained.

It is now an open secret that M. Hanotaux, at that time Foreign Minister of France, advised the Russian Government not to make Port Arthur a naval station, and that M. Witte, then the Finance Minister of Russia, was somewhat of the same opinion; but even the trifling element of moderation thus counselled went unheeded, and the Russian official organ, at the time that the Peking Agreement was signed, was encouraged, on the other hand, to indulge in the most extravagant utterances. Thus the *Novoe Vremya* wrote on April 6, 1898, substantially as follows:—

Russia has the right to carry a line of railway from Talien-Wan along the western shore of the Liao-Tung peninsula to any point she may choose. The construction of a line to the west is as necessary for us as the construction of one to the east, along the northern shore of the Korean Gulf to the town of Yi-ju on the river Yalu, whence a French company has obtained the right to construct a line to the south on to Seoul. If the Russian Government do not find it necessary to acquire the railway from Chemulpho to Seoul, constructed by the American Morse and passing now into Japanese hands, it only shows our conviction that we shall possess our own rail from Manchuria to the capital of Korea. Such a line would be most advantageous to Japanese commerce and interests, and the Japanese Government, who are doing all they can to promote their trade, must choose between a risky game of political influence in Korea or the sale of their product in Korea and Manchuria *under the Russian flag and protected by Russian bayonets.* The construction of a Russian railway in Manchuria must at last open the eyes of Japan to the advantage of an understanding with Russia, which might save her from a financial crash and be advantageous to her southern population, which is compelled from poverty to emigrate. Let Japan play the commercial, while Russia plays the political rôle. . . . Common

action between Russia and Japan might further hold England back from her risky enterprises in the Gulf of Pechili, which is the natural sphere of Russian influence. England always wants some contribution to her own advantage on every political step forward which Russia makes. If England takes Wei-Hai-Wei, she will see Russia demanding extensions of territory in Central Asia; the rôles will be changed, and Russia will demand a heavy percentage for every English acquisition. Such a step would undoubtedly check the appetites of English politicians.

Again, the same paper went so far as to declare in the next issue that the treaty of 1895 (Anglo-Russian) ought to be regarded as being no longer in force.

There was, however, one thing worth noting—that was that, according to the best authority accessible, this agreement contained some provisions by which Chinese sovereignty in the localities indicated was guaranteed, and also that the railway concession therein referred to was "never to be used as a pretext for enroachment on Chinese territory, nor to be allowed to interfere with Chinese authority or interests."

On June 1, 1898, the Russian *Chargé d' Affaires* intimated, in the form of a circular to all his foreign colleagues at the Chinese capital, that by Count Mouravieff's order "passports were obligatory for Port Arthur and Talien-Wan," which occasioned great controversy, inasmuch as it was wholly inconsistent with the treaty rights of the other Powers for Russia to make such a stipulation; but she contrived, on one pretext and another, to evade the issue, and the question was allowed to drag on without a complete settlement being reached.

The anti-Christian movement in North China, otherwise the Boxer troubles, of 1900 was a great turning-point in Far Eastern affairs. In the presence of this tremendous upheaval the concerns of Port Arthur and Talien-Wan waned almost into insignificance; and while these grave matters fell into comparative oblivion an excellent opportunity was given to Russia of playing off her tricky diplomacy and selfish efforts at aggrandisement to the detriment of other Powers. True it may be that what she said and did may not always have been intended to deceive *ab initio*, but the results were the same. The Boxer troubles began in the early part of the year named, and by the beginning of June had assumed an alarming aspect. All the Powers

did their best to cope with the emergency, and sent ships and landed marines to the fullest extent available. But from the very nature of the locality, the distance away, and the limited numbers of the forces at command, the measures taken were far from being effective. Japan was the only Power that could efficiently cope with the difficulty, and she was almost universally appealed to by public opinion at large to cast in her lot with the Christian nations against the Boxers by taking the foremost part in the measures designed for their suppression.

On June 13, therefore, Viscount Aoki, who was then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, intimated through the British *Chargé d' Affaires* to the British Government that "if the foreign naval detachments which had actually been landed should be surrounded or otherwise in danger, the Japanese Government would be ready to send at once a considerable force to their relief if her Majesty's Government concurred in such a course, but that otherwise his Government did not intend to send soldiers," similar intimations being given to the representatives at Tokio of other great Powers interested.

This resolution of the Japanese Government was ascribable purely to their consideration of the claims of a common humanity, and beneath it were hidden no political or selfish motives or designs. The prevailing sentiment in Japan was still more plainly set forth in the statement of Mr. Matsui, Japanese *Chargé d' Affaires* in London, to Lord Salisbury on June 25, when it was declared that, for the despatch of a considerable force from Japan, "some assurance would be required that there was no objection on the part of other Governments which have interests in the East." Japan's unselfishness was demonstrated, too, in Viscount Aoki's words to the British *Chargé d' Affaires*, when he modestly said that "although Japan had made great progress, she was not yet in a position to take an independent line of action in so grave a crisis. It was imperative for her to work in line with other Powers."

Japan entered upon the difficult task assigned to her in this spirit, and she acquitted herself, it is believed, thoroughly to the satisfaction of the Western Powers. By Great Britain, at all events, a generous acknowledgment of her services was conveyed in the following telegram, despatched

by Lord Salisbury to the British *Chargé d'Affaires* in Tokio on the completion of the operations undertaken for the rescue of the Peking Legations :—

As her Majesty's Government specially pressed for the action of Japan in sending forces to effect the relief of the Legations, I think you may, without presumption, express to the Minister for Foreign Affairs their earnest admiration of the gallantry and efficiency displayed by the Japanese forces in the present operations, which contributed to the success of the expedition so very largely. (August 25, 1900.)

But to take up again the thread of our argument. After Japan's indication of her readiness to comply with the desire expressed that she should send troops, diplomatic correspondence took place between the Powers with much expedition, and there was found not one that did not appreciate the expediency of the step to be taken by Japan, though there was already a somewhat sinister tone perceptible in the Russian despatch, sent to Japan about June 28, wherein this passage appeared :—

We can only highly appreciate the sentiments expressed by Japan in present circumstances, as also her view of Chinese affairs. We have no desire to hinder her liberty of action, particularly after her expression of a firm intention to conform her action to that of the other Powers.

On July 4 the Marquis of Salisbury telegraphed to Mr. Whitehead, British *Chargé d'Affaires* at Tokio, after repeating Admiral Seymour's alarming telegram, as follows :—

This telegram indicates a position of extreme gravity. You should communicate at once to Japanese Ministers. Japan is the only Power which can send rapid reinforcements to Tien-tsin. No objection has been raised by any European Power to this course.

Barely two days later, on July 6, the British Government reiterated its pressing request to Japan, and at the same time offered financial aid, the Marquis of Salisbury telegraphing to Mr. Whitehead thus :—

Japan is the only Power which can act with any hope of success for the urgent purpose of saving the Legations ; and, if they delay, heavy responsibility must rest with them. We are prepared to furnish any financial assistance which is necessary, in addition to our forces already on the spot.

With regard to this financial assistance Lord Salisbury

explained to Mr. Whitehead that the British Government was prepared to undertake the responsiblity because international negotiations would only result in a fatal expenditure of time. On the same day Japan signified her intention of despatching as rapidly as possible a considerable force, sufficient, with those troops which she had already sent, to bring her total up to twenty thousand men. But with regard to financial aid, Japan did not, after all, desire it, as she considered that the task that she was then undertaking was a purely voluntary one for the common benefit of humanity, and, moreover, she stood in no immediate need of such assistance.

About the middle of the month (July, 1900) Russia submitted to the great Powers, including Japan, notes verbales embodying what she was pleased to term "fundamental principles." The date on which these notes reached the Powers was generally July 13, or thereabouts, and the purport was one and the same. In the case of Japan, however, it bore the date July 8, and was handed by the Russian Minister to Viscount Aoki only on the 20th of that month. The English translation of the text given to Lord Salisbury is appended in full, as the subject is of the highest importance:

On the 11th of June our Minister at Tokio informed us that the Japanese Government had declared their readiness, in consideration of the perilous situation at Peking, to send their troops to China, with a view to saving, conjointly with the other States, the representatives of the Powers who were besieged in Peking, and to rescuing the foreigners resident in the Empire, among whom are many Japanese subjects. Any co-operation, anything tending to the attainment of the object indicated, could only meet with the most sympathetic reception from all the Powers. Moreover, Japan being able, thanks to geographical conditions, by the despatch of a considerable contingent to facilitate essentially the task of the international detachments already at Tien-tsin, we hastened to inform the Cabinet at Tokio that we saw no reason to interfere with their liberty of action in this respect, especially as they have expressed their firm resolution of acting in complete harmony with the other Powers. The decision taken by the Japanese Government, under the above-mentioned conditions, was a very natural one, in consideration of the danger which menaced their representatives at Peking, as well as their numerous subjects resident in China; but from our point of view the accomplishment of this task could not confer the right to an independent solution of matters at Peking, or other privileges, with the exception, perhaps, of a larger pecuniary indemnity, should the Powers consider it necessary, later on, to demand one.

We received almost simultaneously a communication on this subject from the Cabinet of London, which had reference, not to a spontaneous decision on the part of the Cabinet at Tokio to participate in the collective action of the Powers, but to a mission given by Europe to Japan to send considerable forces to China, not only to save the Legations and the foreign subjects, but with a view to the suppression of the insurrectionary movement provoked by the Boxers and the re-establishment of order at Peking and Tien-tsin.

This way of putting the question might, in our opinion, to a certain extent encroach on the fundamental principles which had already been accepted by the majority of the Powers as the bases of their policy relative to events in China—that is to say, the maintenance of the union between the Powers; the maintenance of the existing system of government in China; the exclusion of anything which might lead to the partition of the Empire; finally, the re-establishment by common effort of a legitimate central Power, itself capable of assuring order and security to the country. The firm establishment and strict observance of these fundamental principles are, in our opinion, absolutely indispensable to the attainment of the chief object: the maintenance of a lasting peace in the Far East.

The Imperial Government considers that, in view of the threatening events in China, which concern the vital interests of the Powers, it is urgently necessary to avoid any misunderstanding or omission which might have still more dangerous consequences.

Broadly speaking, it appears to be true that the "fundamental principles" enunciated by Russia were the nearest approach to the ideas entertained at that time by the Powers in general, though none of the Powers seem to have been able to shape any clear insight as to the eventualities of the whole affair; not one of them entertained any thought of partitioning out the Chinese Empire. America had made public her views on this point early that month, and Russia, on being consulted by China, had expressed her willingness, so the Chinese Minister in London assured Lord Salisbury, to guarantee the integrity of the Chinese Empire, though her underlying intentions may, as we now can perceive, have been very different from those on the surface. As to Great Britain, she was from the first, as also were others of the Powers, firmly resolved upon the maintenance of Chinese territorial integrity.

There were, however, two points in the above-quoted Russian communication that specially invite comment. The first is that the claim which she put forward that her "fundamental principles" had already been accepted by a majority of the Powers was altogether presumptuous and un-

warrantable, for there had not then been any formal exchange of views between the Powers on the subject. The second point is that the British suggestion of an invitation to Japan to send troops to China was interpreted by Russia as tending to confer upon Japan some shadowy "special rights" or privileges. On this latter point the statement made by Count Lamsdorff to the German Ambassador, and also to the British, a few days previously, had been much stronger, for he had spoken to the effect that there were grave objections to the giving of a "mandate" for independent action to any one Power in the face of so grave a crisis. As a matter of fact, there was not the slightest foundation for the insinuation that such a mandate was either sought by Japan or proposed by England; and the British Government, at all events, was indisposed to permit this wrongful suggestion to pass unchallenged. A brisk interchange of diplomatic correspondence between the Powers ensued on these two points, and in the end the incident was allowed to drop on Count Lamsdorff giving the following explanation as reported by the British Ambassador, viz. :—

His Excellency (Count Lamsdorff) said that it was his wish to clear the Russian Government at once from the odious and entirely undeserved charge that they had hesitated to accept Japan's assistance, and had thereby assumed the grave responsibility of hindering the prompt relief of the Legations. This charge had been insinuated in the Press and other quarters. His Excellency admitted that in the message which I communicated to him no mention had been made of any European mandate to Japan for independent action, and that co-operation was indicated in the arguments used by me, but he said that at Berlin your Lordship's question had been understood to imply an European mandate, and that it was possible to so interpret the words used: "An expedition to restore order at Peking and Tientsin, if Japan is willing to undertake the task." Although the misunderstanding had been promptly cleared up, unjust deductions had been drawn by the public Press, and it ought to have been made quite clear by the instructions sent to the Russian Minister at Tokio that all available prompt assistance from Japan, equally with the Powers concerned in meeting the common danger, would be gladly welcomed by Russia.

As a result of this incident, however, Russia remained even more solemnly pledged than ever to what she had declared to the world and to what she herself termed the "fundamental principles," and Japan proceeded promptly and whole-heartedly with the work asked of her, in concert with

the Occidental Powers. It should be a matter of no slight interest to the reader to discover, as he will presently do, that the propagator and disseminator of these sublime "fundamental principles" was the first to try to frustrate their useful application, and that it was the Power against which an effort had been made to arouse and foment distrust that proved to be honest and patient in the execution of the task which it undertook to perform.

The siege of the Legations in Peking, and the narrative of the expedition of the combined forces for their rescue, form a history with which every one is now familiar, and there is scarcely any need here to relate how Sir Claude MacDonald was placed in supreme charge of the defences by his colleagues how he gave to Lieutenant-Colonel Shiba, a young Japanese officer, command of a most important point, or how Sir Claude subsequently commended this officer for his skilful dispositions, and as having contested every inch of the ground at the most critical moment, thereby gaining time for the defences to be placed in thorough order, which was one direct cause of the success ultimately achieved, and of the preservation of many lives in a period of unexampled danger; nor is it needful further to allude to the splendid organization of the international expeditionary forces, and the conspicuous part that the Japanese played therein during the advance to the Chinese capital. Suffice it to say that, as a whole, the march to the succour of the beleaguered foreign residents, and the final success and triumph over the forces of disorder and fanaticism, were episodes in the world's history and efforts in the cause of humanity which Time will be slow to efface, whilst at the same time the complete concord and sincerity of all the nations engaged in this undertaking—save for the barbarity which was displayed by the Russian troops, as was much commented upon at the time, and also save for the one black shadow that at times obtruded itself, as will be shown hereafter—were at once unprecedented and beneficent. The malign influence that began to make itself felt was due to Russia's having, even at this early stage, begun to betray something of her innate disposition to play an unworthy part; for early in July Russian troops had occupied the south bank of the Amur, opposite Blagovestchensk, under the trifling pretence that the Chinese had been guilty of

some offence, of which, in reality, the Russians had been the cause by their own provocative behaviour. They had, moreover, perpetrated that appalling massacre of the Chinese before which the whole civilized world stood aghast. It was on that occasion that—as Count Tolstoi incidentally describes in his recent remarkable letter—thousands of helpless men, women, and children were drowned or slaughtered by the Russians in compliance with the Russian Commander Gribsky's orders, he acting, as he declared, in consonance with Imperial decree.

Though the contingent which Russia sent to take part in the Peking Expedition was comparatively small, she despatched large numbers—though less than one-third of the number she pretended when she claimed compensation—of her troops into the three provinces of the Chinese Empire comprised under the head of Manchuria. Early in August she occupied the treaty port of Newchwang, hoisted the Russian flag, possessed herself of the Customs department, and began to collect revenue for her own purposes—an intrusion for which there was absolutely no justification—and she at the same time seized the railway between Newchwang and the Great Wall, of which more anon.

Russia's proceedings in Manchuria continued to be of this high-handed and unscrupulous character, until at last, in September, they had reached the pitch of celebrating a grand feast on the site of the Chinese town of Sakalin, previously burned in July, and which they had renamed Ilinsky, on the south bank of the Amur, in honour of the "relief," as they chose to designate it, of Blagovestchensk. The *Novoe Vremya*, in a telegram from that place, thus described this indecent and blasphemous function :—

> To-day, on the Chinese bank of the Amur, on the ashes of Sakalin, a solemn thanksgiving service in memory of the relief of this place by the Russian forces, together with the ceremony of re-naming the post Ilinsky, was held, in the presence of the authorities, the army, the English officer, Bigham, and a large crowd of people. The High Priest Konoploff said : "Now is the Cross raised on that bank of the Amur which yesterday was Chinese. Mouravieff foretold that sooner or later this bank would be ours." In a beautiful speech General Gribsky congratulated the victorious troops. (September 7.)

Let us now see what Russia was doing all this time in the devious paths of her diplomacy.

When, in July, the idea of concentrating the general command of the international forces was mooted on the Continent, an idea which crystallized into the determination to despatch the German general, Count von Waldersee, to China, Russia, referring to the importance of the "ulterior military measures," and expressing herself as averse to the selection of a commander either on account of his seniority of rank among the generals in command, or the greater size of the contingent that he might control, invited the opinion of the interested Powers. The trend of her lurking motive was sufficiently obvious, and any effort on my part to expose it would now be superfluous. When, moreover, further explanations were sought from Count Lamsdorff by Great Britain concerning the "ulterior military measures" that Russia appeared to have in mind, and as to the suggested scope of the authority to be delegated to this *generalissimo*, the British Ambassador was informed that the field of action of the international forces might in practice be roughly defined as the province of Pechili, and that as regards other parts of China where dangers might equally be present, it was clear that the direction of any necessary military measures would have to be undertaken independently. "For instance, Russia would have to undertake independent military action in the north of China bordering on her own territory and on her railway, and it was to be assumed that other Powers would act similarly in the south and centre of China where their own territorial and special interests were more immediately concerned."

At a casual glance this proposal seemed to be very fair, but it was not difficult to perceive the specious nature of the arrangement that was veiled by these suggestions. Nevertheless, one thing was certain—namely, that if independent action should be taken, no matter in what part of China, it could not but be subject to the restrictions involved in the application of the broad line of policy which Russia had herself enunciated under the head of "fundamental principles," and to which she stood committed in the eyes of all the world.

On August 14, 1900, the international forces entered Peking, and the Legations were relieved. Eight days later, on the 22nd of the month, Sir Charles Scott, by the

direction of Lord Salisbury, inquired of Count Lamsdorff about the affair at Newchwang, concerning which certain information, implying Russian aggression, had reached the British Government on the 20th. Count Lamsdorff at once replied that "any steps taken could only be of a provisional and temporary nature," but at the same time he promised to "inquire what were the real facts of the case." But with what result?

On August 28, and during the next few days, identical communications were addressed by Russia to all the interested Powers, and the text of these despatches reads very like an attempt "to kill two birds with one stone." It began with a repetition of the time-honoured declaration that she remained faithful to the "fundamental principles" which she had proposed to the Powers as a basis of common action, and announced her intention strictly to adhere in the future to the programme laid down therein. The despatch went on to state that the occupation of Newchwang and the sending of troops into Manchuria had been forced upon Russia by the progress of events, such as the attack by the rebels on Russian troops at Newchwang and the hostilities begun by the Chinese along the Russian frontier, and had been dictated solely by the absolute necessity of repelling the aggression of the Chinese rebels, and not in any way with interested motives, "which were absolutely foreign to the policy of the Imperial Government."

Directly the pacification of Manchuria was attained [the communication continued], and the necessary measures had been taken to ensure the security of the railroad, Russia would not fail to withdraw her troops from Chinese territory, provided that such action did not meet with obstacles caused by the proceedings of other Powers.

The communication then proceeded to state that in occupying Peking the first and most important object—namely, the rescue of the Legations and of the foreigners besieged in Peking—had been attained. The second object—namely, that of rendering assistance to China in the restoration of order and the re-establishment of regular relations with the Powers—had been hindered by the absence of the Chinese Court from Peking. In these circumstances the Russian Government saw no reason for the Legation

to remain in Peking, and proposed to withdraw it to Tien-tsin, together with the Russian troops, whose presence in Peking now became useless in view of the decision taken not to exceed the limits of the task which, it was alleged, Russia had undertaken at the beginning of the disorders.

This communication served mainly to augment on all sides the growing suspicion regarding Russia's sincerity of purpose. It was all very well for her to repeat, as she did so often, the avowal of her "fundamental principles," but the vital question was whether or not she honestly intended herself to be bound by them. The phrase "unless she is prevented by the action of other Powers," which was more than once employed, was one to engender a certain amount of distrust. It could receive no other interpretation than, as the sequel proved, that it was an artful provision of a way of escape from the obligations of her pledges, for what other Power could there be disposed to hinder Russia, so long as she should remain faithful to her own promises?

As to the proposal to withdraw her Legation as well as her troops—which, by the way, she promptly did, without waiting for the other Powers' concurrence—Peking had only a fortnight or so previously been rescued from a terrible fate, and the views entertained by other Governments were that there was still a great risk to be run in a too speedy evacuation of the Chinese capital; but Russia held to her own course with great tenacity. Her attitude towards the restoration of the Chinese Government, moreover, was almost inconsistent with the principles to which she ostentatiously professed, in the earlier part of the communication, to adhere, and in sober truth her behaviour cannot be considered otherwise than as having purposely protracted the unsettled state of things in Central China in order that she might gain time for the establishment of a firm hold upon Manchuria.

Diplomatic correspondence was, of course, entered upon with alacrity, and I may here give the essence of the American reply to Russia's communication, for it seems to have embodied precisely the sentiments that were generally entertained among the Powers. It expressed satisfaction with the reiterated declaration of Russia that she entertained no design of territorial aggrandizement at China's expense, and also that assurances were forthcoming about

the occupancy of Newchang, which Russia had explained was merely incidental to military steps, so that the Russian troops would be withdrawn from the treaty port as soon as order should be re-established. It referred to the important tasks yet remaining, such as the restoration of order, the safety and general peace of China, and the preservation of the Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protection of all rights guaranteed by treaty and international law to friendly Powers, and the safeguard for the world underlying the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire, and it proceeded to state that these purposes could best be attained by continuing the joint occupation of Peking. Next it laid stress upon the importance of the Powers maintaining their concord, thus indirectly expressing disapproval of Russia's attitude.

On August 29, just after Russia had sent round the above-mentioned communication to the Powers, Count Lamsdorff, in a long conversation with the British Ambassador, spoke most forcibly of the Russian determination to adhere to the so-called "fundamental principles," and went on to remark that "it had been assumed that Russia was taking advantage of the present crisis to extend her territory and influence at the cost of China by permanently occupying territory on the right bank of the Amur in Manchuria, and at Newchwang, and by seizing control of the Customs and lines of railway in which foreign capital was interested. This was entirely incorrect. Russia had no such intention, and any places which she had been obliged by the attack of Chinese rebels on her frontier to occupy temporarily, she intended, when the *status quo ante* and order were re-established, to restore to their former position."

One may well be reminded of Ben Jonson's lines:

> The dignity of truth is lost
> With much protesting.

On September 11, Sir Charles Scott announced, by Lord Salisbury's directions, to Count Lamsdorff, that in the opinion of her Majesty's Government the time when it would be expedient to withdraw the British forces from Peking had not arrived. It would appear that about this period public comment grew in intensity with the deepening of the obscurity in which the Russian motives and designs

were enshrouded, and it was, we may fairly assume, with a wish to allay this increasing uneasiness that Count Lamsdorff begged Sir Charles Scott to make it clear to the British Government that the different course Russia had decided upon was not in any way to be taken as indicating the slightest intention of separating herself from the general action of the Powers, and that she had chosen that course on her part as she considered it desirable to have her troops as well as her Minister as soon as possible in a position where communication with their Government would be easy and rapid. He also asserted that the Emperor (of Russia) was more firmly determined than ever to continue in loyal co-operation with all the other Powers, and to abide by his agreement with them as to common aim and direction, and the Russian action and aims would be faithfully kept within the limits of the statement made in Count Lamsdorff's own circular, and, further, that there was nothing more foreign to the Emperor's mind than to entertain the selfish aims or motives for his action with which certain foreign newspapers had credited him.

When, on September 13, the British Ambassador called the attention of Count Lamsdorff to the report of the celebration of the so-called "relief of Blagovestchensk," described in a preceding page, criticizing it as contrary to the expressed views of Russia, Count Lamsdorff begged the British representative to take no further notice of that action on the part of a military commander, and went on to confirm the assurances of the Russian Government's intention not to make territorial acquisitions in China. He urged in explanation of the proceedings at Blagovestchensk that distances were so great and means of communication so few that it was not easy to keep the authorities in distant parts of the Empire in touch with the views of the Central Government.

Truly this was explanation *à la Russe!*

While discussions of this kind were taking place in St. Petersburg, more audacious acts were continually being perpetrated in Manchuria itself. On August 17, a code of rules and regulations was published in the *Amur Gazette*, in the name of Lieut.-General Gribsky, the Military Governor, by which the Manchu territory of the Trans-Zeya, and the territory that had been occupied by the Russian troops

on the right bank of the Amur, were proclaimed as having passed into the jurisdiction of the Russian authorities. The Chinese who had quitted the river bank for the Trans-Zeya region were forbidden to return, and their lands were appropriated to the exclusive use of Russian colonists. All private individuals were absolutely forbidden to settle in the former towns of Ai-gun and Sakalin—both on the Manchurian side of the frontier—as also in their vicinity. The re-establishment of these towns was interdicted, and the Chinese buildings which had remained in them undemolished were to be devoted to the warehousing of military stores and the quartering within their walls of Russian troops.

Such being the case, it was surely not to be wondered at that in some of the Continental organs it was declared that Russia had annexed the conterminous Manchurian territories. An official denial was published on October 1, in the *Messager Officiel*, to the effect that the report of the annexation was entirely devoid of foundation. It is possible that some of the acts of the military authorities had not obtained the full concurrence of the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg, but the general trend of Russian policy was sufficiently clear, and in the first week of October the whole of Manchuria was in the possession of Russia, including the palace of Mukden and the Ying-Kow terminus of the Shanhaikwan Railway, over which the Russian flag was hoisted, not to speak of most public offices and all telegraph wires and establishments.

It may be worth remembering that when the Russian troops occupied Newchwang and hoisted the Russian flag at the Customs flagstaff, the consuls of Great Britain, America, and Japan sent a formal notice to the Russian authorities that it was presumed this step had been taken as a temporary measure only, and was due to military exigencies, and that they claimed the reservation of all rights and privileges which their countries enjoyed. Admiral Alexeieff officially replied that the temporary administration which Russia was about to establish there was in the interests of the foreign residents in general, as well as the Russians, and that the rights and privileges they had enjoyed in the settlement (Ying-Kow) would not be infringed. The administration was established, but it was neither of a

temporary character not dictated by considerations of military expediency. It did not cease until long after even a pretence of its necessity could with decency be put forward—in fact, it was never relinquished until the end of July of this year, when military considerations of another kind prompted its hurried evacuation.

In this connexion it may not be inappropriate to recall briefly some incidents illustrative of Russia's high-handed proceedings concerning the Chinese railway joining Peking with Shanhaikwan and Newchwang.

On July 8, 1900, the Russians seized this railway at Tein-tsin, and turned out Mr. Claude W. Kinder and his staff. Eight days afterwards, on July 16, at a Council of Admirals convened on board H.B.M.S. *Centurion* at Taku at the instance of Admiral Alexeieff, it was decided by the majority that the railway between Tongku and Tien-tsin should be managed and guarded by the Russians, who were then in occupation, on condition that it should be given over to the former administration as soon as military circumstances would permit. It should not be forgotten that the construction of the Peking and Newchwang line of railway was chiefly provided for by British capital, and British interests were therefore largely involved—the line is, indeed, with some exceptions, mortgaged to British bondholders—and it is, moreover, a fact that Russia recognized this at the very outset. The British Government, however, expressed to the Russian Government its acquiescence in the above-mentioned decision of the Council of Admirals on the ground that it was an arrangement resorted to solely in compliance with the demands of military exigency.

Previously to this the Russians had, on June 18, occupied that part of the foreign settlement in which are situated the railway offices. Thence they removed and shipped to Port Arthur a quantity of tools and appliances that were the property of the railway administration, and, not content with having done this, they broke open the safes, causing the loss of a considerable sum of money, and destroyed the archives. Finally, on the 28th of the month, they set fire to the offices, and the premises were entirely consumed in the flames.

Russia's next step was to claim the right herself to reconstruct the railroad from Tien-tsin to Peking, declaring that

the whole of the line had been turned over to her by the above-mentioned Council of Admirals. This was totally at variance with fact, as the minutes of that meeting distinctly proved, for the action of Russia was expressly limited to the section between Tein-tsin and Tongku. To prefer an unjust claim and immediately to act upon it was the normal course of procedure to be expected of the Russians, and accordingly we find that they began forthwith to occupy various points on the route and even to occupy the terminus at Peking the moment that the Chinese capital was entered by the allied relieving forces on August 14. In short, as the British and Chinese Corporation justly complained, the Russian occupation of the northern railway was progressing so rapidly at that time and in such a manner as to give rise to the most serious apprehensions that there was a design to make the line a permanent Russian possession.

When, on August 30, the British troops occupied Feng-tai railway station, and proceeded, in conjunction with the Japanese, to repair the line between Feng-tai and Yang-tsun, the Russians objected to this being done, and posted a detachment in front of Feng-tai dépôt. Three weeks afterwards, on September 23, they went so far as to tender a formal protest and request for the withdrawal of the British forces on the ground that the entire line had been handed over to the Russians, the Russian commander assuring the British General, Sir A. Gaselee, that an Imperial (Russian) decree had been received to "construct" the railway to Peking, and that he, the Russian commander, had given orders accordingly.

The Russian pretensions to a right to the whole line were simply a sham, as already shown. Of course the English officer did not yield to so transparent an artifice. On the contrary, he told the Russian commander that Russia was in the wrong. The dispute waxed warm and the situation became acute, but in the beginning of October Count von Waldersee, who had arrived on the scene shortly before, took the matter up and decided that the construction and control of the railway from Tongku should as far as Yang-tsun be Russian, and from Yang-tsun onwards to Peking the line should be worked by Germany with the assistance of other Powers, and thus curtailed the Russian pretence; but at the same time he suggested that the section

of railway between Tongku and Shanhaikwan should also be handed over to the Russians. The British had good reason to consider this suggestion as unjust.

As regards the practical repair and working of the line it had by this time become quite clear that the object sought would be more effectively attained by entrusting it to the former administration under Mr. Kinder and his staff, and on October 6 the commanders of the British, American, and Japanese troops suggested this to Count von Waldersee, but without effect. Previously to this, on September 30, a British officer with eighteen men had occupied Shanhaikwan Station and there hoisted the British flag. Two days later, on October 2, a numerous body of Russian troops went there, by land and sea, and refused to acknowledge any rights *but those of conquest*, which they assumed, and laid claim to all the railway from Tongku throughout to Newchwang, solely on these grounds, as being Russian. On October 6 they occupied the Ying-Kow terminus of the Chinese railway and hoisted over it the Russian flag, fifty miles of railway material being simultaneously seized and sent off to Port Arthur.

At home in England telegraphic reports had reached the Government in quick succession from its diplomatic representative, general, and admiral, and from many other sources; and as the acts thus committed by the Russians in the Far East were entirely at variance with the assurances which had been given by the Russian Government, and there could be no rights of conquest, the Marquis of Salisbury took up the matter strongly and repeated protests were lodged at the St. Petersburg Foreign Office by the British Embassy at his direction. At the same time the attention of the German Government was also called to the unfairness of Count von Waldersee's decision, he having been led astray, as it seemed, by the exceeding astuteness of the Russians.

The Russian replies were, as is usual, invidious and inconsistent all through. But at last the false position which Russia had taken up had to be relinquished, and she sought to discover a way of escape, which she found in withdrawing her troops from Peking, and subsequently from Tien-tsin, as described in a previous page, and thus, on November 13, Count Lamsdorff was able to assure Sir Charles (then Mr.)

Hardinge, the British *Chargé d'Affaires* at St. Petersburg, that

the section from Tongku to Shanhaikwan, on the one hand, and from Tongku to Tien-tsin, on the other, were of special military importance to Russia only so long as Russian troops remained to occupy the province of Pechili. On the 30th of October, however, the Russian Emperor ordered a reduction of the troops in Pechili, and on their withdrawal from Peking to Tien-tsin the Yangtsun-Peking section was placed at the disposal of Count von Waldersee. On the retirement of the Russian troops from the Pechili province, the whole line from Yangtsun to Shanhaikwan would also be given over to the Field-Marshal.

As to the line joining Shanhaikwan with Newchwang, Count Lamsdorff indulged in further procrastination on the pretext of the economical and geographical gravity of the problems involved, and declared that its complete restoration to its former owners could not take place before all the outlays incurred in the re-establishment and exploitation of the whole line between Peking and Newchwang had been fully repaid to the Russian Government.

This claim to reimbursement was on the part of Russia wholly unwarranted, because, as was demonstrated on November 23, by Lord Lansdowne, who had succeeded Lord Salisbury in the conduct of Great Britain's foreign affairs, Russia had no right to be placed in a preferential position in regard to the repayment of such outlays, inasmuch as all expeditionary expenses, including outlays of this description, were ultimately to be indemnified by China, and, for another thing, Russia was not the only country that had incurred expenditure of this nature, for the Japanese had in reality themselves repaired a considerable length of the line. When the Japanese "railway battalion" began work the Boxers were still in force in the vicinity, and it was necessary to disperse them as they worked, which resulted in the loss of an engineer officer and several non-commissioned officers and men; further expense was incurred owing to the fact that railway materials, being unobtainable on the spot, had to be sent over from home. The British, and to some extent the Germans, were also engaged in similar repair works. Hence diplomatic negotiations were carried on with unabated vigour, but, as Russia is not a country that is at all scrupulous in regard to the introduction of side issues and fresh pretexts for delay when it suits her, it is

easy to understand that a long time elapsed before the matter was settled.

Before the excitement relating to the "Railway Incident" above described had subsided there arose what was termed the "Tien-tsin Incident," which was equally, if not more, serious in its character.

At the beginning of November, 1900 the Russians seized land on the left bank of the Pei-ho, extending from the railway station as far as Messrs. Meyer's petroleum dépôt, and planted a number of Russian flags and notice boards at different points, and on the 6th of that month the Russian Acting Consul, M. Poppé, issued a circular to the Consuls of the Powers notifying them that the land in question had become the property of Russia by act of war. Comically enough, the Belgian Consul, in imitation of his Russian colleague, next day issued a notice to the Consular body which began by saying, "In accordance with instructions from his Belgian Majesty's Legation at Peking I have this day occupied the territory situated," etc, etc., and going on to describe its exact situation, which was contiguous to the extensive area appropriated by Russia. The Russian circular was one so truly audacious that I give its text in full :—

His Excellency Lieutenant-General Linévitch, Commander-in Chief of the Russian expeditionary corps in Pechili, instructs me to inform you that, as on the 4th (17th) of June of this year the Imperial Chinese troops joined the rebels in attacking the foreign concessions and the railway station occupied by Russian troops, and as on the 10th (23rd) Russian reinforcements relieved these troops, swept the left bank of the Pei-ho from above the railway station to beyond the petroleum dépôt of Messrs. H. Meyer & Co., and occupied it by right of conquest, having seized it by force of arms and at the cost of Russian blood spilt in order to prevent the Chinese returning there and reopening fire on the Concessions, his Excellency therefore considers the whole of this space, from above the railway station to beyond the petroleum dépôt, as property of the Russian troops from this day (10th (23rd) of June of this year) by act of war. Russian flags have been planted and notices posted on boards placed at many points in this territory, which has been occupied and patrolled under orders of the Russian military authorities.

Consequently, his Excellency cannot and will not be able to recognize any cession, unless with his special authorization, of land included in this territory, of which he has taken full and complete possession.

It is of course, understood that all proprietary rights, duly registered in the name of foreigners (other than Chinese) before the 4th (17th) of June of this year, will be safeguarded.

The land claimed by Russia embraced practically the whole of the left bank of the river opposite the foreign settlement, and was a mile and a half in length, by 500 yards wide. In it was comprised a portion belonging to the railway administration's property and others belonging to the private property of some British firms, but the Russian flags waved over all. Apart from that, the Russians' contention that they had cleared the area by their own troops was one of which the accuracy was most doubtful, for it was a well-known fact that when the Russians were attacked by the Chinese near the railway station, the assistance gallantly rendered by the Japanese troops went very far towards the repulse of the assailants, and, indeed, saved the Russians from being routed. In truth, it is believed that the fighting ability of Russian troops was really measured by the Japanese on this occasion. In the battle of June 23 the international forces were collectively engaged on a common footing, the British on that occasion playing a very conspicuous part in effecting a clearance from the quarter in question of the Chinese forces. Commander Cradock, in a memorandum specially drawn up for the British authorities, in refutation of the Russian pretensions, went so far, indeed, as to assert that "on the whole of the advance our (the British) left flank touched the river, and the right was well extended towards the railway. No Russian or German troops had anything whatever to do with clearing the left bank of the river." Besides, the Russians enjoyed no special right of conquest, if there ever was such a right conferred upon the participators at large by that campaign, inasmuch as in their occupation of that or any other place the Russians could not but have been executing the tasks assigned to them as part and parcel of that war which was in process of being waged by the international relief forces in common. Again, the Russians, a little later on, systematically removed vast quantities of machinery and stores from the railway works at Tong-Shan to Port Arthur and elsewhere for their own use, and they deprived the Bridge Works Stores at Shanhaikwan of fifty thousand pounds' worth of material, the premises being completely denuded of all portable property The Russians even took away the steam cranes and machinery of every description, having, as an expert's report states, seized "everything they could lay hands on."

All these outrageous proceedings were, of course, stoutly challenged not only by the British authorities and the interested individuals in the East, who at every successive stage protested to the Russian authorities, but by the British Government, who time after time briskly remonstrated with the Russian Government. America also contended that forcible appropriation under claim of conquest was in conflict with the declared purposes of the Powers and disturbed their harmonious action. On November 16, the Russian Minister at Peking wrote to the American Minister that if the communication of M. Poppé contained any expressions suggesting any question of acquiring territory by conquest they had been certainly erroneously used by him, and that the object of the Russian military authorities had been to prevent the seizure of, and speculation in, land by certain parties within the radius occupied by the Russian troops for military purposes since the preceding June. What a groundless insinuation! At last, when the Russians were no longer able to sustain their unjust designs they endeavoured, as usual, by their craft and subtleties to provide a loophole for escape. They procured from Li Hung-Chang the cession—made public on January 6, 1901, in a circular from the Acting Russian Consul at Tien-tsin—of a piece of land for a new Russian settlement which was practically identical with the area that they had so audaciously invaded. True, the part in which were the private premises of British firms was this time excluded, but in respect of that belonging to the railway administration there was ambiguity; as a matter of fact, in the Concession Agreement, when it came to light, it was discovered that the exact delineation of the boundary had been left over for future arrangement.

Although England disdained to challenge the validity of the concession, though she entertained some doubt as to the mode in which it had been obtained, it was palpable that the ground already owned by the railway administration could not suddenly be wrenched from them in such a fashion, and that in fact the Agreement could not be held to comprise those lands, so there immediately arose upon this point a most serious controversy.

As to the machinery of all sorts and the stores and materials which Russia took away from the railway, they were

eventually restored to the rightful owners, the Russians putting forward the extraordinary plea that, as there were no workshops, no stores, and no materials to the north of Shanhaikwan, it would be impossible to work this northern section of the line after the southern section should have been handed over to Count von Waldersee, and that therefore Russia had "borrowed" the plant and stocks in question; but now that an arrangement was made that the Russians might use the Shanhaikwan workshops for the working of the northern section, they restored the borrowed materials to the parties to whom they belonged. The memorandum of the Russian Government on the subject expressly declared that they had restored *everything*, but the report of the expert went to show that only a part of the whole was ever disgorged, and that in a very badly damaged and scattered condition.

Early in 1901 the railway near Tien-tsin was handed over by Count von Waldersee to the British contingent, which thereupon proceeded to construct a siding in the common interest of the international forces, beginning it on March 7, on land which belonged to the railway administration. The Russians made objection to this on the basis that by the concession derived from Li Hung-Chang the ground belonged to Russia. They also greatly impeded the transfer of certain railway property at Tien-tsin, Tongku, and Shanhaikwan, contrary to the terms of the railway convention entered into the preceding month at Count Waldersee's instance. On March 15 the Russians placed sentries on the piece of land where the British were making the siding, in order to prevent the work being continued, and at the same time General Wogack, the Russian general, practically demanded the withdrawal of the British sentries from the ground. Naturally this sort of behaviour quickly brought matters to a crisis, and Russia and Great Britain were on the verge of hostilities, so much so that next day, on March 16, the India Office telegraphed to General Gaselee, giving him instructions, and added, "In the meantime do not use force except to repel aggression, and do not eject the Russian sentries." At the same time vigorous, but still conciliatory, protests were lodged by the British Government at St. Petersburg, and in the end an understanding was reached whereby the dispute about proprietary rights was left for

future settlement,[1] and in the interval the British as well as the Russian troops were required to evacuate the plot of land in question. This arrangement was embodied in an Agreement that on March 21 was signed in the presence of Count von Waldersee by General Barrow, representing England, and General Wogack, representing Russia—Count von Waldersee adding his own signature to the document——whereby it was stipulated that both the Russian and British guards should be simultaneously withdrawn at 5 a.m. the next day.

The guards were duly withdrawn on both sides, but before the day was out, to the genuine surprise of everybody, save perhaps the Russians themselves, the Russian flags were replanted on the siding itself, and work was recommenced by the Russian soldiers with such energy that three days later, on March 25, the British military authorities had to telegraph home that "the Russians are working on the disputed ground at Tien-tsin in such a way as to render untenable the British position." Surely there could never be a more flagrant instance of Russian insincerity and duplicity! Protests were made, of course, by the British Government to that of St. Petersburg, and as a result the Russian flags gradually and grudgingly disappeared from the property, the last of them being displaced on April 4, following. Even while these high-handed proceedings were taking place at Tien-tsin Count Lamsdorff actually "expressed his surprise"—as he termed it—"at the temporary measures taken by the Russian authorities being regarded as in any way inconsistent with the assurances given that Russia would not make any territorial acquisitions in China."

Whilst the "Railway Incident" above described was attracting the attention of the Powers concerned, an Agreement was signed by Great Britain and Germany, on October 16, 1900, in which it was mutually recognized that (*a*) it was a matter of joint and permanent international interest that all Chinese ports on the rivers and littoral should remain free and open for all nations, and the two Governments undertook to uphold the dictum for all Chinese territory, as

[1] The dispute was referred to a joint commission, who called upon Mr. Detring to arbitrate on two points whereon the two commissioners were not agreed, and the whole matter was recently settled mainly in favour of the British contention.

far as they could exercise influence; (*b*) the two Governments, on their part, would not make use of existing complications to obtain any territorial advantages, and would direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the territorial conditions of the Chinese Empire; (*c*) should another Power make use of that complication to obtain, under any form whatever, such territorial advantages, the two Governments reserved to themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China; and (*d*) other Powers would be invited to accept the principle thus recorded.

Accordingly the Powers were invited, and Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, and America all expressed in due course their acceptance. In the case of Japan she specially asked the contracting Powers what was to be the effect of expressing acceptance, and having been told that an acceptor would stand in precisely the same position as an original signatory, she forthwith announced her acceptance in due form. It was plain, therefore, that other Powers also which accepted, though they may not have put the question, stood *pari passu* in the same position as the signatory Powers.

The best part of the joke, if I may be allowed the expression, lay in the situation in which Russia thus unexpectedly found herself. When the Agreement was communicated to her for her acceptance, the British representative in Russia was instructed by the Marquis of Salisbury to state—should any complaint be made of Russia not having previously been consulted—that the Russian Government had given many assurances, but little attention had been paid to the avowed policy of the Russian Government by its officers on the spot, and that this was how England was deterred from making a fuller communication.

The Russian Government, however, accepted the Agreement without wincing, in a communication which, briefly, was as follows:—

(*a*) The first part of the Agreement can be favourably entertained by Russia, as this stipulation does not in any way infringe the *status quo* established in China by existing treaties.

(*b*) The second point corresponds all the more with the intentions of Russia, seeing that from the commencement of the present

complications she was the first to lay down the maintenance of the integrity of the Chinese Empire as a fundamental principle of her policy.

(*c*) As regards the third point, relating to the eventuality of an infringement of this fundamental principle, the Russian Government can only renew the declaration that such an infringement would oblige Russia to modify her attitude according to circumstances.

When one reflects that, to judge from the then existent situation, there was absolutely no Power but Russia herself that was in any way likely to infringe the fundamental principle which she had enunciated, her lofty acquiescence in and expressed readiness to adhere strictly to the Anglo-German Agreement cannot but give rise to a smile and a chuckle over the manifest intention she thus betrayed of throwing dust in the eyes of Europe and America.

Russia's reckless and high-handed infractions of solemn pledges and treaties have been in the preceding pages but partially laid bare to the light of day, and unhappily there are still more serious counts in the indictment that must be reserved for the next chapter. As I shall have to show, the tenets upheld by Russian politicians, and particularly as exemplified in their treatment of Far Eastern Questions, are nothing short of a peril to the world at large, for they are of a character which must tend in time to sap the foundations of diplomatic intercourse and constitute a permanent menace to the peace of nations.

## CHAPTER IV

### HOW RUSSIA BROUGHT ON WAR

### *THE HISTORY OF SIX YEARS*

### Part II. 1901–1903

THE peace negotiations had now begun to assume concrete form. China had throughout evinced a willingness to accede to reasonable demands, and towards the end of August, 1900, Prince Ching and Li Hung-Chang were nominated as her co-plenipotentiaries. Views were actively interchanged between the Powers, and matters had progressed so far that in October the Chinese plenipotentiaries submitted a Memorandum for the consideration of the Diplomatic Corps at Peking. In this, among other things, China acknowledged her fault in laying siege to the Foreign Legations, and promised that it should never occur again; admitted her liability to pay an adequate indemnity; and showed a readiness to revise commercial treaties. Eventually, by the combined efforts of the Ministers of the Powers, a joint note was agreed upon and presented to the Chinese Government, toward the latter part of December, embodying twelve demands, fulfilment of which was deemed necessary for the restoration of normal relations between China and the Powers.

Russia was, of course, a party to all these proceedings, but she secretly cherished the idea of independently making a great stroke herself which was extremely well calculated to thwart and paralyse the concerted policy of the Powers in general in at least one portion of the Celestial Empire. This design crystallized into the so-called Manchurian Agreement.

The hole-and-corner arrangement which it was sought

to carry through was actually entered into at Mukden between a subordinate of Tseng, the Tartar general stationed there—a person with no authority whatever to make such a treaty, as the Chinese Government rightly complained—and a representative of Admiral Alexeieff, to wit, General Korostovitch; and the purport of it all was first disclosed to an astonished world by a telegram published in the London *Times* from its correspondent in Peking, dated the last day of 1900. It was an enumeration of conditions which were dictated, as is credibly reported, to the accompaniment of very significant threats from the Russian side, leaving absolutely no alternative for the Chinese but to acquiesce, and only upon compliance with which would Russia consent to allow the Tartar general and the Chinese officials to resume the civil government of Manchuria.

These new conditions, plus the concessions previously acquired, were tantamount to an annexation of Manchuria. It may be remembered that soon after the Chino-Japan war Russia seized the opportunity and, by successive machinations, partly by threats and partly by gilding the pills in many ways, chiefly at the cost of Japan and England, exacted from China, under the so-called Cassini convention and others, not only a concession of the right of constructing the Trans-Manchurian railway line, having no other credible object than a military one, right across Manchuria to Vladivostok, which she utilized in substitution of her own Trans-Siberian line, but further a similar right of construction from Harbin down to Port Arthur and Talienwan, and also that of stationing all necessary troops, nominally for the protection of these railways. Add to these the new concessions embodied in the Manchurian convention, and the result is nothing more nor less than a consummation of Russia's long-cherished designs. Hence the next step taken by her was to seek to obtain recognition of the compact by the supreme authority at Peking, and to have it embodied in the form of a recognized treaty, and this demand was forthwith pressed upon the Chinese Government at the capital with all imaginable vehemence and persistency.

Diplomatic correspondence immediately followed the disclosure of Russia's secret endeavours, and the utmost alacrity was shown by the Governments of America, Britain,

Germany, and Japan in dealing with the question. The Russian Government pretended that the Agreement had no more than a local significance and application, but it was like trying to smother the electric light under a fold of crape, for the real meaning of the compact was always visible. The successive communications and replies that Russia made to the Powers in response to their protests were all alike. Here is one which Count Lamsdorff telegraphed to M. Iswolsky, then Russian Minister at Tokio :—

You are authorized to deny most categorically the false reports about a treaty between Russia and China concerning an alleged protectorate in Manchuria. Negotiations which are yet to take place between Russian and Chinese Governments will bear on the manifold questions relating to the installation of Chinese Administration in Manchuria and the establishment in this province of permanent order capable of insuring the tranquillity of our (Russia's) extensive borderland, as well as the construction of the railway, which is the object of a special Russo-Chinese Convention. As to the Agreement signed between the Chief of our (Russian) forces and the Dziandjiem of Mukden, it is but a temporary arrangement laying down rules for the relations between the local authorities and the Russian troops while those are still in Manchuria. The aforesaid false reports are particularly malignant at the present juncture, when the Russian Government is about to hand over Manchuria to China, in harmony with Russia's previous declarations.

There was, however, another and very pregnant allusion in this telegram, which was handed by M. Iswolsky to Mr. Kato, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, but as it bore upon a somewhat different branch of the subject, reference will be made to it later on.

Here is another, which was sent to the Marquis of Lansdowne by the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and, with the full consent and cognisance of the Russian Government, presented at the time to the British Parliament :—

Count Lamsdorff said that the Emperor had no intention of departing in any way from the assurances which he had publicly given that Manchuria would be entirely restored to its former condition in the Chinese Empire as soon as circumstances admitted of it. Russia (he added) was in the same position with regard to fixing a final date for evacuating Manchuria as the allies found themselves with regard to the evacuation of Peking and the province of Pechili. When it came to the final and complete evacuation of Manchuria, the Russian Government would be obliged to obtain from the Central Government of China an effective guarantee against

the recurrence of the recent attack on the frontier and the destruction of her railway, but had no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquisition of territory or of any actual or virtual protectorate of Manchuria. . . . Manchuria would be restored to China, when all the temporary measures taken by the Russian military authorities would cease, and everything at Newchwang and elsewhere would be replaced in its former position.

All these asseverations and protestations of Russia were ostensibly genuine, but in reality they little corresponded with her actions. Remonstrances from the aggrieved nations continued, and China was herself by no means inclined to concede the Russian demands. She sought the conjoint mediation between herself and Russia of America, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan. It was at this critical moment that the Emperor of China, ruler of a huge empire with 400,000,000 of inhabitants, made in an Imperial edict the following truly pitiable avowal :—

Russia proposes an Agreement of twelve articles. We have authorized our plenipotentiary to amend and modify them, so as to preserve our right of sovereignty. The foreign representatives also advise China not to accept them. But in reflecting upon the present situation, though we are grateful for the advice of the foreign representatives, *it is impossible for China alone to incur the displeasure of Russia by remaining firm.* This is not only a question for China to study with all possible care in order that it may be solved without any danger to her, but also a question in which the foreign Governments interested should maintain the balance of power.

Meanwhile the suggestion, or rather complaint, had been made by Count Lamsdorff that garbled versions of the Agreement made at Mukden were being circulated by the Chinese Government in order to create dissension between the Powers, but this was all a farce. The Emperor of China speaks in his solemn edict of the twelve demands of the Russians, and we have here in full the actual document as translated from the Chinese by no less an authority than Sir Ernest Satow, who succeeded Sir Claude Macdonald in Peking. He stated that the Chinese version had evidently been translated direct from the Russian text.

(1) The Emperor of Russia, being anxious to give evidence of his friendly feeling towards China, is willing to forget the hostile acts committed in Manchuria, and to hand back the whole of that country to China—its administration to be carried on as heretofore.

(2) Under Article 6 of the Manchurian Railway Agreement the Administration is authorized to maintain troops for the protection of the line. The country, however, being at present in an unsettled condition, and such troops few in number, a body of soldiers must be retained until the order is restored, and until China shall have carried out the provisions of the last four articles of the present Convention.

(3) In the event of grave disturbances the Russian garrisons will afford China every assistance in suppressing the same that lies in their power.

(4) In the recent attacks against Russia, Chinese troops having taken a prominent part, China agrees, pending the completion of the line and its opening to traffic, not to establish an army in those provinces. She will consult with Russia as to the number of troops she may subsequently wish to establish there. The importation of munitions of war into Manchuria is prohibited.

(5) With a view to safeguarding the interests of the territory in question, China will, on representations being made by Russia, at once deprive of office any military governor or other high officials whose conduct of affairs may prove antagonistic to the maintenance of friendly relations.

A police force consisting of mounted and unmounted units, may be organized in the interior of Manchuria. Its numbers shall be determined after consultation with Russia, and from its armament artillery shall be excluded. The services of the subjects of any other Power shall not be employed in connexion therewith.

(6) In conformity with the undertaking given by China at an earlier date, she will not employ the subjects of any other Power in training Chinese soldiers or sailors in North China.

(7) The neighbouring local authorities will, in the interests of peace and order, draw up new special regulations with reference to the neutral zone (see Agreement of March 27, 1898) treated of in Article 5 of the Agreement relating to the lease of part of the Liaotung Peninsula.

China's autonomous rights in the city of Chinchou (Kinchau, near Port Arthur), secured to her by Article 4 of the Special Agreement of May 7, 1898, are hereby abrogated.

(8) China shall not, without the consent of Russia, grant to any other Power, or the subjects thereof, privileges with regard to mines, railroads, or other matters in conterminous (i.e. with Russia) regions, such as Manchuria, Mongolia, and the sections of the new dominion known as Tarbagati, Ili, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khoten. Nor shall China, without Russia's consent, construct railroads there herself.

Except as far as Newchwang is concerned, no leases of land shall be granted to the subjects of any other Power.

(9) China being under obligation to pay Russia's war expenses, and the claims of other Powers, arising out of the recent troubles, the amount of the indemnity presented in the name of Russia, the period within which it will have to be paid, and the security therefor will all be arranged in concert with the other Powers.

(10) The compensation to be paid for the destruction of the railway lines, for the robbery of property belonging to the railway administration and its employés, as well as claims for delay in carrying on the construction of the lines, will form a subject of arrangement between China and the Administration.

(11) The above mentioned claims may, by agreement with the Administration, either in part or in whole, be commuted for other privileges. The grant of such privileges would involve a complete revision of the previous agreement.

(12) In conformity with the undertaking previously given by China, it is agreed that a line may be constructed for either the trunk line or the branch line [of the Manchurian railway] in the direction of Peking up to the Great Wall, its administration to be governed by the regulations at present in force.

Although in some respects a little difference in the form and scope is to be perceived between this version of the Convention and one which had been telegraphed to the *Times* by its Peking representative, their purport is substantially the same. In any case, China was bound hand and foot under the heel of Russia, and that, too, contrary to Russia's solemn pledge to maintain concord with other Powers.

The strenuous opposition of the Powers interested continued, however, and at last, in April, 1901, Russia had to abandon the project. On the 5th of that month the Government of St. Petersburg published an official *communiqué* in the *Official Messenger*, which explained her position at great length, interspersed with the usual protestations to the effect that in every case the course which she had adopted was a temporary measure, and that she meant to withdraw her troops from Manchuria when order had been permanently restored, and everything possible had been done to safeguard the railway, *provided that no obstacle was placed in the way by other Powers*. The motive of this qualifying phrase will be obvious to my readers. The *communiqué* went on to declare that the reported Agreement was only intended to serve as a starting-point towards the realization of the restoration of Manchuria, but owing to obstacles having been put in the way of the conclusion of that Agreement it became impossible for her immediately to take the contemplated measures of evacuation, and that, remaining true to her original programme, she would quietly await the further progress of events.

Subsequently to the publication of this *communiqué*

on April 8, M. Iswolsky handed to Mr. Kato at Tokio a *note verbale*, which, after it had announced Russia's abandonment of the project, viz. the Manchurian agreement, on a plea similar to that advanced in the *communiqué*, proceeded thus :—

Divers information having shown that under the actual circumstances such an understanding might cause all sorts of difficulties to the neighbouring Empire instead of serving to clearly show the friendly intentions of Russia with regard to the interests of China, Russia would not only *not insist, vis-à-vis* the Chinese Government, upon the conclusion of this understanding, but even renounce all further negotiations on the subject.

A similar announcement was, of course, made to the other Powers. Here we have Russia affecting to ride off in dudgeon upon her high horse, whilst retaining in her own hands that which was the actual object of dispute—viz. the possession of Manchuria.

I might here perhaps venture to recall to the remembrance of my readers that prior to the middle of January, 1901, Russia, as far as her Foreign Office was concerned, consistently held that a state of war did not exist between the Powers and China, but that *subsequent* to that date she began to insinuate that she had the right to hold Manchuria as a result of conquest. Thus we see that on July 4, 1900, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in a despatch reporting to the Marquis of Salisbury the particulars of an interview with Count Lamsdorff, said: "There was one point on which Count Lamsdorff laid particular stress in his conversation with me, and it was that the European Powers should proceed on the assumption that they were not in a state of war with the constituted Government of China, but with rebels and anarchists." Again, on August 28, 1900, Count Lamsdorff said to the British Ambassador: "We have been proceeding . . . . on the assumption hitherto that we were not in a formal state of war with the recognized Government of China, but with a nation in a state of rebellion." On September 27, Count Lamsdorff said to the British *Chargé d'Affaires* that "his view was that there had never been any rupture of diplomatic relations [between the Powers and China], as had been strikingly proved by the fact that a new German Minister had been appointed." Then came, in January, 1901, a faint suggestion of the

*ballon d'essai* in the next recorded expression of Count Lamsdorff's informal but candid opinion, as telegraphed by the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg to Mr. Kato at Tokio. The Russian Minister declared that "the Russian occupation of Manchuria being the result of self-defence on the part of Russia against the Chinese aggression upon her frontiers, she would be in perfect right even if she should choose to make the occupation permanent, but in point of fact she entertains no intention of exercising the right of conquest." And in the telegram handed by M. Iswolsky to Mr. Kato—to which previous reference has been made as embodying an allusion of much significance—Count Lamsdorff declared that Russia, in harmony with her previous declarations, was about to hand over Manchuria to China, "instead of possessing herself by right of conquest of this province [Manchuria], from which came an attack on her boundaries." As to the Russian military authorities, they have, from almost the very moment that opportunities for increased activity in the Far East presented themselves—after the Boxer rising—made pretensions, as we have seen already, to these so-termed rights of conquest, shadowy in the extreme as they must have known such rights to be.

While, on the one hand, Russia had been giving interminable trouble to the Powers by her action in the railway and Tien-tsin incidents, and her intrigues in connexion with the Manchurian Agreement, the real peace negotiations, on the other hand, between China and the Powers, Russia included, had made satisfactory progress, and the final Peking Protocol was signed on September 7, 1901, wherein the Powers declared that the international forces should evacuate Peking itself on September 17, and the province of Pechili five days later, save for certain trifling exceptions provided for in the protocol. The Chinese Court returned from Hsi-An-Fu, to which city it had resorted on the approach of the Allies to Peking, and the old order of things was revived at the Chinese capital in January, 1902. It may be remembered that by this protocol the importation of arms into China was forbidden for two years, with a proviso to the effect that this term might be prolonged if requisite, according to circumstances. In the course of the discussion of the terms of the protocol a sub-committee of the Conference of Ministers of the Powers had proposed

that the period of prohibition should be five years. But the American, Belgian, and Japanese delegates held to the opinion that two years, with a proviso, would suffice. This view prevailed, and before the clause was finally embodied in the protocol China had published an Imperial edict in anticipation. The Russian delegate, however, was of opinion that the term should be *ten* years. This marked divergence of Russia's views from those entertained by other Powers was eminently suggestive, now that we can calmly reflect upon it, of some lurking sinister motive.

In the meantime Russia was eagerly engaged in an intrigue for the revival of that objectionable Manchurian Agreement which she professed to have abandoned months before. Her diplomacy on this occasion was precisely similar in its base and cynical disregard of all moral obligations to that she had employed decades before in depriving China of the "Maritime Province." The Marquis of Lansdowne was apprised in August, 1901, of the fact that, despite her denial thereof, Russia was seeking to obtain China's signature to a Manchurian Agreement, and a week later it was definitely stated in reliable quarters that as soon as the final Peking Protocol should be signed, Russia's negotiations concerning Manchuria would be recommenced at Peking or St. Petersburg. The protocol was, as we have seen, signed on September 7, and it is to be presumed that thenceforward Russia was busily occupied with the furtherance of her schemes.

It was at this juncture that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of alliance took practical shape, and was signed in London on January 30, 1902, it being entered into between Great Britain and Japan solely from a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Extreme East. This Agreement is to remain in full force for five years, and is terminable after the expiration of that period at one year's notice. When, however, one of the Allies happens, in the meantime, to be engaged in war, the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded. The aims and motives of the Agreement were admirably summed up in an eminently statesmanlike despatch from the Marquis of Lansdowne to Sir Claude Macdonald at Tokio, as is well known to the students of history.

The publication of this Agreement was followed on

March 16 by the issue of a Russo-French Memorandum, being communicated in due course to the Powers concerned. It ran as under :—

The Allied Governments of Russia and France have received a copy of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of January 30, 1902, concluded with the object of maintaining the *status quo* and the general peace in the Far East, and preserving the independence of China and Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and industry of all nations, and have been fully satisfied to find therein affirmed the fundamental principles which they have themselves, on several occasions, declared to form the basis of their policy, and which still remain so.

The two Governments consider that the observance of these principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special interests in the Far East. Nevertheless, being obliged themselves also to take into consideration the case in which either the aggressive action of third Powers, or the recurrence of disturbances in China, jeopardizing the integrity and free development of that Power, might become a menace to their own interests, the two Allied Governments reserve to themselves the right to consult in that contingency as to the means to be adopted for securing those interests.

Simultaneously with the issue of this Memorandum was published in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*, March 20, an official *communiqué*, omitting to consider how and why it came about that an Anglo-Japanese Agreement came to be entered into, and insinuating that two of the eleven Powers (Britain and Japan being meant) which had quite recently signed the Peking Protocol were seeking to separate themselves from the others, and to place themselves in a "special situation in respect to the Celestial Empire," and after repeating the usual rigmarole about Russia's guiding principles and desire for peace, wound up with the assertion that the French and Russian Governments found it needful to formulate their views owing to "the ever-persistent agitation concerning the Anglo-Japanese Arrangement."

France appears to have felt some sort of reluctance to associate herself with the Russian policy in the Far East, but she was persuaded to do so on account of Russia being most studious in making her believe that the Muscovite Government were sincere as to their intention of evacuation.

What America thought of these matters was to be seen from Secretary Hay's Memorandum, which, after expressing America's gratification on finding in both the Anglo-

Japanese Agreement and the Russo-French Memorandum renewed assurances of the concurrence of their views with those held by America in respect of Far Eastern affairs, ended thus:

> With regard to the concluding paragraph of the Russian Memorandum, the Government of the United States, while sharing the views therein expressed as to the continuance of the Open Door policy against possible encroachment from whatever quarter, and while equally solicitous for the unfettered development of independent China, reserves for itself entire liberty of action should circumstances unexpectedly arise whereby the policy and interests of the United States in China and Korea might be disturbed or impaired.

This was an indirect way of telling Russia that America was not to be inveigled into any sanction or acceptance of "suitable means" to be devised by her, and it is not difficult to understand how little trust was at that time placed by America in Russian avowals. Indeed, the American people were just then irritated by the friction which had arisen between the Russians and the American consular and naval authorities, as well as the American mercantile community at large, owing to the iniquitous retention by the Russian military authorities of the treaty port of Newchwang and the resultant interference with telegraphic and mail facilities, and obstacles to commerce at large, in consequence of which America had several times made representations to the St. Petersburg Government, to say nothing of the many anxieties concerning graver subjects created by Russia's policy.

At the very moment when the Russo-French Memorandum was being circulated, Russia was, in point of fact, maturing her second Manchurian Convention, which was as objectionable as the first one. Mr. Conger, the American Minister in Peking, had in December, 1901, reported to Washington that Prince Ching had returned to Peking armed with authority to sign a Manchurian Convention, and also that the British and Japanese Ministers were warning China not to enter into it. He asked for instructions as to the course he should take, giving the substance of the provisions of this proposed Convention which had come to his knowledge.

Mr. Hay thereupon instructed Mr. Conger to advise Prince Ching that America trusted and expected that no

arrangement which would permanently impair the territorial integrity of China, injure the legitimate interests of the United States, or impair the ability of China to meet her international obligations, would be made with any single Power. Prince Ching, in assenting, said he would insist on the Russian evacuation in one year instead of three, that matters concerning Chinese troops should be left to China herself to arrange, and likewise as to guarding the railways or building railway bridges. Russia's claim for expenses in repairing and maintaining the railway would not be paid if it was found that it had been covered by the general indemnity. But Mr. Conger confessed that he had grave doubts regarding the Prince's ability to secure consent to the terms he proposed.

Mr. Tower, the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg, was then instructed by Mr. Hay to remonstrate with the Russian Government on the ground that by permitting or creating any monopoly by one Power of the trade of the region, China would contravene the provisions of the treaties with other Powers, and such action would infallibly lead to the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, and tend to diminish the ability of China to meet its obligations; and further that other Powers as well might be expected to seek similar exclusive advantages in different parts of the Chinese Empire. This would be destructive of the policy of equal treatment for all the Powers, and contrary to Russian assurances regarding the preservation of an "open door" in China. Mr. Conger was simultaneously directed to warn the Chinese Government still further.

The Russian reply to America was handed to Mr. Tower on February 9, and it must be characterized as one of the most remarkable of Russia's many remarkable despatches. After declaring that Russia was fully disposed to remove the causes of anxiety to the American Cabinet, but that it felt bound at the same time to assert that negotiations carried on between two entirely independent States were not subject to be submitted to other Powers, it proceeded thus :—

> There is no thought of attacking the principle of the "open door," as that principle is understood by the Imperial Government of Russia, and Russia has no intention whatever to change the policy followed by her in that respect up to the present time.

If the Russo-Chinese Bank should obtain concessions in China, the agreements of a private character relating to them would not differ from those heretofore concluded by so many other foreign corporations. But would it not be very strange if the "door" that is "open" to certain nations should be closed to Russia, whose frontier adjoins that of Manchuria, and who has been forced by recent events to send her troops into that province to re-establish order in the plain and common interest of all nations? It is true that Russia has conquered Manchuria, but she still maintains her firm determination to restore it to China and recall her troops as soon as the conditions of evacuation shall have been agreed upon and the necessary steps taken to prevent a fresh outbreak of troubles in the neighbouring territory.

It is impossible to deny to an independent State the right to grant to others such concessions as it is free to dispose of, and I have every reason to believe that the demands of the Russo-Chinese Bank do not in the least exceed those that have been so often formulated by other foreign companies, and I feel that under the circumstances it would not be easy for the Imperial Government to deny to Russian companies that support which is given by other Governments to companies and syndicates of their own nationalities.

And it concludes by stating that there is not, nor can there be, any question of the contradiction of the assurances which had been given by Russia under the orders of the Emperor. Was it not a scandalous thing that Russia, the promulgator of the so-called "fundamental principles," should have the hardihood to claim for her clandestine negotiations with China that they were no concern of the other Powers? Was it not positively outrageous that Russia, whose contention it had been that the Powers were not at war with the constituted Government of China, should declare, when it suited her purpose and in a formal State document, that she had a claim on Manchuria by conquest?

It will be remembered that the Powers which took most interest in the affair at this period were Britain, America, and Japan. As to Germany, she seems to have made the best use of the Anglo-German Agreement during the peace negotiations with China, as shown by the report of Mr. Rockhill, the American Commissioner, to his Government, which states that "the position of Germany on the question of the indemnity was most uncompromising," and that "the urgent necessity for Great Britain to maintain her *entente* with Germany in China was responsible for the numerous concessions that she had made to Germany's insistence on being paid the last cent of her expenses."

Germany, however, soon showed herself lukewarm, and in March, 1901, Count von Bülow announced in the Reichstag that her interpretation of the Agreement was that it had no application to Manchuria! He even went so far, in an attempt to minimise its scope, as to designate it "the Yang-tse Convention"!—not, however, without evoking much comment and surprise, nay, even some suspicion, in England and elsewhere. Such being the German attitude, the Imperial Chancellor, speaking in the Reichstag on March 3, 1902, in reference to the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, remarked quite unconcernedly that no exception could be taken to it by Germany, as it did not in any way interfere with the Anglo-German, Agreement of October 16, 1900, *with regard to the Yang-tse Valley*, or with declarations exchanged by the several Powers with regard to the "open door."

Russia continued to exert the utmost pressure at Peking, and on April 8, 1902, the Manchurian Convention was signed at Peking by the Russian and Chinese Plenipotentiaries. The *Journal Officiel* of St. Petersburg published the text of it four days later, and this veritably Satanic triumph was crowned by China formally expressing her obligations to the Powers whose counsel she had sought, viz. America, Britain, and Japan. True it was that the terms were perhaps more favourable to China than she would have secured had she been left entirely to the tender mercies of Russia, but they were, in all conscience, onerous and degrading enough. The truth was that China's helplessness to resist Russian coercion was coupled with an intense anxiety on the part of the Manchu Court to regain possession of that part of the empire which, for dynastic reasons, was most dear to it. The dilemma in which the Chinese Court found itself is well illustrated in a report by Mr. Conger to the American Government, dated January 29, in which he states:—

> On the 27th I had a conference with Prince Ching, who informed me, substantially, that he was in a most difficult position. He had used, he said, every effort in his power to come to some agreement with Russia whereby the evacuation of Manchuria might be secured without the great sacrifice on the part of China which Li Hung-Chang had agreed to. He had, he said, secured some very material concessions on the part of Russia, but they would yield no further, and he was convinced, if China held out longer, that they would

never again secure terms as lenient; that the Russians were in full possession of the territory, and their treatment of the Chinese was so aggravating that longer occupation was intolerable; that they must be got out, and that the only way left for China to accomplish this was to make the best possible terms. The only terms that Russia would consent to was the signing of both the Convention and the Russo-Chinese Bank Agreement.

Accompanying the text of the Agreement there was published in the Russian official organ an explanatory communication to the effect that, having been "repaid the material expenses to which she was put by her military operations in China," Russia saw no necessity thenceforward "for leaving armed forces within the confines of the neighbouring territory," and therefore this Agreement had been made by Imperial will. The stipulations of this Convention are tolerably well known, but they may be briefly stated:—

The right to exercise authority in Manchuria is to be restored to China, and the Russian troops, within six months after signature—i.e. October 8, 1902—to be withdrawn from the South-West Province up to the Liao River, and the railways handed over to China.

[Prince Ching said he thought Newchwang was included, but, as the sequel showed, the Russians thought otherwise.]

Within the following six months the remainder of the Mukden Province, plus the Kirin Province, to be evacuated and finally, within another six months, to quit Hei-Lung-Chiang; thus all three provinces were to be restored to the Chinese Empire by, at the latest, October 8, 1903.

Of course, as a set-off to this magnanimous return of wrongly acquired property, Russia laid a number of restrictions on China.

She was limited as to the numbers and disposition of the troops she was to place in Manchuria.

She was to protect the Russian railways there and the persons employed thereon, in their various undertakings.

Nor might she invite any Power to participate in protecting, constructing, or working her own railway—viz. that from Shan-hai-Kwan to Newchwang and Hsin-Min-tsun—nor allow any other Power to occupy the territory vacated by the Russians.

China might neither extend nor reconstruct, nor erect a

bridge nor remove the terminus, at Newchwang, without first discussing the matter with the Russian Government.

Finally, China was to pay Russia's expenses incurred in the working and repair of the Chinese railway in Manchuria, which sums, it was declared, were not included in the total of the previous claim.

Could any rational being fail to perceive that in these stipulations there were direct infringements of the sovereignty and integrity of an independent State? They evoked, indeed, on all sides, the severest criticism. Yet because it was presumed that Russia would keep her word on the essential points—the evacuation by given dates of the three occupied provinces—the Powers were willing, it would seem, to acquiesce.

I may here remark that the Russian share of the indemnity included not only the expenses incurred by her in Pechili but also in Manchuria. In whatever way assessed it was altogether exorbitant,[1] as compared with the claims of other Powers. Now that Russia insisted on claiming an extra indemnity on account of the railway, the iniquity of it all became the more glaring.

For some time after this things appeared to be going on tolerably well, though some anxiety was felt in certain quarters as to Russia's sincerity. October 8, 1902, was the day on which the first part of the Russian evacuation was to be completed, and towards the end of that month the Chinese Government was enabled to announce the restoration of the south-west portion of Mukden Province and all the Chinese railways outside the Great Wall, as previously stipulated. Then came the second part of the evacuation—Newchwang included—which had to be carried out by April 8, 1903. Not only did the Russians not evacuate Newchwang and other parts of the territory as agreed upon, but signs were perceptible that they had altogether changed their programme. Rumours began to circulate that Russian troops were being moved towards the Korean frontier. On April 17, the British *Chargé d'Affaires* at Peking telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne:

[1] Russia obtained £17,900,000 on the basis of £100 per combatant, though it was estimated that her actual force never could have exceeded 50,000. The exceptional moderation of Japan's demand was commented on by the British Government.

"There is a growing feeling here that either the evacuation will not take place or that Russia is exacting conditions." When inquiry was made about it at St. Petersburg by the Chinese Minister, both Count Lamsdorff and M. de Witte assured him that, as to the movement of troops, neither the Imperial Government nor the Russo-Chinese Bank had any interest whatever in any timber concessions which private individuals might have acquired, and they repudiated the idea that troops had been sent there to guard these concessions which were said to have been obtained from China and Korea. General Kuropatkin, then War Minister, did not deny, however, that M. Besobrazoff had acquired certain forest rights in Manchuria, and thought it possible that Admiral Alexeieff had "granted" some soldiers to protect these rights. The Chinese Minister, who persisted in his inquiries, was assured that the delay of the second stage of the evacuation was but temporary, and was caused by the presence of foreign ships at Newchwang; Admiral Alexeieff feared, so he said, that the Chinese might admit some other Power as soon as the Russians had gone away. Count Lamsdorff was nevertheless positive in affirming that the Emperor's commands would be fulfilled. By this time, however, things had begun to assume a very alarming aspect in Peking, for in reality the Russian representative was once more vigorously pressing there his daring new "seven demands," the purport of which could not for long be hidden from the diplomatic circle there, and the British *Chargé d'Affaires* briefly outlined their scope in a telegram on April 23, 1903, to his Government. They comprised :—

(1) A demand that no portion of the territory restored to China by Russia, especially at Newchwang, should be leased or sold, under any circumstances, to any other Power.

(2) The system of government actually existing thoughout Mongolia should not be altered.

(3) China to engage herself not to open new ports or towns in Manchuria without notice to Russia, nor permit foreign Consuls to reside at such ports or towns.

(4) Foreigners engaged by China for the administration of any affairs shall exert no authority in the northern provinces, where Russia has predominant interests.

(5) As long as any telegraph line may exist at Newchwang and Port Arthur, the Newchwang and Peking line must be maintained, as the telegraph at Newchwang and Port Arthur and throughout Shing-King Province is under Russia's control, and its connexion

with her line on the Chinese telegraph poles[1] at Newchwang, Port Arthur, and Peking is of the utmost importance.

(6) After the restoration of Newchwang to China, the Customs receipts shall, as at present, be deposited with the Russo-Chinese Bank.

(7) No rights which have been acquired in Manchuria by Russian subjects or foreign companies during the Russian occupation to be affected by the evacuation. Quarantine to be established in Newchwang against the spread of epidemics to the northern provinces. Russians only eligible for Commissionership of Customs at ports or the post of Customs Physician, under control of Inspector-General of Maritime Customs. Permanent Sanitary Board under presidency of Customs Tao-tai to be instituted.

All of these demands were not divulged at first, but what leaked out was bad enough, and diplomatic activity was stimulated to the highest pitch. China herself wished to reject the demands *in toto*, and at the same time solicited the support of England, America and Japan, which at once was promised. Russia, on the other hand, exerted all her craft and subtlety to gain her ends, but in vain. On April 29 the Chinese Government finally intimated its refusal to comply. M. Plançon, the Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*, continued to grumble, and insisted that his Government should be "reassured" that (*a*) there was no intention of assimilating the administration of Mongolia to that of China proper; (*b*) that no cession of territory to a foreign Power in the Liao River region was in contemplation; and (*c*) that no foreign consuls were to be appointed in other places in Manchuria, even with China's consent. Prince Ching told M. Plançon point-blank that there had never been any intention of ceding territory—that no alteration of the administrative system of Mongolia was for the present under consideration, and that the extent to which trade might be developed would alone decide the question of the opening of treaty ports and the appointment of consuls. M. Plançon promised the Prince that this answer, which he insisted was to be given as a note, should be transmitted to the St. Petersburg Government, and he then volunteered to state, with much apparent candour, that the delays of the evacuation had been brought about by the military party in Russia, and that this reply by the Prince would go far to allay anxiety, so that, in his opinion,

[1] Proprietory right in the *poles* remained to China, at least in theory even at Port Arthur.

Newchwang would shortly be evacuated. As will presently be seen, this proceeding was simply a farce.

The report of a movement of Russian troops towards the Korean frontier was only too true. Some time previously a timber-cutting concession had been extracted by Russia from China, as regarded the right bank of the Yalu, and from Korea as to the left, nominally on behalf of some private individuals who transferred their rights to M. Besobrazoff. But, as the world came eventually to know, Admiral Alexeieff, certain Grand Dukes, and even the highest personages in the Muscovite Empire, were implicated in this transaction. Private and public concerns were thus intermingled, and the movement of Russian troops to the Yalu banks was undoubtedly connected therewith. And though Russia had for decades coveted the Korean peninsula, it was by this means that the affairs of Manchuria and Korea were artfully blended, and the military forces were brought to bear to further the ends both of private avarice and the unscrupulous territorial aggrandisement of Russia.

As before shown, the time limit for the second stage of the evacuation of Manchuria was April 8, 1903. At Mukden the Russian troops once made a feint of evacuation; they even actually did withdraw, in part, but the remainder simply marched to the railway station and marched back again to their old quarters, without entraining. At Newchwang too, they once appeared as though they were preparing for evacuation; but the aspect of affairs suddenly changed when April 8 arrived, and it was urged in excuse for the troops' retention that the Tao-tai was not present to have the place handed over to him. This was the crowning impudence, for the Russians themselves had the Tao-tai safely in their own hands at Mukden. Simultaneously, M. Plançon was trying hard at Peking to get his demands acceded to; true, he once told Prince Ching, on the April 29, that the evacuation would probably be proceeded with; but next day the cloven hoof peeped out, for in returning to the charge with his seven demands M. Plançon allowed himself to say that if they were not acceded to there would be no evacuation at all!

From that time Russia's military activity grew apace. At the Yalu the Chunchuses were enlisted by her ostensibly

as "forest police" for the timber-cutting district, and coals and munitions of war were brought to Yongampho, at the mouth of the river, in vessels specially chartered, be it observed, by the *Russian Military authorities*. Here a settlement was quickly formed, to which was given the title of Port Nicholas, and this was used thenceforward in all official documents.

Parenthetically it may be mentioned that, in accordance with Article 11 of the Peking Protocol, England negotiated with China and concluded a new Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty in September of the preceding year, 1902. Then America, and some time afterwards Japan, were likewise in negotiation with China. As, however, the opening of Antung and Mukden was included in the project of the Chino-American Treaty, and of Ta-tung-Kau and Mukden in the Sino-Japanese Treaty, to which also a provision for the concession of a "settlement" was attached, the Russian representative at Peking repeatedly opposed it, at times indirectly, and at others directly; and as the Chinese Government was anxious first of all to see Manchuria freed from Russian domination, the definite conclusion of the Treaties was put off for a time. While these tricks were being played by Russian agents in the East, at St. Petersburg the most plausible tales were being told as usual to the Powers' representatives. Count Lamsdorff declared solemnly that no demands were being made at Peking, and that China was simply endeavouring by her tortuous diplomacy to sow discord between the Powers. At another time it was that Russia merely sought to obtain guarantees, and that there was no idea of excluding the consuls or obstructing foreign commerce.

But on May 19, on the British *Chargé d'Affaires* paying a call at the Russian Legation in Peking, it being the Tsar's birthday, M. de Plançon at once "took occasion to speak about the existing state of affairs at Newchwang. He presented that the port could not be held to be included in that part of Manchuria which should have been evacuated during the last month, since it more properly formed part of the section evacuated in October last, and was held by the Russians much as Tien-tsin was formerly held by the Powers." Needless to say, M. de Plançon's visitor was astounded at this proposition. For it had been at Russia's

own instance that Newchwang had been placed outside the sphere which formed the first part of the evacuation provided for in the Agreement. Perfidy could no farther go! M. Lessar returned to Peking, but there was no change of Russian diplomacy! And now Russia found it time to shift her ground once more, as the discrepancy between promises and actions had become too pronounced for even her lax notions of diplomatic morality. So Count Benckendorff called on the Marquis of Lansdowne in London and assured him that (*a*) whatever might be the outcome of the pending Russo-Chinese negotiations, Russia had no intention of opposing the *gradual* opening of some towns in Manchuria as commercial relations might develop, excluding, however, the right to establish "settlements." But (*b*) this declaration was not to apply to Harbin. That town, being within the limits of the concession for the "Eastern Chinese Railway," said he, was not unrestrictedly subject to China, and the establishment of foreign consuls there must depend on the consent of the Russian Government. Lord Lansdowne frankly told the Russian Ambassador that this was a qualification of Russia's previous assurances, and that the exclusion of Harbin was something quite new. Russia's representative begged that Britain would discourage Chinese opposition to Russia's demands; but Lord Lansdowne plainly said that England must first be fully informed of the nature of those demands. A few days later Count Lamsdorff, who had been informed of this answer, observed in conversation with the British *Chargé d'Affaires* that this desire for information was natural, but he could not supply it until General Kuropatkin's return from the East, whither he had been on a visit. General Kuropatkin did, in fact, at this time visit the East. He went to Japan by way of Manchuria, ostensibly on a pleasure trip only, but no doubt in reality to form his opinion of her naval and military strength and resources, and on his return westwards he called at Port Arthur, and held the now famous conference with Admiral Alexeieff and M. Besobrazoff.

On July 29, 1903, the Russian Ambassador in London once more approached Lord Lansdowne, with a view of coming to an understanding with Great Britain, saying that it might be arrived at by Russia's not opposing England in the Yang-tse Valley. To this Lord Lansdowne peremp-

torily replied that the British difficulty with Russia lay more in the Manchurian question. As to the Yang-tse Valley, his impression was that by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1897 a partial understanding had already been arrived at, and that unless the British Government were more frankly made acquainted with the terms Russia was endeavouring to obtain from China no hope existed of coming to an understanding.

At this juncture her first approach to Russia, which led to the subsequent negotiations, was made by Japan—viz. on July 28, 1903; but of this more anon.

The conference at Port Arthur had had no pacific tendency. On the contrary, whilst the Russian Ambassador was suggesting to Lord Lansdowne an utterly unacceptable *modus vivendi* on the one hand, and entering to all appearances willingly upon negotiations with Japan on the other, the Russian Government was planning the audacious *coup d'état* embodied in the Imperial ukase of August 12 (July 30, O.S.), 1903, creating a Russian vice-gerency out of the Amur and Kwan-Tung territories. By this the Tsar's representative was invested with full administrative control, the command of both military and naval forces, and supreme power for the maintenance of order and security in "the zone of the Eastern Railway of China," as well as with the duty of providing for the needs of the Russian populations in "the frontier possessions beyond the Imperial lieutenancy." He was also given control of the diplomatic relations of these provinces with neighbouring States. By the same ukase a special committee under the presidency of the Emperor was appointed to control the Viceroy, thus making the office independent of any Ministry or Department, and Admiral Alexeieff was nominated Viceroy. This, of course, was Russia's defiant intimation to the world that she meant to hold Manchuria in perpetuity.

Early in the ensuing month of September, 1903, the Russian Minister at Peking made five new demands as conditions of evacuation. Briefly these were that:—

(1) Assurances should be given by China that the three provinces should never be ceded to any other Power, nor any scrap of land therein pledged, leased, or disposed of in any way whatever.

(2) Russia should construct wharves at several points along the Sungari, and should station troops for the protection of the telegraph lines along the river and of the vessels plying thereon. Russia should

also establish stations at various points on the roads between Tsitsihar, Mergen, and Blagovestchensk.

(3) No specially heavy duty to be imposed on goods carried by railway, nor any heavier duties to be levied on goods conveyed into Manchuria by rail from one station to another than on those transported overland or by waterways.

(4) The branch offices of the Russo-Chinese Bank in various parts of Manchuria to be protected by the troops of the Tartar General of Mukden, the expense of lodging such troops to be defrayed by the Bank.

(5) Needful sanitary measures, similar to those in Shanghai and Tien-tsin, to be taken by the Chinese authorities in order to prevent the importation of plague through Newchwang; and within the territories appertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railway, Russia to adopt the necessary measures. Where the Tao-tai has charge of these measures a Russian physician to be appointed, so as to secure due accord between the steps to be taken by the Chinese and Russian authorities respectively.

The Russian Minister further demanded a prolongation of the period for evacuation, representing to Prince Ching that on these conditions Russia would withdraw her troops from Newchwang and other places within the province of Mukden on October 8, 1903, from the province of Kirin within four months, and from that of Hei-Lung-Chiang within one year. The creation of foreign settlements was still, however, objected to, and there was, according to a report emanating from a source deserving of all confidence, another proposal, designed to overthrow the provisions contained in Article VIII, section 10, of the Mackey Treaty, by the establishment of a separate Inspectorate of Customs for Manchuria, to be presided over and manned exclusively by Russian officials.

The more one examines these proposals the more one realises the gravity of their purport. Had China accepted them, as Prince Ching observed to Sir Ernest Satow, and Russia had nominally withdrawn, the Russians would still have remained in actual possession, to all intents and purposes, of Manchuria. Prince Ching, however, animated by the assurances of America, Britain, and Japan, on September 25 finally refused the Russian demands, at the same time pointing out that by a solemn convention entered into by plenipotentiaries of both Powers, and ratified by their respective Sovereigns, Russia was bound to complete the second stage of the evacuation by April 8, which in reality had already passed, and the third by

October 8, 1903. China was willing, he said, to discuss international matters needing settlement as soon as the evacuation had been completed in accord with that convention; and on October 6 the Chinese Government formally requested the Russian Minister to carry out the promised evacuation by the 8th, to which the answer given by him was that unless China accepted the Russian conditions the evacuation was not practicable.

The new Sino-American Treaty, and also the Chino-Japanese Treaty, were signed, despite Russian opposition, simultaneously with the expiration of the third term of the Manchurian evacuation, and, by virtue of these treaties, Antung, Tatungkau, and Mukden were opened to foreign commerce. China's original wish was to sign these treaties subsequently to the Russian evacuation, so as to give Russia no offence; but the Russian threat, that unless the new conditions she proposed were accepted, the evacuation would be impracticable, decided the Chinese statesmen to wait no longer.

The day that the Sino-American Treaty was signed the Russian Minister actually wrote to Prince Ching upbraiding him, and threatening that unless he reconsidered his action Russia would herself carry out the projects contained in the five proposals, and from that day forth the military and naval activities of Russia, which had been for more than half a year before incessantly pursued, were redoubled in intensity. Forts were constructed, additional warships were sent out from Europe, more troops were moved to the Korean borders, and in one way and another the Manchurian and Korean affairs were inexplicably blended and everything assumed a most warlike and menacing aspect.

On October 28 Russian troops occupied the Chinese castle and palace of Mukden, possessed themselves of the public offices and archives, and next day imprisoned the Tartar General. The castle gates were guarded by Russians, the telegraphs seized. The pretext for all this was that a Chunchus bandit, one of those enlisted by Russia for service at the Yalu, had been condemned to death for an offence against Chinese law by the Tao-tai's chief aide-de-camp. The Russians demanded that the latter should himself be beheaded and the Tao-tai dismissed.

On the Korean side of the Yalu Russian aggression became

particularly noticeable. The Government of Seoul was pressed to grant a lease of Yongampho similar to that extorted from China for Port Arthur. Telegraph lines were set up without consulting Korea at all, and, without waiting for an answer about Yongampho, forts were begun. (One of the first completed was reported at the beginning of October, by a military *attaché* sent from the Japanese Legation at Seoul to investigate matters, to be twenty metres in height, with three embrasures for guns.) Koreans having business connexions with Japanese were arrested without cause, timber which the Japanese residents had found floating down the Yalu and had brought to bank for their own use was violently wrested from them on the plea that every fragment belonged of right to the Russian concessionnaires, and things had become so unbearable to the Japanese that they were preparing to quit when Mr. Hagiwara, Secretary of the Japanese Legation at Seoul, was despatched to investigate and report on the condition of affairs in general. The Russians refused to let him land at Yongampho from the steamer, and he was obliged to return with his mission unachieved, though later on the Russian Minister at Seoul acknowledged that his people had been indiscreet. All these high-handed proceedings could have no other object than that of securing the Russian position beforehand, in defiance of international obligations and solemn pledges, as well as the convention which had existed between Russia and Japan concerning Korea, and with the express purpose of driving Japan to extremities. Both the United States and Japan had strongly advocated the opening of Yongampho to the trade of all nations. The opinion of the British representative at Seoul was similar; but this course was systematically and strenuously opposed by Russia, who, at the same time, had no scruple in practising all sorts of intrigue with, the unscrupulous section of the Korean officials.

We now come to the stage of the purely Russo-Japanese negotiations, of which I will in this place merely give the substance in brief outline.

Japan had always, from time immemorial, possessed large interests in Korea, and it was in the determination to uphold her rights there that she did not hesitate to throw down the gauntlet to the Chinese ten years ago, at a time

when China's naval and military strength was considered by many to be far superior to that of Japan. She staked her existence on the result then, and she has done so now for much the same cause, with the additional reason that she has interests in Manchuria likewise which she cannot afford to sacrifice. More than all, the presence of any foreign Power in Manchuria tends to become a constant menace to Korea, and the territorial integrity of the peninsular kingdom is absolutely indispensable to Japan's safety. Russia's ambitions had for years run counter to this, and thus it was that in Japan there was perpetual anxiety and unrest. When matters in Manchuria and Korea began to assume the unmistakable character which has been described in the foregoing pages, and which was totally at variance with all the pledges Russia had given, not to Japan alone, but to the whole world, and also with the two Agreements which had been arrived at between Russia and Japan some years before concerning Korea, and which were still in actual force, it was high time that Japan paid some attention to her own interests and allowed herself to be actuated by the instinct of self-preservation. She therefore addressed herself to Russia direct, in the early autumn of 1903, and sought to open up negotiations with the aim of bringing about a more desirable condition of things both in Korea and Manchuria, in order that the advantages of a permanent peace might be secured for all.

Japan was willing from the first to recognize Russia's special interests in Manchuria so far as they had been acquired by legitimate means, but she desired that Russia should keep her word by entering into an international compact with Japan to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China in respect of those provinces, as being vital to Japan's special position in Korea, and which, in its turn, was vital to the Japanese Empire's own existence.

Japan's demands were presented only when the most careful consideration had been given to every phase of the question, and after the interests of other Powers as well as her own had been taken into account. Russia had all along perfectly understood Japan's position, and there was absolutely nothing in the Japanese demands that was new or extravagant. In their extreme moderation they scarcely satisfied the aspirations of the nation, but it was the Govern-

ment's aim to avoid any disturbance of the peace of the Far East. Russia had pledged herself, in her various communications at different times to the Powers, to accord practically everything that Japan asked for, but when it came to a request that the Russian avowals should be embodied in an international compact she practically ignored all. After this barefaced avowal it was plain to Japan that Russia would have to be kept up to the mark if the promises that had been given so freely were not to become a dead letter.

The negotiations were by Russia made to drag on month by month, whilst she was unremitting in her efforts to strengthen her armaments in the Far East by land and sea, until Japan's patience was exhausted and an answer to her final inquiry was requested by a certain day, the only response being a further irritating postponement.

I have now, I hope, fairly set forth in this and the preceding chapter all that is necessary to show how Russia brought on war. My aim has been to show how she was prolific in self-denying ordinances, but resolute in her practice of ignoring them as soon as they could be supposed to have served her turn; how her procedure throughout these negotiations had been to bring the traditional diplomacy of Western Europe into discredit, and reduce its international importance to the level of a cynical farce; how while ostentatiously flourishing the olive branch with her left hand she had been slapping the right over pockets that would scarcely contain the plunder derived from the hugging and squeezing manœuvres in relation to the dispirited Chinese government which we have in this and the preceding chapter attempted without the least unfairness or exaggeration to describe. And from all this I deduce that the (just concluded) war in the Far East was not in reality a conflict which had arisen merely out of a dispute between the two combatants. It was rather to be ascribed to the general revolt of all the civilized peoples of the earth against the perfidy and insincerity of Russia, who for many years past has sought to outwit and overreach the other Powers. It was because Japan felt all along that her interests, more than those of any other country, were involved, and because China's helplessness to cope with her own calamity placed her beside the question, that Japan, little as she is, at last resolved that she would take up the cudgels, and was content to do battle

with Russia single-handed, in advance of the other nations whose prospects were similarly jeopardized. It cannot be too often pointed out that in so doing Japan risked her very existence as a nation, and this is why we demand so boldly, as I am sure we are entitled to do, the common sympathy of the world at large in our huge undertaking, on which we embarked in the interests of justice and humanity. It is my proud privilege to perceive that, excepting in certain quarters, which have had reasons of their own for the attitude they adopt, this sympathy has from the very beginning been cordially and almost universally extended to us.

# CHAPTER V

## FIRST HOSTILITIES

### JAPAN AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR WITH RUSSIA[1]

AMONG other questions raised by an article from the pen of Sir John Macdonell, in *The Nineteenth Century and After* for July, 1904, on "The Present War," there is one especially upon which a few observations from a Japanese point of view might seem to deserve permanent record in this place.

Sir John Macdonell appears to think that our attack came to Russia as a surprise, and was therefore unjustifiable; and whilst he makes reservations on account of his lack of accurate information concerning the actual state of affairs at the commencement of the war, he proceeds to argue that it was a nice point whether the negotiations had or had not, on February 8 or 9 last, reached a stage at which discussion had really been abandoned, and both sides had resolved to accept the arbitrament of battle. Sir John seems to consider that notice should be given to an adversary, before beginning a war, that hostilities have become inevitable.

I will not say anything about the fact that the first shot was fired by the Russians on the Japanese vessels at Chemulpho; nor is it my intention to enter upon any justification of Japan's course of action on the common theory of international law, or on the basis of the prevailing practice in such cases, of which Russia herself is one of the most significant examples,—for it could easily be shown, with the aid of nineteenth century precedents, that a formal declaration is not needed to constitute a state of war. On the contrary, I rather appreciate Sir John's contention that no blows

[1] '*The Nineteenth Century and After*,' August 1904.

should be struck without adequate warning, or while diplomatists are still debating the matters in dispute. And it is my desire to prove that Japan, far from taking her enemy unawares, did actually do precisely as Sir John Macdonell is anxious to show she ought to have done, and that, in the sense of his comment on the operations, there was no room for the Russians to be surprised in any degree whatever.

I will first endeavour to demonstrate the truth of this proposition by recalling the successive stages of those negotiations which culminated in hostilities; but it is unnecessary to dwell upon the earlier part of the diplomatic correspondence, nor is it worth while to enlarge either on the flagrant neglect of Russia to fulfil her own pledges, or on the persistency with which she sought to (the expression may be pardoned, since there is no other term that applies equally well) make a fool of Japan throughout the protracted negotiations. It may suffice to point out that, from the very nature of those negotiations, any failure to arrive at a satisfactory understanding was tantamount to an admission that war was inevitable.

The most acute phase was reached in November, 1903, as was plainly indicated in the telegram despatched on the 21st of that month to Mr. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg, by Baron Komura, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of Tokio, in which the following passage occurs:—

> Baron Rosen added that he had not yet received any instructions on the subject of the counter-proposals, consequently you are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and after explaining to him Baron Rosen's statements, as above, you will say that *the Japanese Government are anxious to proceed with the negotiations with all possible expedition*, and you will urge him to exert his influence to secure the early despatch of instructions to Baron Rosen, in order that negotiations may be resumed and concluded without delay.

This view was, of course, communicated to the Russian Foreign Minister, and after further futile endeavours on Japan's part to elicit an early reply, Baron Komura telegraphed to Mr. Kurino on December 1, 1903, again urging the importance of a speedy solution of the question at issue, in yet more plain-spoken fashion; and he wound up his despatch thus:—

In these circumstances the Japanese Government cannot but regard with grave concern the situation, for which the delays in the negotiations are largely responsible. You are instructed to see Count Lamsdorff as soon as possible, and place the foregoing considerations before him in such form and manner as to make your representations as impressive as possible. You will add that the Japanese Government believe they are rendering a service to the general interest in thus frankly explaining to the Russian Government the actual state of things.

When Mr. Kurino made these representations, which could scarcely have been more explicit, to Count Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister said that " he would fully explain the urgency of the matter on the occasion of his audience on the following Tuesday " ; but things in reality were made to drag on, and the Russian preference for the game of diplomatic seesaw was exemplified to the full, until at last, on December 23, when three whole weeks had been frittered away, Mr. Kurino, reporting to Baron Komura an interview which he had just had with Count Lamsdorff, thus ended his despatch : —

In conclusion, I stated to him that under the circumstances it might cause serious difficulties, even complications, if we failed to come to an *entente*, and I hoped he would exercise his best influence so as to enable us to reach the desired end.

On January 6, 1904, a Russian reply was handed at Tokio by Baron Rosen to Baron Komura, but in substance it amounted to little more than a repetition, save for mere changes of wording, of what had gone before, and the attitude of Russia, it was plain, had undergone no sensible alteration. Speaking candidly, there was an end to all hope ; but the Government of Tokio, still willing to exert itself, and even to make some concession, again invited the Russian Government, on January 13, to reconsider the matter, in terms which, though conciliatory enough, constituted practically an ultimatum. In the despatch conveying this decision to the Russian Government the subjoined phrase occurred :—

The grounds for these amendments having been frequently and fully explained on previous occasions, the Imperial Government do not think it necessary to repeat the explanations. It is sufficient here to express their earnest hope for reconsideration by the Imperial Russian Government.

And again :—

The above-mentioned amendments being proposed by the Imperial Government entirely in a spirit of conciliation, it is expected that they will be received in the same spirit at the hands of the Imperial Russian Government ; and the Imperial Government further hope for an early reply from the Imperial Russian Government, since further delay in the solution of the question will be extremely disadvantageous to the two countries.

Even in the face of such earnest representations of the danger of procrastination Russia still dallied, and on January 23 and 26, 1904, Baron Komura successively telegraphed to Mr. Kurino, pressing for a prompt response. In one of the telegrams Mr. Kurino was instructed to seek an interview with Count Lamsdorff and state to him, as a direct instruction received from the Japanese Government, that,

in the opinion of the Imperial Government, a further prolongation of the present state of things being calculated to accentuate the gravity of the situation, it is their earnest hope that they will be honoured with an early reply, and that they wish to know at what time they may expect to receive the reply.

On January 28 Mr. Kurino reported to Baron Komura his interview with Count Lamsdorff, in which he explains how

He (Count Lamsdorff) stated that the Grand Duke Alexis and the Minister of Marine are to be received in audience next Monday, and the Minister of War and himself on Tuesday, and he thinks an answer will be sent to Admiral Alexeieff on the latter day. I pointed out the urgent necessity to accelerate the despatch of an answer as much as possible, " because *further prolongation of the present condition is not only undesirable, but rather dangerous.*" I added that all the while the world is loud with rumours, and that I hoped he would take special steps so as to have an answer sent at an earlier date than mentioned. He replied that " *he knows the existing condition of things very well,* but that the dates of audience being fixed as above mentioned, it is not now possible to change them " ; and he repeated that " he will do his best to send the reply next Tuesday, (February 2)."

Upon this Baron Komura, still anxious beyond measure to avoid the risks attendant upon these indefinite conditions, again telegraphed, on January 30, to Mr. Kurino to see Count Lamsdorff at the earliest opportunity and state to him that ;

Having reported to your Government that the Russian Government would probably give a reply on next Tuesday, you have been instructed to say to Count Lamsdorff that, being fully convinced of the serious disadvantage to the two Powers concerned of the further prolongation of the present situation, the Imperial Government hoped that they might be able to receive the reply of the Russian Government earlier than the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff. As it, however, appears that the receipt of the reply at an earlier date is not possible, the Imperial Government wish to know whether they will be honoured with the reply at the date mentioned by Count Lamsdorff, namely, next Tuesday (February 2), or, if it is not possible, what will be the exact date on which the reply is to be given.

On the evening of January 31 Mr. Kurino saw Count Lamsdorff, who said that he

*fully appreciated the gravity of the present situation*, and was certainly desirous to send an answer as quickly as possible, but that the question was a very serious one and not lightly to be dealt with. The opinions of the Ministers concerned and of Admiral Alexeieff had to be brought into harmony—hence the delay. As to the date of sending an answer, it was not possible for him to give the exact date, as it entirely depended on the decision of the Emperor, though he would not fail to use his efforts to hurry the matter.

It was not until the *fifth* day after this interview which Mr. Kurino had with Count Lamsdorff, and the *third* day after the reply had been once virtually promised to be given, namely, on February 5, 1904, at 2.15 p.m., that Baron Komura telegraphed to Mr. Kurino as follows :—

Further prolongation of the present situation being inadmissible, the Imperial Government have decided to terminate the pending negotiations and to take such independent action as they may deem necessary to defend their menaced position and to protect their rights and interests. Accordingly, you are instructed to address to Count Lamsdorff, immediately upon receipt of this telegram, a signed Note to the following effect :—

"The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to address to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias the following communication :—

"The Government of H.M. the Emperor of Japan regard the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Korea as essential to their own repose and safety, and they are consequently unable to view with indifference any action tending to render the position of Korea insecure.

"The successive rejections by the Imperial Russian Government, by means of inadmissible amendments, of Japan's proposals respect-

ing Korea, the adoption of which the Imperial Government regarded as indispensable to assure the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire and to safeguard Japan's preponderating interests in the peninsula, coupled with the successive refusals of the Imperial Russian Government to enter into engagements to respect China's territorial integrity in Manchuria, which is seriously menaced by their continual occupation of the province, notwithstanding their treaty engagements with China and their repeated assurances to other Powers possessing interests in those regions, have made it necessary for the Imperial Government seriously to consider what measures of self-defence they are called upon to take.

"In the presence of delays which remain largely unexplained, and naval and military activities which it is difficult to reconcile with entirely pacific aims, the Imperial Government have exercised in the pending negotiations a degree of forbearance which they believe affords abundant proof of their loyal desire to remove from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government every cause for future misunderstanding; but, finding in their efforts no prospect of securing from the Imperial Russian Government an adhesion either to Japan's moderate and unselfish proposals, or to any other proposals likely to establish a firm and enduring peace in the Extreme East, the Imperial Government have no alternative than to terminate the present futile negotiations.

"In adopting that course the Imperial Government reserve to themselves the right to take such independent action as they may deem best to consolidate and defend their menaced position, as well as to protect their established rights and legitimate interests."

Simultaneously with the presentation of this note Mr. Kurino was instructed to address Count Lamsdorff in writing to the following effect:—

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary, etc., etc., has the honour, in pursuance of instructions from his Government, to acquiant H.E. the Minister for Foreign Affairs, etc., etc., that the Imperial Government of Japan, having exhausted, without effect, every means of conciliation, with a view to the removal from their relations with the Imperial Russian Government of every cause for future complications, and finding that their just representations and moderate and unselfish proposals in the interest of a firm and lasting peace in the Extreme East are not receiving the consideration which is their due, have resolved to sever their diplomatic relations with the Imperial Russian Government, which for the reason named have ceased to possess any value.

In further fulfilment of the command of his Government, the undersigned has also the honour to announce to H. E. Count Lamsdorff that it is his intention to take his departure from St. Petersburg, with the staff of the Imperial Legation.

These Notes were presented to Count Lamsdorff by Mr. Kurino on February 6, at 4 p.m., and on the same day

Baron Komura conveyed a formal intimation to Baron Rosen, in Tokio, in the sense that

Whereas the Japanese Government had made every effort to arrive at an amicable settlement of the Manchurian question with Russia, the latter had not evinced any disposition to reciprocate this peaceful purpose. Therefore Japan could not continue the diplomatic conferences. She was regretfully compelled to take independent action for the protection of her rights and interests, and she must decline to accept the responsibility of any incidents that might occur in consequence.

A dispassionate perusal of all the foregoing despatches cannot fail to lead the student of history to the conclusion that repeated warnings were given by Japan in the successive stages of the negotiations, and that the last two despatches, dated Feburary 5, left absolutely no room for doubt that Japan had finally, though reluctantly, arrived at the conclusion that war was inevitable. The wording is polite, but who can doubt that it was a clear notice of war ?

I must go farther than this; and it will, I think, be equally plain when I have finished that not only had Japan made up her mind upon this point, but that Russia by her actions—which "speak louder than words"—conclusively manifested that her intentions were warlike too. First, let me mention that the day on which Count Lamsdorff had led Mr. Kurino to expect that the reply would be ready was Tuesday, February 2. The day on which negotiations were finally broken off was Saturday, February 6. On the intervening Thursday the Russian fleet at Port Arthur suddenly emerged from harbour and steamed out for hours to the south-eastward, ultimately returning to port. For what purpose this cruise was undertaken could not be divined, but it created of necessity intense excitement and anxiety in Japan, where it was interpreted as the prelude to some desperate measure, and the activity of the Russian naval squadron, thus exemplified, is wholly inconsistent with the theory of unpreparedness. It should be remembered that for a long time before this Russia had been pouring regiment after regiment into Manchuria, her Cossacks had invaded Korea, warship after warship had been despatched from Western waters to reinforce the fleet which she already had in Far Eastern seas, and in her diplomacy

she had displayed a persistent arrogance which contrasted strongly with the conciliatory attitude of Japan.

But this is not all. At the moment when Admiral Togo actually made his attack *the Russian ships lay outside the harbour in a perfect battle array*, in front of the shore forts and batteries of the fortress, a position that they had taken up on their return from their cruise to the south-eastward. Wherein was the unpreparedness? If the officers of the Russian ships were caught in an unguarded moment, blame must not be imputed to the Japanese. The cause must rather be sought in a misconception on the part of the Russians of the watchful strategy which the situation demanded. The facts are, moreover, that the Russian ships had lain under a full head of steam for days off the Port Arthur entrance, had been continually using their searchlights as though they apprehended an attack, the battleships had their decks cleared for action, and the instant that the first torpedo was launched the Russians opened fire on the Japanese boats.

These remarks should alone suffice to show that Russia was *not* taken by surprise; but I will show a few well-authenticated figures in addition. Her warlike preparations in the Far East had been going on from the previous April, when she ought by right to have been completing the evacuation of Manchuria in accordance with her solemn pledges. In the remaining months of 1903 she despatched to Far Eastern waters

| | Combined Tonnage. |
|---|---|
| Three battleships | 38,488 |
| One armoured cruiser | 7,727 |
| Five other cruisers | 26,417 |
| Seven destroyers | 2,450 |
| One gunboat | 1,344 |
| Two mine-laying crafts | 6,000 |

Seven other destroyers were sent by rail to Port Arthur and there put together, and two vessels of the "Volunteer" Fleet were armed and hoisted the Russian naval ensign at Vladivostok.

On land the increase of the Russian forces was equally marked. The known augmentations, subsequent to the end of June, 1903, were two infantry brigades, two artillery battalions, and a large force of cavalry. The total was

continually being increased by troops being sent by train from Russia, up to 40,000, and plans were made for despatching over 200,000 more men. In October a train of fourteen cars was hurriedly sent off, laden with the equipment of a field hospital.

On January 21 two battalions of infantry and a detachment of cavalry were sent from Port Arthur and Dalny to menace the northern frontier of Korea. On January 28 Admiral Alexeieff gave to the Russian forces then stationed in the vicinity of the Yalu River orders to prepare for war. Troops were advanced in large numbers at the same time from Liao-Yang towards the Yalu. And on February 1 the military commandant at Vladivostok formally requested the Japanese Commercial Agent at that port, by order of the Russian Government, to notify Japan that a state of siege might be proclaimed at any moment. This was five days, be it observed, before Japan broke off diplomatic relations.

Sir John Macdonell says :—

> It [the first torpedoing the Russian vessels] was an attack of surprise. Was it a treacherous and disloyal act ? The question must be put with the knowledge that a nation which is patient may be duped ; that the first blow counts much ; and that under cover of continuing negotiations a country unprepared might deprive another better equipped of its advantages.

All that I have said above would be sufficient to solve these points of the question. The attack on Port Arthur was not an attack of surprise in the sense of international law. It can be at the most spoken of as an attack of tactical surprise, though it was not also the case. The party who was defeated can complain of it no more than he can complain of the defeat of the Yalu or Kinchow. The Russian plan was to deprive Japan of her chance, and either to bluff her off to the end or to fight at the hour of their own choice. Japan was patient enough ; if she were patient longer she would have been completely duped. As a matter of fact, there was some report that the plan of the Russians was to make a sudden raid on Japan on about February 20, and that was not at all improbable. Some Russians say that Russia never meant to go to war, and that the very fact that she was not at all prepared to cope with a little nation like Japan is the best proof of it. This does not follow at

all, and nothing is more foreign to the fact than to imagine that Russia was sincerely anxious to maintain peace. In the eyes of the Russians there was no such Japan as they have, or rather the world has, begun to see since the opening of the war. They trusted, no doubt, either to be able to bluff through or to crush us at a blow if necessary. Even in the battle of the Yalu, nay, even in the battle of Kinchow, or Wafangu, they were unable to believe that the Japanese were not after all "yellow monkeys" Only a little time ago an eminent French statesman told me that France understood Japan little, Russia still less; and that it was the sole cause of the present unfortunate war. "In that respect," he continued, "England was sharper, for she understood the Far East, and, consequently, the changing circumstances of the world, before any other Occidental nation." There is, I believe, a good deal in it.

36052

# BOOK II

# A Nation in Training

# CHAPTER I

## THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION INTO JAPAN[1]

THE Spanish and Portuguese who first entered Japan some three hundred years ago left nothing to mark their stay in the way of civilization. It is true they made a large number of Christian converts at the time, and it is said that the art of building castles in Japan owes a great deal to the suggestions of these visitors. But the country soon after became entirely closed to all foreigners. The establishment of a factory by the British East India Company in its early days proved the reverse of successful from a commercial point of view and had to be abandoned. The Dutch alone were allowed periodically to come to the port of Nagasaki, where there was a small settlement at which they were allowed to trade, mainly by exchanging their European goods for the products of Japan. There were, of course, a certain number of interpreters in Nagasaki, but they only learnt to carry on conversation to a degree sufficient to permit of the transaction of business between the Dutch and the natives. None of these interpreters studied Dutch with any linguistic method, in fact, they were forbidden to read and study books; hence, of course, they could acquire no real insight into European science and knowledge.

From the early part of the eighteenth century, however, things became very different. Tokugawa Yoshimune became the eighth Shogun of the Tokugawa line in the year 1716. He was a clever, enlightened person, and he took a considerable interest in matters relating to the West, including the system of Astronomy and the European Calendar. He

[1] The English original of an article which appeared in the Christmas Number, 1904, of *Wiener Tageblatt*.

cancelled the prohibition of the importation of Dutch books, though the introduction of books on religion was still forbidden. From that time the Dutch language gradually came to be studied scientifically and grammatically, though among a very limited circle. There is a book called *The Commencement of Studies in Dutch*, which lays bare all the difficulties which those who began to study Dutch books met with in getting at the proper meaning of Dutch words. The book was written by one who had surmounted the obstacles, and it therefore is authentic and very interesting. It states that a certain number of them, meeting together from time to time, laboriously plodded through some elementary Dutch books. I remember one incident that was narrated where they had with great difficulty made out the meaning of a certain word X. They found out that the nose was X and the refuse piled in the corners of gardens were X, and hence they concluded that X was an adjective which described the shape of something which was a little elevated. By such a process as this they sought to make out the meaning of words, one after another. The European ideas which first took root in Japan were those appertaining to medical science. The men who first studied the Dutch language were as a consequence medical practitioners. The medical science of Japan was originally based upon the Chinese system, but as time went on the Western system supplanted it, and Dutch methods came into vogue, though only on a comparatively limited scale. There grew to be two systems of medicine practised side by side, one being called the Chinese system (kampo) the other the Dutch system (rampo). Little by little the sphere of the Dutch study extended itself, and a knowledge of that language came to be utilized for other purposes, chiefly in obtaining European intelligence. The next European idea to be introduced into Japan was that of matters military, though natural philosophy was by no means neglected. As is well known, from the latter part of the eighteenth century European ships began to make periodical appearances along the Asiatic sea coast, Japan not being any exception, until at last the tidings of the European invasion of China were brought to Japan. This being a rather alarming state of things, questions regarding the defensive measures of the country came to be discussed among the officials of the

Government and the different feudal lords. With this, of course, there arose the desire of knowing more about the military systems of Europeans; and men who had studied Dutch primarily for medical purposes came to be utilized as translators of those Dutch books which treated of such subjects as the drilling, training or composition of companies or regiments, or even of tactics and strategy. These books were not easily obtainable, nor were translations easy after the books had been procured, but strenuous endeavours were made to undertake all these matters. This fact will also account for the circumstance that our best soldiers and statesmen of those days were often originally medical students.

I remember reading in a French work something about the discovery of a book on tactics, translated from the Dutch in the camp of the Chosiu men after the bombardment of Shimonoseki, and of the amazement it created. But it was nothing surprising at all that such a volume should have been found. Japan was officially opened to foreign intercourse just about fifty years ago, and people generally think that no European ideas had found their way into Japan before then, so that they are led to express their astonishment at the great change which has been made during the last thirty or forty years. But history, to be exact, must differ a great deal from what people are apt to imagine the facts to have been. It is true that Dutch influence was not very extensive, but it was enough to give the general public of Japan a good start on the road to the introduction of European civilization whenever they came to make up their minds to effect a change.

I will explain a little further. The headquarters of Dutch study, which was inaugurated in the manner stated above, was in Yedo (now Tokio), the seat of the Government of the Shogun, far away from the Dutch settlement in Nagasaki. There were, naturally enough, no Dutchmen there to study with, though among those Japanese who were most eager students some may have gone at one time or another to Nagasaki, where they perhaps had the advantage of meeting here and there with the Dutch interpreters, or, on rare occasions, with even the Dutchmen themselves. I remember that I once personally heard the late Mr. Mitsukuri, a Dutch scholar, father of Professor Mitsukuri, who

is now teaching in our university, telling about the difficulty he met with in learning foreign languages in his youth. In those days steel pens were as valuable to scholars as a jewel might be to a lady. If one such pen were by chance given to a student by some friend who had returned from a visit to Nagasaki he was in those days prone to consider it a handsome present and to treasure it with such tender care that it would be sedulously polished whenever it became rusty, and this process would be repeated over and over again. Mr. Mitsukuri actually did this himself; he also told me that he had to copy the Dutch Dictionary "zooff." Mr. Mitsukuri of whom I am speaking—mind, there were several Mitsukuris—would be some eighty years of age if he were living now, so the period he spoke of as his youth would be some fifty or sixty years ago. From what he thus told me, we can well imagine how much more difficult things must have been in the days which precede his time by many decades of years.

I will here mention some of the earlier and more important circumstances in the history of Japan's approximation to Western ideas. In 1725 some medical materials were manufactured according to the Western method. In 1744 Aoki Bunzo, a scholar and retainer of the Shogun, was ordered to study Dutch, and the next year the Dutch interpreters at Nagasaki were allowed to read and study Dutch books. This was after the lapse of 108 years, during which time the interpreters had been forbidden to read any Western books whatever. In 1757 Sugita Gempaku advocated and practised the Western surgical treatment. In 1759 Hiraga Gennai propagated the study of electricity. In 1771 the same Sugita mentioned above translated from the Dutch *The New Treatise on Anatomy*. This was the period when a group of medical men devoted themselves to the study of Dutch, as above described. Anatomical practice also commenced from about this period. In 1783 *Rangaku-Kaitei* (the ladder to Dutch study) was written by Otsuki Gentaku. In 1785 the *Bankoku-Zusetsu* (illustrated description of the world), and the *Komo-Zatsuwa* (Miscellaneous talks relating to the Dutch) were published. In 1787 the *Kaikoku-Heidan* (Discourse on the military necessities of a sea-girt country) was written by Rin-Shihei.

About this period the art of copper engraving and of oil-painting were introduced by Shiba-Kokan and Denzen, simultaneously but independently. They both acquired these arts at Nagasaki. In 1796 the Dutch Dictionary Harma (?) was translated into the Japanese. The translation of a Dutch medical book with the title of the *Naikwa-Senyo* by Udagawa Genzui was also published about this period. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the famous map of Japan with the longitudes and latitudes was completed by Ino Chiukei, it having cost him eighteen years' labour, and a "Complete Map of the World" was also published by him. In 1808 the Shogun Government issued an order whereby the official interpreters of Nagasaki were required to study both the Russian and English languages. In 1801 a public office of translation was created by the Shogun Government for the purpose of translating Western documents and books, and Otsuki Gentaku, Baba Sajiuro, and Utugawa Gensin and others were appointed as translators. Here the Dutch scholars began to be valued for something else than their medical professional pursuits.

After this period the works of the Dutch scholars multiplied themselves as the appearance of the "black ships" of the West became more frequent, especially with the American advent in the Far East, followed by several European Powers in the middle of the nineteenth century, which put the country in a commotion, and Japan came to be divided between two opinions concerning the "opening" thereof. It would be too tedious to give here any further lists of the work done by these famous scholars. Come what might, however, the superiority of Western arms and Western arts of war was recognized on all sides, and hence the Dutch scholars became very useful in translating Dutch books on military matters into Japanese. Notwithstanding all this, it must not be imagined that students of Dutch always enjoyed an enviable position. It was just a little before the American advent that Takano and Koseki, two Dutch scholars, had to commit Hara-kiri in implication with Watanabe Kwasan for their advocacy of the policy of opening the country. Even after that time the Dutch scholars often had very hard times of it, owing to the political animosities aroused.

Towards the latter part of the Tokugawa regime the

Japanese themselves began to visit Western countries. In the year 1860 a mission was sent to America by the Shogun. It was then that a Japanese man-of-war of the Western type was despatched to San Francisco under the command of Japanese officers, with Kimura as their chief. In 1862 some youths, including Katsu (afterwards Count) and Yenomoto (afterwards Viscount) were sent to Holland, partly to superintend the construction of a couple of men-of-war, partly to study naval affairs. In 1863 a number of young students were sent to England by the Shogun. This was followed by the despatch in the next few years of some more of these students to England, France, and Russia. Hayashi (now Viscount Hayashi) and Kikuchi (now Baron) Kikuchi were among those who were thus sent to England. About this time several missions, one after the other, were undertaken to Europe.

It was not, however, the Shogun Government alone that sent students abroad. Satsuma and Chosiu, two clans which championed the cause of the restoration of the Imperial régime, also sent some. In 1863 five Chosiu students arrived in London. They were the pioneers of ordinary Japanese students who studied abroad. They all distinguished themselves in the service of their country on their return, Ito (Marquis) and Inouye (Count) being the greatest of them. Before their departure for England, Ito, Inouye, and most of his comrades were vehement adherents of the anti-foreign party; in fact, their entire clan of Chosiu was conspicuously so. But somehow or other they came to think that it was better for them to see the real condition of the West before they went too far, and Mr. Sufu (father of Baron Sufu, the present governor of Kanagawa), who was the most influential statesman of that clan, entertained the same view, which likewise was held by Murata (afterwards Omura, a Dutch scholar, and founder of the Japanese army). It is said that when Sufu decided to send them abroad he said he was going to make a few "living machines" in England for the future service of the country, and there exists a letter written by Ito, on the eve of their departure, in the name of himself and his comrade, stating that "they entreat the government of the clan to pardon them for costing it so much money on their account as they are sure to become good living machines,"

and so they proved themselves. Three more of the Chosiu students were sent to England a little over a year after these five left; but one of the three returned home from Shanghai for some reason or other and one died in England. In the course of a few years after the Chosiu students were sent abroad, Satsuma also sent a number, most of whom also distinguished themselves afterwards in the service of the country. Among these the names of Sameshima and Mori must be well remembered by many Westerners, as they were at one time and another our Ministers in America, England, and France. Satsuma also sent a mission, independently of the Shogun Government, to the grand Exhibition of 1867 held in Paris.

In those days much progress had been made in learning several Western languages, and also in introducing Western ideas, especially in medicine and in matters pertaining to the army and navy. Amongst the Europeans who did much in promoting learning, the names of Von Siebold and Baudin will ever be remembered.

It was, however, after the inauguration of the new imperial régime that the whole nation went heart and soul into the adoption of European modes and ideas of enlightenment, although there was still much difficulty in the way. One of the first utterances of the Emperor was his solemn oath to seek wisdom and intelligence from all nations and to cast off old and out-of-date notions of our own. Competent instructors were enlisted from America, Britain, France, and Germany, nay, also from other European states. Our countrymen, officials and students alike, were also despatched to Western countries to seek whatever good they could gather in those countries, to be utilized for our land. The governments and people of those countries were far from being slack in assisting our country's efforts to advance herself in this direction. And thus Japan began her great work of transforming herself on the basis of Western civilization—a task by no means unarduous. Yet we are now told in many quarters in Europe that we are to be despised because we have been so diligent in following the instruction of our teachers and in seeking to emulate the progress of the Western Powers. Let me ask, in conclusion, is this quite fair?

# CHAPTER II

## LEGAL STATUS OF FOREIGNERS IN JAPAN.[1]

### I

IT is now fifty years since Japan gave up her seclusion from the world and concluded in the course of a few years (i.e. 1854 and after) treaties of peace and commerce with the Western nations one after another. Up to 1899, however, the foreigners had the privilege of settling in Japan only in a limited sphere within a narrow radius of the five ports which were opened for foreign trade. In those days foreigners had their own jurisdiction; that is to say, their Consular agents exercised jurisdiction over their respective countrymen by the privilege of the treaties—in other words, all foreigners coming to Japan had extra-territoriality. They had no right, on the other hand, of travelling in the interior beyond a certain compass unless a passport were given by special permission. In the open ports where they had settled they had their own local administration in their own hands. In 1899, when the new revised treaties between the Powers and Japan came into force, all these things changed. Foreigners now may not only travel in any part of Japan they like, but may also reside and do their business anywhere. On the other hand, however, they have no longer extra-territoriality; the Consular jurisdiction has been given up. They have no longer communal administration of their own; this also has been given up entirely into the hands of the Japanese authorities. It may under the circumstances be of some interest to examine what is the exact status of the foreigners in Japan.

Broadly speaking, the status of the foreigners in Japan

[1] The English original of an article which appeared in the Easter number (1905) of the *Wiener Tageblatt.*

is almost identical with that which the Westerners have in another country among themselves. The *lex loci* of Japan governs every person who finds himself in the lands of Japan. Therefore, if any foreigner commits any offence punishable by the law of Japan, he will be arrested, prosecuted, and punished accordingly by the Courts of Japan. Of course he has the right of appeal, etc., exactly as has any Japanese. In civil matters also he has the same rights and obligations as Japanese subjects, except in some special matters of which I will speak presently. This principle is enunciated in the first part of the civil code where an Article is formulated, thus :—

> Foreigners enjoy civil rights except in the cases where exceptional provision is made by law or in treaty.

The term "civil rights" of course implies civil obligations as well. All foreigners, therefore, may sue, and be sued, in Japanese courts. They may possess or dispose of property; they may set up business establishments and sell or buy commercial articles; they may acquire shares in different companies, and be partners in business. Therefore, roughly speaking, they have all fields of enterprise open to them. The first exception wherein a difference is made between foreigners and Japanese subjects, is that no real ownership of land is allowed to foreigners. This is laid down in the terms of the treaties. They may, however, acquire possession of lands on a long lease for any number of years, which practically, therefore, is almost the same as real ownership. Foreigners, as I said before, may form a company in Japan according to the Japanese laws, so long as no real ownership of land is acquired, and, moreover, they may be partners in a company possessing real ownership of land if the company be formed in conjunction with Japanese subjects. This has been interpreted in this way in the diplomatic notes attached to the German-Japanese treaty, which hold good, of course, with subjects of any other treaty Powers. In extreme cases it amounts to this, that so long as there be one Japanese subject among them, a company with rights to acquire the ownership of land may be formed by foreigners. In mining concessions it is expressly provided by law that they can be granted only to Japanese subjects and companies formed according to Japanese laws. From this it results

that no foreign individual may acquire mining concessions, but he may be a partner in a company which works mines; in other words, foreigners may be partners with Japanese, or may possess shares in a Japanese mining company. There are some banking and shipping companies in which foreigners cannot participate. This is done either directly by law or by the constitution of the company, which is subject to the approval of the Government. This prohibition, however, is connected with some special kinds of companies for obvious reasons, and their number is few. Thus in the case of the N.Y. Steamship Company, foreigners may not become partners, because the company is subsidized by the Government, and it is not thought wise to subsidize foreign shareholders. In the case of banks, there are a few banks which are under the special protection of the Government. Foreigners cannot profit themselves by becoming participators in them. This kind of exceptoin exists, and with reason, in almost all countries. With regard to private railways, it has been held by the military authorities that it is not desirable to allow foreigners to become shareholders, for military reasons. The danger of foreign influence becoming predominant in such an undertaking was felt to be one that could not with safety be ignored. With these exceptions all foreigners who go to Japan may be regarded as having exactly the same civil rights in every matter as Japanese subjects.

## II

There are several methods by which foreigners may become Japanese subjects. The first of these methods is, of course, naturalization. The law relating to naturalization in Japan does not in principle differ much from those prevailing among the Western nations. Any foreigner may naturalize in Japan by permission of the Minister of the Interior. The conditions for doing so are as follows :—

1. That one has a continuous domicile in Japan for more than five years.
2. That one is more than twenty years old and has civil capacity according to the law of the native country of the individual in question.

3. That one has good morals.
4. That one has means or ability to obtain an independent livelihood.
5. That one has no legal nationality anywhere else, or that, according to the law of one's own country, one will lose one's former nationality the moment he or she acquires the new Japanese nationality.

The last condition will show that a subject of any nation that does not permit the effacement of his nationality of that country, even though he acquires new nationality, would not be allowed to be naturalized in Japan. The wife of any foreigner cannot be naturalized in Japan unless she does so together with her husband. There are some cases where the first of the five conditions above mentioned may be dispensed with or shortened. For instance, a person whose father or mother was a Japanese subject, or one who was born in Japan,or one whose wife was a Japanese. In the case of a person who has done some distinguished service for Japan, naturalization may be permitted by special permission of the Emperor, irrespective of the conditions above mentioned. There are several provisions relating to minor points of naturalization which I omit here because the principle is much the same as those of other countries, as I have said before.

There are two other means of becoming a Japanese subject, these are by marriage and adoption. A woman who marries a foreigner generally acquires the nationality of her husband and loses her own. This is also the case by our law, but with us there is another peculiar provision. When a man becomes husband of a woman and becomes adopted into her family and assumes the family name of the wife, he is with us technically called " entering husband," i.e., a man who becomes husband by entering into the wife's family. If a foreigner follows this method of marriage, he becomes a Japanese *ipso facto*. Of course for doing this there are certain conditions before one can get permission for it from the Minister of the Interior. The conditions are two :—

1. That he has possessed a residence or domicile for more than a year continuously in Japan.
2. Good morals.

This kind of marriage may appear rather peculiar to foreign-

ers, but in Japan adoption is very common, as it was with the Romans, and it is in one way productive of much good to society. As a matter of fact, the so-called "entering husband" is only one method of adoption. There is another method by which one can become a Japanese, and it is by becoming the adopted child of a Japanese subject. This kind of adoption is more common amongst the Japanese than the former one, that is, the adoption by becoming an "entering husband." The conditions which are imposed upon foreigners on becoming the adopted son or daughter of a Japanese are the same as in the case of the entering husband. There are, as is common in all countries, certain functions from which all naturalized subjects, be it by ordinary naturalization or by adoption or marriage, are precluded as a measure of political caution. These are:—

1. Ministers of State.
2. President, Vice-President, as well as members of Privy Council.
3. Officers of Chokunin rank of the Imperial household.
4. Ministers plenipotentiary.
5. Generals and Admirals.
6. Chief of the Cours de Cassation, of the Audit Board and of the Administrative Court, and
7. Members of the Diet.

There are several foreigners who have become Japanese subjects by one or other of these methods. The famous Lafcadio Hearn, among others, was one of these. He became a member of his wife's family and inscribed himself in the Japanese *état civil* as Koizumi Yakumo, Koizumi being his wife's family name.

## III

Compare the foregoing conditions of the country with those which had existed until fifty years ago for centuries. What a difference! In those days no foreigners, as I have said before, were allowed to enter the Japanese land. The only exception was that of the Dutch, who were allowed to come and trade with us at the port of Nagasaki, but the space where they were allowed to conduct their trading transactions and build houses to shelter themselves was confined to a

small island in the harbour connected with the mainland by a bridge. Some of their representatives were occasionally allowed to visit the capital of the Shogun, the modern Tokio, but very rarely, and this was done only on the occasion of the accession of a new Shogun to the Shogunate. The Chinese were allowed to come to Nagasaki occasionally for the purpose of exchanging goods in a similar manner with the Dutch and other Asiatics; the Koreans were the only exception; they paid their official homage in the shape of a special envoy to visit the capital of the Shogun on the accession of a new Shogun. And yet it would be a mistake to suppose that Japanese were always antagonistic to foreigners. About three hundred years ago the Portuguese and the Spanish were welcomed in Japan. But the policy of exclusion was adopted only because those who had been welcomed abused their privilege, disturbed our peace and order, and even tried to destroy our sovereign rights. There was also a time when the English East India Company had its branch office and factory in the island of Hirado, which was the trading port before Nagasaki was opened; but these English closed their factory, having found it not lucrative. Before the opening of our country fifty years ago, and for some time after, some sort of dislike of foreigners was manifested among certain classes of the Japanese. But that sentiment was due primarily to political reasons. We did not like the way in which the foreigners tried to force us to open our country. We soon found out, however, that it was no use to shut up the country as we had done, and the policy of opening the country which was adopted by the Government of the Shogun, was carried out more thoroughly by the new Imperial Government under which the country was unified, as every one knows, in 1868. Since then everything European has been studied, valued, and respected. At one time there was even a sort of mania for things European. We have had our civilization in our own way, and we do not under-estimate its merits; but we also saw that it ought to be revivified with the spirit of the European civilization. We have seen that there was nothing pugnacious in the Europeans, and we have become more cosmopolitan in our notions. We are quite prepared to go hand in hand with the Europeans on the paths of Western civilization so long as the Westerners do not adopt different steps. There are,

therefore, many chances for the Europeans to promote more and more the commercial intercourse between Japan and their respective countries, and to extend their ability and intelligence in promoting industrial enterprises as well. In order to discover a good opening each individual, as elsewhere, must depend upon his own ability and pluck, but, speaking generally, there is a good field. Would it not be a great blessing if the day came when the West and the Far East developed to the best of their mutual advantage the commerce and the industry which already exist?

# CHAPTER III

## MORAL TEACHING IN JAPAN[1]

IN another chapter, entitled "The Religions of Japan," I shall dwell upon the relative positions of Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism in Japan; in the present chapter I propose to myself to discover the moral notions which govern the Japanese mind, and how they are inculcated among the people at large.

I am acquainted to some extent with the Greek ethics of the Platonic school, and also with the moral teaching of the Gospel. Our moral notions, as it seems to me, do not materially differ from either in essence and purport, though in classification of the different virtues, and in the prominence given to one or other of these virtues above the rest, all these systems in some respect diverge.

Tenets of morality have been taught in Japan for centuries in various ways, and it has ever been a prominent feature of our education that stress should be laid upon this branch of intellectual culture. It developed itself most conspicuously side by side with *Bushido* during the last three centuries, but it was by no means limited to the military class alone; for wherever literature was studied these doctrines of morality were *ipso facto* associated with that study, and, moreover, among illiterate people the teaching took the form of popularized lectures, or of most easily read books, while by religious preachers the subject was enlarged upon as constituting a supplementary basis for most ardent exhortation to their followers. The dicta were chiefly founded upon Confucianism, but in such a manner as to conform to our own ideas and characteristics.

With the inauguration of our own Meiji era, a system of

[1] *The Nineteenth Century and After*, February, 1905.

universal education was gradually introduced, in which moral teaching formed an important branch of the curriculum. As time went on, however, some difficulties began to arise through the want of a universal standard of excellence on which the attention of the students should become focussed and the endeavour of the teachers concentrated. This need, which was a very real one, arose from the fact that, on one hand, the old books on the subject were too numerous and too diversified in character, and, on the other, new books written by modern writers were not sufficiently authoritative to command the students' reverence. Then, too, as the country was in a state of transition, it was apt to give rise to varied speculative views likely to distract the teachers' thoughts as well as those of restless youths, so that it might end in producing results unfavourable to the purpose in view. In a word, the want of a textual injunction which should authoritatively set forth the fundamental principles and serve as the guiding star, as it were, in educational circles began to be severely felt. This want was supplied by the Emperor himself, whose well-considered initiative is ever most eagerly followed, and his watchful care for their welfare most promptly appreciated by his loyal subjects. This step, taken by the Emperor in 1890, consisted of a special injunction to the nation, commonly called the "Educational Imperial Rescript." The issue of such an injunction was altogether exceptional, and was ascribable to the exceptional nature of the circumstances. After the declaration, in the preliminary part of the rescript, that the notions of loyalty and filial piety universally entertained were based on the traditions left by the Imperial ancestors and the national characteristics of the Japanese through untold generations, it proceeds :—

It is our desire that you, our subjects, be filial to your parents, and well-disposed to your brothers and sisters. Let husband and wife dwell harmoniously together; let friends be mutually trustworthy. Impose upon yourselves self-restraint and rectitude of behaviour. Extend to the multitude philanthropy. Advance learning and regulate your pursuits, developing the intellectual faculties and perfecting the virtuous and useful elements. Further, seek to enhance the public good and enlighten the world by deeds of social benefit. Treasure always the fundamental constitution and respect the national laws. In any emergency exert yourselves in the public service, and exhibit voluntarily your bravery in the cause of

order. And by every means assist and promote the prosperity of the Imperial régime, which is lasting as the heavens and the earth. Thus you will not only be our loyal subjects and good citizens, but will manifest the highest and best traditions of your ancestors.

This moral precept the Emperor declared in his own name, as well as for his successors, that he would zealously observe in common with his loyal subjects. Throughout all grades of the educational system in Japan this precept forms the fundamental basis of the moral and ethical teachings. As, however, greater stress in this respect is put upon elementary education, I will describe below how it is imparted in the elementary schools.

These are divided into two grades—the common and the higher elementary schools. In the first article of the Imperial Ordinance of 1900, relating to elementary schools, which is the one in force at this moment, it being an amended version and summary of previous ordinances, the primary object of these schools is laid down thus :—

The fundamental object of the elementary schools is to endow the children with the foundation of moral and popular education, and so equip them with ordinary knowledge and attainments necessary for their after success in life, paying attention at the same time to their physical development.

Based upon this article, moral teaching forms a part of the school curriculum, and according to the time-table, as it stands at present, two hours per week during the school terms are devoted solely to this purpose for every class. In the second article of the Departmental Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, which is a direction for carrying into practice the provisions of the Imperial Ordinance, it is provided that :—

The essential point of moral teaching should be to nourish and develop the virtuous instincts of the children and to lead them to the actual practice of morality, making the precept of the Imperial rescript relating to education its base.

It then goes on to direct that, at first, matters which are easy and simple to emulate, relating to filial piety, brotherly kindness, friendship, frugality, truthfulness, self-restraint, bravery, and suchlike virtues, should be taught, gradually advancing to the subject of such simple topics as those of

one's duties as regards the State and society, and thus elevating the sentiments and strengthening the ideas of the young, and fostering in their minds an enterprising and courageous spirit, as well as a due respect for public virtues, coupled with the loftiest admiration of patriotism and loyalty. In teaching all these, illustrations should be given of the wise sayings and commendable doings of exemplary persons, and full use made of maxims and proverbs. In the case of the girls, care should be taken that they be thoroughly instructed in the womanly virtues. The difference of teaching between the common and higher schools is only in respect of the treatment of the subject, one being more advanced than the other.

To infuse moral sentiments into the minds of the young is also to be kept in view in teaching other subjects—i.e. in history, geography, science, and even in drawing and singing. Thus, for example, even in the teaching of science, not only may an elementary knowledge of natural objects and phenomena be conveyed, but the training of the mind is expected "to nurture and develop a love of nature."

On three of the great festival days of Japan—viz. the 1st of January, the 11th of February, and the birthday of the Emperor—the master and teachers of every school, together with all its scholars, gather in its main hall to celebrate the occasion, and there the "Imperial Rescript" is read aloud by the master, and an appropriate address is given by him in the way of exposition of its solemn precepts.

Such, then, are the methods we adopt in the tuition of our children in regard to morality. True it is that religion as such, forms no part of their scholastic training, and that this branch of education is entirely left to the parents. What I have said above, however, will amply show that sufficient care is taken of the rising generation in regard to these matters. Perhaps I may mention here that as far as the common elementary schools are concerned, education is obligatory, exceptions being allowed only for special causes. It may also be mentioned that there is no community in Japan where no elementary scholastic training is provided for.

School age begins at six. The course of common elementary schools is four years, while that of higher elemen-

tary schools is four years in ordinary cases, and two years in cases where the children are destined to be sent to the middle schools.

According to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Minister of Education, the statistics of the elementary schools for 1901–2 show the following : [1]

(1) Total number of children under obligation to attend school :—

| Male | Female | Total |
|---|---|---|
| 3,388,273 | 3,109,216 | 6,497,489 |

(2) Number of the same receiving the prescribed course of instruction :—

| Male | Female | Total |
|---|---|---|
| 3,177,486 | 2,543,440 | 5,720,926 |

(3) Number of children who were excused from school attendance :—

| Temporary Exemption | | Permanent Exemption | | Total | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Total of Male and Female |
| 178,131 | 483,930 | 32,696 | 81,846 | 210,787 | 565,776 | 776,563 |

(4) Pupils of both sexes receiving instruction per cent. of the school age population :

| Male | Female | Both sexes |
|---|---|---|
| 93·78 | 81·80 | 88·05 |

From this it will be easily seen that the greatest care that we can possibly take is actually being taken in teaching morality to our boys and girls at large. I may here add that there are many text books based on the Imperial Rescript, published with sanction of the Minister of Education for the use of the teachers as well as students, varying in their form and scope according to the requirement of the different grades of students.

As to the soldiers and sailors who are taken by the universal service system from among the boys thus brought up, further care of them is diligently taken in the same direction. In our military and naval instruction there is one branch which we commonly call the " spiritual education." This is no other than moral teaching. In it also the " Educational Imperial Rescript " plays an important part, but

[1] These figures do not include Formosa.

for this purpose there is another Imperial injunction, commonly called the "*Gunjin* (Soldiers and Sailors) Imperial Rescript." It was issued by the Emperor in 1882, when the universal service system was modified and made more thorough, and it is more exhaustive and of older date than the educational rescript.

After having recounted the chief features of the long history of the military organization of the Empire from its very beginning, it being demonstrated how, in ancient days, all the youths of the Empire served in the Imperial army, and how they were led personally by the Emperor, the Empress, or the princes of the Imperial blood, and how, in the Middle Ages, the military classes gradually came to have a distinct formation, and how all this was reformed at last, the rescript proceeds thus:

Know that We are the Grand Marshal of you the warriors. We rely upon you as the arms and legs, and you should regard your Sovereign as your head and neck, and thus only can our mutual sympathy be deepened. Whether or not We shall be able to protect Our State, thereby responding to the blessing of supreme heaven, and deserve and repay the deep benefactions conferred by Our illustrious ancestors, depends upon whether or not you, the warriors, discharge your mission. Should the prestige of our Empire decay, you should share the pain with Us. Should the martial spirit of the Empire be raised and give forth its lustre, We would share the fame with you. If you all cling to your duty, and, becoming of one mind with Us, exert your strength for the protection of the State, the people of our Empire will enjoy everlastingly the happiness of peace, and the glory of Our Empire might even be augmented and become the light of the world. As We entertain so much hope of you, Our warriors, We have some instructions to give you.

Then the rescript goes on to elucidate these instructions under five headings: (1) That soldiers should make it their function to exert themselves to the utmost of their loyalty and patriotism; (2) that they should strictly observe decorum; (3) that they should prize courage and bravery; (4) that they should treasure faith and confidence; and (5) that they should practise frugality. All these headings are followed by full and adequate exposition given to each clause separately, care being enjoined that at the same time none may be led astray by excess of zeal. Thus, for instance, under the heading of courage and bravery it is enjoined that "one who prizes courage and bravery should

be modest and endeavour to win the love and respect of others," and under the heading of faith and confidence the soldier is warned not to make promises carelessly, as one is sometimes apt to prejudice essential duties on account of trifling obligations. Care is also to be taken not to forget the value of gentleness of mind. Thus, under the heading of decorum, it is enjoined that :—

> The superiors should not be arrogant to their inferiors, cases where one has to comport oneself with dignity on account of the nature of public duties being excepted. One should endeavour to deal with all matters carefully, ever mindful of kindness as the fundamental basis of one's actions ; and thus the superior and the inferior, becoming of one mind, may discharge adequately the duties incumbent upon them in regard to Imperial affairs.

In the concluding paragraph it is enjoined that these five instructions are the very essence of the soldier's life and his rules of conduct, and it goes on to say that "sincerity" is highly prized, and it is earnestly enjoined upon every one to adhere to these precepts with "one sincere mind."

Officers and rank and file, one and all, are expected to learn this rescript almost by heart. Officers endeavour constantly to imbue the rank and file with its spirit and tone, and the first thing the new recruits have to do is to study it side by side with their technical training. Our soldiers and sailors are all trained in this fashion, and, indeed, the utmost pains are taken in respect thereof.

Such are, then, the fundamental principles of the moral teaching of Japan in the schools as well as in the barracks. In imparting them, of course, much elucidation and exposition are employed so as to inculcate these sentiments in the minds of the recipients. To effect this the more completely, illustration is obtained from various sources, historical and otherwise, and not merely from Japan, but from other lands. Narratives of the lives of great and good men are freely given for the edification of the scholars, and the highest examples are in this way selected as a basis for the formation of the youthful character. The maxims of the sages are similarly impressed, and every channel whence mental profit is to be derived is laid under contribution for the inculcation of every moral virtue.

To the outsiders who have not grown up in an atmosphere of this kind, it may appear somewhat difficult to comprehend

how boys and girls could be thoroughly imbued with moral sentiments without connecting these in some way with religion; but when they are taught with thoroughness, basing their systematic exposition on the duties of human beings towards one another and to the State, and on the noble tradition of their own community and the characteristic virtues of their forefathers in which they ought to rejoice, and when appeals are made to the honour and pride which one should feel and value, and, above all, to the conscience of individuals, one's thoughts appear to become imbued with the lessons conveyed, and moral notions thus taught seem to become *per se* a kind of undefined but none the less potent and serviceable religion. This seems approximate to a correct delineation of the feelings of the bulk of the educated classes of Japan—at least, I feel it to be so myself.

The cardinal points of Oriental ethics are loyalty and filial piety. Of these two, filial piety takes precedence in China, but greater stress is laid in Japan on loyalty. This is where the difference between Chinese and Japanese ethics is most noticeable. Then, again, in Japan, side by side with loyalty, the doctrine of patriotism is rigidly enforced. When historically examined, the notion of patriotism is of much later development. As a matter of fact no such word finds place in the enumeration of different virtues in the Confucian teaching, and it seems never to have taken any hold of the masses in China. It may be remarked that, as the Chinese nation believed itself to stand so high as to be practically alone, and took no account of other States —a belief which was fostered by the ease with which it was seen to absorb any venturesome peoples who threatened its borders—the spirit of national rivalry, which in great measure gives rise to patriotism, was entirely lacking in ancient China. Moreover, as the Chinese wholly or in the greater part fell in succession under the sway of foreign dynasties, the Liao, Kin, Yuen, and Ching in turn, it obviously was not to the interest or advantage of those dynasties that patriotism should be roused among China's millions. The Chinese were always fond of China as their native land; they wished to return to it, alive or dead, if they were away; but this love of country did not prompt them very keenly to take measures to protect it from invasion, or to die in its defence, and it was not to the benefit

of the ruling house that any more patriotic spirit than this should take root. The case is very different with Japan, and yet even in Japan the term *Ai-koku-Shin* ("the mind that loves the country") is very modern. In former days the equivalent of *Ai-koku* was *Ho-koku*—i.e. repaying what one owes to the counfry; the idea being that the people, as subjects of the sovereign, owed a duty to the country, and it behoved them to sacrifice themselves in its cause. The term "country" was thus used more in the sense of the State than in the sense of the land. Even in this sense patriotism was not so old an idea—in literature, at least—as loyalty. This was only natural when the country had no exterior concern with the outer world, or, at least, when it was not subjected to external pressure from other countries. But, with the march of time, patriotism has made with us a deep and enduring impression on the minds of the people, together with the most intense realization of loyalty. In this Japan has been most happily situated. Let me explain myself in full, though it may sound somewhat dogmatic.

In Japan, broadly speaking, the country, the land, the people, the nation, and the State are co-extensive; they may, therefore, from an ethical point of view, be said to be with us Japanese one and the same thing. Then, on the other hand, the reigning Emperor, the Imperial dynasty, and the State are, sophistic as it may appear, almost synonymous from the moral point of view, and constitute, in their mutual relationship to one another the most lofty object of all that Japanese people can ever have before them in the secular world, which, therefore, may be regarded as though thereby transformed and spiritualized. There is an absolute community of interest in this tripartite relationship, consequently there is no possibility of making any distinction between these inseparable elements in the mind and eye of the Japanese people. Then, too, the reigning Imperial family, and the country traditionally and historically, are most closely bound together, and the Empire, in respect of the sway exercised by that august family, is entirely co-existent with it in regard to both time and space. Hence, in the mind and eye of the Japanese, be it from the point of view of a loyal subject or of a good citizen, all these—i.e. the Emperor, the Imperial dynasty, the State,

the country, and the nation—are one and the same thing; and devotion to the cause of any of these serves, *pari passu*, its purpose to promote the good of any other. In the Japanese conception, therefore, true patriotism includes love for the Emperor, and true loyalty includes love for the country, and hence patriotism and loyalty may be said to be almost identical as to their relative purport.

With us, speaking as a member of the community, the State is always put above the individual in the way that Socrates taught the Greeks in his beautiful dialogue concerning the duties of a citizen. The doctrine of Liberty has also taken deep root in the mind of the Japanese in recent years, but the idea of individualism is nevertheless regarded as subservient to principles of State, as, I believe, it ever ought to be.

This attitude of mind arises from the combination of unique conditions with which Japan is favoured. In the first place, the Imperial dynasty has always been the same, and rightly lays claim to a remote antiquity, so that no dynastic predilections involving differences of opinion among the people can ever agitate the public mind. In the second place, so far as our history carries us back—and that is a very long way—the nation has always been compact and united, save for those minor periodical disturbances and internal dissensions that are common to the lot of nations at large, and no other race has ever intermingled with ours. In the third place, the Japanese people were never scattered abroad beyond the confines of the Empire, and the land of the Empire is the graveyard of all their ancestors as far as history knows; and in the fourth place, Japan has never suffered any foreign conquest. An attack on a gigantic scale was made in the thirteenth century on Japan, as elsewhere, by the Mongols, before whom the whole world once trembled and mostly succumbed. It was the only instance of foreign invasion of Japan worth mentioning; but we repelled it effectively.

All this makes the Japanese, from the highest to the lowest, feel an immeasurable pride in their country, though by no means boastfully, and its culmination is the very acme of loyalty and patriotism. Only the other day I accidentally came across an English translation of a war song, entitled "Now is the time," by the late Commander

Takeo Hirose, our naval hero of Port Arthur, which he improvized shortly before he went to his doom. The earlier part of it gives a very good idea of the Japanese conception of loyalty and patriotism in a concrete form, so I quote below the first stanza of it :—

> Boundless like the dome of heaven above,
> Is what we owe to our Emperor ;
> Fathomless as the deep sea below,
> Is what we owe to our country.
> Now is the time to repay what we owe.

Hirose was just the sort of man who, had he been a Roman warrior, would joyously have sung at the last moment of life the sublime line, however hackneyed it may be :—

> Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.

Many people outside Japan seem amazed at the valour and fortitude of our soldiers and sailors at the front, testifying, as they do, to the intensity of their loyalty and patriotism. But what I have stated above will, I hope, go a long way in explaining how deeply these notions are engrafted in the mind of the Japanese, and why they can be implicitly trusted to bear good fruit in due season.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE JAPANESE CHARACTER[1]

YOUR Council has cordially invited me to deliver an address before you on the subject of Japanese Character. I accepted the invitation with a certain feeling of diffidence, fearing that my utterances might sound in your ears like blowing the trumpet of self-praise, or that in another way it might be a mere repetition of what already has been written and spoken by those who are more competent among your own people. As, however, your Council has insisted on hearing something direct from Japanese lips, I now venture to present you with a brief delineation of our national character. We have a saying that "human minds are like their faces," meaning there are no two minds which are exactly alike. This is the case with we Japanese, just as much as it is the case with you Westerners. It must therefore be taken for granted that all I tell you is only a summary or a generalization from facts which are more conspicuous than others.

In the first place, I must point out that we are not a nation of high imagination: in this respect we differ very much from the Hindoos. You all know that the Indian people have been from the earliest periods of history a race permeated with the highest forms of imagination; they have evinced the highest trends of metaphysical ideas, ideas not necessarily always scientific, and hence they have been in many ways carried into all sorts of channels culminating in the very extremes of superstitious fantasy. The consequence of this is to be seen in the fact that they have never supplied any dates in recording their history. There have

[1] An address delivered at the reception specially given in the author's honour on March 29, 1905 by the Ethological Society, London.

been many historical episodes and vicissitudes in India; but when it comes to the question of their dates, all students of history are at a loss; the utmost they can do being to infer the period from some foreign records, especially from those of China. We Japanese have never had any such high flights of imagination as the Hindoos, and therefore we have never had any such cosmology as the Hindoos, and at the same time we have not been led astray into the misty paths of mythological superstition as the Hindoos have been. There is more resemblance between the Japanese and the Chinese than between the Japanese and the Hindoos, inasmuch as Chinese ethics have had great influence in moulding Japanese character, but here again there exists a great difference, in that the Japanese character is largely influenced by our own national tradition, which has made us the richer by its infusion of chivalric spirit. On this point, however, I will not detain you long, as I have spoken more fully regarding it elsewhere.

We are credited with being, or rather are characterized as, a nation of imitators. People say we imitated China in the days gone by, and that we now imitate Europe in our own days. This is certainly true to a great extent; but we are not ashamed of it. The spread of civilization is, after all, only an accumulation of imitation. Even in the European civilization of the present day, the fact that it is but little more than merely an accumulation and development of imitation is patent; for if you take away from it the Greek culture, the Roman jurisprudence, and the Semitic religious notions, how much will there be left behind? The only difference between our imitation of the Chinese and the European civilization, and your imitation of that of Greece and Rome is that you have expended much time in attaining your object, whereas we Japanese did it in a shorter period, because we could not afford, under the circumstances in which we found ourselves, to lose any time in making our choice. Again, Japan, though an old country, is young compared with China and India. When Japan awoke in the dawn of civilization she already found her neighbour highly advanced in enlightenment. It was of no use for Japan to despise those advantages which she could get by learning from that neighbour. That is why we imitated China to the extent we did. Then again, when

Japan roused herself from her long seclusion at the moment of the advent of Western enterprise in the Far East, we saw how high Western civilization in its way stood above ours. Well! you came to the Far East with big ships and big guns and bombarded us. Not liking it, we began imitating you, so as not to be bombarded again. Indeed, it was of no use for us to try and invent anew, by exerting our own brains, all that was comprised in the term Western civilization. So we began to imitate those things European which we perceived to be advantageous in respect of our own progress. Make any further improvement in your civilization, we will continue for ever imitating you. We have a maxim which runs thus: "Take what is long in another and amend with it what is short in yourself"; that is to say, imitate anything excellent in other people, and thus amend your own shortcomings. We respect that maxim both individually and as a nation, and we do not think the purport of that maxim is ethically bad; on the contrary, we regard this endeavour after compensation to be one of the best traits of a person or a nation. It does not mean a mere subservient imitation; and if imitation proceeds from lack of discrimination it may easily degenerate into fickleness. We always guard ourselves against falling to that level, but if great caution be taken, then our adherrence to the maxim above quoted will only result in acts of progress, which will stand out in commendable contrast to what is called strict conservatism. Conservatism is a very good thing in some ways, but when it is carried too far it must mean the complete stagnation of a nation. There is more than one nation which stands in that condition, the consequence of which must be the decline, if not the extinction, of its own organic existence, especially in these modern days when international competition is so acute.

We are often told that it is a pity that Japan should have lost her own antique customs and manners and institutions to such an extent as she has, whereby she is in danger of ceasing to be one of the artistic objects of the world. It may be true to some extent, but we cannot afford to be deterred from promoting the growth of our own country, along the only path which will enable it to keep pace with the progress of the world, merely for the sake of pleasing the globe-trotters.

The whole world now admits that the Japanese are good fighters, that they make good soldiers and sailors, and are brave and dashing in warfare. The question arises whether these qualities are inherent in their nature, that is to say, if the bravery they exhibit emanates from an inborn disposition inherited from barbaric ancestors, or are due in some degree to long training, animated by the innate ethical sense of the people. I cannot deny that there is some sort of inherent capacity for military achievements in the Japanese blood; but I may say the development and the maintenance of martial ardour and prowess are due more to the spiritual training which has been inculcated among the people at large on ethical lines for untold centuries. That the Japanese are brave, dashing, loyal, and patriotic may be granted; but it is altogether wrong to suppose that they, as individuals, are by nature bellicose and pugnacious; on the contrary, they are normally a peace-loving race. They understand what is their duty to their country and to their Emperor, and therefore when they are called out in an emergency to uphold the interests of their land they become fierce fighters, and in that respect they are very different from many other peoples. But at the same time they have a great inclination towards tenderness and compassion. Here is the secret why the Japanese are artistic in their tastes and ideas, as the world knows them to be, and at the same time are also born fighters.

Now I will speak about the artistic capacity of the Japanese. Oriental art differs of course from that of the West in many ways, but no one will deny that Japan is an artistic nation, and artistic tastes prevail throughout the land to a degree far beyond that to which they obtain in other countries. Some people may be puzzled in observing the co-existence of a profound military spirit and artistic tastes side by side; but if they regard the connexion as I have explained it above there will be no surprise felt.

Some people ask me what is the extent of the artistic capacity of the Japanese, and I should say that it is very deep and thorough. The Westerners are well acquainted with many small objects of Japanese art such as *netsuke* or ivory carvings, and in admitting their artistic excellence, such critics are apt to call the Japanese "grand in small things." This is true to some extent, but it is not quite fair.

In recent centuries the circumstances of the time compelled our artists to devote their energy and skill more to small objects, but it would be wholly wrong if one were to suppose that the Japanese had no capacity for grand objects. If only one goes back to the relics of the art of the sixth, seventh or eighth centuries of the Christian Era, to see what capacities the Japanese of those days had, one must soon be convinced that the Japanese are not merely fabricators in ivory or metal imitations of small insects or animals. The colossal bronze images of Buddha at Nara and Kamakura are among the best specimens of truly grand artistic creations. This, I think, is admitted by most experts. But in Japan, unlike most nations, artistic tastes are universal, so much so, that they are observable even in the smallest cottages of the farmer or trader. This also is admitted by keen observers of things Japanese. Barbarity and art may be said to be irreconcilable. One who has keen artistic tastes cannot be a brutal savage; for the higher the artistic development the more refined are the people. Hence we can see here again that Japanese bravery is not of the nature of a mere continuation of the primitive prowess and stubbornness in battle which distinguished our progenitors, but is blended with a compassionate and humanizing spirit which harmonizes with our taste in art.

People often speculate upon the extent of the intellectual faculty of the Japanese. The development of intellectual faculty, it seems to me, depends a good deal upon heredity as well as on the surrounding atmosphere. The adoption of Western methods on the lines of scientific enlightenment does not in Japan date back very far, and therefore it would be preposterous were I to attempt to give you any definite assurance on this point. I am, however, satisfied with all that has been achieved by my compatriots, and I at least am not despondent for our future. There are many of our students who acquitted themselves creditably alongside their European comrades in the Western institutions for scientific study. There are many professors and scientists among us who have made valuable discoveries; there are many engineers who have accomplished vast engineering undertakings in Japan just as well as any European engineer could have done. Our medical men are just as skilful as their brothers in the profession in other

countries. Mathematics were the weakest point with the Samurai, because trade-like occupations were despised by the gentry class, and consequently arithmetic and mathematics were not much taught. But it does not seem to be the failing point in our intellectual faculty now, because, since the condition of things changed, and those subjects formerly neglected began to be taught in our schools, most of the students have proved themselves to be as capable of assimilating as much knowledge in those branches of study as one could reasonably wish for.

As to the moral character of the Japanese, the details of Oriental ethics may differ in some ways from those of the West, but our people have always had strict views on the lines of ethics in general. It is therefore a mistake to suppose that people in the Far East lacked ethical principles, as many people formerly imagined to have been the case. The Japanese have as much affection, in other words, attachment to their homes and families, as have other peoples, and they also have passionate emotions. In these matters, however, a great difference between Japan and the West presents itself in regard to their outward manifestations. In Japan affections and emotions are manifested outwardly as little as possible. This arises from the difference not only of mere customs and manners, but from different interpretations of ethical principles. Thus, for instance, in the West members of a family kiss one another before other people without any compunction, all the more so in the case of parents and children. Here in the West the idea of love manifests itself conspicuously, to an extent that we Orientals cannot view as decent, and hence deem quite unnecessary. As a matter of fact, I cannot see any necessity for a man and wife to kiss each other before strangers. In Japan one would never see members of a family kissing one another, not even parents and children. In reading a book, recently published, by Miss McCaul, I came across an amusing passage in which the authoress speaks of her Japanese friend telling her about the kiss imported from abroad, and ever after that calling a kiss in the European style "an imported kiss," but the matter is perfectly true. A father loves his child, but he is expected to be a rigid disciplinarian towards it, and therefore he does not kiss his child lest too much caressing should spoil

it. A mother of course is allowed to be more tender to her child than a father, but even she does not go so far as to kiss it. Brothers and sisters do not kiss, neither do men kiss their wives. All this does not signify, however, that we, the Japanese, have less affection for one another than the Westerners.

There are many things in customs and manners which differ from one another in different countries; it is therefore necessary not to form hasty conclusions when one may be called upon to pass judgment on other people upon points affecting national characteristics, or on manners and customs in general. To give a few instances: in the East we open our books from right to left, whilst you do it from left to right, and if we happen to do this in the presence of a Westerner, one exclaims "You open from the wrong end," but I do not see any right or wrong in the matter; it is only a difference of method. If we speak about eating food with chopsticks, the Westerners say "How funny," but we do not see anything funny in it. As a matter of fact, using new chopsticks at every meal, or keeping one fixed pair of chopsticks for each particular member of a family, as is the Japanese way, seems to be far cleaner than that knives, forks, and spoons be used indiscriminately by all in the household, because, however they may be cleaned and wiped, the fact remains that the forks or spoons which are put into one's mouth are liable to be used by others in the same way. At restaurants and hotels we often notice lazy waiters bringing to us forks and spoons that have just been used by other persons, merely wiped with a cloth; and yet those who are accustomed to their own modes of using knives and forks are prone to think that people who use chopsticks are eating their meals in a primitive fashion.

I will give you another instance. I once quite inadvertently offended a young lady in an English family where I was staying. She admired an article which I had, so I said "I have no more use for it, so I will give it to you." She said at once, "If you value it and can spare it for me, I will of course accept with pleasure, but not a thing which you have no more use for." I was doubtless wrong according to all the Western modes of giving and taking. Here you praise up the thing you are giving, and so show the recipient that you sacrifice it for friendship's sake; but our idea when

we say we have no more use for a thing, is to save the friend to whom we give it from experiencing a sense of being under an obligation to us, the giver. Here again the matter is only one of difference in the mode of manifesting our thoughts; but because one is not conversant with that different custom, it is likely to be taken as an offence. How much mischief is done and how much offence is given by not understanding another's ways, not merely in the case of individuals, but in the case of nations!

Some say that the Japanese are a laughing nation, that they smile even when they visit a mourner. I say the Japanese know sorrows as much as any other nation: the only difference is that their training and tradition teach them to restrain unnecessary manifestations of sorrow. There is a saying, "He does not show either joy or anger in his face." This peculiarity has always been regarded as a sure sign of a great character, and the same may be said to be the case with every individual, more or less. Great demonstration by shouts or clapping of hands is not indigenous to the Japanese, it is an "imported" method. Hence foreign onlookers may often observe the majority in a crowd keeping silence, and that only some portion of those assembled are shouting or throwing up hats, or clapping hands, as the case may be; but this does not signify that only those who are imitating the more demonstrative European manner are satisfied with the occasion, and that the others are not, because in this case we may see the native methods and foreign fashions being practised side by side. Such traditions as that above referred to will also account for the somewhat stern and apparently unsociable composure of our Generals and Admirals, for they are mostly men who grew up amidst the reserved atmosphere of the old Samurai class. The teaching of the Bushi, that is the Samurai, was especially rigid in inculcating this kind of discipline, and it is an utter mistake to suppose that such men are heartless. I may tell you a tale about General Nogi, the captor of Port Arthur. Every one knows that he is a stoical and stern warrior, but I have read in the vernacular press that once in the quietude of his camp, while sitting alone, it was observed that he was leaning on his chair with his head in his hands and tears wetting his cheeks. His heart was apparently moved by the noble sacrifice and

devotion of so many of those flowers of Japan's youth who were under his command, including his own sons.

The Japanese, as a rule, are more disposed to be reticent than to push forward. They like cleanliness in everything; they prefer simplicity to gorgeousness. Here I have to speak of two different currents of thought and taste, which exist in Japan side by side, almost antagonistic to each other, so that many outsiders are often puzzled; and yet both of them get on well with each other without much concern to the practical working of the community. The best example of this may be illustrated by different kinds of architecture. You will observe on one side some grand and imposing temples belonging to Buddhism, and on the other you may observe very simple and unpretentious and small temples belonging to Shintoism, cleanliness and simplicity being almost the sole objects of the latter. Here we observe that the origin of both of them clearly differs, and the influence of these two origins may be observed in almost all things, but the latter influence is more prominent. This trait is still more observable in art. Nay more! as a matter of fact, cleanliness and simplicity, or in other words purity and sobriety, may be said to be the very foundation of the Japanese character in everything, both mentally and materially. Many of you, no doubt, have seen fine lacquer work, and will have observed that the inside of a box of that kind of work is often more finely and more costly ornamented than the outside, which proves that even in intrinsically valuable works of art, showiness is considered more fitting to be concealed. I may give another example. If you should be invited by a rich nobleman to his mansion you will see that the front rooms and halls are comparatively grand, but you may also, if you are a privileged guest, be led to a set of small rooms which are used for the tea ceremony. Here you will observe everything very simple, almost primitive, and apparently of very cheap structure. You will notice that the roof is only thatched, that the pillars are made of unfinished trunks of trees; you will see balconies constructed of rough bamboos, but you will be surprised when I tell you that this kind of construction often costs many times more than bricks or iron buildings. It is doubtless true that the original idea of this kind of structure was that it should be simple and cheap,

almost like a sort of primitive building, but when we consider how much more difficult it is for the artisans to join together neatly rough natural trunks than it would be to join ordinary timbers of uniform sizes, or how much more costly it is to get rare trees of natural growth than to obtain ordinary hewn timbers, which are only fit to be varnished, we can understand how the cost mounts up. In this case, therefore, simplicity may not be simplicity in reality, but only studied simplicity. So people who are unaccustomed to see these kinds of things may think it a rather foolish task, and yet the Japanese do not mind being considered fools in undertaking it.

These notions also prevail in other kinds of social matters. Take for instance the case of native costumes; it is considered rather good taste to have more costly cloth underneath than the actual outside cloth, because it means an evasion of outside show and display. Then again women, and indeed men too, prefer quiet colours and patterns for their dresses: they do not care for gorgeous and showy costumes, though in the case of young girls some allowance may be made. This holds good also in manners. As I said above, the Japanese are more reticent than pushing, this is more especially the case with ladies. I notice in the West that when in a drawing-room one is asked to sing or play, he or she is readily induced to do so, the idea no doubt being to give pleasure to others in spite of his or her own inefficiency in the matter. But in Japan the case is different; there one would rather ask to be excused on the plea of "I cannot," even though in reality he or she "can." Perhaps this may be carried too far with the Japanese, but so it is with the generality of them, and therefore in Japanese society you are likely to hear more often "No" than "Yes."

I will give you yet another illustration. I have in Japan a friend, Mr. Kano by name. He is a small and slender person. Once on board a mail steamer, as Kano was on his way to Europe there was a big and robust Russian. That Russian, thinking very little of my friend, gave himself airs and tried to pick a quarrel with him. Kano kept himself quite calm, exercising great patience and endurance. At last, however, he accepted the challenge of the Russian and proceeded to fight it out. The whole ship was surprised at the idea of a little Jap going to fight the big Russian! Within a minute,

however, after the combat had commenced the Russian had to ask for mercy. The Russian did not know that Kano was a scholar and at the same time a great master of the Jujitsu. A similar story is told about the late Captain Takasaki, son of Baron Takasaki, who was killed during last year in a battle of the present war. In a naval college in America, where he was a cadet, there was a big American who was very offensive and often provoked and insulted Takasaki. The latter for a long time patiently endured the affront, but when it became unendurable he challenged the big American and forced him by a single combat to ask his pardon. There was no difficulty for Takasaki in the matter, as he was a good student of the Jujitsu, being one of the best disciples of Kano, but the American boy did not know it! The secret of the teaching of the Jujitsu lies in the fact that every pupil is enjoined to use the art only in extreme cases when its use is inevitable.

Self-restraint and modesty manifest themselves in every phase of social life. In the West it is not rare for a mother to praise her daughter before others, of for a man or wife to do the same for his or her life-partner. It is, no doubt, an outcome of the extraordinary growth of individualism, but the matter is looked upon from a different point of view in Japan. There, we regard our near relatives as though they were a part of ourselves when we speak of them with other people; hence foreigners would be surprised when they hear that we have such expressions as "My stupid father," "My rustic wife," or "My foolish son," but with us they sound no more strange than when here one calls oneself "Your humble servant."

This leads me to say something about our family system. With us the sense of duty for mutual assistance by near relatives is felt more keenly than it is in the West. Of course our old family system had some shortcomings, but it had the advantage of promoting good feelings between different members of a family or near relatives. The growth of individualism, of course, has its advantage; its notions have been introduced into Japan of late to a considerable extent, and have been recognized by law. There is, however, a fear of some shocks being inflicted by it on the good parts of our family system. It seems desirable to take some care in the matter. However it may be, I may

say that in former days this sense of mutual assistance, coupled with the economic condition of the people and the state of the administrations of the community, went a long way in promoting the comfort and happiness of the lower classes. Outsiders sometimes say Japan is so very poor in the way of public charities, such as the establishment of poor-houses, hospitals, etc., but, as a matter of fact, there was formerly scarcely any need of that kind; in recent years the condition of things has changed and those institutions also came into existence, and I fear that the more time goes on the more they will become necessary. We admit the benefits of the introduction of European civilization; we admit the necessity of international trades; but in one respect, that is to say, the separation of rich and poor, we have to recognize that the old distinction is becoming more keen on account of these very facts, and therefore it behoves us to look after the general condition of the people, always kindly, and to promote the charitable instincts of the public at large; but from what we have noticed we need not fear any lack of a philanthropical disposition in our nature. We had that instinct in former days, only in a different manner. The only necessity we now have is to adapt it to modern requirements, and our people have already shown their capability in many ways. Those who have seen our organization of the Red Cross Society would not be inclined to conclude that the Japanese are incapable of establishing that kind of institution.

Some people over-praise things Japanese, and even say that Japanese babies do not cry. Our babies cry just as much as your babies; as a matter of fact, in the case of very young babies, crying is to some extent needful for the development of their lungs; but I daresay that strict and rigid though our parents are, they cannot in a general sense be accused of being cruel to their children. There is no necessity for creating a society for the prevention of cruelty to children in Japan. Nay, the Japanese cannot be accused of being cruel even to the lower animals, for not to kill living things is one of the ten commandments of Buddhism. That notion was inculcated among the people at large in times gone by, but, apart from this religious doctrine, the nation seems to have become imbued with that idea almost unconsciously.

The introduction of cigars and cigarettes has caused some difference in the smoking habits of the Japanese tending towards an augmentation of tobacco consumption. The import of all sorts of Western spirits, formerly unknown, also has caused some slight increase of the drinking habit. But, for all that, the Japanese as a race are neither a drinking nor a very great smoking nation. You would scarcely ever meet with a drunkard in the street. The introduction of Western civilization brings with it its disadvantages as well as its advantages; but this we must put up with, for we cannot expect harmless soda-water to travel alone without its congenial friend—whisky!

I have already spoken about the introduction of the notions of individualism derived from the West, and this leads me to speak about the influence of Western civilization upon our character and characteristics. It is no doubt exercising a great influence and producing a modification, and I may say that scientific modes of Western thought and reasoning have already made a marked impression on our brain as a nation, but this change is taking place even with regard to customs and manners. Many houses are built after the European style, European clothes are worn by men and women, and to a great extent the mode of living is also undergoing some changes. It is all very well for the Westerners to say what a pity it is that our ladies have cast away their costume. As a matter of fact, ladies do not wear European clothes as much as men do; but speaking in a general way, the introduction of European customs and manners is also unavoidably an outcome of the changes of the time. We recognize many good points in European customs and manners, including the mode of living; but apart from that, there are reasons why we should not stick to our old modes entirely. If we were still to fight with swords and spears you would consider us savages and barbarians, but when we kill hundreds and thousands of men by one blow of a bombshell, then you tell us we are civilized. Why should we stick to our old modes even if they were effective and useful? This holds good with everything. If we stick to old modes we remain for ever in the position of some inferior animal in the eyes of the Westerners. You may think that I go too far in saying such things, but you cannot deny that there is some foundation for my

assertion. Of course I do not say that everything in Western customs and manners is excellent. Let us just take the example of leather boots. Is it not a dirty thing to come into a drawing-room or sitting-room with dirty boots? There is no use for you to conceal from me that the majority of you are suffering from the mere use of boots, I mean most of you, by giving you corns and other pains. The difference between the European modes of leather boots and the squeezing of the Chinese ladies' feet appears only to be a matter of degree, and yet if I came for instance to this room in Japanese fashion I would simply become an object of ridicule, if not of offence.

Let us hope that some happy medium may be discovered some day or other for the benefit of the people concerned; and, moreover, as things stand at present we, the Japanese, incur great economical losses in everything. We have to furnish a room to receive foreigners, and another for our compatriots; we have to carry about, when travelling, a pair of European boots and a pair of Japanese clogs. Our women have to buy ornamental hairpins as well as European brooches; in fact, we have to possess everything in double sets—foreign and native. I may also add that some differences, though they are not great, in the customs and manners of the Western nations give us trouble very often. If I went to an English wedding in Tokio in my evening dress I should be laughed at; were I to go to a French or German wedding in the same place without putting on evening dress, they would say that I was rude. If I meet French and English ladies at a party I shall have to take off my gloves hastily when I shake hands with the English lady, and I shall have to put them on again the next moment when I shake hands with the French lady; and if I did vice versa I would offend both of them.

## CHAPTER V

### THE MAKING OF A SOLDIER IN JAPAN[1]

THE questions that are frequently asked me as to the constitution and working of the army of Japan may be said to revolve in two very small orbits round two main objects of curiosity. How does Japan get her men? How does she train her officers? And both questions are three parts answered in a very few words: "Universal Service," and a ready acceptance of Napoleon's maxim that in war "the moral is to the physical as three to one."

I shall endeavour, however, to the best of my ability to answer both questions in a little further detail by explaining, in the first place, how it is that we have found universal service so much better suited to our requirements than any other system that we could adopt or desire; and, secondly, how the Government of Japan has aimed in the course of studies prescribed for those seeking commissions in our army to postpone the acquirement of technical training, invaluable and indispensable though that is fully recognized to be, to the inculcation of loyalty and the soldierly spirit.

First, then, with respect to Universal Service, upon which subject my views may be regarded as accepted, by common consent, by all the citizens of the Japanese Empire, high and low.

1. We have found that system superior to our old system, wherein fighting men formed a distinct class and made military duties a sort of profession in their families. At first some people laboured under an apprehension that the troops consisting of men recruited by the universal service

[1] A letter addressed to Lord Newton and printed in *The National Service Journal*, November, 1904, and a letter addressed to Dr. Maguire, Military expert, and printed in the *Westminster Gazette*, October, 1904, blended together.

system, who would naturally be taken from all classes, might not be so efficient as those consisting of men who belonged to the class just mentioned, and who, therefore, had traditional and natural proclivities for military duties. This apprehension, however, was altogether dispelled by the practical experience gained during the civil war of 1877. This was a campaign in which the Imperial Government troops, organized not long before on purely a universal conscription basis, contended against the regularly trained *samurai* of Satsuma, the most warlike of all the ancient military clans of Japan. The leader of the insurrection was Saigo Takamori, who as an individual was perhaps the most popular person in the land, on account of the great services which he had previously rendered the Imperial cause. It was a conflict in which I may be permitted to mention that I had the honour of serving my country, though not, strictly speaking, in a military capacity. I was an officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, my official designation being that of a Secretary to the War Department. We then found that men under the compulsory service system were capable of being made far more efficient as a compact body than were the *samurai* under the older system, wherein the effects of discipline were somewhat subservient to individual prowess. Besides, the old system was not equal to the demands of modern military organisation for many other reasons.

2. We had also some experience (during the latter days of the Tokugawa régime) of the actual working of the voluntary system. But we have found the obligatory system superior to it, on points wherein uniformity is in many respects to be desired above all other considerations.

3. Compulsory service puts the country to less expense. It would be almost impossible to maintain the number of soldiers on active service and in the reserve with the money we now spend were it not on account of this system.

4. The system of universal service tends to make every citizen of the land feel his responsibility to the State more keenly—in other words, makes him more loyal and patriotic. This sentiment goes down to the lowest grade, and animates not only the men, but also the women; for the latter also come to share it with the men who are thus inspired.

5. The nation becomes more compact by reason of the

recruits coming into contact with men hailing from all parts of the country, and with men of all sorts, belonging to different social grades or professions in life, and through realizing that the great common cause of their mission or duty is above the particular interests of localities or classes.

6. The system does good in regard to physical development and personal discipline, which latter enables a man to be more punctual and regular in his habits, and more enduring of hardships than he would otherwise be.

7. Universal service gives to the people at large, as well as the recruits themselves, little chance of looking down upon military occupation as an unelevated profession, which is a great thing for keeping up the general tone of the Army.

8. The universal service system dispenses with the necessity of employing all sorts of devices to induce men to enlist under the national flag for military service. It also enables the country to obtain, on the whole, more desirable recruits, from its very nature.

9. Men under the system of personal military service seem to be more animated with a sense of the duties devolving upon each individual than are those under the voluntary system, because the idea of being "on hire" never enters into their minds.

10. The troops organized under this system seem to be more amenable to military discipline than those under voluntary systems, inasmuch as the discipline could not be, it was found, so strictly enforced upon the latter as the former. This has been demonstrated unmistakably upon a recent occasion in China (during the occupation), when both kinds of troops were stationed in the same locality.

11. The system helps the spread of intelligence among the people at large.

12. The part of our military instruction which we call "spiritual education," to which the greatest attention is paid, and which really is an elevated ethical teaching, imbues the "men" with fine moral sentiments, especially on the lines of patriotism and loyalty, and these sentiments are not only of great use to them while in actual service, but also after they have left the ranks. This branch of military instruction does not seem to exist in other countries in the same way as it does in Japan, but, with us, it cannot fail to be beneficial to the country, for these sentiments are

carried back to every corner of the land by the "men" after a few years' active service.

13. Universal service makes the spread of the patriotic as well as the martial spirit more feasible in all the schools, because that system makes every boy expectant of becoming a soldier at some time or other.

14. At one time there was some fear that men returning from barracks to their rustic or urban homes might make themselves arrogant and detestable among their neighbours, and would be more or less unfitted to revert to their original occupations. But this fear proved to be wholly groundless, the more so as years went on, for a very good reason, namely, that the number of men similiarly placed to themselves increased with time, and no one man in particular could venture to rank himself as the only hero.

15. We do not notice that there is any material detriment in regard to the general economic condition of the country—at all events, in any appreciable degree—arising from universal obligatory service, though we must admit that the labour performed by the men during service is unproductive in character from its very nature. This drawback appears to be fully recompensed by subsequent advantages.

Such are, then, the chief advantages of the compulsory service system which we have adopted in Japan, and we have never had the least cause for regretting it. At first we experienced some difficulty in adopting it, of course, because its introduction was effected at the time when the old military system retained in great measure its vigour, though the feudal régime had already ceased to exist as a political system. There was also a popular rising of farmers on rather a large scale, which came about in the following way: The phrase "blood tax" was used—perhaps inadvertently—in the ordinance which first announced the adoption of the system. This phrase was seized upon by a man who was not satisfied with the various changes which were then being made, and he represented to illiterate farmers the meaning of the term "blood tax" as literally implying the squeezing out of one's blood. The incident was altogether a ridiculous one, and only proved how easily people are to be led astray by agitators; but the fact remains that we actually experienced some trouble on this account. Such notions, however, were soon dissipated, and the nation

is now heart and soul in favour of conscription; it is regarded as the one essential factor in the country's defensive system. If the time should ever arrive when all nations may dispense with armaments *in toto*, so much the better, of course; but until that blissful day shall dawn, Japan must stick to the system of universal military service which she has already adopted.

And now with regard to the second point in answer to the question, How does Japan train her officers?

The faculty which it is considered as above all things most important for officers—as, indeed, for all soldiers—to be equipped with is "soldierly spirit," and therefore the chief object of their education is expected to be the nurturing of this spirit among them. Then, too, each officer is regarded in the sphere of his competency as a commander as well as an instructor, and therefore he is expected to be equipped with both "knowledge" and "capacity."

## EDUCATION

Education is the means for advancement of knowledge and capacity. The education of officers, however, is to be gradually advanced according to the position occupied by them, so that the chief under whom an officer works has to give him from time to time an "independent mission" based on the different stages of his career, thereby completing his training step by step. The chief and senior officers of each group are expected to be responsible for the junior officers, and therefore they are expected to be exemplary in their conduct themselves. All officers are also expected to be diligent in their endeavour for the improvement of their own knowledge and capacity. It may here be mentioned, once for all, that much stress is always put upon the so-called "independent missions" (or duties), as being the best and quickest means of cultivating an officer's capacity for independent actions, and of sapping the pernicious idea that he is to remain a mere dependent upon some one else's initiative.

The main responsibility for the education of officers is put upon the shoulders of the chief of the corps of officers, and the course of the education is broadly divided into two

branches: (1) Technical Training, which consists of regimental duties, including those of field manœuvres; (2) Scientific Training, which consists of (*a*) winter works, (*b*) discourses; (*c*) war games, (*d*) topographical surveys, (*e*) discourses on the spot, (*f*) practice in the art of war by the aid of maps.

## SOLDIERLY SPIRIT

Soldierly spirit is explained in the instructions as consisting of (1) loyalty and sincerity, (2) bravery and courage, (3) trustworthiness and truthfulness, (4) respect for duties, (5) exercise of frugality, (6) scrupulous observance of courtesy, and (7) mindfulness of military discipline. With these, too, is joined a due sense of the responsibility devolving upon every individual, as well as the cultivation of pluck in "initiative." A careful consideration of these points is to be kept in view in all military education.

## TECHNICAL TRAINING

When an officer is newly commissioned he is for the first year given a number of new recruits whom he has to train; he himself at the same time is expected by so doing to acquire experience in the regimental duties under the superintendence of the senior officers, especially the commanding officer of the company to which he belongs. As a matter of fact, the responsibility for training new officers is put upon the shoulders of the chief of each company. Thus the new officer is to do his work under an "independent mission," as the case may be; but his every act is subject to the criticism and correction of the commanding officer of the company, whilst the latter is expected, besides such criticism and correction, to give further and additional useful suggestions to his newly commissioned pupil. The senior officers submit in turn to the superintendence of their superior according to their rank, but of course in a degree less as their position advances.

As to field manœuvres, the commanding officer of a battalion is to order the lieutenants and sub-lieutenants of

his battalion, prior to the last ten days of September in every year, to execute some field manœuvres with a group of men under his independent command. The commanding officer of a regiment is to give orders to the captains of his regiment in a similar way. The time, the number of men, and other details befitting particular cases are prescribed in detail. With regard to the troops which, from the nature of their composition, cannot practise the field manœuvres with opposing forces, they are to be ordered to practise with "independent missions" some of the duties appertaining to their specialities. The manœuvres and special practices thus executed are to be reported within forty-eight hours by the officers who have charge of them to the commanding officer of the corps of officers (through the commanding officer of the battalion in case of infantry or artillery), with sketches. The meritorious among these reports are forwarded to the commanding officer of the division (in case of infantry to the chief of the brigade). The officer through whom the reports are sent will, when forwarding them to his superior, in every case add his own observations on a part or the whole of each report.

The very best of these reports are submitted to the personal perusal of the Emperor. These reports, however, are not to be confused with the general reports which are made by the responsible chiefs of the divisions or battalions on these affairs on each occasion.

### SCIENTIFIC TRAINING—(*a*) WINTER WORKS

Every captain, lieutenant, and sub-lieutenant of each corps of officers has during the winter season of every year to draft an answer to a question on some subject on either military science or practical military duties. The subject is to be selected and given by the chief of the corps. One for captains, one for lieutenants, and one for sub-lieutenants in case of infantry and artillery; the subject of lieutenants and sub-lieutenants is given by the chief of the battalion annually on December 1, and the answers must be finished and sent in by March 1 of the next year. In reporting these answers the procedure is the same as in the case of reports of manœuvres.

(*b*) DISCOURSES

Discourses are to be given from time to time in each corps of officers by majors, captains, and senior lieutenants on the history of some war, or on some subject of which the lecturer has made a special study, or on his experience when sent on duty or for study, say, to a military school, or to some foreign country, or any such occurrences as these in connexion with himself. The subject of the lecture is either to be set previously by the chief of the corps or to be approved by the latter on the application of the lecturer.

(*c*) WAR GAMES

War games are to be practised frequently by each corps of officers, irrespective of seasons.

(*d*) TOPOGRAPHICAL SURVEYS

Topographical surveys are frequently to be executed by captains, lieutenants, and sub-lieutenants, whenever it is practicable in the neighbourhood of each garrison, and under the direction of the chief of the corps.

(*e*) DISCOURSES ON THE SPOT

The chief of every corps of officers is personally to lead out one or other portion, in turn, of the officers under his command to the field, and there appropriate discourses are to be given under his own supervision.

(*f*) PRACTICE OF THE ART OF WAR ON MAPS

The officers of each corps of officers are to hold meetings in their spare hours, under the supervision of the chief of the corps, and practise the art of war by the aid of suitable charts and plans.

FURTHER REMARKS

It may not be quite unfitting here to develop my statement a little further. I have spoken of the broad division of military education into two branches—Technical and

Scientific. The term "scientific" must not be taken in its stricter sense, as appertaining to pure science. The original term in the text has the wide significance of "learning" and "knowledge," and includes, as I have shown, matters which relate even to the morality of the troops. That branch of education when spoken of independently is called "spiritual education." Perhaps "mental" or ethical education" is easier to understand, but we call it "spiritual," because that branch of our education is regarded as being expressly devoted to the nourishment of the best and highest spirits among all ranks, which at the same time is ethical, and it lays greater stress on the mental operations than on mere conventionalities. This part of education is regarded in our army as being of superlative importance, and the greatest possible attention is paid thereto. In this part of education the Imperial rescript for soldiers (1882), together with the Imperial educational rescript of 1890, plays the most essential part. In this branch of education, moreover, the duty which one owes to the Emperor and to the country is inculcated as highest of all, and that duty is placed above any other consideration. In it the grand conception of loyalty is made to supersede all other thoughts—of home, of parents, of wife, of children, or of personal aims and interests. As to the education of the rank and file, some matters may be with discretion entrusted to a non-commissioned officer, but the "spiritual education" must be always undertaken by the officers themselves. There are no religious chaplains in our army. I may also mention that with us loyalty and patriotism exactly coincide with each other, and the terms are synonymous, as it were, in their practical application.

### STAFF RIDES AND LARGER MANŒUVRES

I may also add that there are several Staff rides to be practised each at least once a year. Annual autumn field manœuvres are also carried out on a comparatively large scale within each division, beginning with the manœuvres of the combined detachments; next those of the brigades, and finally ending with those of the division; the first two with opposing forces, and the last with imaginary forces of enemy on the opposing side. The peculiarity of these

manœuvres is that at a certain stage every officer is given a command one rank higher than that he is properly entitled to. Again, two or three divisions perform combined manœuvres every year, and at an interval of a certain number of years there are grand combined manœuvres of the Army and Navy.

### INSPECTIONS

I need hardly explain that there are several kinds of "inspections," both ordinary and extraordinary, annually performed at the proper season, and regulated by the ordinances relating to the subject. Some of the inspections are undertaken by special inspectors commissioned for the occasion by the Emperor, and others by the chief of a division or a brigade *ex-officio*.

### EDUCATION PREPARATORY TO RECEIPT OF COMMISSIONS

So far I have described what an officer has to do after he has received a commission, but my statements do not seem to be complete unless a brief allusion be made to the preparatory stage of his education prior to being commissioned —i.e., during the stage of his cadetship.

Cadets are divided into two classes: (1) Candidates for officers; (2) quasi-officers.

There are several schools, both Government and private, in which boys are taught with the special object of becoming cadets. But it is not a necessary condition, in offering himself for cadetship, that one should have been educated in one of these schools, provided he is equipped with certain educational qualifications. All the cadets are at first attached to one or other regiment for a certain period, and have to undergo their training by going the ordinary round of the duties both of the ordinary "men" and non-commissioned officers; subject, however, to some discrimination which is made by the responsible officers between those cadets who have already received a certain amount of military education in the schools above-mentioned and those who have not. During this period all cadets are treated, so far as their regular duties are concerned, exactly like the ordinary rank and file or non-commissioned officers, as the case

may be, except that they are associated with the officers in other respects, and that special and extra attention is bestowed upon them, calculated to be beneficial to them in their military career.

After this stage the cadets are sent to the "officers' school." There they are educated in such a way as to make them proficient in everything that appertains to their ultimate rank as commissioned officers. I will not detail the curriculum of the schools above-mentioned. Suffice it to say, that the courses prescribed are much on the same lines as those of the education of the officers, with a difference, of course, in degree. They are given both the technical training and the scientific one, including the "spiritual" one, on which so great stress is laid in all the stages of military education.

The cadets are sent back, after having completed the necessary course in the "officers' school," to their regiments, and they have to gain experience as "quasi-officers" in the duties of officers for at least six months before they are commissioned.

### THE ARMY UNIVERSITY

There is a military academy which is called "the Army University." Its chief aim is to obtain good staff officers, and therefore promising young officers are drawn from different divisions and educated at this institution. The principal courses of study in this academy are, of course, directed to the acquisition of the theory of tactics, strategy, and cognate subjects connected with the higher branches of military education.

## CHAPTER VI

### WOMAN'S EDUCATION [1]

THE position of woman in Japan has always been different, to a significant extent, from that of the same sex in other Asiatic countries. Looking back to the history of Japan over thousands of years, we see many renowned figures of the fair sex. There have been several Empresses, some brave, intelligent, and highly cultured. There have been several heroines fighting side by side with our brave warriors. There have been numerous poetesses, novelists, artists.

In fact, in the ninth century, when the study of Chinese was in vogue, the culture of our native light literature was mainly in the hands of the other sex. It was then that we had Murasaki Shikibu, the authoress of the great *Genji-Monogatari*; Seishonagon, the authoress of the *Makura-no-soshi*; and many others. In the latter part of the Tokugawa régime there were many women well known for their Chinese culture, such as Kamei Shokin, Hara Saihin, Yema Saiko, Cho-Koran. This period also produced several lady poets, as Rengetsu, Chiyo, Botoni, and others. Examples of patriotic women also abound preceding the restoration of the Imperial régime.

Women have always enjoyed a large social freedom, though not to the same degree as in modern Western nations; and thus we have produced from time to time some conspicuous female figures in history. Even in our own days such examples are not wanting. We see ladies engaged in educational institutions in China and Siam; one of them is even gone to Mongoria, where she is engaged by a native chief as instructress in his household.

Women's education, however, has always been a problem.

[1] From *Japan by the Japanese.*

From the very nature of the case, it is very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory solution. Still, we realize the importance of it as much as do Europeans. Especially have we done so from the time of the inauguration of the new régime. Here I might cite an instance, which is not without interest. In 1871 a number of young girls were sent to America for their education, one, now the wife of Admiral Uriu, whose name is well known in connexion with th present war; another is the Marchioness Oyama, wife Marshal Marquis Oyama, head of the General Staff of Japa

I am far from speaking confidently of the problem a solved in Japan. I will but give a brief description of it present condition, basing my materials mainly on different official reports.

In Japan the system of elementary education is most extensively carried out. There is no village where a school is not provided at the public expense. Elementary education is compulsory, every child having to be educated, though some relaxation is made under exceptional circumstances. Elementary schools are divided into two grades: ordinary elementary and higher elementary schools. Ordinary elementary are for children of the age of six and upwards, for four years, and that of higher elementary education from the age nine. In the case of the latter the period of their sch education is not uniform, because some may join high schools after certain years, and some may leave school the middle of the course. But in case of children who through the ordinary course the period is four years.

In these preliminary schools boys and girls are taken without any distinction, though, for the convenience teaching, the classes are generally formed separately. Le me now proceed with statistics, taken from the annual reports of the Minister of Education for 1901-02. It relates to Japan proper, including the islands of Yezo and Liuchiu, but not Formosa.

The number of children in that school year was: Boys, 3,876,495; girls, 3,590,391; total, 7,466,886.

Of these, children attending the ordinary elementary schools were: Boys, 1,714,509; girls, 1,632,018; total, 3,346,527.

Those who completed the ordinary elementary course were: Boys, 1,462,977; girls, 911,422; total, 2,374,399.

The total number of children of school age receiving the prescribed course of education was therefore : Boys, 3,177,486 ; girls, 2,543,440 ; total, 5,720,926.

The total number of pupils in higher elementary schools was as follows :—

Those belonging to public schools (including those attached to normal schools) : Boys, 705,238 ; girls, 230,955 ; total 936,193.

Those belonging to private schools : Boys, 4,268 ; girls, 3,437 ; total, 7,705. Thus, the total number of pupils in the higher course were : Boys, 709,506 ; girls, 234,392 ; total, 943,898.

The percentage of boys receiving instruction for 1901-02 was 93·78 of the whole eligible school population. The percentages of girls was 81·80.

I may here also mention that in populous towns there are many kindergartens established, and their benefit is so universally admitted that there is a great tendency to increase their number. In these, children, both boys and girls, aged from three years up to the age of admission to ordinary elementary schools are taken. The subjects of training are games, singing, conversation, and handicrafts.

There were in the year under our consideration 182 public and 72 private kindergartens—a total of 254 ; and the number of infants attending those public kindergartens was : Boys, 10,327 ; girls 8,972 ; total, 19,299. That of the private ones was : Boys, 2,235 ; girls, 2,137 ; total, 4,372. Aggregate total, 23,671.

After the elementary schools the education of the boys and girls takes separate courses. There are higher schools and ordinary as well as higher normal schools for girls. There are also many private schools for their higher education.

The relative percentage of the girls attending these schools is much less when compared with that of the boys attending similar schools, partly from the very nature of women's position, and partly on account of insufficient provision for admission of applicants. The courses and methods of their study also are not uniform. It would be tedious to enter upon a minute description of each. But I will try to give the general outline of them.

First, as to the course of study in the higher schools for

women, I quote part of the annual report of the Minister of Education.

The course of study in the higher schools for women extends over four years, but may be further extended or curtailed by one year, according to local circumstances. In addition to general courses, supplementary courses not exceeding two years may be provided for the benefit of those desiring to study such arts as are necessary for women; special art courses extending over not less than two and not more than four years, may be established in addition to general courses. Special courses of two or three years may also be so instituted, for the benefit of those graduates who are desirous to pursue some special branches of study.

The qualifications of applicants for admission are: age twelve years and upwards; possession of attainments at least equivalent to those who have completed the second year's course of higher elementary schools. The number of such schools for the year 1901-2 was: Public, including one connected with higher normal school for women, 61; private, 8; total, 69; and the number of pupils was: Public, 14,975; private, 2,240; total, 17,215; and the number of graduates was: Public, 2,778; private, 812; total, 3,590.

The regulations for the courses of instruction relative to higher schools for girls are given thus in the first article of the ordinance of the Educational Department for such schools:—

The courses of instruction in the higher schools for women should be: Moral precepts, Japanese language, foreign language, history, geography, mathematics, science, drawing, training for domestic affairs, cutting out and sewing, music and gymnastics.

In cases where the period of school years is shortened foreign languages shall be omitted.

The foreign language shall be either English or French.

Foreign languages may be omitted, or may be made an optional course in all cases.

Music may be omitted for those pupils for whom the art may be deemed difficult.

Besides the courses enumerated above, pedagogy or handicrafts, or either of them, may be added as an optional course, excepting the cases where the period of school years is shortened."

There is a college for girls situated in Tokio, and called the Higher Normal School for Women. The object of this college is for training instructors for higher schools for girls

and for prefectural normal schools. The plan of the college is divided into a Literature course, a Science course, and an Art course. The first comprises ethics, pedagogy, Japanese language, Chinese literature, English, history, geography, music, gymnastics.

The second comprises ethics, pedagogy, English, mathematics, physics, chemistry, natural history, music, gymnastics.

The third comprises ethics, pedagogy, English, physics, chemistry, domestic management, cutting-out and sewing handiwork, drawings and designs, music, gymnastics. To the Japanese language and Chinese literature is added the practice of penmanship. The course of household management is divided into two branches, one relating to pure household management, and the other to family education. A post-graduate course, an elective course, a special course, and a training course for kindergarten teachers are instituted as distinct courses of instruction. A higher school for women, an elementary school, and a kindergarten, are also organized in connexion with the chief instruction. The course of study for the main school extends over four years, the post-graduate course extends over two years, the elective course over four years, and the training course for kindergarten conductors over one year, the length of the special course being fixed at each admission of fresh pupils.

The number of pupils in the year we are speaking of was 311, and of graduates 86. One of the instructors of this school was Miss Yasui, who was educated in England; she has gone to Siam lately by invitation of the Queen of that country, to instruct the women pupils there. A higher women's school is attached to this school. The course of study extends over five years, a year longer than other higher schools for women.

There is a higher school for girls attached to the college. It is designed to provide the means of studying the general method of women's education, and affords the pupils of the college an opportunity of practical training in women's education.

The number of pupils in that year was 325, of graduates 91.

An elementary school is also attached to the college. It is also designed to afford the means of studying the methods

of general education, and to secure the pupils in the college an opportunity for practical training in teaching children. It is divided into three sections. The first section represents an elementary school in connexion with a higher school for girls, and is provided with ordinary and higher elementary school courses. The second section comprises both ordinary and higher-school courses. The third represents an ordinary elementary school organized as a single-class school. The course of study varies from two to four, according to the sections.

The number of pupils in ordinary elementary course was 323, of whom 80 were boys and 243 girls; and that of those in higher elementary course was 139, of whom 28 were boys and 111 girls.

This gives a total of 462, 108 of whom were boys and 354 girls.

A kindergarten is also attached to the college.

For the purpose of training women teachers, special normal schools for women are instituted in some provinces, whilst in others a section is provided for women in the ordinary normal school for males.

There is a school for women under the direct auspices of the Empress. It is under the control of the Minister of the Imperial Household, and not of the Minister of Education. It is called the Peeress's School, and, naturally, the women belonging to the noble families have the right of first entrance, though the door is not shut against the daughters of other respectable families. Here also a kindergarten is attached.

There is an Academy of Music in Tokio under the control of the Minister of Education. The course is divided into (1) preparatory, (2) main, (3) post-graduate, (4) normal, and (5) elective. In the Academy both men and women are admitted.

Besides Japanese teachers, there were five foreign teachers in the school year of 1901–2,—two German, one American, one Russian, one French.

As to private establishments for female education, the method, style, and origin are so various that it is beyond my power to attempt any clear description of them. I may, however, mention a few types of schools.

The Tokio Jiogakkwan occupies a unique position. The

idea was started by some foreign philanthropists in connexion with a foreign philanthropic mission; it is outside the province of this school to teach religion, but its object is to educate young girls of a respectable class in the Anglo-Saxon attainments. The idea was taken up by several eminent personages, contributions to the fund having been made by both native and foreign patrons. It also receives some special patronage from the Imperial Household. The number of pupils in October, 1903, was 230, according to a recent periodical on female education.

There is a college for girls in Tokio called the Women's University. The name may be somewhat inappropriate if compared with men's universities, but at any rate it comprises a vast number of female aspirants. It exceeds 1,000 at present, if we include all preparatory courses attached to it.

There are also various institutions where girls may study medicine, pictorial arts, technical industry, even commerce and agriculture.

There are not many women physicians practising, but I have seen some notified as passing State examinations.

There are also many private schools for girls established by foreign missions in Tokio, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Kioto, and many other places. Many of them are doing praiseworthy services for the education of women.

There are in the city of Tokio 73 schools of all kinds for female education. These include the schools mentioned before, and also among them are included schools for midwifery and nursing; but in a vast majority of them ordinary courses of instruction are given.

A few words about the occupations of women. Men and women are pretty equally proportioned in Japan, so that the fair sex in Japan has greater chances of being married than in some other countries. When they are married they are mostly contented with looking after their household affairs and making themselves good wives and mothers. But there are a large number of women employed in operative works, such as cotton, silk, and paper mills. As to the public institutions, the number of women employed is not great; but a considerable number are employed as instructors in schools; and those who are less fortunate and have fewer attainments are employed to a considerable extent

in different post and telephone offices and in some branches on the railway. Many private companies of different kinds have begun to employ women clerks as an experiment, and in most cases they have already proved successful.

It seems that there is good hope for women acquiring a wider field for the display of their talents.

It might not be quite out of place to add a few words about more or less important institutions organized by ladies. There are some twenty of such in Tokio: the Charity Hospital, under the direct patronage of the Empress, with her Imperial Highness Princess Arisugawa as the Chief of the Council; the Japanese Ladies' Educational Society, with her Imperial Highness Princess Kanin as President; the Special Society for Nursing the Sick, under the direct patronage of the Empress, in connexion with the Red Cross Society; the Japanese Ladies' Sanitary Society, the Ladies' Society for Orphans, the Society for Nursing Infants belonging to female prisoners, and such-like, with eminent ladies as presidents. Most of them are doing their work well.

A society for female charity handicraft is under the presidency of Miss Parker, of England.

There are many similar institutions in the provinces.

Proportionately, the mental capacity of Japanese women to men seems to be pretty similar to that which their Western sisters are supposed to bear to the men. We cannot, of course, predict what will be women's place in the social sphere at large in future; but one thing is certain: the educational system for women has been extended, together with that for men, to a proportion that Japan has never before known. Their emulation and aspiration increase year by year, so that the supply of educational institutions is always far behind the demand.

## CHAPTER VII

### HARA-KIRI: ITS REAL SIGNIFICANCE [1]

HARA-KIRI! The word has been before us, of late at every turn. In translating it the English equivalent is often given as "disembowelling"—a ghastly term, and, moreover, inappropriate. "Happy despatch" was formerly the phrase employed; it is, as it seems to me, a far better term, though how that expression originated no one seems to know. The matter itself, to the Western notion, is already not an agreeable one to talk about, but the recent translation of the term makes it worse. It may not be wholly without interest for the reader if I try to explain, though with some diffidence, from the very nature of the subject, the true signification of the act, and at the same time endeavour in some degree to account for the sensitiveness displayed by my own country-people at the misapprehensions produced by a wrong translation.

Literally, of course, *hara-kiri* is "belly-cutting," and this is the expression in common use, but *kappuku*, or more usually *seppuku*, is the word employed by persons of refinement, the actual meaning, however, being the same as *hara-kiri*. *Seppuku* and *kappuku* are expressions coined from Chinese. There are vigorous Anglo-Saxon terms in use in Great Britain which people of taste often prefer to replace—at afternoon tea, for example—by something, perhaps equally forcible, derived from the Latin. The instance is similar.

*Seppuku* was, in the feudal period, an honourable mode of committing suicide. It was unknown to the Japanese of ancient days, and was a custom which grew with the age of chivalry. With us, in the Far East, to hang oneself is

[1] *The Nineteenth Century and After*, December, 1904.

looked upon as the most cowardly of all methods of self-destruction, and drowning oneself or taking poison was deemed to be no better. Even to shoot himself was, in a Samurai, regarded as a base and ignoble way of shuffling off this mortal coil; it was vulgarly spoken of as *teppo-bara* [*h* is changed into *b* for euphony], an abbreviation of *teppo-hara-kiri*, in other words *hara-kiri* by means of a gun, though in reality the throat, and not the *hara*, was the spot usually assailed in this case.

There was never an instance, so far as can be traced, of *seppuku* by a female, and the honourable equivalent thereof for a Samurai lady was generally known as *jigai* (self-destruction) a death by a stab in the throat from her own dirk, a weapon she generally carried in her girdle to be used in time of need. Where a Roman dame would in ancient times have plunged her dagger into her own heart, a Japanese heroine preferred to thrust the weapon into her neck; and there is no record of either male or female in Japan ending existence in the fashion that is so often depicted in Western novels, and less frequently, perhaps, in real life.

*Seppuku* was not only a mode of self-dispatch, but was prescribed as a form of capital punishment for all of Samurai rank. Beheading, and still more hanging, were forms of execution that might not be employed in cases of offende[illegible]s of the military classes, whose position, even to the last [illegible] of their existence, merited respect; and when, in very extre[illegible]me cases, the crime of which a Samurai had been convic[illegible]ted was heinous enough to deserve exemplary punishment b[illegible]y condemnation to an ignominious death, the culprit wa[illegible]s first stripped of his rank and privileges as one of the Samurai class. No Samurai was ever to be beheaded; still less to be hanged.

Naturally under such conditions the act of *seppuku* came to be invested with much formality, and cases in which the most elaborate etiquette had to be strictly observed were those when a daimio, i.e. a feudal baron, or Samurai of particularly high standing, was called upon by the proper authorities to dispatch himself in this way in expiation of some political offence. A special commissioner was then sent from the proper quarters to witness the due execution of the sentence, and a *kai-shaku-nin* was chosen to assist

the principal in ridding himself of the burden of life. This person was selected by the condemned from the circle of his own immediate relatives, friends, or retainers, and the *kai-shaku-nin's* office was an honourable one, inasmuch as he was thereby privileged to render a last service to his comrade or chief.

There was always a special apartment or pavilion prepared in which the ceremony had to take place; a particular dress, designed for use only on these melancholy occasions, had to be worn; and the dagger, or short sword, was invariably placed before the seat of the condemned on a clean white tray, raised on legs, termed *sambo*, which in the ordinary way is a kind of wooden stand used for keeping sacrifices offered to the gods, or for some similar solemn purposes. The actual cutting open of the body was not essential, a trifling incision in a horizontal line 6 or 7 inches, or rarely in two lines crossing each other—the more superficial the better, as proof of a light and skilful touch—being ordinarily made, followed by a deep cut in the throat. As a rule, however, immediately after making the incision in the abdomen the condemned made a slight movement of his disengaged left hand, and stretched his neck forward, as signs to the *kai-shaku-nin* to do his office; perceiving which, the latter, who stood by with his sword ready poised, instantly struck off his principal's head.

In Japan there is no need to speak directly of either *hara-kiri* or *seppuku*, as the euphemism *ku-sun-go-bu* is often employed—literally nine inches and a half, which was the proper length of the dagger to be used on these occasions. The weapon was always wrapped in some sheets of pure white paper, only the extreme point being exposed, and it was correct to hold it, when making an incision, in the right hand, not by the handle, but by the middle of the paper-wrapped blade. How to sit, how to bow to the spectators when about to commence the awful task, how to unfold reverently the part of the clothing which covers the upper part of the body, how to wrap up the dagger, and how to make the requisite signal to the *kai-shaku-nin*, were all matters on which the utmost nicety was enjoined, and were part of the instruction which every Samurai was obliged to receive from the master of military ceremonies. *Hara-kiri*, indeed, was to the Samurai a matter involving an ap-

palling amount of ceremony. The end of the world-famed, "Forty-seven Ro-nins" was reached by *seppuku* in the same way; each died by his own hand. They were given in charge of three daimios, in three separate groups, and on the appointed day each group killed themselves simultaneously at an appointed hour, but each individual one after another, in specially erected pavilions provided in the gardens of the Yedo residences of the three barons. The tale so often retailed in popular story-books, that they all committed *seppuku* around the tomb of their avenged lord, is fictitious, though it is true that they all were buried there.

Perhaps the most notable instance of *seppuku* was that which took place at Sakai, near Osaka, just after the establishment of the new régime in Japan, when a number of young Samurai, some twenty in all, if I remember rightly, who, not liking the secret surveying of the locality performed by French naval officers and marines, had attacked the French, were ordered by the Government to expiate their offence in this fashion, in the presence of the French Minister, whose rage it was necessary to appease. He begged that the carnage might stop when eleven had thus closed their careers.

I need scarcely add that this form of punishment has totally disappeared from our laws, with the abandonment of the distinctive privileges of Samurai, and the gradual assimilation of all classes of the Emperor's subjects in regard to civil rights and punishments. But, before that stage was reached, the practice had not wholly ceased for some years after the Restoration in 1867, and I well remember that there was a case in 1871, when a nobleman who was indicted for high treason was sentenced to *ji-jin*—literally self-ending—which was the same thing as *seppuku*.

When *seppuku* was purely a voluntary act the formalities were necessarily much curtailed, and very often the person who thus conceived himself condemned by fate's decree retired to some secluded spot, and there slew himself in orthodox fashion, without making known his intention beforehand, and merely announcing his reasons by letters which he left by his side for all to read. The principle, however, was always the same, and it was the Samurai's main endeavour at the last to observe due decorum and to conform to the rules in every way that was possible.

There were numerous instances in which men of truly noble soul chose this manner of death. Watanabé Kwazan was one of them. He was councillor to a small daimio, a genuine patriot, and a pioneer advocate of the opening of Japan to foreign intercourse. As a painter, though an amateur only, he stood very high. In 1850, seeing that through his views on the subject of Western civilization his feudal chieftain was bound to be implicated, and that his own self-extermination would be requisite if his lord was to be preserved from the stigma which then attached to any predilection for Occidental methods, Watanabé hesitated not to commit *seppuku*, and thereby saved his master from any such imputations.

Takano Choyei, a sympathiser and active co-operator with Watanabé, being a well-known physician and Dutch scholar, and Koseki Sanyei, who was also a Dutch scholar and assisted Watanabé by translating Dutch books for him, both died by *seppuku* for the same cause.

Kuruhara Riozo, father of the present Marquis Kido, who succeeded to the heritage of the house of Kido after the death of his renowned uncle on the maternal side, and received the honour of a marquisate in memory of his relative's splendid services to the nation, was another instance. Kuruhara was a brave Samurai. When Nagai Uta, an officer of high rank of Chosiu province, about 1862, advocated the definite opening of the country, Kuruhara sided with him. Circumstances compelled him to show that he had not adopted that view from any base motive, and in the furtherance of this attitude he committed *seppuku*. When he was stationed with the garrison of Uraga, the guarding of which place was entrusted to the Prince of Chosiu at the time of the American advent to the Far East, the present Marquis Ito, then a boy of fourteen, was his subordinate, and when, a few years afterwards, he was despatched to Nagasaki at the head of a group of young Samurai of Chosiu for the purpose of studying the Dutch system of artillery, young Ito was one of them. Ito was in those days a special favourite of Kuruhara, and knew him well. Ito was almost the first person to rush into the room when Kuruhara died. I have often heard the marquis talking with admiration of Kuruhara, saying what a fine chivalrous character he possessed, and how nobly and with

what studied observance of formality he died. To preserve a perfect self-possession at any dread hour is the essence of the Samurai doctrine. By the bye, Nagai, just mentioned above, was himself one of those who committed *seppuku*. He died thereby at the command of his prince, as a consequence of a political dissension. I may perhaps remark here parenthetically that Japan's adoption of Western civilization was not attained without it costing her much in blood and treasure.

In former days, sometimes, a man committed *hara-kiri* by an over-zeal for some cause which he advocated, merely to demonstrate his sincerity. Such earnestness is fine, but the method of exhibiting it has some drawbacks which have led to its being discouraged. *Hara-kiri* has in these later days gone out of fashion.

The basis on which *seppuku* was prescribed as a mode of capital punishment for Samurai was that it was unbecoming the dignity and status of one of the warrior rank that he should be subjected under any circumstances to the rough handling of the common executioner, and therefore, when the deed of *seppuku* was a voluntary one, the root idea was the same, for it was undertaken in order to avoid ignominy, and to prevent the family escutcheon being stained by any act towards which the scornful might afterwards point a finger of derision.[1] All that the Samurai

[1] The idea of the abdomen's being assailed seems to be that it was vaguely regarded as the seat of one's mind. So much so that the term "clear or black abdomen" used to be the signification of a good or bad mind. Scientifically it may not be correct, but then even the most scientific people speak of heart in place of one's thought or feeling. Assailing the abdomen, then, may be taken as an emblem of showing the clearness of one's mind, on the casting off of any pollution thereof.

In an old Japanese book, however, the following statement appears :—

"In the Hogen Monogatari it is stated that Tametomo, who was then 28 years old, leaned against the central pillar of the house, cut his abdomen but could not die, so he cut his back-bone and fell forward. Perhaps from that period warriors began to resort to *Seppuku* as a method of self-extinction, in order to show their bravery. The practice of a lord ordering his retainer to die by that method as a punishment is perhaps an innovation of a much later date."

Hogeni Monogatari is an antique Japanese book. Hogen was an epoch eight and a half centuries ago, which is the time when our

might ask of his proud race—like Don Cæsar de Bazan in *Maritana*—was "to die . . . and not disgrace its ancient chivalry," and as the chivalric spirit is still, I am glad to think, ardently cherished in Japan, there are occasions, as the readers of "war news" of the day must have discovered, when it yet seems to some to be appropriate to end their days in the fashion of feudal times, though among private individuals this course is now but very rarely resorted to.

Among the Chinese and Koreans *seppuku* is unknown. At the capitulation of Wei-hai-Wei, ten years ago, the Chinese Admiral Ting destroyed himself by smoking an immense quantity of opium. He did this, in accordance with Chinese ideas, to save his men from punishment, and in the eyes of his countrymen it was altogether the act of a hero, and so it was. A Japanese, under like conditions, however, would have died, not by poison, but by *seppuku*. The three Chinese of high rank who had been implicated in the Boxer troubles of 1900, and committed suicide at the command of the Emperor in consequence of the joint demand of the Powers, died either by taking poison or by hanging. If the event had taken place in former days in Japan, their deaths would have been secured by *seppuku*.

Terrible as it unquestionably was to witness, the act of self-sacrifice was so bound up with the revered traditions of our race that it was shorn in great part of the horrors with which it must seem to readers in the twentieth century to have been invested. Exaggerated and loathsome accounts are even to be met with in popular story-books in Japan, scenes in which the victim is depicted as hurling, in a last effort, his intestines at his enemy, who is supposed to have been looking on—a thing in itself quite impossible under ordinary circumstances—and certainly, if it occurred, altogether exceptional. The incision usually made, as I have shown, was quite superficial, a mere flesh wound; and death was due to the injury inflicted in the throat by the suicide's own hand, or to the good offices of the *kai-shaku-nin*, whose duty as assistant—the idea is perhaps better

chivalric age begins. Tametomo was a well-known warrior of the Gen family. The above account of his death is perhaps an exaggeration, and moreover there is even another story representing him to have escaped to Lou Chou, where he became the father of the founder of the Lou Chou kingdom.

conveyed by the term "second" in the case of a duel—it was to remove his principal's head with the utmost expedition. Thus to translate *hara-kiri* as disembowelling, or embowelling, is both ghastly and inaccurate in the impression that it leaves on the mind.

Suicide in any form is incompatible with Western notions of right and wrong, and it certainly ought not to be encouraged, and yet there may be conditions, it would seem to us in the East, when it may be wholly or partially excused.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE POLICE SYSTEM OF JAPAN [1]

IN Japan the police system is essentially a part of the State organization. It has nothing to do with the communal corporations. The police force is organized in each prefecture under a universal regulation of the central Government, with local option of making some trifling modifications to suit the condition of the locality, such as the average amount of the salary of the policemen and the total numbers of such men. The system in force in the prefecture of Tokio, our capital, which comprises the city of Tokio and some suburban guns (counties), forms an exception. The general control of the police forces belongs to the Minister of the Interior. In his ministry there is a special bureau for management of police affairs, with a director who acts under him. In prefectures the governors have the control of police affairs, each in his prefecture being under the general control of the Minister of the Interior. In each prefectural government there is a division of officials, with a chief, who takes charge of police affairs under the governor.

The general expenditure of the police force is included in the prefectural budget and defrayed out of the prefectural taxation. But part of it is subsidized by the central Government, and besides the salaries of the officials and some small specific expenses are also paid by the Treasury. The budget is, of course, submitted to the consideration of the prefectural elective assembly in each prefecture, and thus the local assemblies have a voice in determining the average amount of the salaries of the men, and the number of men employed. The state subsidy is the one-sixth part of the whole expenditure of each perfecture (modified imperial ordinance of 1888) and the number of the men is one for

[1] *Japan by the Japanese*

from 300 to 800 of population in cities and one for from 1,000 to 2,000 in counties (imperial ordinance of 1896).

In case of the prefecture of Tokio the system differs from other prefectures in that there is a police-governor, who is also under the general control of the Minister of the Interior, with separate establishment of his office, quite independently of the ordinary governor. Here the police governor and the ordinary governor carry on their function severally, but, of course, they have in many matters to execute their authority conjointly. It resembles very much the system practised in Paris. In Tokio, moreover, the State aid to the expenditure is the four-tenth part, instead of the one-sixth part which is the case with other prefectures.

In each gun (county) there is a police-station, with a certain number of men allotted to it, under a police official (or rather officer, and hereafter to be called officer).

Branch stations are often established besides in the rural districts; generally one particular policeman is allotted to look after the police affairs within a certain compass of the locality and resides therein. There are several classes of the branch stations and sub-branch stations, according to their importance; but it is scarcely necessary to dwell upon them in this place.

According to the Government statistics, there were in the year 1901, police officers 2,116, and men 31,833; total, 33,949, and the ratio of this total as to the whole population was 1 to 1,332.

In the above description Formosa is not included, although the Islands of Yezo and Lou Chou are. But even in Formosa the system does not differ much, except that there is no prefectural assembly. In Lou Chou also there is no prefectural assembly, and in that respect Lou Chou is also an exception.

The function of the police force is pretty much the same as in any other civilized country. Their functions are various, but they may be summed up as being "to keep peace and order"; nay, not only to keep peace and order, as they are, but also to promote the welfare of the people without being over-officious. Hence they have, among kindred ancillary duties, to look after the sanitary conditions of the people and enforce sanitary regulations As a rule, their actions are expected chiefly to be "preventive"

in the first place and "suppressive" in the second place only. There is another duty appertaining to them, namely, the so-called "high police," which means the observation of political movements or intrigues which may be fostered within the Empire. They have also another function, which is that of the "judicial police." This function comes into action when an act which is punishable by law is committed by a person. Here the police force is to be considered as forming part of the official personnel of the law court, and they are expected, as assistants of the court, to search and arrest the offenders. For searching or arresting an offender there are stringent rules for preventing abuses of authority; but that is a matter to be discussed separately. These various functions are, of course, not devolved upon an individual police officer. On the contrary, the division or rotation of the tasks is regulated by minute rules and regulations. Fire brigades form a separate organization, apart from the public, but they are also under the control of the police authorities.

In the eyes of the law in Japan, policemen, low as their actual rank in the official hierarchy may be, are regarded as "government officials" and not as mere operative employés. As a matter of fact, their social standing is relatively higher than that of their comrades in the Western nations. True, they are incessantly taught to be civil and obliging to all with whom they come in contact, and not to display any official arrogancy; but they are not expected, nor do they feel it their duty, to do some things which appear to me quite common among Western nations. I mean they would not oblige any one by doing a thing which is inconsistent with their dignity, and therefore one would rather offend them if he were to expect some such thing to be done for him, say, by offering them a "tip." For instance, they would not come officiously to one's carriage and open the door if there were not some special reason for them to do so, such as an apprehension of accident. This is a very important point for foreign visitors to Japan to keep always in mind. It is my hope that foreign visitors will not judge our policemen on account of that difference from the Western point of view. I do not in the least mean to say that our system is in any way better. The Western method and habit have their

good points. They are very useful and well adapted to the requirements of their countries. I only mean to say that our customs differ in these respects.

In Japan the police force in its modern shape has been formed only after the abolition of the feudal system, as one may well surmise, though it has gone through much evolution. It was the time when thousands of the young Samurai had lost their employment on that account, and it was chiefly those Samurai who were enrolled in the police force. Their social position and intellectual culture were of a rather higher degree than that of those with whom they had to come in daily contact. That condition has never been lost sight of. Even now, only those who pass a certain special examination prescribed for them are taken, and the examination is not a very easy one. Such being the case, it will not be difficult to understand the cause of the difference which exists between the Western police and those of Japan. Here I will interpose a few words. It is the constant desire of our authorities that the police should be especially civil and obliging to foreign visitors; but that some unhappy incidents may have occurred without intention cannot be gainsaid. I once read in a newspaper that in a country town a policeman went up to a foreign lady who was watching the Crown Prince and Princess as they passed and requested her to take off her bonnet. In Japan it is the usual custom that men should take off their hats on such occasion: of course our women wear nothing on their heads. The policeman in question had not known the Western custom concerning ladies' bonnets: hence the request to take her headgear off. There was no wrong intention in this matter. At another time I heard of an incident taking place, of a foreign prince (incognito) shooting pigeons in a temple. A policeman, without knowing who he was, and knowing that he himself was doing only his duty, tried to stop him. Both these occurrences were unfortunate, but of course they were promptly explained and the matter ended. It is our hope that foreign visitors will always make certain allowances, remembering that they are in a foreign land and that they will take the trouble of explaining calmly rather than becoming irritated. I may also add that discrimination in treatment, to be accorded to any one according to the social position which one occupies, is a matter of great

difficulty in Japan, especially on the part of such persons as policemen. Here, therefore, some allowance must also be made. Apart from the police question, it is needless to say that there are many things which are socially permissible in one country and not in another. It is desirable for foreign visitors to keep these facts always in mind and make due allowances as the case may require.

But to return to our subject. Although it is the endeavour of the Japanese authorities to keep up the standard of the police, the tendency of late years has shown the difficulty involved, inasmuch as the remuneration given them is not sufficient either to enlist, or to retain long in the service, men of the same standing as in former days. The monthly salaries were increased to some extent, but they are, after all, small, for they vary from 9 yen to 15 yen (the imperial ordinance of 1897), and this scarcely keeps pace with the general development of the country. The increase of local expenditure, however, prevents any significant augmentation. There is a system of pension for long services of policemen or for those disabled in the discharge of their duties. There is a regulation of rewards for conspicuous services done by them, and a few other kinds of inducements. But all these are not quite equal to maintain the old standard.

A few words more. There is in Tokio a college called "Police and Prison College," under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. It is not a college in the strict sense. It is a place where police and prison officers are trained for the discharge of their special duties, both in theory and practice. Police officers are sent there from the prefectures. Each prefecture selects a certain number of the most promising young officers from amongst the police force for his prefecture. When these police officers go back to their prefecture, they in turn train others at the training station of their several prefectures. This college was instituted in the year when the old treaties with the Western Powers were revised, and has proved most successful. The majority of the teachers were foreigners at first; but their places are now taken by natives.

And yet another word. With us there is a system of the so-called "applied-for-policemen." A bank or any commercial firm, or municipal corporation, private school, or even private family of sufficient standing, may apply for

the permanent despatch of a number of policemen to their premises, and so establish a kind of privately regulated police-station. These policemen do not differ from their colleagues in any way, except that the expenses pertaining to them are defrayed by the applicants. To make it more clear, there is a fixed sum, which is determined by the governors with the concurrence of the respective prefectural assemblies, to be contributed to the authorities for each of the men applied for. These men are not always identical, but the necessary number of them is always stationed on the same premises and keep watch, which plan has proved both convenient and successful.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE ETHICS OF JAPAN[1]

THERE are three sources of the factors which influenced the moulding of the ethical system in Japan, namely Shintoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The first is the native religion of Japan; the second is, needless to say, a religion originated in India and introduced to Japan through China and Korea; and the third is the moral teaching of China. As to the relative positions of these three, they are fully explained in the chapter on "The Religions of Japan." They are not antagonistic to one another, as people not living in Japan might imagine, and as would only appear natural to these people from their own notions of religion. Of these three, Buddhism is the most religion-like in the ordinary sense of the term. Shintoism ranks next, but it is very simple and liberal if viewed in the light of a religion. Confucianism comes last; it is ordinarily classed by Western writers as a religion, but as a matter of fact its religious aspect is very vague, and it is not considered a religion by the Orientals. Perhaps a better term for it would be the Chinese teaching of morality, because moral notions which can be gathered from Chinese study are comprised in all sorts of Chinese writings, and Confucius, the great sage, is only one of the exponents thereof. Confucius, however, takes a very high place among those exponents, and therefore he came to be revered more than any others by Orientals; and thus Chinese teaching came to be usually associated with the name of that great sage. I cannot do

[1] An address delivered at the Society of Arts, March 8, 1905.

better than follow this example, and call Chinese teaching by the name of Confucianism.

Comparing these three systems of teaching with regard to ethics, Confucianism stands out very prominently in its systematic exposition and practical utility. Buddhism, it is said, is very philosophical, and deep in its ideas of the cosmos, and there is no doubt that it is capable of exercising a great influence on the popular notion of a future life, though it does not do so as much in Japan as in some parts of the Asiatic continent. It has, however, very little to say with regard to ethics relative to the actual life of the human being. It says you must not do wrong—it says you must do good —but as to what is good or what is bad it is very vague in its meaning. It suggests rather religious notions than practical ethics, how one should behave in this world towards one's fellow creatures or towards the community or State to which one belongs. It speaks of ten warnings and four benevolences. The ten warnings are: 1. Do not kill the living. 2. Do not steal. 3. Do not commit adultery. 4. Do not speak wantonly. 5. Do not make sensational exaggerations. 6. Do not calumniate. 7. Do not use a double tongue. 8. Do not be greedy. 9. Do not be angry. 10. Do not entertain crooked views.

The four benevolences which one has to remember are :— 1. The father and the mother. 2. The ruler of the land. 3. "All beings." 4. The three treasures, i.e. the Buddha, the Laws, and the Priesthood (Order).

It speaks of compassion and forbearance. It also speaks of eight correct ways: 1. Correct views. 2. Correct thoughts. 3. Correct words. 4. Correct conduct. 5. Correct living. 6. Correct ministration, meaning self-reflection and aspirations. 7. Correct conception. 8. Correct mediation. In their essence, however, all these teachings are mostly of a negative character, and, moreover, I must say that they have more importance from a religious point of view than from an ordinary, and a practical ethical point of view. Therefore I can say that Buddhism has very little to do with the ethics of Japan in the sense of a systematic exposition of them, though in an indirect way it has had some influence on the moral atmosphere of the Japanese, as I shall show later on.

The Chinese teaching, otherwise called Confucianism, is

a system of moral teaching founded upon a patriarchal system of community. It does not, therefore, only speak of the good conduct of an individual, as relating to his fellowship with other individuals; but also from the point of view of the whole system of community as a state. Therefore it speaks of modes of governing and of being governed, as well as of individual relationship between man and man. It does not recognize any difference between sovereignty and ruler, nor does it notice a difference between State and country. In it, the greatest natural bonds of humanity are five, and they are: 1. Sovereign and subjects. 2. Father (implying also mother) and child. 3. Husband and wife. 4. Brothers (implying also sisters). 6. Friends. To each of these relationships, the essential duty which is to be borne in mind by each individual is separately attributed, and to each of these duties a special term is given to designate its actions from the point of view of a virtuous nature. Besides these five relationships there are two other relationships which have to be added, namely, the relationship between the elder and the younger, not necessarily meaning brothers, and also the relationship between master and pupil. The term, "the sovereign and subjects," in Oriental notions, signifies in their bearing a very deep meaning in their mutual relationship. I once heard from a very trustworthy authority that a Western diplomatist, well versed in Oriental affairs, had said that the Oriental idea concerning sovereign and subjects was not, and could not, be thoroughly understood by Occidentals, and I think that remark is not far from the truth.

The idea of the best virtue that a sovereign can have is "jen," meaning to be as humane as possible to his subjects, detesting oppression, giving the best administration to his country—in a word, to be the best ruler that ever ruled a land. The idea of the best subject is loyalty. The idea of the relation of father and son is filial piety on the part of the child, and strictness on the part of the father, which is modified in the case of the mother towards tenderness, for which there is a special term. The idea which governs the relationship between man and wife is harmony. The older word for this was "distinction," meaning "not to be unseemly," but the word "harmony" is also used sometimes, and we Japanese prefer it. The idea of that of brothers

and sisters is brotherly friendship, for which also a special word exists. The idea of that of friends is trustworthiness. In this way all the five cardinal bonds are dictated by desirable manifestations of sympathetic attentions to one another. But of course more prominence is given to the virtue of a subject, a child, or younger brother, in the case of a sovereign and subjects, or parents and children, and of brothers respectively. Then, again, the elder and the younger in general are expected to respect each other as the case demands, and the relationship between them is to be regulated by a term which is equivalent to the English word "order," that is to say, the younger should not seek to supersede the elder, but to pay respect to him, whilst the elder is expected not to take advantage of the younger but to treat him with kindness. The relationship between master and pupil is also regarded as very important. The pupils are expected to respect their master almost as much as their parents, while the master is expected to treat his pupils with parental kindness; no businesslike thought is to enter their minds. In the olden times in the East the system of teaching and learning was very different to that which exists in these modern days. The teacher taught his pupils out of the love of imparting his knowledge and virtuous example as well as the doctrinal principles he entertained, whilst the pupils were supposed to gather around him out of their admiration for the personality of their master and for the purpose of receiving his instructions and influence for their personal improvement and future usefulness. Such being the case, it was no wonder that the relationship between a master and his pupil was regarded as of so much importance in ethics.

Apart from these classifications the virtuous attributes of man are spoken of in several other ways. We have first of all "wisdom, humanity, and courage." These three are considered to be the three greatest traits of character to be embodied in one person. Wisdom may not exactly fall under the category of a virtue in its strictest sense, but I suppose we need not be very critical on this point. In this instance humanity, that is "jen" in the Chinese original, may be interpreted as comprising every other virtue besides mere mercifulness. There is another catalogue, viz.: "humanity, justice, decorum, wisdom, and faithfulness."

These five are considered essential elements of virtue for regulating a community, and should be observed by each member of it. There is another—"filial piety, brotherly friendship, loyalty, and faithfulness;" these give guidance to a man in his capacity of a son, a brother, a subject, and a friend. There is yet another—"sympatheticability, goodness, respectfulness, self-restraint, and modesty." These are virtues considered important as regards one's self-control. As to the women, "quietness, modesty, and purity" are considered the ideal traits of their character, besides all those which I have just described above, which are of course applicable to women to an extent almost equal to men.

In the West the term love plays an extensive part in governing all the mutual relationships of the kinds enumerated above. The essence of Oriental ideas does not differ from it in its purport, but expressed in words the word love does not play so extensive and imperative a part as it does in the West, because in the Confucian doctrine different technical terms are used, as we have already seen, to meet each particular case. The word love is used very sparingly in the Confucian books, and it is used more especially for designating one kind of virtue as, for example, "extensive love" meaning philanthropy in the Western sense or "charity" in the sense in which it is used in the English New Testament. The word "jen," which ordinarily may be translated as humanity, more resembles the Western word love, because that word "jen" may be interpreted in many ways suitable to the occasion on which it is used, almost in the same way, and in a similar sense, that the word love can be used. But the meaning of that word "jen" is more comprehensive and deeper, because it implies some other meaning than mere attachment. I will not worry you by going into full details of the interpretation of that word, as it is too technical. There is, however, one thing worth noticing about the word love in Chinese. When that word is singled out it is also applicable to many cases, including the relationship above enumerated. Thus it can be used in a very comprehensive manner, and thence there arises a question about the essence of the word. The question is whether the notion of love is absolute, and consequently has no gradation or differentiation in its nature.

At the time of Mencius, sometime after Confucius, there was a school of philosophers who maintained that there ought not to be any differentiation, but Mencius maintained that that was a fallacy. The word may be the same, but the practice may be differentiated according to the circumstances. The meaning is that one should love a nearer object more than a distant one, and thus the ethical notion of cosmopolitanism was reconciled with other notions of different virtues—in other words, if one does good to his neighbour more than to a stranger, or if one does more good to his country than to other lands, out of the feeling of love, it is quite justifiable from an ethical point of view, and thus Chinese ethics are made reconcilable with the principles of state. And this is, I think, an important landmark in which Confucianism differs from the features of an ordinary religion, which in its essence is, as a rule, founded upon cosmopolitanism, and knows not an artificial boundary of states.

There is a Chinese maxim which says, "No loyal subject serves two masters, and no virtuous woman sees two men." The cardinal points of the Chinese ethics are loyalty and filial piety; so that, although all sorts of virtues are inculcated, greater importance is placed on these two points. In China, learning means studying moral teaching. There are, of course, many subjects for study, but moral notions pervade every branch of literature. It is so, even with history. Chinese histories, as a rule record only events as they occur; they have no historical or political observations, and any observations made by the writers are written in such a way as to draw attention from a moral standpoint. Their histories, therefore, have very little value in the ordinary sense of history, as the term is employed among Western nations, but the fact remains that they pay much attention to moral lessons. Their expositions of moral teaching are done more in the way of philosophical or scholastic dissertations. The ethics of China, however, were not necessarily identical throughout the long period of her history, extending over several tens of centuries. There were several schools of philosophers besides Confucius, some of whom even went so far as to differ from him in many points; and also the interpretations of Confucianism differed at different epochs. But the chief feature of his teaching has always remained the same, and all that I have said

about it above represents fairly the idea of Confucian doctrine. It is natural that Confucianism should be regarded as a sort of religion, because its followers respect it almost as a believer in religion respects his creed; moreover, Confucianism recognizes in a measure the existence of some supreme power. It speaks of heaven in the sense of a power; it speaks of the "Commandment of heaven"; it even speaks of the "supreme emperor," meaning the supreme being. It also recognizes the immortality of the soul, though in a vague manner, and pays great attention to festivals given in honour of one's ancestors; to use a common phrase, it worships the ancestors. But the parts of Confucianism which relate to the future of man only form a subordinate element of it, so much so that Confucius himself once said, "I do not yet know the living, how can I know the dead?" At all events, I, in common with most Orientals, do not regard Confucianism as a religion in its ordinary sense. There are of course many customs and matters of etiquette sanctioned by Confucianism, or rather enforced by it, which are absurd or impracticable in the eyes of the Japanese, but there is no necessity for me to dwell upon these shortcomings here.

Let us now see what is Shintoism. It is essentially indigenous to the soil of Japan. It may be regarded as religion, and yet if it be a religion it is certainly of a unique kind, having nevertheless much similarity to the ancient cults of the Greeks and the Romans. It has no founder, nor has it any dogmas, in the ordinary sense of a religion. It has grown up with the customs and traditions and general characteristics of the nation. It recognizes the immortality of the soul; it acknowledges the existence of supernatural powers; it reverences the ancestral spirits, and therefore it may be called a religion of ancestral worship. In that respect it resembles Confucianism. It concerns itself, however, with temporal affairs far more than with spiritual affairs. In this respect also it very largely resembles Confucianism. It has existed in Japan from time immemorial, long before the introduction of Confucianism and Buddhism.

From an ethical point of view it has more teaching in it than Buddhism, but it is not so elaborate as Confucianism. Nevertheless, it has a tight grasp of the Japanese mind. It is supremely content with its simple tenets, so much so that

a well-known scholar, who was a devout supporter of it, when speaking of its ethical teaching in comparison with Confucianism, once said that "We do not want so many nomenclatures as Confucianism requires to signify all sorts of virtues and good conduct, and our simple teaching is quite enough to cover all."

Shintoism is also based upon a patriarchal form of community. Its essential notion of ethics is cleanliness of conscience; but the idea of cleanliness is applied not only mentally but also physically—hence its tendency to bodily cleanliness as well as other cognate matters. It speaks of good and bad; it designates bad minds as "black" or "muddy," and good minds as "red" or "clear." Its ideals of conduct are honesty and straightforwardness. It reverences its ruler from the very nature of its cult, and a magnificent ideal of a subject and a citizen is developed from these simple notions.

Such are then the three great sources of Japanese ethics. It is like the foam produced by currents of water. The water is the source, but when foam is produced it differs from actual water. So Japanese ethics are produced by the intermingled notions of these agencies, but they are no longer of the same substance as their source. I mean to say that our ethics have formed their shape quite independently of the orthodox or dogmatic parts of any religion, and people regard them as such in the same way as one would ordinarily regard foam as differing from water. I will now explain how this has been brought about. From about the sixth century of the Christain era Chinese study was introduecd into Japan, and almost simultaneously Buddhism was also introduced to our country. The study of Chinese, as I said before, means the study of Chinese ethics, and I may say that Chinese has become almost like our own literature, though we had our vernacular literature co-existing. The study of Chinese, therefore, meant the introduction of Chinese ethical notions, in the same way as the study of Greek or Latin introduced Greek or Roman notions into European countries. This, however, did not mean that it supplanted our own ideas of morality, but it rather supplemented and augmented our notions in so far as it concerned the nomenclature and classification of different ethical virtues. We did not mean to make ourselves slaves to Chinese notions,

we rather utilized Confucianism; and therefore Confucianism, as interpreted in Japan, is not the same as Confucianism in China. There is a story told of a Japanese professor, who was a deeply read Chinese scholar, and his pupils. The master once asked his pupils, "Suppose China invaded Japan with an army led by Confucius himself as the generalissimo, and assisted by Mencius as his lieutenant; what would you do?" The pupils replied, "It would be our bounden duty to take up arms unhesitatingly for our country and beat and crush them to pieces." Thereupon the master smiled and expressed his glad assent. This will show how we interpret Chinese teaching. Then also Buddhism, poor as it is in ethics, has contributed something towards forming our national character, in that it has indirectly assisted in inculcating gentleness, and also kindliness to living beings. I may go a step further: Buddhism itself as interpreted in Japan is not the same Buddhism as it was originally. It had to accommodate itself to the requirements of the country. Then also Buddhism in China and Japan is studied in books which are translated into Chinese, and therefore the priests who study their own religion have also to study Chinese, which, I repeat, involves the study of Confucianism, and therefore they are familiar with that teaching. The Japanese priests, therefore, made use of Shintoism and Confucianism in their own teaching on any points where they found their own teaching was deficient, that is to say, that they did so in practical and moral teaching. And, not only that, we notice even the dictum of Buddhism itself is sometimes modified to suit such purposes. I mentioned above four benevolences spoken of in Buddhism as being "the father and the mother," "the ruler of the land," "all beings," and "the three treasures." I do not know whether this is to be found in the Sanscrit original, I think it is not, it sounds more like a Chinese Buddhistic notion. It is still further modified in an old Japanese book as "heaven and earth," "the ruler of the land," "the father and the mother," and all "beings." And thus for "the three treasures" is substituted "heaven and earth." This occurs in a passage which is put into the mouth of a famous Shigemori in a discourse which he made when he severely admonished his father Taira-no Kiyomori, though with filial tenderness, when the latter had behaved

badly towards his sovereign the Emperor. The passage is to be found in a famous book written in the middle of the fourteenth century by Kitabatake Chikafusa, who was a court noble, a royalist, and a man with much knowledge of Buddhism.

Here I have to speak of Bushido. The term, as well as its general purport, has been of late made widely known in this country; but, as many people wish it, I will say something about it, although it may be only, as we say, "adding legs to the picture of a serpent," I mean it may be quite an unnecessary addition. Bushi literally means a military gentleman, or in more common English, a military man; and "do" literally means a road or way, and in its extended significance, a principle, a teaching, or a doctrine. The term for "Bushi" in old refined Japanese is "Mononofu," and the term for "do" is "Michi," therefore the more refined ancient Japanese name for Bushido was Mononofu-no-Michi. The origin of the "Bushi" is as follows: They were originally large or small landlords of the provincial parts of Japan, and had their retainers or vassals. At the time when, in the court of the empire, over-refinement, or rather effeminacy, succeeded enlightenment, and nobles who usually resided in the capital came to despise military service, those landlords and their retainers began to play military rôles under different distinguished leaders. They were more prominent in the eastern parts of the country, called Kwanto, namely, the large plain, in the middle of which modern Tokio is situated. With the march of events, when the governing power fell into the hands of the military leaders, these landlords and their retainers began to form an hereditary class, and the system extended to the whole country; this is the origin of Daimio and Samurai. I do not say that in the case of later developments of this system all Daimio and Samurai necessarily belonged to the same ancient stock, because at the time when the country went through many stages of war many new men appeared on the scene and enlisted themselves in the ranks of the Samurai, among them the Bushi, several of whom became Daimios themselves by their personal valour and the distinction they attained. But I may say that on the whole the successive stages of the class always inherited and handed down the same sort of sentiments and notions as their predecessors.

We may in a measure compare this military class with the country squires in this country, who gradually became barons of the Middle Ages, together with their children and retainers. "Bushido" is no other than the doctrine held and cherished by that class as its code of honour and rule of discipline. In the earliest days of the development of that class, individuals forming it were not cultured or enlightened in the sense of luxurious refinement; in other words, they were mostly illiterate. But on the other hand they were mostly men with healthy notions of manliness in contrast to those who usually lived in the capital town, where literary and artistic culture under Chinese influence had been attained in a marked degree. The motive and sense of their culture were therefore more like those belonging to primitive Japan, unstained by foreign influences. The families belonging to this class were called in their early days "The houses of the bow and arrow." Needless to say that the early projectile weapons of warfare were the bow and arrow, and they had a place of honour amongst the warlike instruments of those days. Little by little a phrase, "Yumi-ya-no-michi," literally meaning "The ways of the bow and arrow," came into existence, and it was the original name of Bushido. At first, perhaps, the word referred more especially to the proper use of the instrument of war, but it soon came to signify something more. There were many ceremonies and etiquettes which grew up with a warrior's life and military affairs, not only with reference to his comrades or to his superiors and inferiors, but also with reference to how he should comport himself towards his enemy. At the bottom of all these matters there lay the idea of honour, not merely one's own honour, but also a compassionate regard for the honour of the enemy. All these ideas came to be implied in the term "The ways of the bow and arrow." Here we see that special moral sentiments were being awakened among this class. Bushido, however, has no particular dogma or canon, except such as grew from practice, and except those of which we can gather some idea from instructions given by certain leaders or by certain teachers of military ceremonies or science in the way of interpretation of such matters. Here we have an instruction given to his men by Yoritomo, the first Shogun, and therefore one of the early leaders of the system. The essential

points of the instructions are these: 1. Practise and mature military arts. 2. Be not guilty of any base or rude conduct. 3. Be not cowardly or effeminate in behaviour. 4. Be simple and frugal. 5. The master and servants should mutually respect their indebtedness. 6. Keep a promise. 7. Share a common fate by mutual bondage in defiance of death or life.

We may say that notions such as these were the foundations of the ethical parts of Bushido. These will mean when interpreted in ethical terms of the Chinese school: 1. Diligence in one's profession. 2. Love and loyalty between master and servants. 3. Decorum and propriety. 4. Gallantry and bravery. 5. Trustfulness and justice. 6. Simplicity and frugality. 7. Contempt of meanness.

At the bottom of these lay the sense of honour. When speaking of any action as unworthy of a Bushi, the following phrase was customarily used in early days, "It is disgraceful in the presence of the hand of the bow and arrow," as in later days one would say "A disgrace to Bushi," in the same way as you would say in English, "It is unbecoming to a gentleman." The term "Bushi" has in many ways a similar meaning to "gentleman" in English. Bushido, of course, encouraged bravery above all things. In an old book describing the war between Gen and Hei, an account of the bravery of Bushi of Kwanto—namely, the plain above referred to as that where Bushido originated—is put into the mouth of a general of Hei as having been addressed to his generalissimo, who commanded the army of Hei, which was formed of recruits coming from Kioto and its neighbourhood. The narrative was to this effect:—

> According to the usage of the warriors of the East, the son would not withdraw from the battlefield though his father might die, or the father would not think of retiring though his son might fall. He would advance and advance, and jumping over the dead, would fight regardless of death or life. As to our own men, they are all weakly recruits from the neighbourhood of the capital [where effeminacy reigned at the time]. If the father were wounded, the son and all the members of the family would take advantage of this and retire; if the master were killed, his followers would utilize the chance, and, hand in hand with their brothers, would withdraw and disappear.

This may be a somewhat exaggerated account, but it will

show how greatly the original Bushi estimated bravery, in the same way as our men do in these days.

In addition to these characteristics, some other features which were brought into more prominence are entitled to be singled out, namely, fortitude, generosity, imperturbability in the presence of danger or on any unexpected occurrence, compassionateness, and straightforwardness. This kind of attitude was inculcated even in physical exercises of different modes of fighting, such as fencing, practice with the spear, and jujitsu. There is a verse composed by a Japanese which may be translated thus :—

> Even in the eyes of the warrior
> Whose beard is ten fists long,
> The one thing that softly flows from them
> Is the tear which is due to love.

This aptly expresses the innate tenderness of heart of a Japanese warrior. There is another verse composed and penned by Commander Takeo Hirose in Chinese just before he went to his doom on the occasion of the second bottling up of Port Arthur, and which, therefore, constituted his last utterance in this world; translated into English it runs as follows :—

> Would that I could be born seven times
> And sacrifice my life for my country:
> Resolved to die, my mind is firm,
> And again expecting to win success,
> Smiling I go on board.

This will show the fortitude and determination of a Bushi at the hour of his exit from this life, and though Hirose was a man of our own day, he may be regarded as one of the best types of an old Bushi.

Bushi is not foreign to Shintoism; as a matter of fact, Bushi generally respect Shinto deities, and, moreover, some military ceremonies were performed in the supposed presence of a Shinto god. Bushi openly invoke the god of war without any compunction, but Bushi never have done so in a bigoted way. It was more in the way of reverence paid to a deity of their inherited cult. They were never devotees of Shintoism as a religion. This sort of sentiment of the Japanese is very difficult to explain with clearness, but my meaning is that though they do *not* despise religion they place more importance on the affairs of the world and on

their own exertions in the matters which they undertake. The Samurai do not worship their deity in order that their souls may be safely rescued in the future. I can therefore say that Bushido, as such, has no bearing upon Shintoism. It has its own independent existence, although to the extent I have just referred to it has its connexion with Shintoism. In other words, Shintoism was a cult founded upon our old customs and traditions, and therefore Bushi also shared the sentiments pervading that cult, but we cannot say that Shinto has produced Bushido.

And again, Bushi do not despise Buddhism; on the contrary, many of them may revere it, but Bushido, as such, has no connexion with this faith. In documents they often make use of a phrase in a vague way, "By the help of Shin-Butsu," meaning both the Shinto deity and Buddha; but it does not mean that it has any foundation in Buddhism. If a Bushi were a believer in Buddha he probably would not like to show it. We have a story about Yoritomo, the first head of the Shogunate. When he first started in his youth his campaign against Hei, and hid himself in a mountain nook, having been defeated by his enemy he took out from his queue a small image of Kwanin (Kwannon) which he reverenced, saying, "If my head be taken by the enemy it would not be becoming to the generalissimo of Gen if this image were to be discovered." This will give you an idea of the way in which Buddha was viewed by Bushi. As we all know, Buddhism chiefly speaks of the future world. The idea of the Bushi was that it was an act of cowardice if one merely did good because one wished to be saved in the future world. Their idea was that good should be done for its own sake, and therefore if one believed in Buddha he had a sort of apprehension that he might be considered a coward. Of course history is not wanting in many instances of great warriors believing in Buddhism, but in many cases this fact had no great significance as far as their conduct and conscience were concerned. There was, however, one feature in which a certain aspect of Buddhism had a considerable influence in moulding Bushido; it was the influence of the teaching of the Zen sect. This requires some explanation. In the thesis of Buddhistic teaching there is included the idea of absorbing everything in the universe into oneself; in other words, mental annihilation of

all things except oneself. This is done by long and fixed meditation, and at least so far as he himself is concerned, a man can for the moment imagine and realize mentally that he is the only being in the universe, and all other things become nothing. Hence, when he is accustomed to meditation of that description, nothing will ever surprise or frighten him. There is a story about Hieuntsang, the famous Chinese Buddhist of the Tan period, who visited India. This priest was once caught by a band of robbers. He sat quietly down and began to meditate in the way described above. The robbers tried to intimidate him by threatening him with drawn swords pushed right into his face; but the priest took no notice whatever of what they were doing to him, and remained entirely unmoved. The robbers, observing the attitude of the priest, and thinking that he must be an extraordinary personage, all went away and left him alone. This phase of Buddhism was introduced into China, where it became the cult of one separate sect of Buddhism. Bodhi-Dharma, an Indian priest, who visited China, is commonly accepted as the founder of this sect, which practises meditation more than do other sects, but of course meditation is not its only feature. In general we may say it is more philosophical in the sense of regarding the universe in a nihilistic sense. This sect is called Zen, and it has been introduced into Japan also. It was patronized by several eminent Bushi in its earlier stages. Perhaps it was liked by them in that according to its doctrine a man puts aside the idea of reliance upon another, and places himself above everything else, and it was found to have an agreeable resemblance to the spirit of self-reliance inculcated by Bushido. In the second place, it repels all ideas of luxury and display, and values simplicity and cleanliness; and in that respect it was found to bear an agreeable resemblance to the frugal and simple life of the Bushi. Thus the Zen came to exercise its influence over the Bushi, but not at all in the sense of believing in future felicity; quite to the contrary, from the very nature of that sect. This influence of Zen seems to have helped to a great extent the development of some of the characteristics of Bushido, such as imperturbability, stoicism, fortitude, and simplicity and cleanliness of thought or body. Here I may add that many traits of Bushido are no doubt to be found in the European knighthoods of former

days, and therefore they are not really new to the Europeans who still remember those traditions.

The weakest point of Bushido in its earlier stages was its want of literary culture in the way of systematic ethical study: hence it easily happened that a thing one might regard as correct might not be correct in reality when examined from a higher point of view. This difficulty was especially observable when two obligations came into conflict, and one had to be preferred to the other. The Bushi, in the earlier stages, knew more about their duty to their immediate master than to higher ones; hence their difficulty in discriminating their duty to the supreme ruler of the land and that to their immediate head. Of course they knew that the Emperor was the highest personage in the country, but they were unable to find out an ethical solution of the question, and indeed in all matters they wanted more systematic enlightenment.

These wants, however, have been supplied gradually as time went on, especially during the last three centuries. During this period almost unbroken peace reigned in the country. It ceased to have any intercourse with foreign countries except in a limited sense, but internally all branches of art and industry were encouraged and developed side by side. The study of Chinese and of native classics has been carried on in all parts of the land, and it was the Bushi who chiefly devoted themselves to such culture. Bushi or Samurai were retainers, as every one knows, of their lords, and certain pensions were given by their lords to each family, according to their rank, so that they had not to work for their own living. Hence their only duty was to make themselves physically and mentally fit to fight for their lords in time of necessity, and, in times of peace, to make themselves as much like gentlemen as possible. In other words, physical training and mental enlightenment, together with the refinement of their manners and habits, were their sole business —they had no other occupation. For, indeed, any other occupation which partook of the shape of business conducted for profit was forbidden, and was despised among them. Bushido came to be deeply imbued with the principles of Chinese and Japanese classics as they were taught. I have shown above that in the systematic exposition of ethical ideas, Confucianism was the richest of all, and the essential

part of it was taken by Bushido; as I have also shown above. There are, however, some defects in the Chinese teaching; all the unimportant parts, therefore, were cast away, and the important parts were taken into the teaching of Bushido, and even these parts, only in such a way as to suit our national traditions and characteristics. The essential spirit of Shintoism was also resuscitated in Bushido in such a way as to give an impetus to it, but in no orthodox manner. Such then is our Bushido. The Bushi formed the governing class of the Japanese society, and it may be also said to have formed the educated class; or, in other words, the Bushi may be called the gentry of the country. We can, therefore, say that Bushido was the ethics of Japanese society. In one way it may be said that Bushido, as such, was a monopoly of the military class, but in truth its spirit was not confined to this only; the literary study of Chinese, as well as of native classics, was not necessarily limited to the military class; hence the same notions which were imbued in it through these studies were also quietly extending their influence among people at large —amongst whom, I may add, there were many families of old Bushi, or families which were quite equal in their standing to the Bushi class. Moreover, the spirit of Bushido has also been making its influence felt by other people in general. Thus we can see that the nation has been preparing itself for centuries for the promotion of moral ideas of the same kind as those of Bushido.

The cardinal points of Oriental ethics, as may be expected, are loyalty and filial piety. In China, filial piety takes precedence, but in Japan loyalty stands first. There is a poem by Sanetomo, the third Shogun of Kamakura and second son of the first Shogun, which may be translated literally as follows:—

> The sea may dry up,
> The mountain may burst asunder,
> But no duplicity of thought
> Shall I have to my Sovereign.

Such is the idea of loyalty which has been taught to the Japanese for centuries. Side by side with loyalty the idea of patriotism—a term which in Japanese is practically identical in its purport with loyalty—was also inculcated, though the development of the last idea was later than the former.

Then also all the other ideas relating to ethics, especially on the lines indicated in Confucianism, were inculcated side by side. With the abolition of the feudal system, some thirty years ago, the structure of Japanese society was totally changed, or rather restored to the condition which preceded the ascendency of the military class in the twelfth century. The question now arises, What is the actual state of ethics in Japan at present? There is a new element which has been introduced into Japan in recent years: the element of Christian teaching; in short of Christianity. The Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience, and therefore there is no hindrance to the propagation of the Christian doctrine with its moral teaching, and, as a matter of fact, there are a number of Japanese who have embraced that faith, but they are, after all, a very small minority compared with the number of the whole Japanese population. The essence of Japanese ethics is the same as existed prior to the new epoch, with certain modifications actuated by the new force of the altered conditions which, after all, affect only small details. I may say, in a word, that the Japanese ideal ethics form an extension of Bushido among the people at large from the still extant class of Bushi with whom it originated. The sphere of the teaching is extensive, as is necessary from the very nature of the matter, but its essence may be summed up in a comparatively small compass. For this I cannot do better than quote a part of the so-called "Imperial Educational Rescript" given to his people by the present Emperor. It is given in a previous chapter on the "Moral Teaching of Japan," but I will recite it once more :—

"It is our desire that you, our subjects, be filial to your parents and well-disposed to your brothers and sisters. Let husband and wife dwell harmoniously together; let friends be mutually trustworthy. Impose upon yourselves self-restraint and rectitude of behaviour. Extend to the multitude philanthropy. Advance learning and regulate your pursuits, developing the intellectual faculties, and perfecting the virtuous and useful elements. Further, seek to enhance the public good and enlighten the world by deeds of social benefit. Treasure always the fundamental constitution and respect the national laws. In any emergency exert yourselves in the public service, and exhibit voluntarily your bravery in the cause of order. And by every means assist and promote the prosperity of the Imperial régime, which is lasting as the heavens and the earth. Thus you will not only be our loyal subjects and good citizens, but will manifest the highest and best traditions of your ancestors.

# CHAPTER X

## THE RELIGIONS OF JAPAN[1]

THIS chapter is an attempt to explain the relative positions of Confucianism, Shintoism, and Buddhism in Japan. It is literally a plain explanation of facts as they were and as they are. I have no thought of attaching thereto any arguments, either *pro* or *con*, or of instituting comparisons between these and other religions.

In the Occident an individual has only one faith, or no faith at all, at a time. Every faith is distinct from all others, however closely they may individually approach one another. The Occidentals often try to peer into the innermost recesses, so to speak, of Oriental faiths, without abandoning their "one person, one faith" standpoint; hence the first difficulty they encounter is to establish thoroughly the relative positions, as they deem them to exist, of Shintoism and Buddhism. They also give an undue prominence to Confucianism in its religious aspect; hence the second difficulty in understanding its exact position with regard to Shintoism and Buddhism. Let me briefly dispose of these obstacles to enlightenment.

To begin with, Confucianism is never looked upon in the Far East, at all events not in Japan, as a religion. Confucius and his famous followers are no more regarded as the founders or promulgators of a religion than are Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle so esteemed in the West. Confucian precepts of morality pervade every branch of our culture, it is true. But Confucianism is with us only cultivated as tending toward elevation of intelligence and of ethical notions, never as a religion. This being the case, both Shintoism and Buddhism are very good friends with Confucian-

[1] *The Independent Review*, December, 1904.

ism. As a matter of fact, both Buddhism and Shintoism rely upon Confucianism, to a great extent, so far as practical ethical teachings are concerned; inasmuch as the latter, defective as it may be, is richer than themselves in that respect. It is true that, during the Tokugawa régime, when Confucianism attained its zenith in Japan, there were some cases of men being buried by special permission of the Government according to the Confucian rites of burial, in evasion of Buddhist rites, on account of the staunch adhesion of the dead persons to Confucianism during life. Even in these cases, it was more on account of the philosophical notions imbibed from Confucianism by the deceased, than out of respect for it as a religion, that these rites were observed; and, besides, such cases were exceedingly few in number, so much so that we could count them on the fingers. There were scholars whose special studies were Chinese, and who made it their profession, as it were, and were therefore called "Jusha" (*literati*). A number of these scholars were buried according to those rites. The House of the Prince of Mito, and one or two other *daimios*, used these rites of burial from a similar cause. These were about all.

As to the relative positions of Shintoism and Buddhism, I can say, broadly speaking, that all Japanese belong to both of them at one and the same time (Christian converts excepted, of course, and they are not alluded to in this paper, for it would only confuse the subject). As a matter of fact, all Japanese, before the restoration of the Imperial régime in 1868, had to belong to both faiths. This must appear to be a somewhat startling proposition for me to advance; but it was literally so in the days of the Shoguns.

After the cessation of Spanish and Portuguese missionary labours, some three centuries ago, Christianity was forbidden throughout the Empire, and no other foreign religion was known. Buddhism, though originally foreign, was not regarded as such. In those days every family in Japan had practically to subscribe itself to one or other of the native religious denominations; there was, in some parts of the land, even a special process periodically gone through in proof that the household had no leanings towards Christianity. These religious denominations only meant one or other sect of Buddhism. Shintoism was not included in the

category. But a doubt will arise in the minds of my readers, how it came about in that case that they, the Japanese, also belonged to Shintoism. The explanation was simply that in those days Shintoism was not looked upon as a religion, in the sense in which religion is ordinarily understood in the West. There was, in each communal corporation or section of such, or in a few such corporations or sections in common, as the case might be, one or other Shinto deity, consecrated in a temple and regarded as the guardian god of those portions of the land, somewhat in the same fashion as a country, or part of a country, in the West has a patron saint. The people residing in the district formed a sort of congregation, and supported that temple, quite independently of their connexion with the Buddhistic congregation to which they belonged. The peculiar difference between these two kinds of congregation was, that the Shinto congregations owed their formation mainly to considerations of locality, whilst the Buddhist ones were more in the nature of assemblies of individual families, somewhat similiar to the congregations of the West. Besides local Shinto temples, there were many more of them of greater sanctity, such as those at Ise, which were more elevated and more popular, and were places of worship for the people at large. In English, all buildings consecrated to the worship of deities, be they Shinto or Buddhist, are commonly called "temples"; but in Japanese the names are different. One is a *tera*, the other a *miya*. There was a sort of division of labour, as it were, between Shintoism and Buddhism.

Broadly speaking, matters relating to temporal affairs belonged to the sphere of Shintoism, and those relating to spiritual ones belonged to the sphere of Buddhism. The spirit of Shintoism was clean and bright, whilst that of Buddhism was gloomy and dark. Hence, sacred services, which it was fitting should be pathetic in character, were performed by Buddhist priests, and those which were to be cheerful were performed by Shinto ones. The functions of priests were divided on those lines in general; thus, funeral rites and memorial services for the dead were undertaken by the former, whilst the celebration of happy events was performed by the latter. For instance, when rites of "purification" were performed, as was often done, on the site of some new building, prior to the commencement of the

workmen's labours, they would be done by a Shinto priest; or when a baby was taken out of the house for the first formal occasion, it was always to a Shinto temple that it was carried, and there it would be received by a Shinto priest, and an appropriate prayer would be offered by him to the Shinto deity, at the request of those who accompanied the child. One would, in the old days, never have thought of inviting a Buddhist priest to a wedding, though no prejudice existed against a Shinto priest; and of late a wedding is even occasionally celebrated in a Shinto temple. Shinto burials were very rare; they were occasionally heard of in connexion with the families of the hereditary Shinto priests, but, even in those cases, an additional religious service was almost invariably performed by Buddhist priests. Thus we can easily see that there was little conflict of functions between Shintoism and Buddhism. Generally speaking, this state of things continues to this day, though, of course, entire freedom of conscience is guaranteed by the Constitution. By-the-by, to join the Buddhistic priesthood was in one sense regarded as giving up all individual pretensions and claims to worldly rights and privileges as a man. So much so, that the old refined Japanese term for the priests was *Yo-sute-bito*, i.e. men who had abandoned the world. Then, too, the essence of Buddhism has always been considered to consist of being compassionate (or merciful), as may be seen hereafter. Hence, there existed some peculiar customs in the feudal period, leaving some slight traces even now. Thus, to shave off one's hair and profess to join the priesthood was the greatest sign for acknowledging one's own fault; for example, if a beaten chieftain asked for peace, after having his head clean shaven, it was not to be thought of by the conqueror to push the matter to the extreme; or if a man serving a chieftain committed an offence deserving capital punishment, and a priest, observing that there existed some ground for compassion, that his life should be spared, proceeded to "beg his life" (so it was termed), it was not considered as becoming the chieftain to refuse it. And, again, some great monasteries used to afford asylums for offenders, somewhat similar to the monasteries of medieval Europe. It was not considered as befitting a great feudal lord to chase an offender after he had taken shelter under the sleeves of venerable priests in a

monastery, say, high up in a secluded nook of a mountain, it being more on account of saving the monks pangs which might otherwise be caused to them whose only ideal was supposed to be compassionateness. No such special considerations, however, ever existed with regard to Shintoism. The characteristics of Shintoism were vivacity and manliness, whereas those of Buddhism were humility and tranquillity, though in practice the monks were often far from being so. These are the traits of the two faiths still observable, side by side, in Japanese characters.

The essence of Shintoism is cleanness of conscience. The commonest prayer of it runs: "Our eyes may see some uncleanness, but let not our mind see things that are not clean. Our ears may hear some uncleanness, but let not our mind hear things that are not clean," and so forth. Shintoism has no particular dogma! It has no sacred books, except some perhaps on ancient history, and about two dozen texts in the form of set prayers, if these may be called sacred writings at all! It is a poor creed in the ordinary sense of a religion; but it holds Japanese minds in a powerful grasp sublimely contented with its simple tenets. There is an old Japanese poem attributed to Sugawara Michizane, who, by-the-by, is deified by the name of Temmangu, which says: "So long as a man's mind is in accord with the way of truthfulness, the gods will guard him though he may not pray." This is about correct as a delineation of the Shinto faith. It worships heavenly deities as well as some deified spirits of human beings, but more in the sense of reverence and thanksgiving for the good they have done and given to posterity, than as channels for obtaining new benefits. Hence it has no compunction in worshipping one deity one day and another the next day, or even simultaneously. If any individual worshipper goes further, it is more with the hope of "driving off" some evil spirit which might induce him to do wrong or visit him with some evil, than to implore the deity to bestow on him some extra boon —as a matter of fact, the commonest form of prayer offered in Shinto rites is called *Harai*, i.e. "driving off," meaning, to make one free, both physically and mentally, from any pollution caused by any sin he might have committed, or by any evil inflicted by a malignant spirit. And, moreover, the nature of Shintoism is not intolerant so long as

its sphere is not encroached upon; but, at the same time, it is indigenous to Japanese minds, and therefore is not easily to be taken away.

The early Buddhist priests knew this well; hence, not only did they not try to oppose it, but they sought to incorporate it in, or at least to induce it to fraternize, as it were, with, their own creed. Some of them went so far as to represent Shinto deities as being incarnations of Buddha or Bodhisattva, basing this proposition on a theory called *Honji-Suijakŭ* ("origin and manifestation") derived from an original Buddhistic theory of Dualism. Nay, more; there existed several large temples where both Shinto and Buddhist priests ministered together, with a certain demarcation of their functions, of course. And this was called "Dual Shintoism."

It was only after the restoration of the Imperial régime that any appreciable amount of friction manifested itself between Shintoism and Buddhism. It may be remembered that Shintoism had so small share in the work of the restoration, from the very nature of the movement, whilst Buddhism did almost nothing in that direction, except that there were many Buddhist priests who took part in it from their individual proclivities. In the early years of *Meiji*, there prevailed two great currents of thought: *Fukko*, i.e., return to ancient, and *Ishin*, i.e., thorough innovation (or rather, renovation). Though apparently opposed to each other, they were both, and in equal degrees, motive powers of the new régime. How they worked together I have shown in the chapter on "The Great Change." Shintoism moved with the *Fukko* current. Many who were originally Shinto priests or adherents, being possessed of knowledge and ability, occupied high positions of State. Their notions acquired corresponding ascendency over Buddhism. In their eyes, Buddhism was, after all, of foreign origin. It formed no part of the purest ancient institutions of the Imperial régime. Hence, Buddhism came to be somewhat despised. Princes and nobles who had held high religious positions under it returned to their laymanship. Government allowances were stopped, and, many more heavy blows having fallen upon it, much of its power was lost. It was then that "Dual Shintoism" was abolished, and a distinct separation between Shintoism

and Buddhism was enforced in all things. It was then, too, that there arose many families which entirely severed their connexion with Buddhism, and came to use Shinto rites in their funerals and memorial services of the dead. The tide, however, ceased long ago to ebb, and, in its reflux, matters have in this respect returned to pretty much the same position as in the olden days, except that Buddhism has not recovered all its former vigour, and that many funerals are now performed according to the Shinto rites, though the number of these is exceedingly small in comparison with the whole population.

So far I have spoken of Shintoism as though it were a compact creed; but now I have to describe it a little further in detail. I said above that it was not regarded in former days in the light of a religion. It was a national institution of unique form, having sprung up from traditions of time immemorial. It had no founder, no propagator, except that many books were written upon it in the way of commentary by eminent scholars, in comparatively recent periods of the Tokugawa régime. It was only about two decades ago that the idea of attributing to it a religious character struck some interested people as having been necessitated by the tendencies of the age. Shintoism, however, is not even now regarded wholly as a religion; only part of it is esteemed a religion. This is a fine distinction, almost unintelligible, perhaps, to outsiders; but it is nevertheless true. The communal temples, as well as all the larger and higher temples, with their priests, are regarded quite apart from religion as the term is employed in the Occident. They still constitute a national institution, of a character that is unique. But there are many voluntary congregations which are called *Kiokwai*, i.e. teaching associations (not to be confounded with the communal congregations referred to in a preceding page); and these congregations have their ministers, to whom the title of preachers (*kioshi*) is given. Such a congregation generally has a connexion with some large popular temple, but is not directly concerned therein. These congregations form that part of Shintoism which is to be regarded as a religion. The expounding of the creed, or the performance of funeral rites, is undertaken by the priests belonging to the congregations; though in the lowest grade

of temples the priests attached thereto are permitted, as a temporary measure, to act in both capacities. I might perhaps liken the difference to that which exists between a corps of troops with its staff officers, and a club of officers with its secretaries, the former being the temple with its ministers, and the latter being the congregation with its preachers; the one being more official in character and the other more voluntary. But observe; even those who belong to one or other of these congregations are also mostly Buddhists at the same time. There is no State religion in its ordinary Western sense; but, as far as the public Shinto temples and their priests (non-religious part) are concerned, their proper superintendence and control form, in a great measure, part of the business of State—in fact, all such priests are commissioned by the State, those in the more important posts by the central authorities, and the others by provincial authorities. In the case of Ise, more especial attentions are paid by the State. The whole nation is quite satisfied with these matters as they stand; and he would be a very bold person who, in Japan, would venture to find fault openly with this arrangement.

I may parenthetically remark here, that the term "priests," when applied to Shinto ministers, is not quite in accord with our ideas and feelings, though it is rather difficult to convey to Western minds why it is so. I have, however, applied the same term to both Buddhist and Shinto ministers, for fear of confusing the threads of my statement were I to employ more distinctive terms— though the separation is to the Japanese mind very clearly marked.

Let me here add a brief sketch of Japanese Buddhism as generally reflected in the minds of the common people. Buddhism is a religion capable of philosophical interpretations, or, rather, founded upon philosophy; and there are many sects of it in Japan, each drawing fine distinctions in relation to its creed. But are these philosophical phases or fine distinctions of each creed conveyed to the minds of, let us say, aged rustics or children? I must answer No! In the Buddhism as reflected to them, there is an eternal soul in every individual. There are paradise and hell. There is a future life for every individual. All this is much in accord which the religions of the Occident. *Jigoku gokuraku* are hell and paradise. When we speak of them con-

jointly we always say *jigoku* first, perhaps because it is more euphonic, as we interpose no conjunction between two terms in such cases. *Jigoku* literally means "dungeons in earth." It suggests the idea of its being down below. The literal meaning of *gokuraku* is "the supreme pleasure," and is an abbreviation of *gokurakujodo*, meaning "the pure land of supreme pleasure." There is a very common phrase; *Ojo anrakkoku*, meaning: "Go and be born in the easy, pleasant country"—in other words, be born in heaven. *Ojo* ("go and be born") alone, is an abbreviation very commonly used in ordinary parlance to convey the same sense. Here is another: *Saiho Mida no jodo*, i.e. "The pure land in the west where Amitabha dwells." There is a popular saying: *Gosho wo negoo*, which means: "Pray for the after-life," and another: *Gosho daijini*, meaning: "In such a way as though the after-life is everything," used in connexion with some action which one undertakes most seriously. *Gosho* ("after-life") is a common Buddhistic phrase.

All these expressions indicate that there is an elysium, and that it is somewhere in the Western sky; also that there is an inferno, and that we may go or be born somewhere in those places after our death. But what part of us does do so? Surely not our physical part! Philosophy explains the doctrines of transmigration by the theory of *Karma*, basing its manifestations on "cause" and "effect." It admits some difference existing between the theories of the "greater vehicle" and the "lesser vehicle"; and it alludes, by way of explanation, to all sorts of intricate propositions, such as "being and non-being," "finite and infinite," "relative and absolute," and so forth. It does not, on the other hand, speak about the immortality of the soul; the reason of this being that, from the point of view of imperishability, the physical parts of a "being" are no less immortal than the soul, inasmuch as they never descend to complete annihilation; but, from the point of view of perishability, the soul of a "being" is no less mortal than the physical parts of it, inasmuch as the "the new existence" of a soul somewhere else is not the same existence that it had been before. No such philosophy, however, is intelligible to the minds of the common folk. If we can go anywhere at all after our death, it must be our spirit that migrates, i.e. the soul. The common

folks have no ear for the philosophical interpretation of the "after-life," in the philosophilcal sense of the Karmatic theory. When the theory of "cause and effect" is taught the common folk generally understand it as implying that, "cause and effect" mean the process precipitating the salvation or non-salvation of the soul; it is the shortest way to understand. These are the only popular and common-sense interpretations. The popular Buddhistic notion of one's future life in the halcyon fields up above is most commonly represented as sitting and enjoying one's self on a lotus flower in the heavenly lake. The only picture one can form in the imagination of such enjoyment would be eternal existence in a concrete form—a human form, in fact—minus the mortal part which one possesses in the present existence; and thus it could not be, in popular imagination, anything other than an existence appertaining to the soul. Moreover, in the pictures of purgatory which are periodically exhibited in many Buddhist temples, the sufferers are represented as still possessing human shapes. Philosophy tells us that *Nirvana* is the last stage, and is merely an abnegation of self, implying therein much philosophical meaning; but in the picture which is called the *Nirvana of Shakyamuni*, and which is also exhibited in many Buddhist temples on the anniversary of the great sage, common folks can only see him lying on his death-bed, and can only imagine his spirit ascending to the best place in heaven. Such are the illustrations of a future life of Buddhism as reflected in the popular mind. These impressions are not, however, drawn from their own imagination only, but are in fact to be derived from the representations of their preachers, for whom the more abstruse philosophy would fail to answer their purposes, even were it to be propounded, inasmuch as it would leave no more impression on the popular imagination, than would a professor reciting the early Greek philosophy on the idea of ever-recurring permutation or ever-identical sameness of all things in the universe. As a matter of fact, in Japan, the newer the creed the less philosophical is the dogma.

Shintoism also has some notions of the future world; but they are vague, and certainly not so picturesque as those of Buddhism. It firmly believes in the immortality of the soul, but it puts more stress on temporal affairs than spiritual

ones. In the philosophical conclusions reached by some Shintoists with regard to the soul, it seems to be regarded as a manifestation of a particle of that great spirit which pervades the universe—shall I say a sort of Pantheism, in this respect?—and that, after one's death, it returns to or becomes amalgamated with, as it were, the original essence, capable, nevertheless, of still being individualized, so far as it is concerned with the faith of those who venerate the reminiscences of its former mundane possessor, whilst certain chastisements are meted out hereafter to the soul which is not free from pollution on account of crooked conduct in this world. As to the people at large, however, they assign the domain of the future to Buddhism as explained before; and in their minds, if there were a future world at all, there could not be several such, existing separately for different creeds, so it would not matter under what name or by which route they travelled thither.

With regard to the ethical side of Buddhism, *jihininniku* ("compassion and forbearance") seem to constitute its principal component part. For general guidance the following maxims are laid down:—

Do not do anything that is bad;
Do all that is good;
Cleanse thine own heart;
This is the teaching of all Buddhas.

But then this is only an abstract idea. For the convenience of teaching, goodness and badness are divided into two kinds, spiritual and temporal. But as to the practical ethics, which are the same thing as the exposition of the temporal goodness and badness just referred to, Buddhism can endure no comparison with Confucianism, in the point of systematic exposition; so, on this point, Japanese Buddhism freely calls Confucianism to its aid and that, too, in the manner interpreted by *Bushido*; and even the spirit of Shintoism is silently utilized in the same way. It goes without saying, as may be gathered from what I have said in the preceding pages, that Shintoism also makes free use of Confucianism in the same respect as does Japannese Buddhism, though of course it is Confucianism in its Japanified form.

I may mention here that, apart from religious teachings, the Confucian system of ethics was spread in many ways in former days among the people at large in popularized forms,

though in recent years the system of moral teaching has been placed on a much firmer and wider basis, through the institution of universal education.

But now suppose the question were put to the Japanese educated classes in general with regard to a religion: "Do you believe?" It would be rather difficult to get a satisfactory answer. They are mostly imbued with the influence of *Bushido* (a term now so well known) which, on its broad lines, is by no means confined to the Samurai class alone, supported silently by the doctrine of a clean conscience of Shintoism, and of an elevated culture of practical ethics of Confucianism. They consider that "he who does what is good for its own sake, and not for fear of anything exterior," is the most courageous man; and to be courageous is the most important feature of *Bushido*. The probability is that, were a Japanese gentleman a devout adherent of any particular form of religion, he would rather conceal it than make a display of it. And yet they are most tolerant to all religions. Many a painter has painted the world-renowned *Fuji-yama* from all sides; but the main feature is always alike, whatever may be the foreground the painter may have chosen. So, too, to thoughtful people in Japan, the essence of all religions, taken in the abstract, appears to be pretty much the same—at least, it would generally seem to be so regarded; and they do not trouble themselves much with outward forms. And, therefore, if a countryman of mine were to chance, for instance, to be present at the funeral of a dead friend, where the rites performed were not those of the religion to which he might belong, he would still go through the requisite formality incumbent on a mourner all the same, just as do those who belong to that religion; for here his first thought would be to pay a last tribute to the memory of his dead friend, and he would not consider himself as being a humbug, or as doing something against his own conscience, in view of the fact that the ceremony could, after all, be regarded as no more than a mere form of testifying his sincerity, and it would be, he would consider, a matter of bad taste if he were openly to differ from others present on such a solemn occasion.

By way of summing up this chapter, I may perhaps offer one general observation. Shintoism is essentially a creed

founded upon reverence of ancestors, conjointly with a love of the "fatherland," and likewise of the exalted personage who mirrors the best traditions of our common ancestors and exercises the wisest control over our land; hence loyalty and patriotism are the most important features of the creed, as regards its outward manifestations. All foreign creeds, be they Confucianism or Buddhism, when once transplanted to the soil of Japan, become gradually imbued with the spirit which animates Shintoism. Thus, Confucianism in Japan is not the Confucianism of China. The great Chinese teaching, with all its wealth of fine maxims and sayings, is made full use of; but it is Japanified. In Japan it has been revivified, as it were, and breathes a new atmosphere, wherein it is strengthened and purified, until it is nationalized and becomes identified with all our notions of loyalty and patriotism, to the degree that it seems almost to assume concrete form. The case is the same with regard to Buddhism. It is no longer the Buddhism of China, still less that of India. It is Japanified. It is imbued with a spirit similar to that infused into Confucianism; though perhaps there may be a little difference in degree, owing to the very fact that Buddhism is a religion, whereas Confucianism is not. The processes by which these metamorphoses have been brought about should constitute, it seems to me, a matter worthy of inquiry and analysis, and should by no means be allowed to escape the attention of those who take an interest in things Japanese.

## CHAPTER XI

### ARTS AND LETTERS[1]

I AM often told by the Europeans I meet how amazing it is that Japan should have made such rapid progress in so short a time as thirty or forty years since her adoption of European civilization. Some even go as far as to say that it is all the more amazing inasmuch as Japan must have been in a state of semi-barbarism before that time. They say this with no other wish than that of emphasizing their appreciation of the reality and the rapidity of our recent progress. Of course we recognize our great indebtedness to the Western nations, and we frankly avow that our present forward movement along the path of civilization is mainly based upon the European methods of thought and reasoning. But at the same time it is desirable to point out how inconceivable and impossible a great and successful transformation of this kind would be, unless the nation that attempted it had solid antecedents and a sound basis of ancient discipline and culture to work upon.

Japan has had thoughts and feelings of her own for many centuries; and without some acute perception of that mind and sentiment it would seem almost impossible to understand what Japan is. Hence the amazement to which I have referred. But that amazement will diminish its extension as the knowledge of the mind and ideals of Japan increases. The heart and brain of a nation are chiefly manifested and are conspicuously traceable in the objects of art and literature which it produces. Now I ask your attention in this chapter for some of Japan's products in this sphere.

[1] *Japan by the Japanese.*

# ARTS AND LETTERS

## I

The subject of Japanese art is so wide and complicated that it is a matter of absolute impossibility to deal with it in a short chapter or so. In what I am going to say, therefore, I would merely endeavour to delineate the general outline of the history of our arts and our notions about them.

The Nara period, which corresponds to the eighth century, was one of the great, if not the greatest, epochs of Japanese Art. Nara was our Imperial capital in the days before the primacy of Kioto; the remnants of the art of this period, including many fine productions of previous centuries, are to be seen to this day mostly in the prefecture of Nara. The highest excellence of the arts attained at this period is to be found in the images, both in bronze and wood, and also in the dried lacquers; the pictorial art was also excellent, and is seen at its best side by side with architectural design. There are many Buddhistic temples of olden time now remaining, and many images of bronze or wood, apart from those in the Imperial Museum, are to be seen standing in such temples. Nara and its suburban districts make up a locality which is one of exceptional interest to foreign visitors.

I would not for a moment dare to place the art products of Japan of this period on a level with those of the Greeks, but it is most flattering to us that wherever our sculpture of this era is spoken of by foreigners some references are made to the plastic art of the Greeks, and some kinds of comparison are made so as to draw a very close resemblance between them. Dr. Anderson, speaking of this period in his *Pictorial Arts of Japan*, sums it up thus:—

> Whatever be the credibility of the majority of the early records, it is certain that the level reached by the Japanese in the sculpture of metals, upwards of a thousand years ago, was remarkably high, and many of the products of this period of art culture demonstrate a breadth of conception and a courage of effort that could only emanate from an intellectual and energetic race; but unfortunately the subsequent errors have contributed little to increase the fame won by the authorship of the great bronzes that adorned the ancient capital of Nara.

This colossal bronze Buddha of Nara is well worth

seeing by any connoisseur. It is true that its head is not good; it is a comparatively new head, affixed hastily and by not very competent workmen to replace an ancient one lost by fire caused by war; but from the artistic ensemble it is assumed by competent native experts that the head must have been equally good, if not even more excellent than that of the great Buddha of Kamakura, which was a product of the latter part of the twelfth century. As to this latter big Buddha, all connoisseurs of the West agree in placing it in a very high position among the art treasures of the world. I may here only give an extract from *The Ornamental Art of Japan*, quoted from a French expert, who winds up thus :—

A people who could thus embody the most illusive of metaphysical mysteries must have had an exceedingly lofty conception of the capacities of art."

After Nara we come to the Heian period. Heian is the same place as the modern Kioto. From after the Nara period down to the beginning of the present Imperial régime it remained the Imperial capital for eleven centuries; but what we speak of as the Heian period is generally taken to include the first four of these centuries only. Art flourished, together with general culture, to a very high degree in these centuries, but somewhat in a different way from that of the Nara epoch. In the Nara period we have seen that the arts achieved a very high standard, but such art was always subordinated and made subservient to religion. Art does not seem to have played its part independently as such, hence the individuality of an artist did not achieve a fully distinctive mark. If a picture was painted it was generally a religious subject, and it was used for religious objects, not as a product of an artist for the sake of associating his name with it and admiring his representation of the subject as a picture. But in the Heian period things seem to have changed to a significant degree, especially in pictorial art, which came to be admired as such, while individuality in artists became more and more marked in public estimation. It was then that artists such as Kanaoka and Nobuzane appeared. Pictures founded upon scenes in narratives or actual landscape came to be generally appreciated. On the whole, the arts of the

Heian period seem to have become more extensive and less profound. To show in what sort of relationship pictorial art and society stood towards each other, there is a very good illustration in the famous *Genji Monogatari* contained in a chapter under the title of "Ye-awase," which means "pairings of pictures." At that period there was a very common practice of so-called "uta-awase," which means "pairings of poems." It was done in this way. Ladies and gentlemen who were versed in composing poems were told off to meet at an appointed place at an appointed time, when successive competitions would be held by pairs formed by one on the left and one on the right, each producing his or her poem and submitting it to the umpire, who would judge which of them was the better, and when one pair was finished the next pair continued the contest, and so on. The pairing of the pictures was no doubt conceived in imitation of the pairing of poems. The pairing of pictures seems to be rather quaint in its conception, but it will give us a very good idea of the society of the time. I give below a full quotation of the passage describing it from my own translation of the *Genji Monogatari* :—

The Emperor was very fond of pictures, and painted with considerable ability. Lady Plum, too, as it happened, possessed the same taste as the Emperor, and used often to amuse herself by painting. If, therefore, he liked ordinary courtiers who exhibited a taste for painting, it was no matter of surprise that he liked to see the delicate hands of the lady occupied in carefully laying on colours. This similarity of taste gradually drew his attention to her, and led to frequent visits to the "Plum-chamber." When Gon-Chiunagon was informed of these circumstances, he took the matter into his own hands. He himself determined to excite a spirit of rivalry. He contrived means to counteract the influence of painting, and commissioned several famous artists of the time to execute some elaborate pictures. Most of these were subjects taken from old romances, as he conceived that these were always more attractive than mere fanciful pictures. He also caused to be painted a representation of every month in the year, which would be likely, he thought, to interest the Emperor. When these pictures were finished he took them to Court, and submitted them to the Emperor's inspection; but he would not agree that he should take any of them to the Plum-chamber; and they were all deposited in the chamber of his daughter.

Genji, when he heard of this, said of his brother-in-law, "He is young; he never could be behind others." He was, however, unable to pass the matter over unnoticed." He told the Emperor that he would present him with some old pictures, and returning to his

mansion at Nijio he opened his picture cabinet, where numbers of old and new pictures were kept. From these, with the assistance of Violet, he made a selection of the best. But such pictures as illustration of the "long regrets," or representation of "O-Shio-Kun," were reserved, because the terminations of these stories were not happy ones. He also took out of his cabinet the sketches which he had made while in Suma and Akashi, and showed them for the first time to Violet, who was a little angry at his not having shown them to her sooner.

It was about the tenth of February, and the face of nature began to smile at the approach of spring, making the hearts and tempers of people more calm and cheerful; besides, it was just the time when the Court was unoccupied with the keeping of any festival. There could be no better opportunity than this for such an exhibition of pictures to attract the attention of people enjoying leisure. Genji, therefore, sent his collection of pictures to the palace in behalf of the lady of the Plum-chamber.

This soon created a sensation in the palace. Most of the pictures that were in the possession of the lady of the Plum-chamber were from old romances, and the pictures themselves were of ancient date, being rare, while those of Kokiden were more modern subjects and by living artists. Thus each of them had their special merits, so that it became difficult to say which were the more excellent. Talking of these pictures became quite a fashionable subject of conversation of the courtiers of the day. The Imperial mother happened to be at Court, and when she saw these pictures and heard different persons at Court discussing their relative merits, she suggested that they should divide themselves into two parties, right and left, and regularly to give their judgment. This was accordingly done. Hei Naishi-no-suke, Jijiu-no-Naishi and Shioshio-no-Meifu took the left, on the side of the lady of the Plum-chamber; while Daini-no-Naishi-no-suke, Chiujio-no-Meifu, and Hioye-no-Meifu took the right, on the side of the Kokiden.

The first picture selected was the illustration of the "Bamboo Hewer," by the left, as it was the most appropriate to come first for the discussion of its merits, as being the parent of romance. To compete with this that of "Toshikage," from "The Hollow Wood," was selected by the right. The left now stated their case, saying "The Bamboo—indeed, its story, too —may be an old and commonly known thing, but the maiden Kakuya, in keeping her purity unsullied in this world, is highly admirable; besides, it was an occurrence that belongs to a pre-historical period. No ordinary woman would ever be equal to her, and so this picture has an excellence." Thereupon the right argued in opposition to this, saying, "The sky, where the maiden Kakuya has gone up, may indeed be high; but it is beyond human reach, so we may put it aside. When she made her appearance in this world she was, after all, a creature of bamboo; and, indeed, we may consider her even lower than ourselves. It may also be true that she threw a bright radiance over the inside of a cottage, but she never shone in the august society of a palace. Abe-no-oshi's spending millions of money

in order to get the so-called fire-proof rat, which, when obtained, was consumed in the flames in a moment, is simply ridiculous. Prince Kuramochi's pretended jewel branch was simply a delusion. Besides, this picture is by Koshe-no-omi, with notes by Tsurayuki. They are not very uncommon. The paper is Kamiya, only covered with Chinese satin. The outer cover is reddish purple, and the centre stick is purple Ajedarah. These are very common ornaments. Now Toshikagè, though he had undergone a severe trial from the raging storm, and had been carried to a strange country, arrived at length at the country to which he was originally dispatched, and from there returned to his native land, having achieved his object, and having made his ability recognized both at home and abroad. This picture is the life of that man, and it represents many scenes, not only of his country but of foreign ones, which cannot fail to be interesting. We therefore dare to place this one above the other in merit.

The ground of this picture was thick white tinted paper, the outer cover was green, and the centre stick jade. The picture was by Tsunenori, and the writing by Michikaje. It was in the highest possible taste of the period.

The left made no more protestation against the right.

"Next, the romance of Ishé by the left, and that of Shio Sammi by the right, were brought into competition. Here again the relative merit was very difficult to be decided at once. That of the right had apparently more charms than that of the other, since it beautifully represented the society of a more recent period.

Hei-naishi, of the left, therefore said :—

"If leaving the depths of Ishé's night-sea,
We follow the fancies of new-fashioned dreams,
All the beauty and skill of the ancients will be
Swept away by the current of art's modern streams.

Who would run down the fame of Narihira for the sake of the pretentious humbug of our own days ?"

Then Daini-no-Naishi-no-suke, of the right, replied :—

"The noble mind that soars on high,
Beyond the star-bespangled sky ;
Looks down with ease on depths that lie
A thousand fathoms 'neath his eye."

Upon this the Empress Mother interceded. She said that the exalted nobility of Lord Hioye may not, indeed, be passed over without notice, yet the name of Narihira could not altogether be eclipsed by his.

Though too well known to all may be
The lovely shore of Ishé's sea ;
Its aged fisher's honoured name,
A tribute of respect may claim.

There were several more rolls to be exhibited, and the rival protestations on both sides became very warm, so that one roll occasioned considerable discussion.

While this was going on Genji arrived on the scene. He suggested to them that if there was any competition at all it should be decided on a specially appointed day, in a more solemn manner, in the presence of the Emperor. This suggestion having been adopted, the discussion came to an end.

The day for this purpose was fixed. The ex-Emperor, who had been informed of this, presented several pictures to the lady of the Plum-chamber. They were mostly illustrations of Court festivals, on which there were explanatory remarks written by the Emperor Yengi. Besides these, there was one which had been expressly executed at his own order by Kimmochi. This was an illustration of the ceremony which took place at his palace on the departure of the lady for Ishé, some time back, when she had gone there as the Saigu. It was also probable that some of his pictures came into the possession of her rival, the Lady Kokiden, through his mother (as the mother of the former was a sister of the latter).

When the day arrived every arrangement was made in the large saloon at the rear of the palace, where the Imperial seat was placed at the top. The Court ladies of both parties—those of the lady of the Plum-chamber, and those of the lady of Kokiden—were ranged respectively left and right, the left, or those of the lady of the Plum-chamber, facing southwards, and those of the right, northwards. All the courtiers also took the places allotted to them. Here the pictures were brought. The box, containing those of the left, was of purple Azedurah. The stand on which the box was placed was of saffron, and over this was thrown a cover of Chinese brocade with a mauve ground. The seat underneath was of Chinese coloured silk. Six young girls brought all this in, and arranged it all in order. Their kazami (outer dress) was of red and cherry colour, with tunics of wistaria lining (light purple outside, and light green within).

The box which contained the pictures of the right was of "Jin" wood, the stand of light coloured "Jin," the cover of Corean silk with a green ground. The legs of the stand, which were trellised round with a silken cord, showed modern and artistic taste. The kazami of the young girls was of willow lining (white outside and green within), and their tunics were of Kerria japonica lining (or yellow outside and light red within). Both Genji and Gon-Chiunagon were present, by the Emperor's special invitation, as also the Prince Lord-Lieutenant of Chickshi, who loved pictures above all things, and he was consequently chosen umpire for this day's competition. Many of the pictures were highly admirable, and it was most difficult to make any preference between them. For instance, if there was produced by one party a roll of "The Season," which was the masterpiece of some old master, on selected subjects, there was produced also, by the other party, a roll of sketches on paper, which were scarcely inferior to, and more ornamented with flourishing than, the ancient works, in spite of the necessary limita-

tion of space which generally makes the wide expanse of scenery almost too difficult to express. Thus the disputes on both sides were very warm

Meanwhile the Imperial Mother (the Princess Wistaria) also came into the saloon, pushing aside the sliding screen of the breakfast chamber. The criticisms still continued, in which Genji made, now and then, suggestive remarks. Before all was finished the shades of evening began to fall on them. There remained, on the right, one more roll, when the roll of Suma was produced on the left. It made Gon-Chiunagon slightly embarrassed. The last roll of the right was, of course, a selected one, but it had several disadvantages in comparison with that of "Suma." The sketches on this roll—illustrations of different bays and shores—had been done by Genji with great pains and much expenditure of time. They were most skilfully executed, and carried away the minds of the spectators to the actual spots. On them illustrative remarks were written sometimes in the shape of a diary, occasionally mingled with poetical effusions in style both grave and easy. These made a great impression on the Emperor, and on every one present; and finally, owing to this roll, the left was decided to have won the victory.

In the famous *Makura-no-soshi* we see the following, as quoted by Mr. Aston :—

On the sliding doors of the northern front of the Mikado's private apartments there are painted fearful pictures of creatures that live in the wild ocean, some with long arms, others with long legs. When the doors of the ante-chamber are open we can always see them.

This will show that pictorial art was made use of for the chamber decorations. The notions as to what a picture should be that were entertained by the gentry of this epoch are well illustrated by the following extract from the *Genji Monogatari*. It is contained in a chapter where different kinds of female characters are discussed, and therefore it is only discussed incidentally, but it will give a fair idea, and so I give the extract in full ;—

Again, therefore, he took up the conversation, and said, "Call to your mind affairs in general, and judge of them. Is it not always true that reality and sincerity are to be preferred to merely artificial excellence ? Artisans, for instance, make different sorts of articles, as their talents serve them. Some of them are keen and expert, and cleverly manufacture objects of temporary fashion, which have no fixed or traditional style, and which are only intended to strike the momentary fancy. These, however, are not the true artisans. The real excellence of the true artisan is tested by those who make, without defects or sensational peculiarities, articles to

decorate, we will say, some particular building, in conformity with correct taste and high æsthetic principles. Look for another instance at the eminence which has been attained by several of the artists of the Imperial College of Painting. Take the case of draughtsmen in black ink. Pictures, indeed, such as those of Mount Horai, which has never been beheld by mortal eye, or of some raging monstrous fish in a rough sea, or of some wild animal of some far-off country, or of the imaginary face of the demon, are often drawn with such striking vividness that people are startled at the sight of them. These pictures, however, are neither real nor true. On the other hand, ordinary scenery of familiar mountains, of calm streams of water, and of dwellings just before our eyes, may be sketched with an irregularity so charming, and with such excellent skill, as almost to rival Nature. In pictures such as these, the perspective of gentle mountain slopes, and sequestered nooks surrounded by leafy trees, are drawn with such admirable fidelity to Nature that they carry the spectator in imagination to something beyond them. These are the pictures in which is mostly evinced the spirit and effectiveness of the superior hand of a master; and in these an inferior artist would only show dulness and inefficiency.

"Similar observations are applicable to handwriting. Some people boldly dash away with great freedom and endless flourishes, and appear to the first glance to be elegant and skilful. But that which is written with scrupulous neatness, in accordance with the true rules of penmanship, constitutes a very different handwriting from the above. If perchance the upstrokes and downstrokes do not, at first sight, appear to be fully formed, yet when we take it up and critically compare it with writing in which dashes and flourishes predominate, we shall at once see how much more of real and sterling merit it possesses.

"Such, then, is the nature of the case in painting, in penmanship, and in the arts generally. And how much more then are those women undeserving of our admiration, who, though they are rich in outward and in fashionable display, attempting to dazzle our eyes, are yet lacking in the solid foundations of reality, fidelity and truth. Do not, my friends, consider me going too far, but let me proceed to illustrate these observations by my own experience."

It must not, however, be understood that art in religious subjects had disappeared; on the contrary, there are many pictures of this kind, produced at this epoch, still in existence in many temples, and most of them are of highest merit. From the latter part of the twelfth century Kioto had lost its importance, because from that time the actual ruling power of the country had left the hands of the Imperial Government and been transfered to the Shogunate Government. From this time down to about the middle of the fourteenth century Kamakura became the seat of the

Shogun Government. This interval was called the Kamakura period; there were many conditions in this period which were adverse to any progress in the field of art: you may even say it sowed some decadence, and yet there were many beautiful productions, both graphic and glyptic. The Diabutsu, or bronze Buddha, of Kamakura, referred to above, was itself a product of the earliest part of the thirteenth century. It is such a masterpiece of its kind that it will go a good way towards showing what artistic workmanship existed at that time in Japan.

I may interpose just a few words here. Development in the arts was not necessarily limited to Kioto only; previous to the Kamakura period there existed a centre of refinement in the northern part of Japan, namely, in the province of Osiu. There, a great feudal lord had established the seat of his Government, which was in several repects constructed in imitation of Kioto, and from what remains there to this day in the way of objects of art we can judge very well in what a flourishing state that feudal capital must have been before it was crushed by the invading forces of Yoritomo the first Shogun.

After the Kamakura period the Ashikaga period ensues and lasts for about two and a half centuries. During this time the chief seat of the Shogun Governments was in Kioto, side by side with the Imperial court, though there was also a kind of branch Shogunate in Kamakura. In the early part of this period the country was not yet ripe for general progress in art, but from the beginning of the fifteenth century most of the Shogun of the period showed a strong leaning towards the patronage of artistic talent, especially in pictures, many of them being artists of no mean ability themselves. It was then that Japan produced many eminent artists, such as Cho-densu, Siubun, Sessiu, Siugetsu, Sotan, Masanobu, Motonobu, Sesson, and many others, whose masterpieces we are proud to show to other nations to day, and whose names are immortal in our annals. Their styles indeed are not identical, but, taken as a whole, they were akin to one another, and differed from their predecessors to a very conspicuous extent. It was founded more upon the best artistic ideals formed among the Thang and Sung dynasties of China. They had no rivals among the contemporary Chinese artists.

It is said that when Sessiu went to China to study the arts, he lamented that there was no master to study with. The arts of the Nara period and the early part of the Heian period were distingushed by an excellent sobriety in regard to religious feeling; they were the very embodiment of the period. The traditions of such a school could never be resuscitated again, any more than those of Raphael and Angelo can be revived in Europe. For the same reason Siubun and Sessiu could not follow exactly in the footsteps of their predecessors of those early periods to which we have referred; but in their own way they stood very high, and the kinds of pictures they produced are those which are most admired and appreciated by the native Japanese of later years, inasmuch as they embrace high conceptions in their productions independently of any direct subserviency to religion.

At the end of the Ashikaga period, and before the Tokugawa period, is interposed the short Oda-Toyotomi period. Shortly before this period the country was in a state of turmoil caused by the internal dissensions of different chieftains, who were eventually pacified by the efforts of Oda, while the feuds were finally extinguished by Toyotomi Hideyashi. The latter, who is known as Taikosama by foreigners, and spoken of as the Japanese Napoleon, was also a great reviver of our arts. By his patronage it was that Japan produced Yeitoku and Sanraku, whose boldness of design was unsurpassed even by the best of Ashikaga artists. The castle of Fushimi, built by Taikosama, where the genius of these artists was engaged, and where the architectural arts were also evinced to a remarkably high degree, was pulled down some time after the death of this great hero; but fragments of the internal decorations are still to be found in different places; those who have seen them are in the best position to appreciate how, without degenerating into conventional decorative forms, pictorial art may best be utilized for decoration.

After the Oda-Toyotomi came in the Tokugawa era, which lasted over two hundred and seventy years, until our own time. The greater part of this period enjoyed perfect peace, and though hampered by the further development of the feudal system, the nation witnessed more

prosperity than at any other period, and different branches of art made significant progress. As is stated in the last sentence of Dr. Anderson's remark quoted above, the grandeur of the Nara period has never been revived, nor had we during this period any such master hands as Siubun or Sessiu, but, speaking generally, there is no doubt that all branches of art have made great progress, in dimension if not in depth. The lacquer works and development of fine coloured porcelains was no doubt the monopoly of this period. True it is that the lacquer works existed from very remote periods, and those of the Higashiyama period (or section of the Ashikaga period when Sessiu, Sotan and Motonobu flourished) were excellent, especially from an antique and aesthetic point of view. But the full extension and development of lacquer art falls into this epoch. As to porcelains, they commenced their most characteristic development essentially under this period, their growth being comparatively a matter of recent date. 'Popular' pictures of the Ukiyoye school and those of the artisan style are also entirely the new growth of this period.

I must here interpose some explanations. Old styles of pictures, especially Kano and Tosa, had spread their influence very widely among the gentle classes. Eminent painters were far from rare during this age, among whom we may just mention Tannu as the greatest; but, speaking generally, their styles became more stiff and conventional, they failed to arouse popular feeling with their novelty or audacity, and, besides this, they were not within easy reach of the common street people. Hence out of the tendency to revolt from the hackneyed old style, as well as owing to the vulgar demands of common people, arose the new style of these Ukiyoye and 'artisan' schools. The artists of these schools lacked refinement in themselves, belonging generally to the vulgar classes, whereas the artists of the older schools generally belonged to the gentle class, often holding the rank of Samurai, under the patronage of some feudal lord. Such being the case, these new schools are far from representing the genuine ideals of the Japanese cultured classes. There are, however, some individuals of consummate genius amongst them, Hokusai being the greatest; and in their way they exhibited excellent

points, especially in their manipulation of colours and their aptitude for hitting on new ideas taken from daily life. The credit is due to the European critics rather than to ourselves that their merits have been accorded a much higher place than formerly. It is a fact that the cultured Japanese never can be induced to appreciate these schools in quite the same degree as the Western critics do. Korin and his school form an entirely different category in our art. The pictures of this school are grotesque at first sight, and their merits can be discerned only by those who have the peculiar type of observing mind enabling them to appreciate the subtlety of a hidden craft. I think great credit is owing to the European experts who have discovered the merits of this school with the same eye which had been wont to rivet itself on the two schools of vulgar origin just described.

It is superfluous here to dwell upon the different phases of pictorial art during this period, but I must not neglect to make passing allusions to the Chikudan and Bunchio schools, academic rather than popular in their character and influence. I must also mention Kokwan and Denzen, who introduced independently about the same time a semi-European fashion of pictures and copper engravings at the end of the eighteenth century.

We are now in the Meiji era, which has lasted already thirty-eight years. The commencement of this era was marked by the destruction of everything old. There was a time when fine antique temples were pulled down, precious pictures of some thousand years or more were thrown into the dust, and good gold lacquer works were burned in order that the gold might be taken out of the ashes. Everything must be renovated and founded upon European ideas. It is sad when we look back upon it from the present time, but it was the inevitable outcome of the spirit of the time. I know several of the best artists of the day, having nothing to occupy them, proceeded to take lessons in the modes of European drawing, and they often engaged themselves as draughtsmen in the engineering offices of some public department. But things could not remain in such a state for long. Without sacrificing our emulation of things European, whether material or intellectual, we have found time to retrace our steps on the aesthetic side

and have betaken ourselves again to the art of old Japan; this was also due, to a great extent, to the Western advisers and patrons, to whom we must express our gratitude. We have now succeeded to a considerable extent in reviving our old arts, not only in pictures and sculptures, but also in many branches of semi-industrial and semi-artistic objects. Great encouragement has of course been given by foreign patronage, but greater pains have likewise been taken by the natives, and no small encouragement is given by the Emperor and Empress themselves. Of course, in some branches the industrial arts themselves have undergone transformation. At the present day, for instance, there is no great demand for the products of the armourer. The manufacture of helmets is similarly under a cloud. We are now in a transitory state in every branch of art; we have not yet been able to speak of the grandeur of the Meiji era; but, on the whole, I am of opinion that improvement is perceptible in every branch, and I feel quite confident that if more encouragement, especially from abroad, be given to our artists, they will show themselves capable of initiating a memorable epoch. Some foreigners speak of some kind of deterioration of art objects; I daresay there is, but if so, it must be excused on the ground that art conditions with us are in such a transitional state: nor can our foreign patrons themselves escape from participation in the responsibility. Let me explain this a little more fully. Lacquer work artists can make just as good high-class lacquer work as those of 200 years ago, provided that they are given time and corresponding remuneration and the proper expenses for the materials. But the modern purchaser has no idea of such a thing. He endeavours to pick up curiosities at a low rate, and is successful when the necessities of some ancient family compel them to put their art treasures in the market. In all modern work he is apt to trace pernicious Western influence. However delicate the finish he expects only to give a low price.

The reluctance of modern buyers to give commissions (as the old feudal lord invariably did), and their suspicion of all highly priced modern work, is thus tending to drive really superior workmanship out of the market.

As to our pictures, I must add a few words more. The European oil paintings, and water colours too, are studied

in Japan. There are many artists engaged in this direction, but hitherto we have not been able to produce great artists. It must be of our native pictures, therefore, that I shall speak. The style of our pictures differs from European oil paintings, as every one knows; it has a greater affinity with that of the water colour, where painting in colours is concerned. The chief stress we lay upon pictures is the force of the brush and the effect of impression. I do not say that the oil painting overlooks or ignores this important point, but there seems to exist a marked difference in manipulation between our pictures and the oil paintings, for in the case of the Japanese a little failure or mistake will show itself more readily than in the case of the oil, as there is no possibility in our case of correcting any trifling mistake when it is once committed. Then, again, our aim is directed more to impression than to the minuteness of depicting, so that our pictures are not generally so thoroughly and finely done as the oil pictures, except, indeed, in cases of ancient religious pictures. Hence there are great defects in anatomy and perspective when the subject requires correct drawing. The sculptures and pictures of Nara and Heian were advanced in the direction of anatomy to an admirable degree, and it is a matter of great regret that the later art has become more and more deficient in this respect. In matters of geometrical proportion, or rather perspective, our pictures are greatly deficient. These defects are of course to be remedied. It would be silly to retain such defects because they belong to our old style.

During the past twenty-five years all sorts of art exhibitions—pictures of course being the chief form of exhibit—have been held in Tokio; in provincial centres, too, exhibitions have multiplied year after year. There are also several associations, the object of which is connected with the encouragement of art in one way or another. At the exhibitions the merits of the objects exhibited are submitted to the judgment of the experts, and appropriate prizes are awarded. Such exhibitions are opened at the best time or season of the year, spring or autumn. They are organized much in the same style as those of Paris or London. The method of exhibition undoubtedly shows a material advance since the days of the quaint competitive "pairing" of the Heian Court referred

to above. The objects exhibited are generally for sale; they are all genuine, and their prices are affixed; as a rule the prices are anything but high. In the case of pictures, they are quite insignificant when compared with the prices asked in the Western Salons. Of course our pictures, in the case of the native paintings, do not take so much time and pains as European oil paintings; and this is the reason why they are not so dear. The prices vary from £1 to £3 for those by ordinary painters: there may be some that are even cheaper, but good enough to look at. Pictures by first-rate artists are dearer; but even these rarely exceed £15. I occupy the position of president to one of these associations, and I often find difficulty in giving efficient encouragement to the artists from the fact of purchasers not being found in sufficient numbers at the exhibitions. At the same time the artistic tastes of our people at large, and consequently the demand for art objects, has wonderfully increased of recent years. In small towns and villages people who were once contented with paper-mounted or printed 'ukiyo' pictures have become anxious to possess pictures of a much higher standard.

## II

### ON THE STYLE OF JAPANESE GARDENS [1]

Although this may not be deemed a proper place to speak of the art of making gardens in Japan, I cannot refrain from just touching on the subject, because our art in making gardens has much similarity to that of landscape painting, and has much of real art in it. Even on the smallest scale a garden in Japan is laid out in such a way as to represent a picturesque view as depicted in pictures. Hence mimic hills, natural rocks, and, where it is permissible, miniature tarns or cascades, are designed. We can say it is based upon the principle of fine art; but in the case of European gardens, it seems to me that the original ideas were derived from the old "commons," and their later developments have been based more upon the principle of industrial art; to wit,

[1] *The Outlook*, October, 1904.

there are fountains, but in the shape of mechanical apparatus, and not in the shape of natural springs; there are hewn stones, iron rails, iron bridges, and, if there is any water at all, it is mostly in the shape of a round or square tank. When the Occidentals plant flowers, they make the beds invariably in the shape of a square, or triangle, as geometrically as though designing a carpet. They seem to have no idea of finding regularity in irregularity, or, rather, harmony in differentiation. In towns in Japan there are numerous stone shops where natural stones are sold; but no such places exist in any part of Europe. Of course there is one drawback to our gardens, i.e., they are more ornamental than useful. This is a drawback which must be modified, and it is already being modified in many cases; but, on the other hand, European gardens seem to lack artistic elements to altogether too great an extent. It is almost incomprehensible to me that, in the case of Europeans, who are addicted to hanging in their rooms landscape pictures, and who are so fond of travelling in mountainous regions, running after beautiful scenes and views of landscape of different types, it should never have entered their minds to apply to their gardens the same ideas. In this respect I can venture, without any diffidence, to say that Japan is above any nation in the world, and foreigners would be much benefited if they would begin to appreciate our style of gardening. I am glad to see that there are several Westerners in different countries who have already begun to do so.

At the meeting of the British Association at Cambridge, in 1904, Mr. Douglas Freshfield delivered an admirable lecture on "Mountains and Mankind." On the question of the love of mountains, Mr. Freshfield tells us that it is a healthy, primitive, and almost universal instinct. The belief that it is a taste, or some would say a mania, of advanced civilization is erroneous, an error arising from the adoption of too narrowa time-limit for investigation, by comparing the nineteenth century, not with the preceding ages, but with the eighteenth, and also from taking too narrow a space-limit, hardly casting one's eyes beyond Western Europe. The eighteenth century, Mr. Freshfield continues, was an age of formality. It was the age of palladian porticoes, of interminable avenues, of formal gardens and formal

style in art, in literature, and in dress, Mountains, which were essentially romantic and Gothic, were naturally distasteful to it. Herein lies the clue by which to trace the original cause why Western gardens differ so essentially from ours—the Japanese. The gardens of Versailles and St. Cloud, which were striking examples of formality, were made at this period, and there can be no wonder that that style has exercised so vast an influence on the art of gardening in Europe.

The literature of the eighteenth century, Mr. Freshfield further insists, was the product of a practical common-sense epoch, which looked on all waste places—heath like Hindhead or hills like the Highlands—as blemishes in the scheme of the universe. Intellectual life was concentrated in cities and courts—it despised the country. Here, then, was the reason why there never occurred to the minds of the higher classes of the West the idea of introducing to the proximity of their dwellings imitations of the wild and rugged beauty of mountains or valleys.

In those days, moreover, books were written by dwellers in towns which had not grown into large cities, and whose denizens therefore had not experienced the longing to escape from their homes into purer air that people have nowadays. They frankly abused even the Alps. Few people, if any, included in their programme of summer enjoyments mere sight-seeing among mountains and valleys. Naturally enough in those days few people penetrated into the heart of that paradise of the world, Switzerland, even for scientific explorations, still less for pleasure trips. The Alpine Club was founded in England in 1857. It was only a little time prior to that date, it would seem, that Switzerland grew to be the resort of the summer tourist. The eagerness of the scenery-hunter for other mountain regions has also grown in a similar manner from comparatively recent and small beginnings, and with a similarly rapid progress. Most of the visitors simply go there for pastime, and some, though perhaps an inconsiderable number, go there on scientific investigation bent, with a leaning toward pastime. They are contented with seeing the places as they are, and at the most with committing their impressions to writing. They have not yet reached the stage of being moved by the idea of reproducing in

their dwelling-houses and immediate surroundings the impressions they receive, or of giving to them any material shape. Here is, then, the cause why the modern Westerners, who are fond of landscape-hunting, have not been actuated by the same predilection in their gardening as the Far Easterners. It is not because they not do appreciate the loveliness of a landscape, but because they have not yet had sufficient time to get rid of the formal notions of the eighteenth century, and to revive adequately their natural and instinctive love of mountain scenery in their gardening.

As to a fondness for mountainous regions, the Occidentals, especially the English, have advanced their taste in that, direction far beyond the Orientals, so much so, indeed, that, as all know, lives are annually sacrificed and ascents made of so adventurous a nature as to appear almost foolhardy in the eyes of other nations. Mr. Freshfield points out that the love of mountains and the desire to climb them are distinct tastes, and that though they are often united their union is accidental, not essential. With us, the Japanese, I may say that it is our aesthetic perception which entitles us to a place among the mountain-lovers, for though we universally revel in the sight of our peaks and ranges from a distance, we are but poor climbers. Mr. Freshfield, passingly complimenting the Japanese, calling them "a race destined apparently to play a great part in the world's history," reminds us that the Japanese were from antiquity mountain-lovers. Fuji-Yama to the Japanese is (as is Ararat to the Armenians) a national symbol; its ascent is constantly made by bands of pilgrims; it is depicted in every aspect. This is all very true. Fuji-Yama is very dear to us—we love it. Herr Mossé a German jurist, who was staying in Japan, told me more than once that there were innumerable beautiful things in Japan, but Fuji-Yama was the only one thing which he could call "sublime," and he adored it no less than do the Japanese. The vast majority of the pilgrims whom Mr. Freshfield speaks of, however, are climbers in the real sense of making a pilgrimage on account of a certain religious sentiment, Fuji-Yama being considered a sacred mountain, and a sort of voluntary congregation being formed to proceed thither, often from a great distance, not from any love of the mountain itself, as a natural object, nor from any motive of scientific

investigation. By the bye, there were of old a few sacred places which females were forbidden to approach, and Fuji-Yama was one of them. Lady Parkes, who climbed the mountain, in 1865, to the best of my memory, in company with her husband, Sir Harry Parkes, then British Minister to Japan, was the first female who ever ascended it, although it is noteworthy that it is consecrated by the enshrinement on its summit of a Shinto goddess, and also that it is additionally beautiful in the popular imagination from an association with the tale of the "Shining Damsel," the heroine of the "Bamboo Hewer," one of the oldest Japanese works of fiction, written in the early part of the tenth century.

In regard to these matters, however, opinions are vastly changed in Japan. Many more people now climb mountains than in former days. It is especially so with the youths of the new generation. Great numbers of students may be met at any time during the summer vacation trotting about in mountainous regions for pleasure and recreation, as well as for scientific investigation. Although the Japanese are not, or at least, as I have already said, have not hitherto been, distinguished as ardent climbers, their taste for natural scenery, even among the lowest classes, is evinced in many ways, as all visitors to our country must have observed, and especially is this shown in the Japanese method of gardening.

To return to the subject of European gardens, the nearest approach which I have seen to our Far Eastern ideals is to be found in the park of the Buttes Chaumont, in Paris, which is very little known to ordinary visitors; nay, even to the French themselves. It is a garden made of an old quarry, and the cliffs therein formed, supplemented by some artificial stones, have been shaped into a pleasing imitation of some Alpine scenery. The Central Park of New York affords, perhaps, another instance. I cannot say much about it, as the day I visited it was a very foggy one, and I could see but very little of anything. In the part I saw, however, there were several natural rocks—literally, having been there *ab initio*—suggestive of a natural wilderness in an entirely natural valley. Only the other day, when I was on a short visit in the North of England, I was taken by an acquaintance of mine the round of his vast gardens. All sorts of flowers had been planted in them,

and bloomed on every side; they were very beautiful, of course; but when I reached a particular spot I felt inclined to give way to regrets, for there before me lay an old disused quarry, with an abundance of stones in their natural state, as yet untrimmed. The spot could be turned very easily, if entrusted to a Japanese gardener, and not necessarily a skilled one, into an ideal rock-garden, with moss-grown crags and tumbling cascades, suggestive of the best bits of rugged Alpine landscape. But, as it was, the spot was over-planted with all sorts of shrubs and evergreens, and the rocks were entirely hidden from view and wasted!

I remember that I once had at Tokio a casual talk on the subject of gardening with Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Minister. He observed that the reason why Western horticulture lacked the realistic landscape elements was probably that the Western designers of gardens had no natural scenery on a small scale near at hand which might serve them as a model by which their imitative imagination might be inspired. There may be something in this; but it does not seem to explain all. Now that fashions are changing so rapidly, I should not be in the least surprised if we were to see, before many decades pass by, big mossy rocks drawn into the gardens of the English aristocracy by teams of huge English dray-horses, and skilfully placed in position by gardeners with an eye to natural effect.

## III

The Japanese attainments in literature are for the most part inferior to those in art. In art we can talk with a certain amount of confidence with people of any nation, though not always on equal terms, but in literature our confidence in ourselves fails to a significant extent when we come to talk with the people of the Western civilized nations. We have, however, a sufficient stock of literature accumulated through centuries of years amply to show our minds and sentiments as a nation.

An article by the late Sir Edwin Arnold, published in an issue of the *Daily Telegraph* a few days after his death begins thus:—

The time will come when Japan—safe, famous, and glad with the promise of peaceful years to follow, and to reward this present

period of life-and-death conflict—will engage once again the attraction of the Western nations on the side of her artistic and intellectual gifts. Already in this part of the globe, persons of culture have become well aware how high and subtle is her artistic genius; and by and by it will be discovered that there are real treasures to be found in her literature. Moreover, England, beyond any other European country, is likely to be attracted to this branch, at present naturally neglected, of what may be called the spiritual side of Japanese life.

I, as a Japanese, cannot pretend to guarantee this saying of Sir Edwin Arnold as being perfectly correct, but at all events a great deal seems to be contained in it. We have seen in a foregoing section of this chapter that our arts were in a state of great advancement in the Nara period. But in literature we have nothing worth reading left except our poetry. We have Manyoshiu (million leaves), a book which is a collection of poems dating from some time previous to the Nara period down to the early part of the Heian period. The collection seems to have begun at the end of the Nara period but to have been finished by a great poet who lived in the Heian period, and hence the incorporation of some poems of the latter period.

From this book we can fairly judge that the art of poetry has never again attained to that pitch by any subsequent generation throughout the whole of our history. The scale of our poetry is small on the whole, although our poetry of the Nara period contains a good deal worth reading.

Speaking of the poetry of this period Mr. Aston writes thus :—

While the eighth century has left us little or no prose literature of importance, it was emphatically the golden age of poetry. Japan had now outgrown the artless effusions described in a preceding chapter, and during this period produced a body of verse of an excellence which has never since been surpassed. The reader who expects to find this poetry of a nation just emerging from the barbaric stage of culture characterized by rude, untutored vigour, will be surprised to learn that, on the contrary, it is distinguished by polish rather than power. It is delicate in sentiment and refined in language, and displays exquisite skill of phrase, with a careful adherence to certain canons of composition of its own.

This I think will be a sufficient survey of the subject.

We come next to the Heian period. Here we see that culture has greatly developed. All kinds of books were written

—histories, books of law and ceremony, travels, diaries, memoirs, romances, books of 'ana' and novels. The study of Chinese was much in vogue at the time, and many of these books are written in Chinese. Our native literature had also sprung up and made a wonderful progress, and it was then that our native classical books came into existence. They are written entirely in the pure phonetic alphabet, almost entirely consisting of vernacular words. True it is that the writers had not yet devised a mode of dividing one word from another, so that readers may see at once every word separate; but this was similarly the case with the ancient Greeks. Neither did they know how to make use of the signs, such as the full-stop, the comma, and the exclamation stop, etc., so as to make reading easy, and at the same time to give the reader some kind of sense and idea beyond the words themselves. Had the native literature of the time been kept up, and had such improvements been made, Japan would have had by this time the credit of a considerable native literature, in addition to the great boon of having a good system of writing differing from the cumbrous form that is still in use.

The light literature, that is to say, romances, novels, and such like, of the Heian period are written in the native classical style. They are mostly by female hands. As the study of Chinese was thought to be more masculine and useful, and, generally a higher attainment, most men seem to have gone in that direction, and the task of cultivating the native style was left in the hands of the ladies. *Genji Monogatari* and *Makura-no-Soshi* are generally considered the best of the kind, though they differ in style and purport.[1]

Since the Imperial Government of Kioto lost its grasp of the administration, and the ruling power was transferred to the military governments, that is, since the Kamakura period, literary culture has shown a great decadence. The monks of the Buddhist temples became almost the sole repositories of book knowledge, as was the case to a certain extent in the mediaeval age of Europe. There was a time when much knowledge in the way of learning was considered, in the case of knights and other gentry, to be a hindrance to

[1] For specimen extracts, see *Japan by the Japanese*, 1904, 539–541.

the maintenance of manliness, and therefore not much valued. It was under the Tokugawa period that a great revival of literary culture took place and expanded itself to a degree unknown before. I may here state that previously to that period Japanese literature had scarcely any philosophy. Of histories there were many, but they were more in the nature of chronicles or annals, and did not aspire to any philosophical generalization. In the Tokugawa period literature, and the study of books, spread itself in all directions, and philosophical dissertations formed no small part of the new growth. Works of fiction, too, made their appearance in astonishing numbers; but I think it would be better for me to describe this progress in a more historical manner, even though only a bare outline can be attempted.

After the establishment of the Tokugawa Government at "Yedo," now Tokio, the country enjoyed a long spell of peace extending over two hundred and seventy years. During that time both art and literature made great progress. Schools were established, not only in Yedo, but at almost every seat of the provincial governments of the feudal lords, besides many private schools, which were established by scholars on their own account. In these schools the young Samurai were taught; and many of the Samurai themselves, whose business and inclination in former days was nothing but fighting, began to study books. A learned class thus sprang up whose business it was to study, to read, to write, and to teach. These were mainly *Japanese* scholars, in Chinese, their work being to expound the Confucian doctrine; they were called the "Ziusha," and commanded the high respect of society. In the beginning of the period they were classed with priests or physicians, but as time went on a little, it was thought that this classification was not sufficient for them. They must be regarded as something higher; they were accordingly given comparatively high places among the Samurai, and their occupations were not considered as professions. This was, of course, where the teachers were engaged in the official schools; but a similar kind of respect was also accorded to the masters of private schools. It was these learned people who wrote vast numbers of books on different subjects, more especially based upon the Chinese ideas of the classical period, but mostly in such a way as to make them more adaptable to the Japanese

conditions, and also to make many scholastic improvements. These ideas, blended together with the chivalric code of honour of the native growth, went a long way in forming the moral aspects of the Japanese character. There was another movement which took place at this period side by side with the movement in the direction of Chinese study. It was the revival of the study of ancient Japanese literature and the resuscitation of the master spirits of the Imperial régime preceding the introduction of the feudal system. This has also gone a long way toward forming the national character of the Japanese side by side with those influences described above. Scholars belonging to this school have also written many books, more especially on the interpretation of the ancient vernacular language and the exposition of native classical literature.

These were, then, the more serious and elevated sides of our literature of the period, but there was also a popular side —I mean the works of fiction, including romances, dramas, and novels. In discussing this part of our literature I must, in the first place, speak of the "No." The No, together with its accompaniments of the "Kiogen," is not a growth of this period; it first began during the latter parts of the Ashikaga period, it then passed through the Oda-Toyotomi period, and was kept up with lively interest down to the period we are speaking of; nay, even to our own days. The No, as literature, is a collection of dramatic poems, and in its action is a kind of drama. When both recitation and action are combined it is something like an opera on a very limited scale. The written parts are sung by the people acting, there are principal and secondary characters, and a large chorus. I once saw a Greek play acted by the undergraduates at Cambridge in imitation of the ancient Greeks (I have also read some Greek dramas), and I noticed some similarity between them and our No, though, of course, the scale of our No is only miniature compared with that of the Greeks. The text-book of the No is called "Yokioku" or "Utai," and is called No only when it is represented on the stage by action. Yokioku is studied and sung by its admirers even without action. It has been long popular with the upper classes, and of late years its practice has been revived among the gentry extensively. The plot and actions are not complicated, but they are refined, and

some passages are superb, though not classical. Its tone is elegant and elevated and, therefore, fit to be associated with the upper classes; hence, No was performed even on great occasions at the Courts of the Shogun.

The word Kiogen literally means "mad utterances," and when acted it is a comical play on a small scale. The Kiogen is a collection of dialogues, and therefore, as literature, has no poetical element. There are several hundreds of these pieces, and their merits are to be sought in the condensed form of their comical elements. They are never sung, they are only adapted for action, and are commonly played after a No drama, though occasionally a Kiogen alone is acted without the No; a good deal of credit may, however, be allowed to them. They often represent great feudal lords in the leading rôle, and the plot is so arranged that the feudal lord is made a fool of by the other characters. They were acted in the period when the feudal discipline was most rigid, and yet this fool-making was acquiesced in. This will show how cunningly the comical parts were displayed, so that the very feudal lords themselves before whom they were played could not get offended.

The works of fiction of this period have taken root in a somewhat similar manner to the popular school of paintings (Ukiyoye) which took their root in opposition to the pictures of the older and more conventional style. They were truly things for the people, and not for the aristocracy. The serious side of our literature in this period was almost a monopoly of the higher classes. The common people had no access to or liking for it, except those who had been favoured with better opportunities or higher aspirations than their neighbours. And yet they began to feel a kind of longing for some novelty, and this was utilized by a number of clever popular writers. The readers were of the inferior class, and the writers were men of the same class, were at least *hommes déclassés*, or pretended to be so by using some fictitious name. Generally speaking, therefore, much vulgarity is perceptible in this class of literature. Nevertheless there is merit to be found in these books. Their plots and situations are, in many cases, so good that they touch our feelings deeply.

Speaking of Bakin, who may be considered the greatest

heroic romance writer of the period, a critic says, as translated and quoted by Mr. Aston :—

> In short, Bakin comprises in himself the best points of many men. We see in him numerous resemblances to Shakespeare. It is not only women and children, tradespeople and peasants, who admire him. Even educated gentlemen are frequently moved to tears or laughter, or made to gnash their teeth and strain their arms (with rage) by his writings.

Perhaps I may here give, with advantage, a rough classification of these works. There are historical romances, comical romances and novels: the latter are called by us Ninjio-bon (book of human nature), and their plots are principally concerned with love affairs. Female characters in these novels generally do not belong to a very select type or class, so that they are often repugnant to the more refined taste of modern times. Such types recur much as the courtesans and parasites do in Latin comedy, but they are often very cleverly drawn. From the literary point of view, moreover, we can discover considerable merit in many of these works of fiction, inasmuch as many of them (among them the so-called *Kusazoshi*) were written in the pure phonetic alphabet and colloquial Japanese. Historical romances of the Bakin school generally contain Chinese letters in their lines to a surprising degree ; and, therefore, from the point of view of the nationalization of our written language they do not appear to merit much consideration at our hands. With regard to those that are written in the pure phonetic alphabet, on the other hand, the writers have succeeded to a very creditable degree in reviving the mode of writing peculiar to the old days of the classical literature of the Heian period after it had been totally disused for so many centuries. For those, therefore, who wish to remodel our written language on the same lines as the spoken language, these works certainly deserve to be taken into greater consideration.

There is one more important kind of literature which deserves our attention ; it is the popular drama.

In speaking of dramas it is necessary to speak first of the books relating to them. There are numerous books under the categorical name of the *Joruri-bon* or *Gidayu-bon*. These are books containing not only the dialogue but also some of the descriptive parts of the stories themselves.

They are written like a novel, only with more dialogue than description, but, of course, in a shorter form, and in such euphonic diction as may be sung. At the same time they are also adaptable to the stage with actors and acting. They were originally written for marionette theatres; experienced vocalists singing them at the corner of the proscenium, while the marionettes were being worked with realistic effect on the stage concurrently with the singing. They could also be sung without the marionettes, and, therefore, the singing of them is widely studied and practised by men and women of the higher classes. They can, moreover, with a little modification, be adapted to the ordinary stage. Ordinary theatres grew up in this period, but at a little later time than the marionette theatres. Dialogue plays were written for these theatres by regular playwrights attached to them: their literary merit was for the most part insignificant.

Many foreigners have imagined that there were no actresses in Japan; but this is an erroneous opinion. At the beginning of theatrical performances, some three hundred years ago, there were actors and actresses playing together, but this practice was prohibited a little later for some reason. In later times also there were many actresses, though fewer in number than actors, and these actresses formed their own companies on the stage and played the parts of men, while male actors similarly formed independent companies. Men (not necessarily youths) played female parts, and women portrayed men, both with admirable success. This state of things obtains to this day. Occasionally actresses act in the company of the actors, but it is very rare, and in exceptional cases. The tendency, however, is in the direction of more fusion between the male and female companies of players.

The stage, both marionette and ordinary, was originally intended for common people, and, unlike the No, the popular stage has never been patronized by the upper classes. It was only at a very recent date that even great actors began to attain their position in society. Much vulgarity was permitted to appear on the stage in former days, both marionette and ordinary, and the Joruri-bon themselves are not free from this defect; but when we make a good selection from the numerous

books of this kind we find that there are many parts which exhibit high literary merits, and parts that may be sung by men and women of the highest classes without hesitation, before any audience. My wife herself is a fairly good singer of 'Joruri' songs. She was first recommended by a medical specialist of high reputation to make frequent use of her voice for the sake of her health, and this kind of singing was selected for her.

Speaking generally, however, I admit that vulgarity exists in many of them still, as I said before; but here I must make a remark which will be most astonishing to the Western readers. I wish to say that these play-books, this popular drama, and the heroic tales contained in these historical works of fiction, together with the Gundan (particular mode of telling heroic stories) have had a great share in making the Japan of to-day. The gallantry of our sailors in trying to bottle up the entrance of Port Arthur, and of the soldiers who fought the battle of the Yalu, Kinchau, Nanshan and Mukden, owes a good deal of its force to the influence exercised by these fictions upon the popular element of the Mikado's subjects. Of course I do not ignore the fact that the vast influence of the serious parts of our education and traditions also would have made them extremely loyal and patriotic to their country and to their Emperor; but, for all that, the influence exercised by the dramatic performances, dramatic literature, and the romantic stories of heroes and heroines can by no means be overlooked.

For this there is reason; in Japan, the idea of the "encouragement of what is good, and the chastisement of what is bad," has always been kept in view in works of fiction, and more conspicuously still in dramatic books and plays. I know very well that there is some opposition to this idea. People in England and France say that works of fiction should be viewed exclusively as art products; hence, so long as the real nature and character is depicted there is an end to the function of these works. I do not pretend in any way to challenge this argument, but I simply state that it was not so regarded in Japan; consequently, with us, some kind of reward or chastisement is generally meted out to the fictitious characters introduced upon the scene; and these representations, whether in books or on the stage, are carried to such a pitch of illusion as to leave a very profound

impression on the minds of the readers or of the audience. Whatever the other remaining parts may be, these parts are always left in and remain uppermost upon the mind of the reader or the theatre-goer. The prominent effect or impression thus produced is generally a great loyalty, such as a loyal servant would feel and express for his master; or a great fortitude and perseverance which a man may exhibit for the sake of justice and righteousness; or the severe suffering he may undergo for the sake of a dear friend; or the devotion of parents with self-sacrifice; or the great suffering, and it may be self-sacrifice, of a wife for her husband, or of a mother for her son in enabling him to fulfil his duty as a true subject of his lord, or as a true friend of a comrade, or a fellow-citizen for whose sake he has to do something. I have myself undergone many times the experience of shedding tears when reading works of fiction, or when listening to the singing of dramatic songs, or while witnessing dramatic performances. This peculiarity seems to be wanting on the Western stage. I remember once in London, years ago, my eyes becoming moist with tears when I saw a character on the stage, who was being taken away as a prisoner, putting out his arms and shaking hands with the man who was his dear friend, but who ought to have been suspected, if I remember rightly, as being the cause of his being taken prisoner, and who told him that he would never suspect and never forsake him; but that was a solitary experience.

If I say anything about Shakespeare, I fear I should at once be considered to be overstepping my proper boundary; but I must say that even Shakespeare's plays, some of which I have read or seen played upon the stage, have never given me such impressions. Whenever we come to the Western stage we appreciate the stage decorations, we admire the splendid movements and shapely figures of the actors and actresses, and, so far as we can understand it, the striking elegance and powerful delivery of the dialogue; and we enjoy ourselves as much as could be hoped, but on coming home we find nothing left in our brain which might serve as an incentive or a watchword in our future career. Such, then, seems to be the difference between our dramatic works and those of the Western nations. If ever the good parts of our dramatic works

be appreciated by the Westerners we shall feel highly flattered.

I must now leave off speaking of the Tokugawa period and must deal with the Meiji era, in which we are now living. The infusion of European ideas has made all our things very different, and literature is also making a new move; I cannot enter upon the subject in this place; I can merely state a very few facts. Works of fiction have been and are being written a good deal. We have not yet produced any great genius such as the geniuses produced in the Tokugawa period, but in some ways we have made improvements. Writers of works of fiction in the Tokugawa period had no great enlightenment in themselves, as I have described above. Modern writers are mostly men of proper training and regular education; many of them are graduates of the university, and many of them have a fair knowledge of Western literature. If only the public would give more encouragement to them to continue their toil, I have every confidence that they would succeed. But, alas, this is not the case. I may also say that although theatrical plays are also written by the young men of the present generation, they have not, hitherto, met with much success. Such works as *Chiushingura* (Forty-Seven Ronin or loyalists) or *Sendaihagi* (Lespedeza bicolor of Sendai), written in the Tokugawa period, have at present found no rivals in the modern literature of Japan.

# CHAPTER XII

## THE GREAT CHANGE IN JAPAN[1]

OF late people have shown a strong disposition to learn something of the cause and effect of that great change which took place in Japan some three decades ago. The following pages are an attempt to give to such persons the keys by which they may open the mystic shrine in which that history is hidden from the eyes of casual observers.

There are in all seven keys, in the shape of terms which it is most important to master, and which must first be thoroughly understood if one really desires to gain access to the shrine. These are: (1) Kinno, (2) Sabaku, (3) Sakoku, (4) Kaiko, (5) Kobu-gattai, (6) Fukko, (7) Ishin. These represent in reality the seven currents of thought, so to speak, which for a considerable time prevailed in Japan, and in the fusion of these currents, after the numberless checks and impediments that were ascribable to the political vicissitudes of the age, we have the Japan of to-day. Amongst these currents the first five more especially prevailed before 1868, which was the year of the restoration of the Imperial régime, and the last two after that year.

Now, "Kinno" means "fulfilling one's duty to the Emperor"; "Sabaku" means "supporting the Bakufu, i.e., the government of the Shogun, who was the military head of the house of Tokugawa. As a matter of fact, the original signification of Bakufu was "the headquarters of a generalissimo." The simple signification of Shogun is "a leader of an army"—a general; but in the case under our consideration "generalissimo" is perhaps the more appropriate title, because in this case "Shogun" was but

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1904.

an abbreviation of Tai-Shogun, which is the precise equivalent of "generalissimo." The nearest terms we can give in English, therefore, to "Kinno" and "Sabaku" would be Imperialism and Militarism. They were the main opposing currents which had animated the Japanese, heart and soul, for some fifteen years prior to 1868, and had been productive of manifestations, often in a most acute form, though their origin and growth were of more remote date. In other words, the question at issue was to decide which of two—the Imperial Court at Kioto or the Government of the Shogun at Yedo (now Tokio)—should gain the ascendency and govern the country. It was in reality a vital question, having its roots deep down in the very foundations of the organization of Japan. Concurrently with these two modes of thought there existed two others, which were likewise in opposition to one another, namely, "Sakoku," which meant "closing the country," and "Kaiko," which implied "opening the ports to foreign trade." The former was sometimes called "Sako," which meant closing the ports, being, of course, the same thing as "closing the country," and in this form it was often coupled with "Joi," i.e., expelling the barbarians, or "Joi," alone, was often used in place of "Sakoku." "Kaiko" was sometimes called "Kaikoku," which means "opening the country," in contradistinction to "Sakoku." Let us term them in English "anti-opening" and "pro-opening." These two issues had to be definitely decided, one way or the other, with regard to Japan's external attitude.

The relative positions of these four currents constitute the most interesting, and yet, to outsiders, most puzzling features of that period of Japan's history. Broadly speaking, Militarism and the pro-opening propagandism were usually ranged on one side in antagonism to Imperialism and the anti-opening propagandism, but they were not necessarily so throughout. It was the Shogun's Government that had to deal with foreign Powers, and which acceded to their demands as respects opening the country to foreign trade. It felt, no doubt, that a greater and more immediate responsibility, in regard to emergencies which might arise, would be incurred in refusing these demands, and therefore yielded to external pressure. It

naturally followed that those who favoured Militarism were also generally to be found on the side of the pro-opening propagandists. It did not, however, follow that because one supported the existing system of Militarism, as a domestic policy, he should also advocate opening the country; as a matter of fact, there were many among the adherents of the Shogunate who did not like the idea of seeing the country thrown open under humiliating conditions, under the menace, as it were, of foreign bayonets. On the other hand, the Imperial Court at Kioto was from time immemorial considered almost sacred, and it was natural enough, in those days, that the Court, with its nobles, should take a certain pride in its seclusion and in the country being free from any foreign interference, and thus its avowed desire was to keep foreigners at a distance. Hence the supporters of the Imperial cause generally espoused the anti-opening propaganda. But it did not necessarily follow, among Imperialists at large, that, because a man longed to see the Imperial authority resuscitated and the country consolidated, he should close his eyes to the advantages which might accrue from foreign intercourse, nor that he should blind himself to the dangers which might arise from an attempt to stem the irresistible tide that was setting in, as exemplified in the advent of foreign fleets.

There was another current, which went by the denomination of "Kobugattai," which implied an intimate relationship and harmonious understanding between the Court and the Shogunate, "Kobu" signifying the Court and Shogunate, and "gattai" signifying a perfect unity, as it were. We might call this propaganda the "harmonism." The idea of this propaganda was that it would be better for the country could some cordial understanding be established between the Court and the Shogunate, and that efforts should be directed toward the maintenance of the country's position as to exterior concerns. The views of the harmonists on this latter point were mainly in favour of maintaining amicable intercourse with foreign Powers, though this did not necessarily and absolutely follow. Harmonism, however, did not, after all, amount to much more than a sort of opportunism—a mere patching-up of matters in conformity with temporary expediencies,

so that this current of opinion did not exercise so great an influence on the nation's future as did some others.

Such was the admixture of the currents of thought at a time when the culmination to be finally attained was a matter of vital importance. It was no wonder, then, that the country was in a great commotion, and that the turmoil cost it innumerable lives and much money. There were several risings of impatient patriots against the authorities at Yedo, attacks on foreigners, and bombardments of foreign ships, with counter-bombardments by the foreign squadrons of our seaside towns, and desperate battles between the Imperialists and the Militarists. There were, moreover, many self-contradictory acts, irreconcilible in themselves save to those whose studies have led them thoroughly to appreciate the unique conditions due to the then existing commixture of interests. No one at the time could predict the ultimate outcome of all this, of course, but the only solution of the problem lay in a unification of the Imperialistic and the pro-opening propaganda. It was beyond doubt that the country needed to be consolidated and made as powerful as possible in order to sustain its independence against exterior pressures, and, for the realisation of this end, Imperialism was the only commendable propaganda. But Imperialism in union with the anti-opening propaganda was neither practical nor feasible. It must be reconciled with the pro-opening propaganda, which, as we have seen, was then ranged on the side of Militarism. There arose at this crisis, I am thankful to say, men amongst the Imperialists who began to perceive this paramount necessity; neither was there lacking a similar element among the supporters of the Shogunate. But on this some further explanation is necessary.

First, as to the relative position of the Emperor and Shogun. In the early days it was usual for foreigners to speak of the former as the spiritual head of Japan, and of the latter as the temporal head. This was not correct according to our notions, as is now tolerably well known. The Emperor was all in all—the real Sovereign of the country. He was always the fountain of honour; and only the administrative authority was entrusted to the hands of the Shogun. This fact was at all times fully recognized

by the followers of the Shogunate themselves. Hence, even among the staunchest adherents of the Shogun, to wrest the sovereignty of the country from the Emperor, and confer it upon the person of the Shogun, was out of the question, even though the object in view was nothing less than the consolidating of the country against foreign intrusions. They dare not contemplate such a sacrilegious crime, and the only thing they desired was the continuation and strengthening of the administrative power of the Shogun. The advocacy of the resuscitation of the Imperial authority, moreover, had been growing for many decades, irrespective of foreign concerns, and the growth of that notion meant a proportionate diminution of the authority of the Shogunate Government. As a matter of fact, the last Shogun, Keiki himself, who exercised great influence even before he became Shogun, was a person who had the keenest possible sense of loyalty to the Imperial Court. He was a scion of the Mito branch of the Tokugawa family, and it is a well-known fact that the house of the Prince of Mito, though descended from Iyeyasu, the first Shogun of the Tokugawa line, was most loyal to the Court, and had been one of the most influential instruments in the revival of the Imperial cause. Young Keiki, at the age of eleven, succeeded the house of Hitotsubashi, another branch of the Tokugawa family. There were six among numerous branches of the Tokugawa family who enjoyed the privilege of supplying a successor in case of default of a direct heir to the reigning line of Shoguns; Hitotsubashi was one of the six, and Mito was another. At the age of eighteen Keiki was one day deeply impressed —I have it on the very best authority—by his father's injunction to the following effect: "You may," said the old Prince of Mito to his son, "one day chance to be the Shogun. You have, however, to bear one thing in your mind, and it is this: should any crisis ever occur in which the interests of the Imperial Court and those of the Yedo Government arrive at such a pitch that they cannot co-exist, you must pay primary attention to those of the Imperial Court. It is the only way to fulfil your duty to the Emperor, and thus only will you be acting in keeping with the best traditions of our family." Keiki's thoughts were ever alive to this teaching of his father, who was in his way a

great man and a most conspicuous figure in the history of his time. Keiki is often condemned by casual observers as having been lacking in decision and courage in his latter days, but here is the clue of his actions, and it should go a long way to dispose of that accusation. Napoleon III burnt his fingers in the latter days of the Tokugawa régime, when he directed his thoughts to Far Eastern politics on the assumption that the relative positions of Japanese Imperialism and Militarism were something like those of the Imperialism and Royalism of his own country, i.e., a rivalry of two factions that were on an equal footing.

As to foreign relations, the Government of the Shogun, being no longer able to resist the exterior pressure, signed treaties before they could get the Imperial sanction, on the excuse that it was within the competency of the Shogun's authority by virtue of the administrative powers entrusted to him by the Emperor. In the eyes of the Japanese at large, especially in those of the Imperialists, his functions were not so regarded. In their view the Shogun's act constituted a usurpation of the Imperial prerogative, and, consequently, it was not viewed as a final and irrevocable arrangement. It is remarkable to notice that even the Shogun's officials, who negotiated these treaties, must have felt some delicacy in regard to this matter, for the title of these treaties had at the top an extra word in the Japanese text—Kari=temporary or provisional. I do not remember how it was in the Western text. And again, in the stipulation about the privilege of despatching a Resident Minister, the representative who was to be despatched by Japan was described as "a functionary who deals with political matters," and those who were to be despatched by foreign States to Japan were mentioned simply by phonetic transliteration as "Diplomatic Agent." Of course both the nomenclature and the function of different classes of diplomatic agents were unknown then in Japan, but it is curious to see one and the same thing differently expressed. The draughtsmen of these documents had evidently no other reason for so doing than that of evading all possible criticism. I may also mention here two other matters in connexion with this subject. One is the term Tai-kun, the literal

meaning of which is "great lord." Foreigners thought it was the proper title of the "temporal head" of Japan. But, as a matter of fact, it was no title at all. It was a nomenclature invented by the partisans of the Shogunate Government purposely to obscure the exact position of the Shogun, although the device was not quite novel, inasmuch as the same term seems to have been at times used in the diplomatic correspondence of the Government of the Shogun with Korea. The other term was the appellation of "his Majesty" used by foreigners to designate the Shogun. It was Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister, who first perceived the absurdity of it, and substituted, in official documents, "his Highness" for it. All foreigners were under the delusion that they had done everything correctly and effectually when they had completed their dealings with the officials of the Shogun. Let matters be as they were, however, there was one thing which was certain, and that was that the doctrine of the anti-opening propagandists was not feasible, hence the necessity of combining Imperialism and the pro-opening propaganda in one channel, in opposition to the other three currents of Militarism, the Anti-opening propaganda and Harmonism. It was no easy matter. If a Britisher could perceive how difficult it would be, at this moment, were he to be asked to take the "Free Trade" doctrine from the Liberals, and the "Imperialism" from the Unionists, and, amalgamating them as one, reorganize the British administrative and fiscal polity altogether, then he could realize how much more difficult it must have been for the Japanese of those days to effect the combination and unification above described. Somehow or other things were brought about, and with the inauguration of the new régime, in 1867, the country was consolidated under the central Imperial Government, and simultaneously, foreign relations were firmly and definitely placed on the basis of the pro-opening policy, and of national progress. Thus was ushered in the Meiji era. And, moreover, in the course of four years, as the sequel of this great reformation, the feudal system was totally abolished by the combined efforts of the whole nation, until at last the consummation of the work was reached by the establishment of a constitutional form of government—a remarkable history, at least so

regarded by outsiders, and one which it is needless for me to expatiate upon in this article.

I must not, however, close without explaining the two remaining terms, "Fukko," and "Ishin." They represented the two great currents of thought that more especially manifested themselves in the early part of the Meiji era. "Fukko" means "a return to the ancient," i.e., restoration, and "Ishin" means "thorough innovation." The terms themselves represent two totally opposing ideas, but they were very commonly used conjointly in almost a similar manner as bread and butter or milk and sugar are employed in combination; and, as a matter of fact, they were both equally the motive power of the new régime in attaining its vital aims. The idea of "Fukko" was akin to Imperialism, and that of "Ishin" to the doctrine of pro-opening. For the furtherance of the Imperial cause it was necessary to encourage the reproduction of the ancient spirit, because the full realization of the idea of centralizing the governing organization, including the abolition of feudalism, and the unification of army and navy as well as all other public institutions—could only be thoroughly accomplished by an appeal to the ancient Imperial régime. For the adoption of a progressive policy, on the other hand, on the basis of Western enlightenment, it was necessary to encourage the idea of innovation, the reason of which needs no explanation. But both of these currents of thought were apt to be misused, and to run to extremes. One was apt to endeavour to revive matters and notions which were totally obsolete and impracticable, nay, even harmful, and to despise things which were comparatively new, i.e., things which were not as old as the ancient Imperial régime; whilst the other was apt to despise everything old, no matter how precious it was from the national point of view, and to endeavour to supplant it by something new, no matter how impracticable or premature, nay, even obnoxious, it might be in other respects. The real Japan seemed at one time as though it were to be ground to powder between these two millstones. It required regulating in the same fashion that an experienced engineer harmonizes negative and positive forces, and regulates the proper motive power of an electric car. The task was not an easy one, but we have done

pretty well so far, and the outcome is the Japan of to-day. There remain, however, many more difficulties to be overcome, though we are doing our best to surmount them. The reform we have so far accomplished, we are told, is a cause of displeasure to some Occidentals, but our effort is sincere. We demand that in the face of Supreme Heaven justice shall be done, and that our little merits, as well as our great demerits, shall be fairly recognized.

## CHAPTER XIII

### HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR: RULER AND POET

### I

MIKADO is the title generally given by foreigners to our Emperor, and without doubt it is a Japanese term, but in Japan as a title of his Imperial Majesty the word is not commonly used. He is called ordinarily Tenno Heika, "Tenno" being the Japanese equivalent of Emperor, and "Heika" of the English phrase "his Majesty." The title employed in State papers to designate the ruler of the country is Kwotei, which also signifies Emperor. The personal name of his Majesty is Mutsuhito.

There is one circumstance here which may strike foreigners as strange, and that is that the Emperor has no family name as European monarchs have, such as Romanoff, Hapsburg, or Hohenzollern. This arises from the fact that the family to which he belongs has reigned over the country of Japan from time immemorial—that is to say, from a date before any distinctive names of families became necessary. It must not be forgotten that in Europe, as well as in Japan, family names are comparatively modern, and mark the post-tribal period of national evolution.

The Emperor of Japan came to the throne thirty-eight years ago, or, to put it more precisely on February 13, 1867. It was at the time when the old régime of the dual Government was abolished. Every one probably knows that the present Japanese era, which dates back from 1867, is known as the Meiji era, which means the era of enlightened administration. "Meiji" is the name given to all the years of the Emperor's reign, the fourth year of his reign, for example, being known as Meiji IV, and the same holds good of any other year. In a word, as every one knows, the Mejii era is the

period in which the new Imperial régime and the progressive administration on the lines of Western enlightenment have been inaugurated, so that the Emperor's reign is exactly co-extensive with this new and noteworthy phase of Japanese history.

His father, the late Emperor, expired amid conditions of profound disturbance throughout the country; and the present Emperor was but a youth of sixteen when he succeeded to the throne, two circumstances which merit to be carefully considered, as they are of great importance in their bearing on the moulding of his Majesty's character. For example, the Emperor has even known what it is to be under fire. I mean that before his accession to the throne a desperate battle was fought in Kioto, round about the Imperial palace, so that bullets were flying in all directions over the palace buildings. From such a fact as this it is to be correctly inferred that the Emperor is not a prince who has been brought up on easy purple velvet, and thence succeeded quietly and serenely to the throne.

His Majesty has been singularly fortunate in the training which he received for his great position. In his youth he was entrusted to the care of the private family of a Court noble, with the expressed wish that he should be brought up hardily, rather than delicately; that he was not to be pampered or unduly humoured in any way. Of course he is not, as far as the scions of the Imperial House of Japan are concerned, exceptional in the manner of his bringing up. He is not a solitary instance of strict discipline during boyhood for our princes, as it has been a common practice in the past of our Imperial family, and continues to be so at the present day. The idea is, of course, that our young princes are thus saved from all danger of being spoiled.

As far as I am in a position to express an opinion, I think that the Emperor has a determined character, while being nevertheless both affable and amiable. He has a very clear mind, and is extremely studious and hard working. Consequently he is well informed on all topics.

At the time of his accession to the throne he had many able statesmen and advisers around his person. Among them there were two Court nobles whom he considered his fathers and teachers—Prince Sanjio and Prince Iwakura, the latter of whom visited Europe and America as Am-

bassador thirty-four years ago. Prince Sanjio died some sixteen years since, and Prince Iwakura about eight years previously. Under the guidance of these two great statesmen, assisted by several other able men of action and affairs, who had risen from obscurity during the turmoil of the revolution, but who were all imbued with the enlightened ideas of the West, his Imperial Majesty became thoroughly saturated with the fundamental principles of government on sound lines. In other words, his reign has been entirely enlightened by the ideal of governing the country by liberal and progressive measures. Thus he has developed the system of government in Japan from theoretical absolutism to constitutional government, by gradual and sometimes almost imperceptible stages.

It is not my province here to enumerate all the benevolent measures and reforms which have affected every branch of the national life, as they in themselves afford ample material for a large historical work extending into many volumes. I can say, however, that the Emperor is our ideal of a constitutional monarch. He is not weak-minded or weak of will, as I have already indicated above, but neither is he prone to insist on having his own way at all costs, or to endeavour to override the opinions of others, for he knows how to reconcile the demands of public opinion with the exigencies of the State. At the same time, he is not subservient to popular clamour or other pressure when in his view concession to either would not be in the best interests of the country. He devotes, it is perhaps needless to add, the most absorbed attention to every branch of State affairs.

During the day, from early in the morning till late in the afternoon, he sits always in an apartment called the study (gakumonjo), where he attends to all public business. He is acquainted, too, in detail with the affairs of the different departments, more especially with those concerned with the army and navy. It happens sometimes, so it is said, that a Minister newly appointed to his post is baffled by the questions which the Emperor puts to him, questions showing a minute knowledge of the details of departmental work. He does not simply give his sanction to a document, an Imperial ordinance, without reading it; but after carefully perusing it, he may say, "What does this mean? Is not

this clause of the ordinance in conflict with that of such and such an enactment ? "—his Majesty having a very accurate remembrance of the enactment to which he refers, so that a Minister may feel that he is a mere smatterer in the presence of one who is a specialist of a very high order.

Most newspapers of the country find their way into the precincts of the Court, and are carefully read. The Emperor himself, so it is said, personally peruses several of them, so that there is little fear of any event happening outside which does not come to his knowledge ; but he does not allow himself to be alarmed or misled by mere sensational clamour. Nor would unfounded accusations or rumours in the public Press, affecting persons in whom his Imperial Majesty reposes confidence, in any degree influence him. It is asserted that he sometimes astonishes the officials of the State with his far-reaching knowledge of things transpiring, or of events occurring among his people. It goes also without saying that he takes the keenest interest in all that is happening in all the great countries of the world ; and his sole desire seems to be to derive lessons from civilized nations in order that the State he rules may equally make progress on the lines of enlightenment.

According to our military and naval organization the Emperor is the generalissimo. He is not only regarded as the head of the army and navy by virtue of his sovereignty—that is to say, as a merely nominal head—but he is the real leader. Hence in that respect he is styled Daigensui, the supreme generalissimo. Therefore, in this regard, his Majesty considers himself as though he were actually a commissioned general, and takes most seriously his mission as military head of the State. During many centuries, when the Imperial Court lost its administrative authority and the military government of the Shogun was in the ascendant, the Imperial Court was, as every one knows, in seclusion. The Emperor had nothing to do with military affairs above other things ; but under the ancient Imperial régime, before the rise of the Shogunate, matters were different. In those days many instances may be found when troops were led by the Emperor in person, often, indeed, by the Empress, to say nothing of the princes of the royal blood. One of the greatest achievements of the new régime was the consolidation and reform of the

military system of the Empire, and the return to the ancient state of things.

Whenever there are any field manœuvres upon an exceptional scale in Japan, his Majesty personally takes part in them. He will follow or watch the movements of his troops for hours—in fact, all day long, and for several days, on horseback, or from some convenient eminence. Even when it is raining, he will do so without resorting to shelter of any kind. When I was Minister of the Interior, and had occasion to be in attendance on the Emperor, I personally saw his Majesty act in the way I have just described.

The Emperor is very fond of horses, and is one of the best riders in the Empire. One of his favourite relaxations, some years ago, was to invite large parties, consisting not only of military men but of civilians, to the Imperial gardens and see them practise horsemanship. His idea, however, in doing this was not merely to provide amusement for himself and others, but to encourage his subjects to take a keener interest in horses and horsemanship, and thus to assist the progress of horse-breeding in Japan. There is not much horse-racing in Japan. One race-meeting, which is the best of all, takes place at Negishi, in the suburbs of Yokohama, much interest being taken in this meeting by foreign residents. His Majesty patronises it, and often favours it with his presence, though he does this chiefly from his interest in horse-breeding and horsemanship.

His Majesty does not indulge in games of any sort, but he is a great poet, and his chief pastime is the composition of poems. Ordinarily, Japanese poems are very short; but it would astonish any one when he hears that his Majesty composes on an average four or five of these poems every day. Consequently, his poems are already voluminous. He is very quick in the work of composition, and his work is considered by experts to be very excellent.

I may add that the composition of poems has always been regarded in Japan as one of the accomplishments of the Imperial family, of the Court, and of the nobility. The poems thus composed by the Emperor are not made public property, excepting in the case of a limited number of them which have been composed for special public occasions; but, of course, now and then one or other of the Imperial

compositions finds its way to publicity. There is one, I remember, running thus:—

"Inishiye no
Fumi miru tabini
Omoo Kana
Onoga osamuru
Kuni wa ikanito ?"

It is quite impossible to convey in English the full poetical sense and delicate shades of feeling expressed in these lines, but the meaning is as follows:—

"Whenever I open
The ancient Books
The one thing I ponder is,
How goes it with the people I rule ?"

In the second part of this chapter I give a number of examples of his work as a poet, and the solicitude shown in those verses for the welfare of the people of which collectively he is the symbol, cannot but tend to intensify the attachment of the people to the Imperial person, and that attachment I must strongly assert is profound. This fact has been made sufficiently manifest during the course of the recently-concluded struggle with Russia. I may add that in Japan love of the State and devotion to its rulers are inseparable. With us loyalty means patriotism, and patriotism means loyalty.

Knowing what human nature is all the world over, I cannot, of course, say that our Emperor has not likes and dislikes where individuals are concerned; but it is a fact significant of much as regards his character that we never have any sign that these sentiments influence his Majesty's actions. If the exigencies of the State demand it, he does not allow his personal prepossessions for or against a man to influence him either in the selection or rejection of a statesman as his adviser and Minister. In a word, he comprehends perfectly the rôle of a constitutional monarch. There is no favouritism of men or women which he permits to influence him in the conduct of affairs of State. Such a thing is absolutely foreign to his Court; and the attitude of his Majesty on this subject is so well understood that no one, however highly placed in his regard, or however pleasing to him for personal

reasons, would dare to make that personal relationship a ground for meddling in national affairs.

At the same time his Majesty is very ready to recognize services rendered to the State. I have alluded already to the great work done for Japan by the Princes Sanjio and Iwakura. Just before the death of each of them, when his Majesty was informed of the precarious state of his valued adviser, he paid him a visit on his dying bed, thus indirectly bidding the statesman in each case an eternal farewell. This may not seem to Europeans a striking line of action; but such incidents, as far as Japanese custom in the past is concerned, have occurred very rarely indeed.

Again, Saigo the elder was a great warrior and statesman, who did very great service in the restoration of the Imperial régime, and he died as the chief of the insurgents of the Satsumo revolution. He was to all intents and purposes a revolutionary in outward seeming and appearance; but the fact is known that that trouble was rather of the nature of a civil conflict caused by the peculiar circumstances of the time. There is no question of the sincerity of Saigo's loyalty. The step he had taken was a mistaken one. The Emperor's magnanimity of mind was shown, however, in recognizing this fact, and taking account of the error of judgment. He pardoned Saigo the elder, together with many other political offenders, at the time of the promulgation of the Constitution; and some years later his Majesty gave the title of marquis to the son of Saigo in recognition of his father's services which had been rendered to the Imperial cause in those earlier days before he became a revolutionary.

The last Shogun, Keiki, was, a few years ago, created a prince—a title equivalent to that of Duke in England. Now, at the time of the overthrow of the Shogun Government, Iyesato, heir to the House of Tokugawa—not Keiki's son—Tokugawa was the family name of the Shogun—was made a peer, and subsequently created a prince. Keiki was a retired member of the Tokugawa family. He had been on the side of the troops of the Shogunate, which opposed the Imperial forces. It came, however, to the Emperor's knowledge that Keiki had personally an intense feeling of loyalty, which had saved him from going to extremes in his hostility to the restoration of the Imperial

authority. Such facts having been brought to the consideration of the Emperor, Keiki was created a peer, in spite of the circumstance that Iyesato, the heir of the Tokugawa family, was already a prince. Thus two princely houses have come into existence whose family origin is rooted in the old Shogunate. All this vividly illustrates the large-minded views which his Majesty takes of political affairs. I may here mention that Prince Iyesato Tokugawa, mentioned above, and who was first created a prince, is now President of the House of Peers of Japan. He was a student in England a little over twenty years ago, living in a very quiet style; I do not doubt that there are several Englishmen who still recollect him. He is fulfilling his duty as a nobleman under our Imperial régime, and diligently discharging his functions, not only as president of the House of Peers, but also as the Chief of the Central Association of the Nobles, an association, however, which is not political. He is, perhaps, one of the most loyal subjects of his Majesty the Emperor. Thus we can easily see that there is not the slightest unpleasant remembrance or shadow of vindictive sentiment remaining over in Japan as a consequence of the abolition of the old political system.

The faith of his Majesty is Shintoism, as is only natural to him; but he is most tolerant in matters of conscience, so far as his subjects are concerned. As regards religion generally, he has guaranteed perfect freedom of conscience by the Constitution which he promulgated gratuitously; and, as every one knows, it was under very different circumstances that the Constitutions of most countries were promulgated.

I have spoken of the intense interest taken by the Emperor in his army and navy, but of personal ambition for military achievement it is a happy circumstance that he has none whatever. He has not the slightest wish to make conquests or invade any other country, nor to enter on any needless conflict with other nations. He has no disposition to advertise himself by any ostentatious action having its base in a spirit of monarchical egotism.

He gives great encouragement, though not in a lavish manner, to all branches of art, and periodical exhibitions are held by different art associations in the capital and elsewhere. These exhibitions his Majesty and the Empress

occasionally favour with visits; and almost regularly some members of the Imperial Household are sent to purchase a number of the objects exhibited, not so much with any desire of making a large collection of these works of art as of stimulating and encouraging the artistic aspirations of his Majesty's subjects. His Majesty has grounds specially reserved for shooting game and netting ducks. He is fond of those things, but does not often indulge in them personally. He sends Court officials to do so. Some specially privileged persons—diplomatists, for instance—are often invited or permitted to join the party. They may cook and eat as much of the game on the spot as they can, and, by connivance, the persons invited may carry home a little for their families. As a rule, the game is taken to the palace and submitted to the Imperial inspection. After that, it is often distributed in the form of Imperial gifts among the high personages of the Court and State.

The cherry and chrysanthemum are two national flowers of Japan. In connexion with them his Majesty has instituted two annual social gatherings in the form of garden-parties—*Kwan-wo-kwai* ("Gathering for viewing cherry-blossoms"), and *Kwan-kiku-kwan* ("Gathering for viewing chrysanthemums")—in spring and autumn, in the Imperial gardens of Hama and Akasaka respectively. Thousands of persons of position, both men and women, are invited to them; and the Emperor, Empress, and other personages of the Court and State are present. The Corps Diplomatique are, of course, among the principal guests. The times when these parties are given are the best seasons for foreigners to visit Japan; and, moreover, persons enjoying sufficient social status in their own countries may be presented to their Majesties by the Ministers-Resident of their nationalities, so that large numbers of Europeans and Americans pay their visits to Japan annually in the cherry and chrysanthemum seasons.

I may in conclusion add a word about two private museums constructed in the gardens of the Imperial Palace in recent years entirely upon his Majesty's initiation and design. In them rare trophies, brought back from China as a result of the Sino-Japanese war and of the expedition to Pekin, are deposited. But besides these objects there are others which illustrate the bravery and devotion of our soldiers in

battle—for example, regimental flags which have been riddled with bullets, and the portraits of officers and others who have nobly sacrificed themselves for their country.

These museums have been built more with a view to preserve the memory of these soldiers and sailors, and the hard work they had undergone, than as monuments of triumph and national glory. They are not open to the public; but Government servants, officers of the army and navy, or students of colleges are allowed to visit them, by express permission.

## II [1]

FEW persons, indeed, can claim to have access to the innermost thoughts of the exalted personage who reigns in Japan at this momentous hour of her history. Fortunately for his people, the Emperor is a poet. Nothing so vividly reveals one's inner mind as poetical effusion. In Japan, it is true, the Imperial essays in this branch are but seldom made public. Nevertheless, some of those short poems that his Majesty had composed since the outbreak of the present war have found their way from time to time, into the columns of the vernacular Press, and these have enabled readers to comprehend in a measure the thoughts which fill the Imperial mind and inspire his Majesty's heart.

Japanese poems are often very short, but they have a profound depth of meaning. As Japanese pictures often delineate the depth of nature by a branch of a bamboo or one or two blossoms of a plant, so do Japanese poems try to speak out the bottom of one's heart in a few lines, leaving many accessory ideas to be imagined by the reader's mind. In the following pages I have printed some sixteen of the Emperor's effusions, with my own very imperfect translations of them into English. It is most difficult to convey in English form the nicety of diction and depth of feeling

[1] The second portion of this chapter first appeared in *The Nineteenth Century and After*, April, 1905, under the title "The Heart of the Mikado."

which distinguish Japanese poetry, and my translation is but a mere outline of the meaning—little more than a prose rendering, devoid of anything approaching the rhyme or rhythm—of the original. Had I sought the help of some one skilled in English poetry I might have evolved something that would have better pleased the Occidental ear, but the product would have been, in a way, artificial, and the crispness of expression which gives a charm to the Japanese version would have been obliterated. I have therefore ventured to follow my own plan, ineffective as I know it to be, adhering as closely as I could to the Imperial text, in the hope that it may win some favour by its simplicity and fidelity to the model.

It should perhaps be explained that poems of this class must consist, as a rule, of thirty-one syllables, neither more nor less, and the poet is therefore given no freedom as to the length of his work. Moreover, the syllables must be arranged in a given order—viz., in the first line, five; second, seven; third, five; fourth and fifth, seven each—total, thirty-one. Hence these are termed thirty-one syllable poems. (The terminal *n*, which was originally a contraction of *mu* and is pronounced distinctly, is regarded as one syllable.)

I

Yomo no umi
Mina harakara to
Omoo yo ni
Nado! nami-kaze no
Tachi-sawaguran.

*(Translation)*

Whereas I deem this as an age
Wherein the "four seas" in brotherhood are bound,
How is it that the fierce winds rage,
And dash and spread the waves around?

The "four seas" is a poetical expression signifying the whole world. There is a Chinese phrase—"The four seas in brotherhood." His Majesty sees that, despite the doctrine of universal brotherhood, the peace of the world is liable to sudden derangement by capricious rulers, and conveys a censure on those who for vanity or greed disturb the harmony of nations.

2

Kora wa mina
Ikusa no niwa ni
Idehatete
Okina ya hitori
Yamada moruran.

(*Translation*)

I suppose all sons to the front are gone,
To do their duty all under arms,
And their old sire at home alone
Guards and watches their lonely farms.

Here we have the evidence of the sovereign's sympathy with a rustic household. The younger men have gone to fight for the country; their aged sire keeps watch alone over their humble possessions. The allusion betrays the infinite tenderness of the Emperor for those who put duty to country and ruler before everything.

3

Yume samete
Mazu koso omoye
Ikusa-bito
Mukaishi kata no
Tayori ikani to.

(*Translation*)

Each time from sleep I awake,
One thought comes up at once to me,
How matters go there, where is gone
So many a warrior for my sake.

This perfectly expresses the Imperial solicitude for the troops at the front, fighting for their revered sovereign.

4

Chibaya furu
Kami no kokoro ni
Kanooran
Waga kuni-tami no
Tsukusu makoto wa.

(*Translation*)

The Power above, so stern and just,
Gladly approves, as I dare think,
The sweet sincereness of my people,
So earnest their devoir to do.

Thus does his Majesty show his appreciation of his people's loyalty and patriotism.

5

Kuni no tame
Ada nasu ada wo
Kujiku tomo
Itsukushimu beki
Koto na wasure so.

(*Translation*)

Hard as thou strikest, for thy land,
The ruthless foe that bars our path,
Forget not, at the hour of need
The mercy's way the heart dictates.

This embodies the Emperor's ideas of humanity in war.

6

Ikusa-bito
Ikanaru nobe ni
Akasuran
Ka no koye shigeku
Nareru kono yo wo.

(*Translation*)

The night it is far spent,
The insects keep a glowing hum,
In what unsheltered places now
My soldiers do they spend their night?

In the oppressive atmosphere of the summer night the Emperor's thoughts are for his wearied soldiers bivouacked on some battle plain.

7

Matsuri-goto
Idete kiku ma wa
Kaku bakari
Atsuki hi nari to
Omowazarishi wo.

(*Translation*)

This day, when deep in things of state,
The things that I am bound to do,
Little did it occur to me
How very hot the day had grown.

This is an Imperial effusion on a summer day after he had attended State affairs. We may gather from it how, in his

eagerness to fulfil his duties, his Majesty becomes oblivious of the summer's burdensome heat. The idea may be quite Oriental, and yet we can perceive a delicate poetical feeling out of a simple matter of fact which in an ordinary sense would have no poetry in it.

8

Tsuwamono no
Kokoro to tomo ni
Noru koma mo
Tsukaruru shirade
Iya susumuran.

(*Translation*)

In strictest bond, we may be sure,
With his undaunted rider's mind,
The soldier's steed still charges on
And knows not or fatigue or fear.

A graceful recognition of the sympathy existing between horse and rider.

9

Kuni no tame
Taoreshi hito wo
Oshimu ni mo
Omoo wa oya no
Kokoro nari keri.

(*Translation*)

Even as I silently lament
For those who for their country fall,
I stop, and can but ask myself,
What do their fathers and mothers feel?

Another example of the Emperor's tender solicitude for his people.

10

Hashi-i shite
Tsuki miru hodo mo
Tatakai no
Niwa no arisama
Omoi yari tsutsu.

(*Translation*)

Even while seated in my balcony,
I gaze at Luna shining bright,
My thoughts carry me far away
To the scene where battles rage.

This shows that even while his Majesty, sitting casually at the front of a balcony amid the most peaceful surroundings, gazes at the moon, he cannot forget that his troops are waging warfare for the country, and he cannot fail contemplatively to imagine the state of the battlefield. Perhaps his men may be advancing against the enemy's impregnable forts, or perhaps the moon's light may be pathetically reflecting on those men who might have fallen in the field, or perhaps ambulance companies may be conveying the sick and wounded, or the troops may be innocently and joyously gazing at the moon from an eminence which they have just captured. All these scenes are suggestive of the Imperial imagination ; and these are to be imagined by the reader.

11

Kuni wo omoo
Michi ni futatsu wa
Nakari keri
Ikusa no niwa ni
Tatsu mo tatanu mo !

(*Translation*)

Some may stand on the battlefield,
And some—God wot—may stay at home,
But all the souls that love their land
Are all the same where'er they be.

A man may be a patriot though not called on to serve his country in the field ; and thus his Majesty expresses herein his apppreciation of the patriotic feeling of his people at large.

12

Masurao ni
Hata wo sazukete
Omoo kana
Hinomoto no na wo
Kagayakasu beku !

(*Translation*)

When from my trusting hand the flag
Is given unto my faithful men
My heart mounts high ; the rising sun
Will surely bring it fame and light.

This is an effusion when, or immediately after, his Majesty has given a military banner, regimental or otherwise to the

officers of the Imperial army. The fact that the emblem of our flag is the rising sun suggested to his Majesty that the fame of the "Land of the Rising Sun" might shine as brightly as the rising sun itself through the brave and indomitable actions of the men going to the front under that flag.

13

Shizuka ni mo
Yo wa osamarite
Yorokobi no
Sakazuki agen
Toki zo mataruru!

(*Translation*)

O for that time when joys of peace
Shall fill again a peaceful world!
Then shall I lift the wine cup high,
O for that time, I long for it!

This is an Imperial effusion over a wine-cup. It was inevitable that Japan should engage in the present war, but the Emperor is a sincere advocate of peace. A monarch may describe himself to be such, not being so in practice, but the Emperor of Japan is very different. He does not care to wage war for simple purposes of aggression, or at least from wanton motives. He is anxious to see the peace of the world at large restored in the due course of events, when the "four seas," as he says elsewhere, may be truly bound in brotherhood.

14

Tsuwamono no
Kate mo magusa mo
Hakoburan
Ushi mo ikusa no
Michi ni tsukayete!

(*Translation*)

Food for my men
And fodder for their steeds;
In carrying ungrudgingly
Even the oxen in warfare serve.

The Emperor here realizes that the humblest play their part, even the oxen, in the service of the State.

15

Kuni no tame
Furuishi fude no
Inochi-ge no
Ato koso nokore
Yorozu yo made ni !

*(Translation)*

The traces left by "life-hairs" of pens
That were handled by patriotic hands
Shall endure for thousands and thousands of years,
Remembered and admired ever afresh.

This refers to the Japanese brush-pens. "Inochi-ge," literally, "life-hairs," is the name given to the point of the brush that forms the Japanese pen. There are many writings left by patriots from the time gone by, and also during the present war countless effusions, poetical or otherwise, have been left by soldiers and sailors who fell on the field. It is not plain from the wording what are the kinds of writing referred to by the Emperor, but the allusion seem to apply in general to all writings of the kind.

16

Inishiye no
Fumi miru tabi ni
Omoo kana
Ono ga osamuru
Kuni wa ikani to !

*(Translation)*

Whenever I open
The ancient Books,
The one thing I ponder is,
How goes it with the people I rule ?

The last poem is one composed by his Majesty years ago. It aptly conveys an idea of his career as a true sovereign. If a book speaks of any prosperous Administration full of instruction, it can, of course, be an important guidance for a sovereign to follow the example. If, on the other hand, it speaks of a bad Government or the misery of a people caused by any negligence of the ruler, it can give a negative lesson to a sovereign, whose duty it is to look after the welfare of his subjects. And so the Emperor thinks of the people he rules whenever he peruses any books of the time gone by ; and thus he gives the bent of his thoughts in these lines.

Here, then, we get some outline of the process of thought in the Emperor's soul. In writing this I have not the least idea of glorifying my sovereign. All that I purport to show is that he is as benign and humane as any monarch can be, though at the same time he is equal to the task of vindicating the right of the country so far as it is necessary. I may also add that the sentiments expressed in these Imperial verses pervade the hearts of the great majority of the Japanese people; and yet our opponents constantly accuse us of being in some sort unworthy of sharing the civilization of the Western nations, and even go so far as to stigmatize us as being "savage" and "wild"—as has been done quite recently by no less a person than Count Tolstoy, the son of the eminent Russian noble and philanthropist. Whether or not such accusations are mere ignorant calumnies I leave to my readers to judge.

# BOOK III

# Some External Relations

# CHAPTER I

## CHINESE EXPANSION HISTORICALLY REVIEWED[1]

### I

### General Survey

LOOKING at a map of the world, one will at once see how vast is the Chinese Empire. There was a time when it was even more vast than at present. The expansion of China is an important subject in history, but its limit was reached long ago. How that expansion was brought about and how that limit was reached is a matter which it might interest many of us to know.

I will not go back to the remotest periods, or seek to make any ethnological investigations as to the races that originally occupied the regions which have come under the sovereignty of China, or which, at least, have been included in the sphere of her influence; for were we to do so, we might find there was a time when both Mongolians and Chinese belonged to the same race; or, if we were to go farther back still, it might appear that both these and many other peoples living quite outside Chinese influence originally belonged to the same stock. But these connexions are too remote and obscure, and have no important bearing on the proposition I am about to make. It is sufficient for my purpose to trace the growth of the Chinese Empire within the limits of the records which we possess—chiefly in the literature of China itself—and that, too, of a very appreciable antiquity.

It is a well-known fact that China is one of the most ancient countries of the world. The Chow dynasty ruled in the period when we begin to find reliable records, and

[1] A paper read at the Central Asian Society January 11, 1905.

the beginning of that dynasty dates back twelve centuries B.C. The period preceding that dynasty had been a very long one, but of it we have no reliable records. It is mainly regarded as the legendary state of Chinese history ; and yet there are some records relating to twenty-three centuries B.C. There is good foundation, moreover, for believing those documents to be genuine records, from the mathematical calculations made by many experts in such matters, relating to astronomical events recorded in those documents, and which all go to confirm their accuracy.

In studying the old documents and history of China, the heart of China in the earliest period is seen to have been located somewhere far up the river Hoang-ho. Those who have studied the evolution of the alphabet tell us that the Hoang-ho is one of three remarkable rivers on the banks of which the three original systems of recording impressions were invented—the Egyptian writing on the Nile, the Cuneiform beside the streams of Mesopotamia, and the Chinese on the Hoang-ho—and that the hundreds of existing systems of writing now in use are really derivatives of these three, however varied and modified they may be.

The area of the original centre of China was very limited, but its sphere of influence and activity gradually spread, generation after generation, as its civilization developed and extended to the surrounding regions. This extension was carried on with but little intermission through successive centuries, until at last a vast Empire, more or less compact, had arisen from the agglomeration. The one peculiarity of this extension is that, roughly speaking, it has not been the result of aggressive conquest. China has always been on the defensive, and it is the surrounding peoples who have always assumed the offensive against her. The conquests China has made have in reality been the effect of the influence of her civilization. Neighbouring peoples came and attacked China, but they soon were amalgamated with the Chinese through the influence of the latter's civilization, and then became sinicized. There was always a marked difference of degree between the civilization of the inhabitants of the centre of China and that of her neighbours, so that the moment the latter came in contact with the Chinese they discovered their inferiority, and whatever sort of primitive civilization they might have had amongst themselves was

soon eclipsed by the higher Chinese civilization, and they became Chinese.

The fact that China has no proper and permanent name for herself, except the names of the successive dynasties, goes a long way to explain this state of things. Such terms as the " Central Flowery Land," or the " Middle Land," are no more than mere fanciful appellations, and the very term China is only a name by which she came to be called by outsiders. There is some resemblance between the romanization of Europe and the sinization of Eastern Asia, but the nature of the process, as well as the ultimate results achieved, was very different.

We know that in Tibet letters were imported only early in the seventh century A.D. In Mongolia letters were introduced only in the middle of the thirteenth century A.D., and in Manchuria several centuries afterwards. All this marks the great difference that existed in the degree of civilization between these peoples and the Chinese, who a long, long time before had possessed a very advanced literature of their own. Broadly speaking, the modern China Proper is that part of the Empire which is bounded by the Great Wall in the north, and excludes Central Asia and Tibet on the west and Cochin China on the south. But for many centuries in the Chinese history this so-called China Proper was not one compact nation, because even in the time of the Chow dynasty neither the part which surrounds Peking on the north, nor the regions around Kansu, nor, above all, the regions which are situated south of the Yang-tse river, nor even some zones on the left bank of that river, were strictly regarded as China Proper. They were then included in the general category of the " land of the barbarians." All the characters in Chinese representing them in generic form are to be translated as "barbarians," and the Chinese themselves also understood them in that sense from very early, if not actually from the earliest times.

Originally those characters had probably a less pronounced meaning. Perhaps they meant people outside their own civilization, or perhaps some of the characters only represented the names of the tribes. Even if this was so, the fact that the people living in those regions were not to be regarded as belonging to the same community as the Chinese is most plain from ancient records. Nevertheless, in those surrounding regions there arose several compact communities, which after-

wards became kingdoms, though no recognition of their status as kingdoms was ever made by China. For instance, toward the latter part of the Chow dynasty there arose on the banks of the Yang-tse a large community called "Chu." It was to all intents and purposes a kingdom, and, as a matter of fact, the chief of that community was called a King among his own people, though the word "King" did not necessarily mean an independent Sovereign of an independent State. But that chief was only styled a Baron by the Court of Chow, "Baron" being the lowest of five classes of titles by which the heads of different principalities were privileged to be called.

The Chow dynasty arose, according to the ordinary chronicles, in the latter part of the twelfth century B.C., and came to an end in the middle of the third century B.C. Under the Chow dynasty many principalities came into existence, both within and without what was then the heart of China. The authority of the Central Government appears not to have been thoroughly exercised; but from the fact that such principalities existed, the political system of the Empire may be called a feudal system, though the system cannot be said to have been identical with that which existed in Europe.

There are many documentary records to show that the original Chow dynasty had much trouble in its earlier years from barbarians on its western borders, localities which are situated within the boundaries of modern China Proper. The dynasty was exterminated by these barbarians in the earlier part of the eighth century B.C., the last Emperor of its line having been murdered by them. The Eastern Chow succeeded, but the Imperial authority was significantly on the wane. The whole period of the Eastern Chow dynasty is divided into two, the earlier part being called the "Spring and Autumn Period," because that period corresponds roughly with the period which is covered by the chronicle of the "Spring and Autumn" (Chun-chu), edited by Confucius; and the latter part is called the "Fighting States Period": (Chan-kue), because it was a time when China was split up between different States, and fighting was continually going on between them.

From the point of view of intellectual cultivation, the latter part of the "Spring and Autumn Period" and the

"Fighting States Period" are the most brilliant epochs of Chinese history, because, as we see, in those days all sorts of mental activity were manifested in China. Not only from the scholastic and philosophical point of view, but also from a military point of view, that period gave to China guiding principles for the benefit of all posterity. During the fighting period the various minor principalities became swallowed up by the mightier ones, until at last China was unified under Chin. The Eastern Chow, which had had an existence only in name for centuries had been totally extinguished some thirty years before. It is to be noticed that Chin and Chu themselves had been regarded in former times as barbarians, but their power obtained supreme recognition during the "Spring and Autumn Period," as well as in the "Fighting States Period."

Roughly speaking, the unification of the Empire under the Chin dynasty comprised the modern China Proper. The Chin dynasty was a powerful one, and its founder was one of the strongest rulers of China. It is even presumed that the name "China," which has come to denote the Empire of China, was first derived from the name of this dynasty. Its founder abolished the feudal system, and divided the Empire into districts, which were governed by State deputies, and not by hereditary princes. Yet, strong as this dynasty was, it was gravely harassed by the invasions of the barbarians from the north. It was then that the great General Mung-tien was dispatched with 300,000 men to fight the northern barbarians, and constructed defensive works to repel their advance, which resulted in that signal wonder of the world, the Great Wall of China. Even that powerful dynasty never thought of extending its dominions toward the north; its only object was to prevent outsiders from coming south. The Chin dynasty, which its founder hoped to maintain for many generations—inasmuch as he called himself Chin-huang-ti, meaning the first Emperor, and decreed that all his successors should be known by their cardinal numbers in due rotation—came to an end soon after his death; and one of the chief causes of this was the exhaustion of the power of the Empire and the discontent of the people at large on account of the tremendous sacrifices and labour involved in the building of the famous Great Wall.

Under the Han dynasty that followed—*i.e.* from the end of the third century B.C. until the third century A.D.—the history of China, though containing some brilliant records of internal development is mainly the story of continual struggles against the northern barbarians—great expeditions and often great reverses and humiliations. We read of a great emperor himself being besieged by them, and only escaping from being made a prisoner by enormous bribery. Whole armies suffered defeat, and, with their generals, were taken prisoners. Imperial messengers were kept in detention, and there is a sad story of a Court lady, described as a princess, being surrendered in marriage to a barbarian chieftain. Giving treasure in the shape of bribes, or handing over a princess in marriage, were methods of pacifying the barbarians which grew very common in all the later periods.

The northern barbarians whom I have described above were chiefly those called "Hung-nu" by the Chinese and "Huns" by Western writers. Their detailed history is not known; but we may presume that they were not much advanced in civilization, though, compared with the modern natives living in the same locality, they had more courage, more organization, and somewhat more cohesive forces. They did not necessarily belong to one community. Sometimes there were many tribes co-existing, and sometimes one of them absorbed all, or nearly all, the others. We also find it recorded that they presently became, after having once amalgamated, divided into two sections, called the South and the North Huns. From about the middle of the Han dynasty, they appear to have turned their chief activity towards the west, and gradually to have made their way, some to India and some to lands still farther westward. From the fact that the Great Wall extended from Liautung Bay far away towards Central Asia, it seems certain that the Huns of those days occupied a very wide space of territory north and west of China.

After having passed through the troubled period of the so-called Three States epoch, China was once more unified under the Chin dynasty, but a large zone within the Great Wall passed into the hands of the northern intruders in its earlier years. This was followed by the rising of several new States, one after another, in the north and north-western parts of China, most of them being of barbarian origin. Chin

at last fell under their pressure, and was followed by the period known as the "Period of the South and North Dynasties," the latter, which were mostly of barbarian origin, being preponderant.

The North and South dynasties were unified under the Sui dynasty towards the end of the sixth century A.D. It is about this time that the barbarians known as the Tuku-Hun (a tribe in Kokonor) seem to have begun giving trouble to China, for we find a princess was given in marriage by the Sui Emperor to their chief, and later on during the same dynasty several raids are recorded to have been made by them. They appear to have occupied the borderland of modern Tibet; some think they were the same, or part of the same, people who were known a little later by the name of Tufan, who were no other than the modern Tibetans. There was trouble also with the northern barbarians, called Tu-Chueh (Turks), as well as with Korea, with which country I shall deal separately. The Sui dynasty was followed by the T'ang dynasty in the beginning of the seventh century T'ang was one of the most brilliant dynasties of China, especially as regards the earlier part of it, the second Emperor being truly a great monarch. Under him China shone with a great lustre, and yet even this dynasty was not free from much serious trouble at the hands of the barbarians. On the north the same Tu-Chueh made several raids during the reign of the first Emperor, and they were repeated in the reign of the second Emperor. It was only by the strenuous efforts of the second Emperor that victory was in some measure achieved. At, first a temporary peace was bought by the humiliating method of giving a princess in marriage to the chief of the barbarians, as well as much treasure. On the west also the Tufans gave much trouble; so did also the Wuigur, a neighbouring tribe of the Tufans. The locality of the Tufans' habitation in those days was in the main the same as modern Tibet; perhaps it may have extended somewhat more towards the Chinese boundary. Great Sovereign as the second Emperor undoubtedly was, and brilliant and prosperous as China had at that time become under the new dynasty, even he at last thought it best to make peace with the invaders. The Tibet of those days was ruled as a kingdom, the name of its Chief or King being Sron-btsan-sgampo. He seems to have been a shrewd

and able man. To him the Emperor gave a princess to wed, and in allying him to his house concluded a peace.

The T'ang dynasty, as we have seen, had much trouble in the west, but it had still more on the north-west and north. The barbarians thence made repeated and sanguinary raids. The earlier of these hordes were designated the Tu-Chueh, but the later ones were known by the name of Kittan. Both of them were probably offshoots of the Huns. It seems that the Tu-Chueh grew in strength as the earlier Huns migrated westwards, and then the Kittan appear in turn to have eclipsed them. We see it recorded during this time that well-known Chinese generals were dispatched to fight these barbarians, and also that a statesman of high repute was dispatched as Imperial Ambassador to make peace, only to be detained and murdered.

After the T'ang dynasty came the Period of the Five Dynasties, during the first part of the tenth century. Three out of these five dynasties were of barbarian origin, they having been founded by men who sprang from some regions outside the Great Wall, though they seem to have been already much sinicized. It was at this time that Kittan, which had arisen in Manchuria, rapidly grew into a mighty Power. As a matter of fact, Cathay, by which the Westerners of the Middle Ages called China, or Kitaiski, by which the Russians do the same, seems to have been no other than a corruption of Kittan. Its Chief adopted the title of Emperor, and called the dynasty the Great Liau, the Liau being the same as the Chinese character for Liau, in Liautung. It rose in power rapidly, and before the Period of the Five Dynasties came to an end it had expanded right up to the Great Wall, and, moreover, a large portion within the Great Wall had been ceded to it by one of the Five Dynasties. The last of the Five Dynasties was succeeded by the Sung dynasty, which commenced a little after the middle of the tenth century and ended in the early part of the twelfth century A.D.

During the Sung dynasty the Kittan—i.e., Liau—grew stronger, and became a source of constant uneasiness and danger to China. The dominion of Liau extended from the north to well inside the Great Wall, comprising the regions belonging to modern Pechihli, or even more. It was to all intents and purposes a well-organized empire.

It lasted over one hundred years, having had ten emperors in succession. Side by side with it there arose another mighty power, called the Kin, from the shores of the Japan sea. It fought hard against the Liau, and it at last destroyed them in the earlier part of the twelfth century, and then having made itself master of the territories occupied by the Liau, it fought against China. In a short time it overran the northern part of China; the last two Emperors of Sung were taken prisoners in quick succession, and both were carried into the interior of Manchuria, and kept in custody in a castle called Wukuocheng, where they ultimately died. Thus the Sung dynasty came to an end.

Yet another empire, with the name of Hia, had arisen in the region adjoining the western part of the Great Wall, also giving much trouble to the Sung dynasty, whilst the Cochins raided in the south. On the fall of the Sung dynasty, the Southern Sung dynasty established itself in the south of China. But Kin had become a great Chinese power. It was no longer a northern barbarian State. In many senses it may be said to have become a real Chinese dynasty. But even while Kin was contesting in China Proper with the Southern Sung dynasty, there arose behind Kin yet another Power in the north from the banks of the Onon, in the modern Transbaikal province of Russia, which was no other than the mighty Mongolian Empire, under the leadership of the great Genghiskhan. Thus the Kin had an enemy both in the front and in the rear—the decaying but still active Chinese dynasty in its front, and the Mongolians at its back. Kin was finally destroyed by the Mongolians in 1234, having lasted 180 years, with ten emperors in succession. It now became a struggle between the Mongolians and the Southern Sung dynasty. Towards the latter part of the thirteenth century the Southern Sung dynasty was finally destroyed by the Mongolians, who at last came to govern the whole of China under Kublaikhan, grandson of Genghiskhan, and the dynasty was named Yuen.

The Yuen dynasty lasted until a little after the middle of the fourteenth century. Whilst their relatives and old compatriots were still doing great things in other directions, the Mongolians, who had established the Yuen dynasty in China, adapted themselves to the ways of China, and adopted all Chinese institutions as their own, except that

they introduced the Lamaism of Tibet, not only into Mongolia, but also into China, which did more harm than good to the Imperial cause. Powerful as the dynasty was at first, it failed to become a firmly consolidated empire, and in the earlier part of the fourteenth century much discontent manifested itself among the people, and the Empire fell again upon evil days, until at last its place was taken by the Ming dynasty, a little before the middle of the fourteenth century. The Ming dynasty reigned in China until the middle of the seventeenth century, after which the prestige of their rule was only maintained by Kokusenya (Coxinga), a loyal subject of the Ming dynasty and half Japanese, who established a kingdom in Formosa, still paying allegiance to the memory of the late Ming dynasty, and setting the new Tartar dynasty for some time at defiance. The Ming dynasty was a weak one, and it suffered all along the eastern coasts from a succession of so-called Japanese attacks, though they were in no sense authorized Japanese forces that ravaged the Chinese shores; but they were very powerful, and it seems that many Chinese subjects joined them. The blow inflicted on the Ming dynasty was a dangerous one; so also was the invasion of Korea by the Japanese troops of Hideyoshi, as the Mings cast in their lot with Korea. Above all, there arose the Tartar dynasty of Manchuria. This Tartar dynasty originated somewhere in Manchuria at a place called Odoli, and grew in power in the same fashion as the Liau and Kin had done. Having made repeated attacks on China, it at last destroyed the Ming dynasty, and subjugated the whole of China under its yoke; it is the present ruling dynasty of China, and the name of this dynasty is Tsing.

I may here mention that the Liau made Peking its chief capital, and so did the Kin. The Ming dynasty, which was a proper Chinese dynasty hailing from the south, also kept its Court mostly at Peking, though Nanking was also its capital. The present dynasty, as every one knows, removed its capital from Manchuria to Peking, and thus Peking, although situated in a region which in ancient times was only a barbarian country, has become the great centre of China, and one of the largest capitals of the world; and I need not say that the present dynasty has entirely adopted the Chinese notions of civilization and all Chinese institutions, though

some precautions are taken to maintain Manchurian influence in every public department. This was only natural, because the degree of Tartar civilization seems to have been very low, and one thing is certain—namely, that through amalgamation with China the Tartar nation has almost lost its distinctive existence.

On the western side, towards Central Asia and Tibet, Chinese influence was gradually extended, especially under the Mongolian dynasty, and later on under the Tartar dynasty. On the south, Tonking, Annam, Siam, and Burmah, also came to be influenced by China, more especially under the Mongolian and the Tartar dynasties. But in all these places China's influence has been of a loose nature, and not permanent or preponderant. The limit of her expansion was reached long ago, and for some time past it has been decidedly and rapidly waning, as I shall hereafter show.

## II

### KOREAN PENINSULA AND MANCHURIA

I WOULD now invite your attention to the Korean peninsula, the Liautung peninsula, Manchuria, and Siberia. Amongst these territories the Korean peninsula seems at one time to have attained in its civilization a degree far superior to other regions in the northern as well as western and southern boundaries of China.

The Korean peninsula has formed for centuries a compact kingdom, having a well-defined boundary on the north, in the same shape as it has now; but one must not think that it has always been so. The first mention made in Chinese history of the peninsula is at the beginning of the Chow dynasty—i.e., the eleventh century B.C., when it was known by the name of Chowsen. The first emperor of that dynasty is reported to have sent Kitsu, a wise man and an uncle of the last emperor of the preceding dynasty, to that region, and empowered him to rule it as king. His descendants continued to exercise the same prerogatives down to the

beginning of the second century B.C., when the Ki family is reported to have been put an end to, and another Chowsen kingdom was established.

It is impossible to define the exact area of the region which was comprised within the compass of Chowsen, either in its earlier stage or in the later one, but the most trustworthy views are that it extended on the north far into the interior towards the Liau river, or that it was gradually extended so far, and that at one time it included the modern Yingkow. And this seems the more likely to be true, inasmuch as the heads of Kau-ku-li some time later received from China on one or two occasions the title of Prince of Liautung. But on the south it does not appear to have reached much beyond the Tatung river, on which the modern Pingyang is situated. According to the Korean account, Kitsu established his capital at Pingyang. The Koreans credit Kitsu with having initiated everything in the direction of civilization, and revere him accordingly. His tomb is to be seen in Pingyang, and it is still reverently preserved by the Koreans. That tomb, however, is said to have been discovered after much research by the founder of a later Korean dynasty—namely, Kau-li—at the beginning of the twelfth century A.D. We cannot, therefore, state how far the early history is exact, but there is no ground to doubt its general accuracy. The second Chowsen kingdom was destroyed by China at the end of the second century B.C., in the reign of the fifth and very able Emperor of the Han dynasty. In the meantime, in the southern part of the peninsula several kingdoms came into existence. In the north, where was situated the former Chowsen kingdom, another kingdom sprang into prominence, named Kau-ku-li. There were many vicissitudes among the southern kingdoms, but they were generally three in number.

With all these kingdoms, more especially the southern ones, Japan had frequent connexion in the early centuries of the Christian era, and the intercourse became much more extended and its effects multiplied in the sixth and seventh centuries. It would be idle for me here to recite the whole history of our relationship with these kingdoms, but I may sum it up by saying that Japan's historical interest in Korea is of very ancient date. At one time intruders from the Korean peninsula infested Kiushiu,

and the Japanese delivered vigorous counter-attacks on the peninsula in order to repress them at their bases, and so secure permanent peace. Again, at one time Japan derived her civilization from China chiefly through Korea, as the Japanese went there and their people came to Japan for purposes of study and the acquisition of learning. There was, it is important to note, a period when one or other of these kingdoms was directly under Japanese rule, Japan having her government establishments on the continent for the purpose.

At the beginning of the seventh century A.D. some complications arose between the Sui dynasty of China and Kau-ku-li, and the former sent expeditions against the latter; the Chinese emperor once commanded in person, but the expedition proved an entire failure.

Toward the latter part of the reign of the great second emperor of the T'ang dynasty of China another expedition against Kau-ku-li was undertaken by China, the origin of which is reported to have been that one of the southern kingdoms was menaced by Kau-ku-li and asked China's help. That expedition also did not prove successful, but in the reign of the next emperor Kau-ku-li was destroyed by the combined effort of China and one of the southern kingdoms above mentioned. Kau-ku-li changed its capital several times, but Pingyang and Kiu-lien-cheng were in their turn the two principal seats of government.

In the beginning of the tenth century A.D. another kingdom, called Kau-li, arose on the old ruins of Kau-ku-li. This is the origin of the name Korea, by which the peninsular kingdom came to be known to the nations of the West. The Chinese characters which represent *Kau-li* and the *Kau* and *li* of Kau-ku-li are identical; hence they are often confused even in Oriental books, but the terms are quite distinct from one another, although Kau-li might possibly have been taken in the first place from Kau-ku-li. The whole Korean peninsula was unified by Kau-li in the earlier part of the tenth century A.D.

The kingdom of Kau-li came to an end towards the end of the fourteenth century, and was replaced by another which revived in itself the ancient name of Chowsen. This latter is the present reigning family of Korea. It seems that the region north of the Yalu was lost to Korea in the latter

days of Kau-ku-li, when that kingdom came to an end, and its territory was divided between Shinlo and China. Korea has never regained it; on the contrary, she always had on the north to struggle from time to time with powerful opponents who arose in the regions of Manchuria, and to these in the end she had necessarily to submit.

As to the general relationship between China Proper and the Korean peninsula, it seems that the latter had usually a leaning towards the former, excepting in regard to her close connexion with Japan. It was only natural that this should be so, because Korea's civilization was also derived from China, and that, too, as I said before, in even a greater degree than other regions that were close to China; hence they felt a natural deference to China.

Nevertheless, Korea had occasional troubles with China, and this was especially the case with its northern part—i.e. the kingdom of Kau-ku-li. These troubles, however, cannot be attributed to any agressive ambition of the Chinese, for their causes and circumstances as a rule proved the exact opposite. At the worst, the decision of China in each case was arrived at more for the sake of restoring her damaged prestige than with any idea of accomplishing territorial expansion.

As to the regions farther to the north—that is to say, modern Manchuria and the maritime provinces of Siberia—we do not know much about them; but, as I have shown already, the Huns seem to have been living there in the Chin and Han dynasties, and were even then a very strong combination. But the exact boundaries which they had under their sway are not known, except that their dominion seems to have extended from Manchuria far to the west. The parts of the region surrounding Yingkow and Liau-yang from time to time belonged to China, but no permanent hold was maintained.

In the north (in the regions of the modern maritime provinces and Harbin) there were two great hordes of Machieh. The southern one of these is said to have gradually extended far into Southern Manchuria. In the beginning of the eighth century we see there was a principality called Pohai; that principality is said to have been identical with the Southern Machieh. The name is very often mentioned in Japanese history, Japan having now and then had some deal-

ings with it. The modern Liautung Bay is sometimes called Pohai Bay, and this would imply that the principality had extended to the coast of that bay. It seems to have formed a regular State, but it also, after the lapse of some centuries, disappeared into oblivion.

There was another State, which was sometimes known as Shushen, sometimes Nuchen, and sometimes Nuchih. It was probably situated in or near the part of Siberia which is called the Maritime Province. This State afterwards actually developed into the Kin dynasty of China. We see in history several other names having some connexion with these regions—that is to say, modern Manchuria and the maritime province of Siberia—but it is almost impossible to make accurate statements about them. It appears that in many cases one and the same region belonged in succession to different tribal associations, some of which gradually became very powerful forces, as we have already seen in such cases as those of Liau and Kin. We must also note that not only did the inhabitants of these regions come into close contact with the Chinese, but they also had much fighting amongst themselves, as well as against some of the Powers which properly belonged to the Korean peninsula.

On the whole, however, I can safely say that China has never had any secure hold of Korea, even in recent centuries. True it is that China claimed a sort of suzerainty over Korea, but on the part of Korea there was as much respect and deference paid by her to her eastern neighbour as was paid to China, and in a manner that was almost identical. Then, what has taken place within the last few decades is known to every one. As to Manchuria, apart from dynastic reasons, that country has remained one of the weakest links in the Chinese Empire, as I shall presently be able to demonstrate, so that in this direction also the potentiality of China's expansion long ago reached its uttermost limit.

## III

### CONCLUSION

I HAVE now given the essential points of Chinese expansion. What I have said will, I hope, be sufficient to give a fair idea of the subject under our consideration. We have seen that the rough outline of modern China Proper was formed very early. Within these limits there are, of course, some differences of degree in the way of civilization. Progress was slower on the west and south-western sides than elsewhere; in fact, on the south-western side traces of the earlier barbarian tribes are very clearly recognizable even to this day.

But, roughly speaking, China Proper has become a huge nation. It is true that, owing to the fact that the distance from one end of the country to the other is so vast, the inhabitants do not orally understand each other (except those who speak the Mandarin tongue); but their written language is the same, and their thoughts, ideas, customs, and manners have all become almost identical. It must not, however, be imagined that this was so from the beginning, because, as I have shown already, the ancient China Proper was but a very small portion of the modern China Proper. It has grown to its present dimensions chiefly by the influence of its civilization. Then, again, outside China Proper we have already seen that on the south the Malay peninsula came to share to some extent the Chinese influence; and this was the case also on the west as far as Tibet (the region bordering Tibet having actually come under the Chinese rule), as well as throughout the greater part of Central Asia. Of course, these regions in turn have given trouble to China, but they ultimately had to bow their heads to China's superior civilization. But it was the north that at all times gave China the greatest anxiety—a region whence the disturbing elements of Eastern Asia have always sprung up. That there is the Great Wall on the northern side, whilst there is no such thing on the south or west, is a fact more eloquent than words. China would have been more than satisfied to make that Great Wall the outermost limit of her

northern dominions, but the peoples outside of it were of another mind.

We all know that the large domains of Mongolia and Manchuria are now supposed to form part of the Chinese Empire. Considerable parts of Siberia also at one time belonged to her, until she was deprived of them at quite a recent date by her great northern neighbour. These regions, however, were added to China, oddly enough, by those very people, who, having resolved to war with their peaceable neighbour, set out on an errand of conquest. In that errand they succeeded, but the conquerors did not convert the country they conquered to their own ideas, minds, customs, manners, or institutions; on the contrary, they were themselves converted by the conquered country, and, having imbibed Chinese ideas, it was they who extended the influence of the conquered country into their own original homes. The very fact that, whenever a barbarian State acquired some power in China, it adopted a Chinese name for its dynasty, even before it subdued China, explains much. There is a notable exception to this rule—namely, in regard to the custom of shaving the head, which was a Tartar custom, and which it was considered necessary, it seems, for political reasons, to enforce upon the conquered in the very beginning of the present Tartar dynasty.

In general, China's neighbours set out, in fact, to annex China, and it ended in their being themselves annexed, and to a great degree absorbed.

There are, it seems to me, three principal systems of civilization: the Western—i.e. the European—the Indian, and the Chinese. From the scholastic point of view, the Egyptian civilization should be counted as a fourth; but it was so remote and unique in character, and came to an end at comparatively so early an age in the world's history, that I need not concern myself with it in discussing my present theme.

Western civilization may, it appears to me, be regarded as a development of the Greek civilization, tempered by Semitic religious notions. With regard to this last system of civilization, scholars are prone to trace its descent from something much farther back—some will even discern a direct derivation from India—but it is a matter involving too much detail for consideration here, and there is no neces-

sity for me to enter upon it. And this Western system of civilization progressed almost entirely westward, until a new start was made towards the east within only very recent times.

We may therefore say that there were only two systems of civilization in the whole of Asia—that is to say, the Indian civilization in India and the Chinese civilization in the Far East. Indian civilization made no expansion toward the Far East beyond its own boundary, except in respect of Buddhism. Chinese civilization was paramount in that part of Asia which faced the Pacific Ocean. It was therefore natural that all the tribes and peoples dwelling round the centre of that Chinese civilization should have bowed to China as their elder sister, and ultimately have been fused into one nation with her. Even in the outer regions, where small States rose and fell from time to time, it was to have been expected that there should also be found a readiness to pay her much respect as the mistress of that civilization, much in the same way that different European States for many centuries reverenced Rome. Even Japan cannot claim to have been any exception to the rule, for she likewise was in the habit, in ancient times, of setting high store by Chinese civilization. There was, however, one marked difference which existed between Japan and the other smaller States bordering China on the Asiatic Continent: Japan did not scruple to avail herself of the opportunity of introducing Chinese civilization, but she always endeavoured to maintain her own individuality, partly because her people always were possessed of distinctive characteristics, and partly, perhaps, because she was able, from her insular position, to escape actual contact with Chinese political ascendency. We read in an ancient chronicle that when a letter not altogether courteous was sent to the Emperor of Japan by the Emperor of China, the Emperor of Japan wrote an answer commencing with these words: "The Emperor of the land where the sun rises addresses himself to the Emperor of the land where the sun sets."

It is recorded in a Chinese history that in the reign of the great second Emperor of T'ang an envoy was sent to Japan, where some dispute arose concerning matters of ceremony between him and the Court of Japan, as the consequence of which the envoy was obliged to return to China without

delivering the Imperial message he had been commissioned to deliver. This appears to have been due to the fact that the Chinese envoy wanted to act as though he was a messenger from a superior Power to a subordinate State—a thing which Japan would never have consented to. We have a phrase which is very common— "The Chinese intelligence and the Japanese soul." This phrase is attributed to Sugawara Michizane, a great scholar and statesman of the tenth century, who is deified. When he was ordered by the Emperor to go to China, he begged to be excused on the ground that it was not becoming in Japan to be too slavish to China by imitating her in everything. He maintained that the intelligence which was obtainable by studying Chinese was important and beneficial, but that it was also necessary to keep the old soul of Japan intact. During the T'ang dynasty of China—that is to say, in the reign of Hsuan-tsung—the envoys of Japan, of Tufan (Tibet), of Shinlo (the then most important of the Korean kingdoms), and of the Tajiks (Persian), happened to arrive in the capital almost simultaneously. There were also numerous other envoys and their suites, from different foreign lands, present at the time. On the occasion of a formal audience, which was then given for the purpose of receiving congratulations for the New Year, the first and second seats to the right of the throne were allotted to the envoys of Tufan and Japan respectively, and the first and second seats to the left to the other two envoys. To this arrangement the Japanese envoy objected, and it was at once modified, the first and second to the right being allotted to Tufan and Shinlo respectively, and the first and second to the left to Japan and the Tajiks respectively (the left from the centre is regarded by the Japanese as higher than the right, because it is the right when faced from the front). And again, when the Mongolian Emperor sent his envoys inviting Japan to submit to him, and persisted in seeking to obtain a definite answer from Japan, the Japanese statesman who was responsible for the negotiation, becoming impatient with the repeated insolence of the envoys—barbarous as the act may appear—ordered them to be beheaded. We also see it recorded in history of an earlier date that when Japan used to send envoys and students to China, the composure and dignity of those envoys were objects of admiration to the Chinese Court, so

much so that Japan came to be called by them "Kuntsu-kuo" (the country of gentlemen). All these incidents will show, in outline, what sort of position Japan always occupied with regard to China.

A close examination of the nature and characteristics and growth of Chinese civilization shows that it achieved vast expansion; but long before the advent of Western civilization in the East the limits of that expansion had been reached. On the North the Monoglian regions were incorporated with, or rather annexed to, the Chinese Empire; but the influence of Chinese civilization beyond the Great Wall was always very feeble. It may be said that its limit was practically marked by the Great Wall. Towards Central Asia also it was very weak. And, moreover, the natives of Mongolia, Manchuria, and Central Asia are no longer those of ancient times. They have not a spark of the fire and energy of the time gone by left in them On the contrary, they are perpetually hampered by the superstitious influences which have grown up with, and are nurtured by, Lamaism. If there are any Mongolians or Tartars who are still formidable, they are those who now belong to the Russian community—a fact too often overlooked by the ordinary public.

I have already alluded to the introduction of Lamaism into these regions by the Mongolians of a former period. It appears that at the time of Genghiskhan some steps had already been taken. Kublaikhan, at a later date, made a great priest of Tibet his teacher. That priest invented for him the Mongolian alphabet, founded upon Indian letters, and by its aid a large number of the Buddhist Sûtras were translated by Kublai's order into the Mongolian language by that priest and several of his compatriots and coadjutors. The work, which was a tremendous undertaking, was accomplished in the succeeding reign. When the Tartar dynasty was established in China, it too favoured Lamaism, and the course taken with reference thereto by the Mongolian dynasty was adopted by it also. Venerable priests were sent for from Tibet; Manchurian alphabets were elaborated on the basis of Indian characters, and the translation of a huge number of the Buddhist sacred books was forthwith resolved upon. Besides all this, the Lama priests, were, under both dynasties, the favoured recipients of much

patronage and distinction. From all this one can easily imagine what an immense influence Lamaism exerted in those regions. I can say with certainty the influence thus exercised sufficed to govern the mental faculties of the natives of those regions in a way that even Chinese civilization had never been able to do. Thus, on the one hand, while the modern Mongols and Manchus do not retain the old dash and spirit that distinguished them in former times, on the other, they have not been able to attain to the full height of Chinese civilization, the result being their thorough degeneration.

In Manchuria the original Tartars that still remain are only a minority of the inhabitants, the rest being chiefly immigrants from Shantung. A large proportion of the original Tartars have in one way or other penetrated into China Proper, and have there become sinicized, so that the present Manchuria is no longer the Manchuria of former days; even the Tartar language itself is said to be almost disappearing. One might have expected the Chinese, who have taken up their abode in Manchuria, to inherit some of the better qualities of the original Tartar inhabitants, but this hardly seems to be the case. Some people say that they do not even come up to the standard of their compatriots in other parts of the Chinese Empire. In a word, I can say that there is now little or no probability of any powerful people arising, as was the case centuries ago, out of these regions of Mongolia and Manchuria.

Towards Tibet the influence of Chinese civilization is blocked by the Tibetan State, where Indian influence under somewhat transformed conditions is crystallized and paramount, and that influence is stronger than that of China. If we look a little farther south, it is blocked by the Himalayas, and, still farther south, towards the Malay peninsula, it is held in check by Siam and Annam, not to say Burma, in all of which the Indian elements preponderate over those of China. Even Tonking has never been truly sinicized. Then, as to the internal condition of China, civilization arrived at a state of complete stagnation many centuries since. No statesman dares to embark on innovations, for if he were to do so his fall would be assured. Take, for example, the case of Wang-An-Shi, of the Sung dynasty. Great as he was as a statesman and scholar, he totally failed when he attempted

a radical change in the administrative and economical system, and his character is always painted in the blackest colour in consequence, not of his failure, but of his attempt. Moreover, the empire is big enough; the Chinese have no desire, nor do they perceive any necessity to extend it farther. It has never entered their minds to create any colonial possessions outside their own empire. Such things have ever been totally at variance with their ideas. The Chinese, especially the southern ones, are as a rule sagacious in commerce, and large numbers of them have gone abroad in recent years. This is due mainly to the fact that they have had little field for enterprise at home in political and kindred matters, so that they have come to exert their best faculties for pecuniary gain. Hence those who go abroad do so only for personal and material advantages, and the fact that they go abroad, even if they do so in large numbers, has no political significance.

The highest ideal of government entertained by the Chinese has always been Jen-Cheng, which may be translated as "merciful and humane administration." Theoretically, the Emperor is an autocrat, but when he becomes excessively oppressive and tyrannical the population rises against him to put an end to his dynasty, setting up a new one in its place. This has become a recognized principle, and has been morally justified through thousands of years. The natural consequence of it has been to cause individual subjects to contribute their private means as little as possible to the State; hence they have the greatest abhorrence of heavy taxes, for whatsoever causes they may be levied, and in China there is actually almost no system of taxation as a national institution, though all sorts of devices are used by the provincial officials to raise certain sums for contribution to the central Government as required by them. Hence the central Government has very little means with which to undertake any enterprising works on a grand scale. This is also one of several causes why the thought never occurs to the Chinese to organize any colonial possessions. True it is that several grand public works, such as the construction of the Great Wall and of canals, were undertaken by energetic rulers, but they were done chiefly by forced contribution of labour, and were generally unpopular, so much so, indeed, that the verdict of Chinese history is generally

rather unfavourable than favourable to those rulers who conceived and accomplished costly works of avowedly public utility.

The mass of the Chinese are not patriotic in a political sense, and in any given part of the empire but little concern is felt about the calamities that may befall other parts of the empire, even in the shape of armed aggression from outside. Their common interests are few, and the immense distances militate against solidarity of feeling. Moreover, China has always regarded herself as placed above all surrounding countries, and her notions of mankind, as interpreted by her own traditions and ancient teachings, have prevented her people from entertaining any feeling of healthy rivalry with outsiders. Her feeling with regard to dwellers beyond her borders was that it was better to placate them by conciliatory methods than to combat them by sheer force. This has been China's cosmopolitan policy, always kept in view by her rulers and expounded by her moralists.

There is a Chinese phrase to this effect: "No two suns in the heavens, and no two emperors on the earth." This simply means, however, that there ought not to be two supreme rulers in China. The Chinese mind never took into account the possibility of there being any rulers in other and remote regions of the world. Hence in China, although the country was split up into several States from time to time through the weakening of the reigning dynasty and the rising of new leaders in different parts of the empire, such conditions as these were always considered to be merely temporary and quite abnormal. People always expected that order would be restored sooner or later under the régime of one emperor. This being so, even a foreign dynasty, when it had once conquered the empire, was the real and true master of the country, to whom the allegiance of the whole empire was due. Here, again, we may perceive that there can exist in China no pure and simple patriotism. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the brotherhood or common interests of the Chinese population, loose and lukewarm as these ties perhaps are, are nevertheless so wide and in a measure so deep that it is difficult to separate altogether the different parts from one another—I mean to such an extent as obtains in Europe, where so many different and independent States co-exist side by side.

The Chinese are a nation, despite all their faults. I might compare the Chinese nation with a mass of raw cotton. It is not solid, but its different particles have their mutual cohesive power, and form a more or less compact substance. It can exert no damaging force against any other substance, from the very nature of its yielding disposition, yet it is best to leave it compact as it is, because it is more useful in that form, and, figuratively speaking, it will rest quite satisfied and content if left to itself in that way.

The limitation of Chinese expansion has become more marked since the advent of Western civilization in the Far East. China is surrounded by this new force on all sides, and her attitude is constantly one of defence. A little time ago I read in an American review an article written by a Chinese diplomatist. He made a remark somewhat in the following words :—

> Our motto is, "Do not do unto others what you would not have others do unto you," but your motto is, "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you"; in other words, we are negative, but you are positive. In consequence of this your people often force other people to do what you yourself like without inquiring whether those other people want it to be done or not. It therefore often results in your doing things against the wish of other people, and often with mischievous results.

This seems to be about the correct description of the feeling of the Chinese as against the rest of the world. China has her moral notions, which are by no means lacking in refinement. It is well for outsiders not to despise the Chinese too much, or, rather, it is desirable that they should be treated with proper consideration. If they are so treated they will always prove themselves to be a good nation with which to maintain peaceable and beneficial intercourse.

Of late there has been much talk about the Yellow Peril, or the possibility of a Pan-Asiatic combination ; this appears to me, as I have said so often elsewhere, nothing more than a senseless and mischievous agitation. How can China rise up alone, and become a source of peril in this form to the rest of mankind ? From what I have said in this paper it will be plainly seen that it is a matter of the greatest improbability. It is therefore in this respect all the more desirable that the mass of Chinese cotton be left alone. We have a proverb saying, "Even a small insect has a soul," and another saying,

"A rat in despair might bite a cat." These proverbs mean that too much persecution should not be inflicted even upon weak objects. Therefore I can say that even such peaceful people as the Chinese should not be treated without due consideration for their feelings.

As I have shown already, China has not been and is not of her own seeking an aggressive nation. It is not only so with the ruling classes—in other words, with those who conquered China and became sinicized—but with the nation itself at large, which has been imbued with the same spirit and the same ideas throughout all time, so that they have become its distinguishing and permanent attributes. The very basic principle of Chinese civilization is essentially pacific.

Looking back through the whole course of history, the Chinese rulers who dispatched well-organized counter-expeditions into the lands of the enemy were, as a rule, able and renowned emperors, such as the first and fifth emperors of the Han dynasty, the second emperor of the T'ang dynasty, and the first and second emperors of the Sui dynasty; but nevertheless they almost invariably failed in their enterprise, often suffering very serious defeats.

Hence distant expeditions came to be universally regarded by the Chinese as a curse to the empire. There is in Chinese a well-known phrase, which might be translated as the "degradation or disgrace of militarism." That phrase consists of only two words in Chinese, and represents the stigma which all rulers have for several tens of centuries been most afraid of incurring, as well as the warning which councillors of the Empire came most commonly to employ in advising their masters. Even when an expedition against Korea was mooted by the great second Emperor of T'ang, at the zenith of his splendid career, the voices of his councillors were one and all against it.

In literature, also, almost all the sentiments which have survived about China's warfare with barbarians in the form of poetry merely echo the misery and hardships entailed, and but seldom is there any glorification of war. The examples of the expeditions of earlier rulers are not to be esteemed subjects of emulation for later sovereigns. And yet if they are steadily driven into the position of a chased rat, it is not possible to guarantee that even these men of

peace may not in the end betray some sort of resentment. I may, for instance, be allowed to say here that Europeans cannot be regarded as entirely free from responsibility for the trouble which culminated in the Boxer rising some years ago.

Then, again, there are some who accuse Japan as the probable organizer of the Pan-Asiatic peril. Peace-loving as the Japanese also are, the characteristics, notions, and feelings of the Japanese and Chinese are so different that there is no possibility of their complete amalgamation in one common cause; and what is true with regard to the Chinese holds even more true with regard to other Asiatic peoples.

Japan aspires, moreover, to elevate herself to the same plane and to press onward in the same path of civilization as the countries of the West. Even in every-day matters one likes to choose good company, so as not to estrange one's best friends. Can any one imagine that Japan would like to organize a Pan-Asiatic agitation of her own seeking, in which she must take so many different peoples of Asia into her confidence and company—people with whom she has no joint interests or any community of thought and feeling? And what of the risks Japan would wantonly incur were she to dare to attempt such an enterprise in the face of the most powerful nations of the earth? Furthermore, the conditions of existence throughout the whole world are totally changed from the time when Genghis Khan or Timur (Tamerlane) performed their extraordinary exploits.

Let us view the matter from another standpoint, and I trust I shall be excused if I allow myself to be extremely candid. In Europe and on its borders there are many States, some of them well advanced, some rather backward. Would it be practicable for all these States to form themselves into one compact body in organized offensive combination against an outside Power, say America? I venture to assert that, even with the intelligence and ability of the advanced nations of Europe such a union of interests and strength would be quite impossible. How, then, could it be expected for one moment that the various peoples of the East, with their varying degrees of intelligence, their conflicting interests, and their old-standing feuds and jealousies, could ever have cohesion enough to range themselves under one banner against the powers of the Occident? And if they could do so, is it to be imagined that Japan would enter

upon so quixotic an enterprise as to place herself at the head of so unmanageable a mob? At the very first onset of a Western military force, the untrained masses would take to flight, and Japan would find herself alone, to bear the consequences of her folly. In Japan we have profited by our military studies to the extent that we comprehend the value of a thoroughly homogeneous force. Could any conceivable agglomeration of Asiatic troops be termed a homogeneous body, and could such an agglomeration be made, by any means known to man, into a compact force fit to associate with a highly trained and thoroughly experienced army such as Japan now possesses, even were she prepared to sacrifice everything for the very dubious privilege of placing herself at their head? Turn we for an instant to India. There we have an example of a vast population immeasurably more numerous than the white element which rules it, yet split up into so many States and sects and castes that combination always has been and must be completely out of the question. Has any one seriously supposed that England has to fear a peril there, such as might be conceivable were union among the many divided peoples at all possible? What is the history of the one attempt to overthrow British rule? That of its utter failure owing to lack of combined effort; of a mutiny of a comparatively small number of troops checked by the fidelity of other regiments who refused to assist in the rising, owing to personal and tribal difference and caste prejudices. Is it not notorious that these Indian races have not only no cohesion but downright antagonism, notwithstanding that they are alike subjects of a conquering nation? Is there any likelihood of these Indian natives and other Asiatic peoples being organized into a compact and united force, as some mischievous writers suggest? If this argument can fairly be applied as regards organization into an effective fighting force of the Asiatic peoples, how much stronger does it become when the matter is considered in a political sense! The peoples of the East are, some of them, politically independent; others are under the sway of one or other European Power. To combine them in a single undertaking would be a task utterly impracticable and unpromising. Japan has already cast in her lot with the Occident, and in the eyes of many Asiatics it is to be remembered the Japanese are no less "Yang-Kwai" (foreign devils) than the Occidentals.

In addition, and with the same candour as before, let me say that Japan has herself chiefly to consider. While she does not for one instant wish it to be thought that she looks down with contempt upon other Oriental nations—which she does not—they, for reasons of their own, have not chosen to accompany her along the path of progress, and actually regard her as something of an apostate. Can she by any stretch of the imagination, be suspected of a willingness to permit her own future to be jeopardized by pausing in her own advance in order to join them in what she fully realizes could only be an enterprise foredoomed to disastrous failure? Moreover, no Occidentals need imagine that Japan would particularly welcome the creation of a strong Power on the Continent of Asia in close proximity to her own shores. To me it seems that the charge of organizing a Pan-Asiatic League which is now and then brought against Japan, if taken seriously, would only be to subject her to utterly unjust persecution, quite unworthy of the civilized nations of the world. It would be like turning round upon an apt pupil whom one had one's self trained and encouraged and brought to the world's notice—rather against its own original inclinations and wishes—and that on the mere ground that the pupil belonged to a different set from one's own, and had grown a trifle more quickly and become more robust than one had expected when one first took him by the hand and led him forth into new paths.

Japan took up the cudgels in the present war with Russia, as I have elsewhere shown, and as it is by this time, I hope, perfectly understood, with no other motive than the defence of her own interests. Whenever it may come to a conclusion she will, as heretofore, seek to establish peace on a sure and sound foundation, having no objects in view that are not consistent with a pacific policy. She has sought throughout, and will continue to seek in the future, the benefits which accrue from this line of action, and it is in pursuance of these principles that she has endeavoured to associate herself with the aims and objects of Western nations. Her people cannot, if they would, change the tint of their skins, and if, after all her efforts, she is to be ostracized merely on the score of colour, she will be obliged to regard it as harsh treatment, far exceeding anything that she had a right to expect from the chivalry and en-

lightenment of the nations of the Occident. At all events, I cannot imagine what material advantage those Occidental Powers who profess to be friendly with Japan can achieve by driving her to desperation by means of those ungenerous and, let me say, unmanly accusations. When this war ends, we shall devote ourselves to the arts of peace; and I may add that we can hardly expect that, no matter in what form the present contest may terminate, circumstances will permit of our embarking upon hostilities in other directions. I can positively declare, in the name of Japan, that when this struggle reaches its conclusion she will honestly and faithfully pursue a policy of peace.

## CHAPTER II

### JAPAN AND FRANCE

### I

SOME time ago I had the pleasure of writing to an eminent French statesman a letter as follows :—

Japan has neither design nor ambition to pick a quarrel with France, still less to take possession of Indo-China. Those utterances of the deputies and many similar comments about my country remind me of a Japanese proverb which says : "Make an uncrying baby cry." The constant accusations of numerous writers and speakers seem, I am sorry to say, to have almost an appearance of being calculated to provoke us. But let me ask if this is their real meaning.

The first thing your countrymen have to perceive is the great difference which exists both historically and geographically between Korea and Indo-China as to their relative positions to my country. Japan's interests in Korea are paramount, both historically and geographically as well as commercially, but this is far from being the case with Indo-China. Besides, we recognize the desirability of preserving amicable relationship with France for many reasons, one of which is our recognition of the services which she rendered to us in the past in imbuing us with Western progressive ideas. And, moreover, Japan is a nation which is essentially pacific and instinctively avoids conflict with any other country; in other words, Japan will never wage a war without being most unwarrantably provoked. Nay more! Japan has to betake herself to internal amelioration and progress, so as to make herself worthy of an enlightened country—a work which is quite enough to pre-occupy herself at home for a long time, if for no other reason, so long as ever she can avoid external complications.

Even if France is determined purposely to irritate Japan, my country will not be easily led astray. But, *a fortiori*, if France is not

[1] The English original of an article printed in *La Revue*, February, 1905.

so determined, then all the irritating accusations appear to me to be extremely unhappy ; they would benefit neither France nor Japan.

Amongst the hostile criticisms, I have often noticed those which have been reported as to have emanated from the French Military Attaché in St. Petersburg, and published in several journals. I may assure you that such criticisms as his give us much pain in consideration of his rank and position.

If I am too outspoken, I must only beg you to excuse it, as I do so from my sincere desire that amicable relationship between my country and yours may not be disturbed by any possible misunderstanding—a sentiment which is not mine alone but is shared with me by all the Japanese at large.

This is the gist of my views as regards the relationship between France and my country. I still continue to entertain the same views, and have no reason to alter them. I will, however, try to elucidate these views more fully, and I shall be highly pleased if what I write has any effect in promoting good-will between the two nations.

## II

Before proceeding with the main point, however, I must, as we say, " cross over the nearer bridge," which has been put in my way by a recent incident, though it must have been made by this time quite clear in the mind of the public that the incident was entirely a false bogey ; I mean the publication in a French paper of the so-called confidential document alleged to have been addressed by Baron Kodama to Count Katsura. I have obtained, from curiosity, a copy of the French journal containing the document,[1] and have read it through. It is certainly very well got up as far as length and superficial appearance are concerned, but to thoughtful persons, especially to the Japanese, the fact that it is a mischievous fabrication and deliberate falsehood is perfectly apparent at a glance ; in other words, the cloven hoof is too manifest to deceive anyone for a moment. As a document, its diction, its phraseology, its style, and its notions and ideas are totally at variance with Japanese diplomacy,—not to allude to the grotesqueness of its whole

[1] The *Echo de Paris*

purport. Without entering upon the argumentative parts, I will here point out some technical errors which entirely disprove its authoritative character. To begin with, the alleged document is dated "Kelung 2nd mois de la 33rd année du Meiji." That year corresponds with 1900 A.D. At that time General Count Katsura, to whom the document is addressed as "President du Conseil des Ministres," was only a Viscount, and was himself Minister of War, and not President of the "Conseil des Ministres." Then, again, Baron Kodama had never been Minister of War, either at that time or previously. How, then, can this fact be reconciled with the statement in the document in which these words are found later on, "Mes titres d'ancien Ministre de la guerre et de conseiller particulier"? Again, how can the phrase in the alleged document "Nos Alliés Anglais," the alliance having been only concluded in 1902, be made to fit in with the date "Kelung 33 Meiji"? Besides, whatever can "conseiller particulier" mean? There is no such office as this in Japan. Then, again, in the footnote attached to the document as published in the journal, a period in the 33rd year of Meiji is given as "the spring of 1902." Now, supposing this latter year was correct, and the 33rd year of Meiji was a misprint for 35th year of Meiji, how can it be reconciled with a phrase where that year of Meiji plus another eight years is spoken of as the 41st year of Meiji? Supposing, however, this again was some sort of misprint, there are other facts which are quite irreconcilable. Baron Kodama was appointed Minister of War, in December of 1900 A.D., in addition to his office of Governor-General of Formosa, which he was then holding, and continued to serve in both capacities until April, 1902, when he was released from his Ministership of War, still retaining his office of the Governorship of Formosa. How then can he describe himself as a former (ancien) Minister of War in February of that year? The document, moreover, purports to have been despatched from Kelung in Formosa; but he was at that time staying in Tokio and not in Formosa. The Japanese Diet was in session just at the time. That session was opened on November 22, 1901, and closed on February 23, 1902, and he had naturally, as a Minister, and as the Governor-General, to attend the Diet in Tokio. Then again the allegation that the document was despatched

from Kelung is absurd. Kelung is only a seaport, where no Government office is established. But even supposing that Baron Kodama had happened to be there, and that he dispatched the document therefrom, how can one reconcile this theory with the phrase which occurs in the course of the document, in which are found these words " L'incapacité prétendue des répresentants de Sa Majesté à Kelung " ? It comes to the same thing as saying Russia is represented by her Ambassador in France at Calais instead of Paris. Then, again, the alleged document speaks about " six battaillons indigène ou même nos trois brigades mixtes." Where do such things exist ? No doubt in the French colonies such a system exists, and I daresay it may be adopted in Formosa also in the course of time ; but most positively no such things existed in Formosa either in 1900 or in 1902. Then, again, the document speaks of " Wai-Wou-Pou de Pékin " for Chinese Foreign Office, but no such office had existed before July, 1902, when it was established for the first time in the place of the Tung-li Yâmen, which was then abolished. Moreover, in that session of the Japanese Diet the *seiyukai* party stood in direct opposition to the Cabinet of which Baron Kodama was a member as Minister of War, whilst two others, *Kensei-honto* and *Kokuminto* (*Teikokuto*) leaned more towards the Government. How then can he make such a statement as the following : " Je suis étonné qu'entre ces deux partis extrêmes *mes amis* Seiyukai ne fassent pas entendu un language plus raisonable " ? The notion of interpreting " Genro " as Conseil de l'Empire, and to speak of it in the manner as shown in the document, is most inexact. The proposition, in the document, of making Fokien the base of the Japanese army for land attacks on Cochin-China shows a total ignorance of geography. Baron Kodama is one of the most intelligent statesmen of Japan, apart from his proper profession as a soldier. If a person like Kodama were such a fool as to dilate on such an absurd idea as is displayed in the alleged document there would never have been the Japan of to-day. Some time ago an eminent French statesman told me, as already mentioned elsewhere, that France understood Japan little and Russia still less, and that it was the sole cause of the present war. The fact that a French journal of good standing propagates such an idea as it

does, based on such alleged documents, with the evident intention of stirring up the good citizens of France and of inciting all other civilized nations against Japan tends to warrant me in believing what was told me by that statesman.

## III

No sensible French people will believe, I am confident, in the authenticity of the alleged document and its purport. But there seem still to be many French readers who entertain some sort of apprehension that Japan might have designs upon their colony in Indo-China. I would therefore state the exact views which we, the Japanese, hold. In a word, there is no such intention on the part of Japan whatever. Korea and Indo-China, as I have quite recently said, are on a very different footing in their relative positions with regard to Japan. In Korea we have immense interests in many ways, and cannot for a moment allow any foreign Power to predominate in that peninsula. But we have no such interests in Indo-China. Above all, the question of Indo-China is one which was decided long ago. We have no intention of questioning a *fait accompli*, or interfering with any *status quo*, but the case is very different with the Korean peninsula, as well as with Manchuria. Geographically speaking, the Korean peninsula constitutes territory of which predominance of foreign influence has vital interests for Japan, and concerns her very existence. Imagine if any foreign Power predominated in it,—how could that fact be anything but a constant menace to Japan? Historically, Japan has had a very long connexion with the peninsula.

It is not necessary for me to enter into any details; suffice it to say that there was a time when intruders attacked Japan from that peninsula; and we were obliged on the other hand to attack them at their bases in the peninsula, in order that we might secure permanent peace. There was a time when one or more of several kingdoms which existed in that peninsula were our tributaries. There was a time when we had our government establishments set up therein

in order to rule the country. There was again a time when we despatched our troops to the help of one or other of these kingdoms against some neighbour or outsider who threatened its very existence. The fact is that that peninsula had great importance for Japan in the numberless vicissitudes recorded in the history of successive centuries. Even at a time when Japan shut her door against all foreigners except the Dutch and Chinese we still had our diplomatic intercourse with the Korean kingdom, which periodically paid its homage and respect to our Government; we still had a trade with it; our people even had settlements in Korea, enjoying extra-territoriality, and carrying on trade between the two countries; and in our own days, since the new régime was instituted, the interest of Japan in the well being and good government of Korea has multiplied enormously. There is no necessity for me to describe these matters in detail, but the very fact that we staked our existence ten years ago against China, who was considered then a mighty Power, will go a long way towards explaining them; and, moreover, the fact that we had all along tried to come to an understanding with Russia, and, as a matter of fact, did reach such understanding once or twice, in official compacts, before the war, evinces how great was the anxiety felt in Japan concerning that neighbouring peninsula.

## IV

The case of Indo-China—Annam and Tongkin—is very different from that of the Korean peninsula. Geographically speaking, it is far away from Japan, and its shape and position is very different from the Korean peninsula. It has no strategical value for Japan. Historically speaking, it is true that about 300 years ago there was carried on a certain amount of trade between Japan, Annam, and Cambodia; but even that small trade came to an end with the policy of exclusion adopted by Japan soon after that period. In a word, French Indo-China was included in Japan in the category of those foreign lands to or from which neither trade would be allowed nor the coming and going of people

permitted. It has even been said that some Japanese who were residing in those regions were not allowed to land in Japan when they returned home, and had to go back again to die there—this was done on account of a decree that no Japanese should ever go to any foreign lands nor would he be allowed to return if he did so. There is no such long history of intercourse between Indo-China and Japan as there is between Japan and the Korean peninsula—there is no community of thought or feeling between the Japanese and the Indo-Chinese. With regard to the Koreans, there was a time when we derived Chinese civilization chiefly through Korea, but nothing of the sort happened in the case of Indo-China. In the history of the Chinese Empire Indo-China has usually been regarded as a place remote from its own proper boundaries and afflicted continually with pestilence, so that it was not a fit place for the Chinese to reside in: how much less then for the Japanese! And consequently the locality has never seriously entered into the minds of the Chinese, much less the Japanese, who only within very recent years have begun to carry on any appreciable trade with it. The chief item of this trade is rice, imported into Japan. On account of Japan's buying this rice some French people imagine that Japan covets the territory of Indo-China, a thing to our minds downright ridiculous. I will therefore, in the first place, give some account of the commercial relations subsisting between Japan and Indo-China.

## V

The volume of trade between Japan and French Indo-China is very small. Taking the average of the last five years, the total amount is 6,846,000 yen, that is to say, only 1·3 per cent. of the whole commerce of Japan. Of this total of 6,846,000 yen, 156,000 yen-worth are exported from Japan and 6,690,000 yen-worth imported from Indo-China into Japan. Looking round the lands which are near Japan, the percentage of the commerce between Japan and these lands is as follows :—

| | |
|---|---|
| China | 36·5 |
| British India | 24·4 |
| Hong-Kong | 18·7 |
| Korea | 8·4 |
| Siberia | 3·8 |
| French-India | 3·1 |
| Dutch India | 2·6 |
| Philippine Islands | 1·8 |
| Siam | ·7 |
| Total | 100 |

Of the trade between Japan and French India 90 per cent. of its whole volume is taken up with the supply of rice from the latter to Japan, and therefore rice as an item may be considered as having paramount significance; besides, rice is the principal food of the Japanese, hence the idea of some Frenchmen alluded to above, but it is a totally groundless impression. In the first place, I will show by a Table the amount of the production of native rice of Japan as well as the comparison of the exports of Japanese rice and the imports of foreign rice. Japan not only imports but also exports this cereal.

| Year. | Home Production. | Import. | Export. |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Koku. | Koku. | Koku. |
| 1894 | 41,859,047 | 1,321,851 | 610,052 |
| 1895 | 39,960,798 | 674,141 | 719,324 |
| 1896 | 36,240,351 | 744,801 | 756,803 |
| 1897 | 33,039,293 | 2,520,558 | 517,678 |
| 1898 | 47,387,666 | 4,678,501 | 420,047 |
| 1899 | 39,698,258 | 660,237 | 871,534 |
| 1900 | 41,466,734 | 914,792 | 253,563 |
| 1901 | 46,914,943 | 1,244,775 | 520,617 |
| 1902 | 36,944,625 | 1,803,629 | 507,695 |
| 1903 | 47,713,166 | 4,864,962 | 328,974 |
| Average | 41,127,488 | 1,942,824 | 551,629 |

(Koku = nearly five English bushels.)

From this Table one can see that the import of foreign rice into Japan varies according to the harvest for the year, and whether Japanese native crops are good or not. But on the average of ten years the export of Japanese rice amounts to 1·4 per cent. of the whole native products, and imports of foreign rice to only 4·7 per cent. of the native products.

Thus we import foreign rice on an average of [illegible] per cent. of the native products—a very small percentage indeed. Let us see now what regions there are for supplying rice to Japan. The following is the Table :—

| Year. | British India. | Korea. | French India. | China. | Siam. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1894 | 5 | 10 | 69 | 9 | 7 | 100 |
| 1895 | 9 | 20 | 65 | 4 | 2 | 100 |
| 1896 | 1 | 50 | 22 | 24 | 3 | 100 |
| 1897 | 4 | 28 | 41 | 22 | 5 | 100 |
| 1898 | 24 | 6 | 53 | 8 | 9 | 100 |
| 1899 | 3 | 29 | 56 | 4 | 8 | 100 |
| 1900 | 11 | 52 | 30 | 4 | 3 | 100 |
| 1901 | 7 | 51 | 27 | 7 | 8 | 100 |
| 1902 | 43 | 22 | 26 | 2 | 7 | 100 |
| 1903 | 53 | 9 | 27 | 4 | 7 | 100 |
| 1904 | 64 | 2 | 25 | 1 | 8 | 100 |

From this Table one can see that British India, Korea, and French Indo-China are the chief places that supply rice to Japan. The proportion of imports from these countries varies according to the year, but, roughly speaking, ten years ago the French supply was more than half, but in recent times it has decreased gradually to a quarter, whereas the imports from British India have gradually increased together with the general advancement of the trades between Japan and that country, and it now takes the place which French Indo-China formerly occupied : Korea, again, when the crops are good, supplies half the Japanese wants. The reason why we export as well as import the rice is this : the quality of Japanese rice is far better than the rice of other regions, and consequently fetches a better price in foreign markets. And conversely, as the quality of the rice of those other regions, especially that of French India, is always far inferior, and only fit for needy families, the price is far lower than that of our own, and as a natural result of economical operations, both exports and imports of the same commodity take place concurrently. Hence it follows the genuine requirement in the way of imported rice is far less than it appears at first sight. Thus we see that the amount which we paid for the rice imported from French India from 1894 to 1903 was 72,600,000

yen, whilst during the same period the price we obtained by the exportation of our native rice was 65,200,000 yen. Besides, although rice is the principal food of the Japanese, and although rice forms the principal portion of the food-stuffs imported, a large quantity of other edible substances is brought into Japan from foreign lands as progress is made in economical matters and as results of economical operations. According to the latest statistics obtainable, the imports of edibles are as follows :—

| Year. | Rice. | Wheat, Beans, Peas, Flour of Wheat. |
|---|---|---|
| | Yen. | Yen. |
| 1901 | 11,878,958 | 8,759,089 |
| 1902 | 17,750,816 | 9,731,834 |
| 1903 | 51,960,272 | 23,459,512 |

These edible commodities besides rice are imported chiefly from China, British India, and the United States, and one can see that although rice is the most important item on the list it forms only a part of the annual imports of food-stuffs. Besides, of late years rice cultivation in the United States has become an important industry. According to an official report of the British Commercial Agent in America, during the fiscal year 1898–99, the production of rice in that country was 250,280,221 lb., and the land under rice cultivation was 342,218 acres, and it was calculated that the yield of rice of 1904 would be about 470,000,000 lb., the area of land planted with rice being 643,400 acres. America will soon be able to export her rice, so that if France does not like our buying her rice we shall have no difficulty in obtaining from America, as we do from British India and elsewhere.

## VI

From the foregoing statements it will be seen that the trade between Japan and French Indo-China is not so material as one might easily be led to suppose. Surely it is not worth while for Japan to trouble her head with it so much

as other people seem to think she does. Besides, there are many things to be thought of in this connexion. In the first place, we must see what is our commercial relation with France itself. According to the latest statistics, our imports from France are 5,107,913 yen, while our exports to France are 34,279,115 yen. This will show that France is a good customer. The chief item of our export to France is silk of all kinds. It is a matter of course that France does not consume all our exports in her own homes, because she exports them again to other countries in altered shapes. But the fact that France takes them from us is unalterable. This commercial relation is very beneficial to us. We have to maintain and to promote if possible the existing condition of things, and to ensure that it continues without interruption, if we can. In order to do so it is necessary, let me say, that we should keep on friendly terms with France. This is the commercial point of view. But there are many other and cogent reasons why we should maintain friendship with France. France is a country far advanced in her enlightenment. We know how to respect her, and, as a matter of fact, we have derived already much benefit from her acquaintance. We must learn more from her; we know that France is a rich and thrifty nation; we know that France can do great things if she likes; we know that it is a most foolish thing to estrange her sympathy, to say nothing of making her a bitter enemy. All these considerations impel us to behave as well as possible towards France, even if for no other reasons. Why, then, should we covet her possessions in the East? Supposing for a moment that all these considerations need be not taken heed of, and supposing we can make war and take possession of French India easily: even under these circumstances a far-off expedition is not an easy matter. It costs much money, and even after conquest much expense would be entailed. Japan does not care to embark upon such business without seriously thinking of the result: in other words, such an undertaking would not pay Japan. This becomes all the more apparent when we have taken everything into consideration. Above all, our conscience, our moral sentiment and ethical teaching, and long-standing national tradition do not allow us wantonly to covet other people's property without possessing a shadow of just or rightful claim. If we had any thought concern-

ing French India it would take the form of encouragement and promotion of peaceful commercial intercourse, which may be beneficial both to France and to our country.

## VII

Such is the case on Japan's side. We have therefore done nothing to hurt the susceptibilities of France. Still less have we done any injury to France. But how is the case regarded by France, especially since the beginning of the war? All that I can say is that many of the French, and especially some of their public men and publicists, have been extremely unkind to Japan. In their eyes the Japanese are a doomed nation; in their eyes Japan can never be allowed to share the blessings of enlightenment and civilization. If I am speaking too candidly I must ask the French public to excuse me with their accustomed magnanimity and allow me to appeal to their chivalry. I can quite understand in what position France stands with regard to Russia; but what these people say and write is not, as it appears to me, incumbent upon them in their situation as Russian allies. I almost think some of them are going to the extent that they are forgetting the interest of their own nation in their over-zeal for one particular country. Let me candidly ask them a question: Can they honestly and conscientiously mean to hold up Russia as a model nation, superior to Japan in the form of government, in the administration both spiritual and temporal, and, above all, in the idea and practice of moral sentiments, and thus subject Japan to contempt and condemnation? I do not find any fault with their being in alliance with Russia, but that does not give them the right to abuse and condemn another nation and another power, which their country ostensibly regards as friendly.

The alliance of France with Russia, I presume, is based upon considerations of European politics; but does this give them any right to abuse another friendly nation by virtue of that alliance to such an extent that justice and righteousness are put out of consideration? What sin has Japan committed in the eyes of France? What crime has Japan per-

petrated against France? Should there be any such, Japan will be very glad to be told of it and to be asked to rectify it. But as far as we are concerned, we cannot think of any such offence that we have committed or perpetrated. The scare of the "yellow peril" appears to me to be quite unworthy of a civilized nation like France. Does France mean, together with Russia, to crush Japan by *coups de main*? In that case there would be some reason for adopting that sort of attitude, though it would appear to be most unjust. But, if not, what *raison d'être* is there for adopting the attitude which now prevails? If my words are too harsh I must once more apologize, but I cannot be otherwise than candid, and often a better understanding is arrived at from being candid than otherwise. The obvious intention in instituting the yellow peril scare is to stir up the whole civilized world against Japan. It is a hard thing for us to think about. Then, again, relating to France herself, they speak about our wanton designs upon their position in the East, and thus try to discredit Japan in the face of the whole world. Do they mean to drive us to desperation? Suppose they really had some apprehensions about their Indo-China, there are many means of ascertaining if they had any real foundation without simply trying to irritate us. I wish just to pause for a moment and think about what would be the result if Japan and France became antagonistic nations, full of animosity toward each other. And suppose France had to arm to the teeth in Annam and Tongkin, and on Japan's side also she had to make corresponding preparations; what waste of money there would be, and what good result could be derived from it all? I remember a long time ago, when Tongkin was taken by France, how M. Jules Ferry was constantly attacked by his own countrymen in the Chamber of Deputies. The time has changed very much since then, and France can enjoy the full benefit of her possession of Indo-China with peace and order. Japan never intends to disturb it, unless France makes it out to be so by her own fantastic imagination. Is it not now already time that French politicians and publicists changed their attitude a little and allowed Japan to realize her fond expectation of making herself a good friend of France? France can do so without violating her obligation as an ally of Russia. Especially will this be the case when the present

war comes to an end in one way or another. There are, I think, several means which could be utilized for the benefit of both countries and could be made a testimony of mutual friendship. But suppose we both of us have that inclination, it is desirable that more consideration be shown by the French politicians and writers henceforward in matters concerning Japan. I must earnestly say that the present attitude of some of the French journals and of public men is hardly calculated to promote that cause. I may mention one instance; I have often noticed that a correspondent of a certain well-known Parisian journal, who is enjoying the hospitality of Japan, is sending and having published articles which are far more than an ordinary correspondence, for they amount to nothing less than bullying abuse of Japan and an endeavour to bring her into contempt before the world. Japan has sufficient forbearance; she does not venture to present him with a passport: but such a thing as he is doing is not productive of any good to any country whatever. I can quite understand in one way that to recognize a parvenu as something like an equal is a very difficult matter to those who regard themselves as far above others; that sentiment is natural enough; but when the time comes that it is necessary, one's duty, from the point of view of common justice, is to adapt oneself to circumstances. It is all the more so in a case when, although that parvenu may be in one sense a parvenu, in another sense he is not so, in that he has a good pedigree and is essentially a gentleman. In the case of Japan we do not blame the Europeans that they regard us as parvenus. Yet on our part we never try to put on airs. What we have been doing and are still doing is to ask for some thought and consideration from those people whom we regard as our pioneers in many ways, and this request might be granted to us above all others by the French, who were, and are still, I think, known as a chivalrous people.

## CHAPTER III

### JAPAN AND A WAR INDEMNITY [1]

THE canon of the Japanese Bushido is that one should not unsheath one's sword unless in case of absolute necessity, nor should restore it to the sheath unless one is totally overcome or has secured equitable satisfaction for one's cause. This is also our ideal in international intercourse.

The sword of Japan is drawn: therefore it would be a mistake for her adversary or for any outsiders if they were to think that that sword would be lightly restored to its original sheath. With us the aim for which we have unsheathed our swords is scarcely attained as yet. We are not aggressive or greedy, but our aim must be attained. We want a peace which will secure a tranquillity in the Far East at least for a generation or two. The antagonists of Japan attribute to her all sorts of future ideas of ascendancy. But that Japan has no such ambition as is suggested by her antagonists, must be thoroughly understood by the whole world by this time. For all that, however, we must be allowed to obtain the satisfaction to which justice entitles us. It is scarcely time for Japan as yet to formulate any definite terms of peace. The task before her is doubtless a gigantic one; and therefore, favourably as events have gone so far for us, successfully as our campaign has been carried on up to this time, and confident as we are of the future, it would be preposterous for Japan to formulate the definite terms of peace, because one might be accused of skinning a bear before it was shot. We have, however, an outline of our idea.

The world should know that in the present war Japan

[1] *The Outlook*, April 8, 1905.

staked her very existence, whereas with her adversary it is a mere war of caprice. Therefore, in the case of Japan's defeat, it is quite plain from the very nature of the matter that the penalty she would have to pay would be very heavy. As a matter of fact, it would affect her very existence. Why, then, in the case of the defeat of her adversary, should Russia not be made responsible for its results in equitable accordance with the nature of the affair? I believe, therefore, that in the case of our adversary asking for peace the satisfaction which she will have to make to Japan should include the making good of the material loss of Japan—in other words, an indemnity. Our adversary has wantonly caused us to incur that loss, and it is only fair that she should make good that loss, should she be inclined to come to terms. Has not our adversary exacted enormous indemnities from the countries who asked peace of her after the wars which she had carried on with them? Some say that the objection to an indemnity in the present case is on the ground that the present war is carried on in a neutral land, and therefore there is no question of indemnity to be raised. This contention seems to be absurd. The fact that hitherto the present war has been waged in a neutral land has been a unique instance in history. The combatants had to spend their blood and treasure just as much as if the war was carried on in the territory belonging to one or other of them. The question of the justice of taking or giving an indemnity can in no way be determined by the fact that the war is carried on in a neutral country. Suppose a war between two nations be fought on an open sea between the fleets of two nations, and one of them had to ask peace of the other, the question of indemnity would be only decided by the merits and circumstances of the matter and not by the fact that the battle had taken place on the open sea, which does not belong to either of them. The present case of the war being carried on in a neutral country must be viewed from the same standpoint. Some people also say that Russia cannot pay the indemnity, and therefore it should be forgiven. I cannot agree with this argument. Our adversary can pay if she chooses. Is she not spending enormous sums of money in carrying on war? Does she not profess that she has enormous reserves in her National Bank? Does she not say that she will patch up the peace only

temporarily, as though it were a kind of armistice, and reorganize her army and navy so that she will be in a position to wage a war of revenge? Besides, if she stops the war and raises the money for the works of peace, including the indemnity, she will not be destitute of the means of obtaining the necessary money. Have not the Powers in concert forced China to pay her indemnity on account of the Boxer rising, in which Russia herself claimed payment out of all proper proportion?

I have noticed that on the part of the "man in the street," as you say, there has been a misconception of the situation. He has frequently imagined that Japan is willing to come to terms anyhow if only peace could be patched up. This kind of misconception must be put aside. I often personally experience a sort of chagrin upon being told by outsiders who advocate peace in such a way, that we are only anxious to get some kind of peace. As a matter of principle, of course, we value peace just as much as any one else, but when we come to the question of the present contest it is most unfortunate that people should entertain this kind of misconception about us. Some even tell us that it is fearful that so many human beings should be slaughtered. They say that for humanity's sake an armistice should be concluded with a view to negotiating peace, and even practical publicists speak of similar propositions. We cannot think in the same way; such propositions can give advantage only to our adversaries. Moreover, one must perceive what progress our military and naval forces are making. If our adversary is not prepared to give us satisfaction, we must be allowed to carry on our plan. It is all very well to speak of humanity, but no injustice must be perpetuated in the name of humanity. If a proposition which arises out of the question of humanity gives more advantage to one than another of the contending parties, it cannot be justice.

I notice even at this moment some sort of psychological instability prevailing in some quarters of Europe. The public at large seem to have gauged the relative value of Russia and Japan, they have seen on which side justice lies, they have weighed the merits and demerits of both nations, they are glad that the large bubble which has been causing nightmare to many people for so long a time has been

pricked. They have seen the justice of not judging the cause of Japan from any racial or dogmatic point of view; they have seen that it was of no use to suppress Japan's aspirations by the combined force of the Western Powers. And yet there seems to be floating in the air some sort of compassion for our adversary. I do not, of course, grudge any compassion that is shown to her—we Japanese are capable of compassion in all matters; but compassion, if not exercised properly, will fall out of the sphere of justice. When a dwarf and a giant fight each other the dwarf will expect to get satisfaction in the case of his victory, just as much as the giant will expect the same from the dwarf—even if the dwarf is not entitled to a greater satisfaction if we consider the matter from the point of equity. How much more would it be unjust if one were to tell the dwarf that he must be subjected to a great penalty in the case of his defeat, because he had accepted the challenge of the giant—that he must be satisfied with very little compensation in the case of his victory, because the "face" of the giant was bigger than his and therefore a greater compassion must be shown to the giant in the case of his defeat. I almost think the sentiment in some quarters out of Japan has some resemblance to this illustration. So many people speak of the prestige, dignity and "face" of our adversary, but it is curious that they do not speak so much about the prestige, dignity and "face" of Japan, and it is the case, even with those who highly recognize the justice on the side of Japan. This I deem an inconsistency, arising out of some psychological instability. It is, I think, already time that the people labouring under this confusion of ideas should make up their mind to choose and decide which way to go.

I am most anxious to ask the outsiders of this class calmly to reflect what would have been the result if Japan were worsted in actual conflict. Have they not heard that it was openly said in the capital of our adversary that she would exact an enormous indemnity from Japan so as to incapacitate her for many generations to come, and that she would annex some important parts of Japan of considerable extent? Did they not say they would even demand a cession of Kiusiu, in which case Oyama, Nozu, Kuroki, Oku, Togo, Kamimura, Kawamura, Ogawa, Komura, Yamamoto, Kaneko, including myself, all of us would be foreigners in our

own country, as Garibaldi lamented in the Italian Chamber? Were not generous and high generals talking about dictating terms in our capital of Tokio? Do they think that Russia would have forgone her claim of indemnity because the war was carried on in a neutral country? Do they think that Russia would have had much mercy and compassion for her defeated foe? I can only think that Japan would have fared very badly should she have been beaten. We are far from assuming any attitude such as would have been assumed by our adversary, as I can imagine, in the case of our defeat. But we believe that justice ought to be done to us, and that no mere sentiment shall be allowed to decide the merits of the case.

Some people say that Japan might be induced to forgo her claim of indemnity provided England and America gave her a good assurance for future security of peace. We appreciate, of course, the general sentiments of England and America; we attach high value to the Anglo-Japanese alliance; we are anxious to maintain the best friendship with these two countries more particularly than with other countries. We should, however, be very sorry if we were to be told that we should forgo on account of that friendship any claim which we deem justice entitles us to demand.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND WOUNDED BY THE JAPANESE [1]

I HAVE just discovered in a newly published volume entitled *The Russo-Japanese War*, by Mr. T. Cowen, a reproduction of a sketch by a Japanese artist made on the spot after the battle of the Yalu, in which a Japanese soldier is seen stooping down to place a bunch of wild flowers on a Russian soldier's grave—one of several at that spot—while another Japanese soldier stands by with his hand to his cap, giving the salute to his departed foe. Such an incident speaks volumes for the generous spirit towards his enemy which is at all times manifested by the soldier of Japan. As, however, it seems just now to be an object of interest to not a few people to know how the Japanese treat Russian prisoners and wounded, I will make in the following pages an attempt to give a succinct account thereof. The Government Regulations speak for themselves, and it is only necessary to state that they are carried out to the letter. But I have supplemented them with brief explanatory remarks of my own, touching their application in practice, in refutation of certain calumnious statements that have been put into circulation. Not only have all the injunctions of the Geneva and Hague Conferences been complied with, but Japanese military law was sufficient of itself, apart from the Convention's rules, to secure humane treatment. And, moreover, "Bushido," the code of honour for Japanese Knighthood, enjoins upon all the most compassionate behaviour towards a fallen or surrendered enemy.

On February 14, 1904, within a week of the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese Government issued regulations, under Imperial ordinance, for "Treatment of Prisoners," and a "Prisoners' Intelligence Board" was established seven days later, also by Imperial command. Supple-

[1] The English original of an article printed in *La Revue* (Paris), December, 1904.

mentary regulations were issued by the War Department, in both cases, later in February and in May.

The Intelligence Board was thus constituted :—

The Chief of the Board to be of General's or Colonel's rank.

His subordinates shall be drawn from among military as well as naval officers, and he shall have civilian clerks also, as required.

The Chief to be under the supervision of the Minister for War.

The business to be transacted by the Board shall include:—

*a.* Investigating circumstances of detention or removal of prisoners, reception into hospital, or decease, of any one of them, and the compilation of proper records concerning each.

*b.* Correspondence with regard to condition of prisoners.

*c.* Due attention to delivery or dispatch of money or other articles sent to or by the prisoners.

*d.* Retention in safe custody of the testaments or other articles or money left by prisoners who die, and for the subsequent dispatch of this property to the families or relatives of the dead.

*e.* Whenever information is acquired by army or naval authorities concerning a fallen enemy, or any property of those killed in battle, or who otherwise die, is recovered, the course pursued is to be similar to that followed in the case of a prisoner.

*f.* The Board has authority to obtain from the naval, military, or hospital authorities, or any other kindred institution, all needful information that they may possess in order to enable the Board to perform its allotted functions.

Minute directions are likewise given for the rendering of reports, by the several authorities above named, to the Prisoners' Intelligence Board, upon all necessary matters in which the condition or welfare of the prisoners may be in any way concerned.

The regulations regarding the treatment of prisoners are very lengthy, and it is only necessary to refer to their salient features :—

*a.* The prisoners of war shall be treated with humane consideration : no insult or cruelty shall be perpetrated upon them.

*b.* They shall be dealt with in careful conformity to their rank and position.

*c.* Save where imposed by military discipline, they shall not be subjected to physical restraint.

*d.* They shall enjoy freedom of conscience, and in virtue thereof shall be at full liberty to attend the religious services of their own Faith, so long as in doing so they do not infringe the requirements of military discipline.

Should a prisoner be insubordinate he naturally must be subjected to disciplinary measures, according to the circumstances of his offence, and so also must a prisoner who attempts to escape, or who may actually for a time contrive to get away and is retaken, but no criminal punishment shall be inflicted on account of such escape.

Offences of prisoners are dealt with and punished in conformity with the established rules of the Military Court.

The subjoined *resumé* of the Regulations are indicative of the care with which the rules have been framed to agree with the spirit of the injunctions *a*, *b*, *c*, and *d* quoted above.

1. Arms, ammunition, and all articles of warlike character carried by the prisoners shall be confiscated, but other articles shall either be kept in safe custody on behalf of the prisoners or left with them to carry on their own persons as expediency may dictate.

2. Prisoners of officers' rank may be allowed to carry their swords, or even any other weapons, according to circumstances, but in the case of firearms, the powder and bullets used in them shall be removed for safety's sake.

3. The Commander of an Army Corps, or of a Division, may arrange with the enemy for the transfer of sick or wounded prisoners, or for their exchange, or he may discharge prisoners on parole of not again taking part in the present war.

4. Prisoners who may be possessed of officers' rank shall be transported to their place of internment separately from the common soldiers.

5. Prisoners captured by the Navy shall be handed over to the Army Authorities. (This regulation was introduced, no doubt, to save the trouble and expenses of caring for them separately, under a distinct organization.)

6. The Army Authorities shall provide suitable places for the internment of prisoners; soldiers' barracks, temples, or other convenient buildings are to be used for this purpose.

7. Prisoners shall be suitably allotted to different rooms, not huddled together indiscriminately, a certain number to each apartment as may be convenient, and the rank and position of the prisoners shall be taken into consideration when thus allotting their quarters. Each room shall appoint from among its inmates one person to be their chief, who shall be responsible for peace and good order among them, and shall be spokesman for his fellow-prisoners.

8. Prisoners may purchase with their own money any articles that they may fancy or that may add to their comfort—subject, of course, to the approval of the Superintending Officer.

9. Prisoners may receive or send telegrams or letters, subject, of course, to the approval of the Superintending Officer, but no cypher or suspicious communication of any sort can be permitted to pass.

10. The postal matter sent to or from prisoners is free of charge, in accordance with the postal convention rules.

11. Any articles or money retained for safe custody by the authorities shall be returned to the prisoners on their discharge.

12. Any articles or money belonging to a prisoner who may die shall be forwarded to the Prisoners' Intelligence Board. Perishable goods shall be sold and the value in money so recovered shall be transmitted to the Board, to be dealt with in due course.

13. The testaments found on prisoners who die shall be treated in precisely the same manner as those found on Japanese soldiers, and are to be sent to the Prisoners' Intelligence Board.

14. The custody of prisoners may, by a special provision, be delegated to a legally established philanthropic association. (This is no other than the Red Cross Society of Japan.)

15. For each pair of prisoners having officers' rank, one common soldier shall be selected from among the prisoners to serve in the capacity of personal attendant.

16. Prisoners of officers' rank may be permitted to take an outdoor stroll regularly on their making solemn promise not to run away or to transgress the disciplinary rules. Common soldiers also may be given this degree of liberty provided that no difficulty is experienced in keeping them in order in consequence thereof.

17. The burial of dead prisoners is to be conducted with due military honours, according to the rank and position of the deceased. They shall be interred in one part of our military cemeteries, or a special plot of land shall be allotted for this purpose, according to circumstances.

18. The mode of burial shall, as a rule, be that adopted in the ordinary interment of a corpse. (Note—The qualifying phrase, "as a rule," here inserted appears to indicate that whereas under some conditions—such as when medical precautions demand special treatment, in cases of infectious disease,—Japanese law requires that the bodies of persons who thus die shall be cremated, a similar rule shall apply to the corpses of prisoners of war.)

Besides these, minute provision is made in the Regulations as regards the food and clothing of prisoners, for their beds and dressing tables, for medical attendance, and travelling expenses, and for funeral expenses in the event of their decease.

As to the work to be done by prisoners, it was foreshadowed in the Regulations first issued for their treatment that separate regulations might be issued if it became necessary to do so, and accordingly they were promulgated on September 16, 1904. Under these rules suitable work may be apportioned to the prisoners, but those of officers' rank may not be set to labour save at their own express desire. In any case the tasks allotted are never to be such as would be derogatory to the dignity or social status of the prisoners in their own land.

A fixed tariff, according to which the prisoners are to be

remunerated for the work they execute, is appended to the Regulations.

The moneys thus earned are in every instance appropriated to the benefit of the earners, partly to the purchase of extra comforts during detention, and the remainder held in trust for him against the day of his release, when it will be made over to him intact.

Such are the benevolent desires of the legislature, and they are most carefully carried into effect, both in the spirit and in the letter.

In the early days of the war, Matsuyama in the island of Shikoku was the place where prisoners were interned, but as their numbers increased, Himeji and Marugame were added, and quite recently Fukuchiyama became the fourth of these depôts. Himeji is the chief town of the district of Harima in Central Niphon, and Marugame, like Matsuyama, is in Shikoku, close to the shores of the Inland Sea. Fukuchiyama is a town in the prefecture of Kioto. All the places chosen have a record for salubrity of climate.

On September 17, 1904, a detailed account of the prisoners then at Matsuyama, as given in a Japanese newspaper, showed that there were present in the several buildings :—

| | Officers. | N.C.O.s | Ordinary Soldiers. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I | | | | |
| Matsuyama Public Hall . | 41 | 3 | 33 | 77 |
| Barracks . . . . . | 26 | 51 | 428 | 505 |
| Temple A. . . . . | — | 11 | 89 | 100 |
| „ B. . . . . | — | 11 | 103 | 114 |
| „ C. . . . . | — | 17 | 104 | 121 |
| „ D. . . . . | — | 3 | 116 | 119 |
| Kwan-jein-sha . . . . | — | 33 | 199 | 232 |
| Private Building . . . . | 18 | 1 | 14 | 33 |
| II | 85 | 130 | 1,086 | 1,301 |
| Healthy prisoners . . . | 59 | 59 | 689 | 827 |
| Sick or wounded . . . . | 26 | 51 | 397 | 474 |
| | 85 | 130 | 1,086 | 1,301 |
| + 25 | | | | 1,326 |

The additional 25 prisoners are explained as belonging to the medical or sanitary corps.

In a vernacular newspaper report dated September 19, it was explained that at Matsuyama, owing to the increasing numbers of the prisoners, it had been arranged to intern only the officers and the sick and wounded. The men were to be sent to Marugame and Himeji, but the limit of the Marugame accommodation being quickly reached, for there was only room for three hundred, and that of Himeji being limited to nine hundred, whereof no fewer than eight hundred and ninety-seven were already allotted to that depôt, it had become necessary at once to select a fourth place, and the choice had fallen upon Fukuchiyama. There it was calculated that space could be found for nine hundred in all, so that in the natural order of things, as the campaign progresses, unless arrangements should be made for a speedy exchange, Japan will be called on to add perceptibly to the list of places at which internments can be effected with due regard to the health and well-being of the prisoners.

According to the figures given in a London journal of November 13, the total number of prisoners, including all depôts, were 2,200, of whom 80 were officers. This total seems to have been arrived at after deducting some soldiers who, having recovered from their wounds, but who were regarded as incapacitated by their injuries from further taking part in the present war, have, according to Japanese newspapers, been released on parole. This has been done in consonance with a special provision of the Regulations for treatment of prisoners.[1]

A vernacular journal dated September 17, 1904, gives an account of the attempts made at times by the prisoners to escape, though they can have but the most vague notions of where they would find themselves even were they to succeed. These efforts are prompted by a childish desire to regain their personal liberty at all hazards, in the hope of reaching their own homes in Russia. They seem to overlook the fact that Shikoku is an island. Of course such vain attempts are confined to prisoners below officers' rank,

[1] Since this article was written the number of prisoners has risen to some 100,000, and the places of internment increased in proportion.

and the little conspiracies in which they engage are almost infantile in their simplicity. The prisoners of officers' rank, thereupon recognizing in the first place the futility of such attempts to get away, and the bad effect that they might produce on the minds of other prisoners—and apprehensive also that such behaviour would convey a wrong impression to their Japanese captors of the general disposition of the prisoners as a body—begged not long since that the depôt authorities would take precautionary steps to prevent these attempts being made.

As a matter of fact, the childish behaviour of the Russian soldiers has been often described in the Japanese journals. While the Russian sailor shows much fortitude under surgical operations, for example, the soldier will wince, and actually scream with the pain. One case in particular may be mentioned in proof of their infantile ideas. When Liaoyang was fought, one prisoner, on hearing of the Russian defeat, at first rejoiced, because, as he said, the Russian Government was a bad Government, but afterwards cried because "after the war there would be no Russia at all" for him to go home to!

The other day I read a telegraphic despatch to a London journal wherein it was announced that an Urgency Edict had been promulgated, applicable to cases of conspiracy on the part of the prisoners to escape. Of course I have not yet seen the text of the edict, but I judge from the description given that its issue must have been necessitated on account of repeated attempts of escape.

Turn we now to another phase of the subject, and we shall see how the sick or wounded are treated in the field, and how, after a battle, those who may be lying helpless and in need of succour, friends and foes alike, are gathered in by the Japanese ambulance corps. I shall not enlarge on this topic, because I think that the efficiency of this branch of the service is known to the world at large. But I would like to add that on May 30, 1904, another Regulation appeared in regard to the "clearing" of a battlefield immediately after an engagement, and the burial, with due respect, of the dead. The rule applies to the treatment of the fallen both of the Russian army and our own, and the only distinction made is that, whereas in a general way the corpses of our own

soldiers are cremated, the ashes being sent home to the relatives, or temporarily interred according to circumstances, the bodies of those who have fought against us are given ordinary burial in the earth, lest, I presume, by any chance we should offend the religious scruples of those who may be opposed to cremation. Occasionally only it may happen that for medical reasons cremation becomes absolutely essential.

After a battle, "clearing" companies are at once told off to the duty of bringing in the wounded, friend or foe, and carrying them to the nearest surgical station or field hospital. The dead are brought to convenient spots, though care is taken to avoid an unseemly mingling of the bodies, and it is expressly enjoined on all that the dead shall be reverently handled, friend and foe alike, though deposited apart to avoid confusion, and all respect shown to the apparent rank of the deceased, to whichever side he may have belonged; for he shed his blood in his country's cause, and earthly animosities vanish with the passage beyond the veil.

So far as it is practicable or possible to do so, the name, rank, office, and regiment to which he belonged is ascertained and recorded for reference in the case of every dead soldier, friend or foe, and all bodies are respectfully covered by suitable matting or other coverings.

The places chosen for interment of the dead are to be at a distance from highroads, towns, villages, or camps—well away from watercourses or wells, on elevated sites, or on slopes where the soil is dry.

Officers are buried in separate graves: the common soldiers may be separately interred, or in numbers not exceeding fifty in one grave, as circumstances may permit, dependent upon the exigencies of the campaign. It is enjoined that the excavations must be deep, never less than one metre between the surface and the body laid, and that straw or boughs of trees or shrubs shall be plentifully strewn beneath, and lime, coke, or some such substances placed above, mounds being raised over all with the soil extracted in digging the grave. A suitably inscribed pillar, or other mark, is planted by the tomb.

According to the rank and position of the dead, the interment shall be attended as far as may be feasible with due

honour, and whenever priests are available they shall be invited to perform religious rites at the graveside. This applies to ministers of the Christian faith, should they be at hand, and to both Russian and Japanese dead.

Anything belonging to the dead—excepting firearms, horses, maps, or military books and documents—shall be sent to the Prisoners' Intelligence Board, with full descriptions of the original owners.

It has been made the subject of special and almost surprised comment in an English journal that the French Embassy in St. Petersburg should have been able to report that large numbers of packages are regularly being received from Japan enclosing articles found on the bodies of Russian officers who have been slain in battle. Trifling sums of one or two roubles have thus been forwarded, not to mention *ikons* and much jewellery. A Mukden despatch, received by Reuter's Special Service, dated November 14, quotes the *Vestnik*, the only Russian newspaper possessing official sanction and published in the theatre of war, as bearing striking testimony to the scrupulous care of the Japanese for the relics and effects of the Russian dead found on the battlefield, and to the anxiety shown in sending such things to St. Petersburg. The journal praises this behaviour, and declares that General Kuropatkin has recommended that a similar practice should be observed towards the Japanese dead.

"Loot," it was remarked, "does not enter into the Japanese plan of campaign." But in reality this circumstance should in no way be regarded as matter for surprise, since it is not only a dastardly act to rob the dead of their valuables, and a disgrace to the military profession, no matter to what country the culprits may belong; but those who might be disposed so to degrade themselves are warned by the Military Criminal Code, in the details of which the rank and file are carefully instructed in time of peace, that such unworthy acts, and also any cruel treatment of a wounded enemy or prisoner, or any insult to a dead foe, constitute crimes which deserve, and will infallibly receive, the severest punishment.

In the Japanese field-hospitals wounded enemies when brought in are treated with precisely the same promptitude, cared for in exactly the same way, and shown in every

respect a tender kindness equal to that meted out to our own sufferers. The doctors attend to the cases in regular sequence, without regard to the nationality of the patient, as has been reported by the correspondents of many European and American journals. In fact, the humane consideration shown to their foes by the Japanese is so widely known and appreciated that it seems almost superfluous to cite instances as attested by European correspondents, for Russians have themselves joined in vouching for the accuracy of these assurances.

It is somewhat painful to be obliged to reverse the picture and show what is on the other side in regard to the character of the common Russian soldier, and I shall therefore content myself with giving a brief note or two to prove that a high standard of honour cannot be said to prevail among them. In a recent issue of a Japanese paper, the fact was commented upon that Russian sailors who had been made prisoners had begged that their captors would not insist on their sharing the same quarters as the Russian soldiers who were also captives. The explanation of this dislike to be mingled with their fellow-countrymen was that the Russian sailor considers the soldier very much beneath himself in respect of discipline and personal habits, so much so that it is impossible for them to associate on equal terms. It strikes one as being very much a case of " the pot calling the kettle black," but their wishes have been acceded to, lest disorder should result. The other anecdote, the substantial accuracy of which there is no reason to doubt, comes from the battlefield itself, where two Russian soldiers were, by a truly remarkable combination of circumstances, killed by a single bullet. One was in the act of robbing the other ! The hand of the thief was in the pocket of his wounded and prostrate comrade, his fingers grasping a coin, when death came to them both. It is inconceivable that a Japanese trooper would seek to rob the wounded, dead, or dying, still less his fellow-countryman.

Within the present month a Russian medical officer, Dr. Matureef, who was captured by the Japanese, has related his experiences, and they fully bear out my contention. He had lost his way, and so fell into the hands of the outpost guards. Having questioned him on various points, the Staff Adjutant told the Doctor that by the rules of the Inter-

national Convention he was free, and he was quartered for the night at the building occupied by the Chief of Gendarmes, given good food, and well looked after. Four days afterwards he was escorted by two cavalrymen towards the outposts of the Russian vanguard, the Japanese doctor of the Cavalry Staff thoughtfully providing him, as he explains in detail, with chicken, biscuits, lemonade, and cigarettes. When across the river separating the two armies Doctor Matureef was given a passport, and a compass was presented to him, so that he should have no difficulty in rejoining the Russian forces, which he succeeded in doing next day.

The Japanese soldier, it has been said, makes war as becomes a gentleman. It may not be quite fitting for me to express an opinion, but I venture nevertheless to say that the commendation thus bestowed is not ill-deserved. And this brings me to the narration of a rather amusing incident. A Russian prisoner was being conducted by a young Japanese soldier to the Japanese camp, and was agreeably surprised to find the Japanese so kind to him. In order to show his appreciation the prisoner suddenly embraced his captor and sought to kiss him. But the Japanese trooper had had no experience of this kind of salutation, and accordingly, fancying that the Russian intended to bite him, he administered a severe thump on the back, and thenceforward led his captive at arm's length. Presently, on arriving at the camp, the Japanese reported the matter to his superior officer, and the whole affair was then explained on both sides, to the great hilarity of friends and foe. Comical as was the incident, it serves to illustrate the temper of our soldiers, and their liberal treatment of an enemy who may be at their mercy.

The truth is that Japanese soldiers are taught to be humane, for every Japanese child is brought up to believe in kindness to animals, and warned that he must never be cruel to any living thing. The injunction dates back to the days when the Buddhist faith held greater sway, for in those days when Buddhism was at the zenith of its influence in Japan, even Imperial decrees were often issued forbidding wanton *Sessho*, i.e. killing the living. This sentiment seems to have been engrafted in the minds of the Japanese in general, and the fact is so often noticed by the Western writers who visited Japan. But the reluctance to take ad-

vantage of, or show disrespect to a fallen or wounded foe comes also from yet another source, for in *Bushido*, or principles of Japanese Knighthood, of which something has been said already, compassion for a beaten or surrendered foe forms one of the most conspicuous features, and the influence of *Bushido* has never been more exemplified, perhaps, than in these modern days of scientific slaughter.

## CHAPTER V

### AN ANSWER TO CERTAIN UNFAIR CHARGES AGAINST JAPAN[1]

I AM in receipt, from a Press-cutting office, of an article entitled "Question de Droit International," which appeared in the French periodical *Revue Russ* (March 24, 1904), and have read it through with much interest.

It is asserted as an utterance of a no less eminent jurist than M. Edouard Clunet, who was recently charged with defending the French interest relating to the Venezuelan question before the International Tribunal at The Hague. The arguments of the article, however, appear to me in many respects to be not exactly to the point, and are almost like logic based on false premisses—so much so, that I almost think that M. Clunet's purport must have suffered much twisting to suit the Russian convenience. I therefore beg to be allowed to offer some answer to it, not from the point of view of the politician, but as a jurist.

The first question the article deals with is: "Whether or not Japan had the right of attacking by surprise the Russian squadrons at Port Arthur without a preliminary declaration of war."

M. Clunet admits that there is much controversy among the writers on International law on the necessity of a declaration of war preceding its commencement. He also speaks of the great difference existing upon this point between the Continental writers and those of Anglo-Saxon communities. For me, however, there is no necessity of resorting to the Anglo-Saxon views, because, as I believe, I can just as well refute M. Clunet's argument, by following the same continental line of argument as M. Clunet himself. I may also mention that M. Clunet, whilst he

[1] The English original of an article printed in *Le Mémorial Diplomatique*, April, 1904.

adduces some facts as precedents in favour of his views, ignores the contrary precedents which are so numerous, Russia herself not being any exception to them.

As a matter of fact, according to a report compiled in the intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General's Department of England, less than ten instances have occurred during 171 years (from 1700 to 1870) where declarations of war have been issued prior to hostilities, whilst 107 cases are recorded in which hostilities have been commenced without such declaration of war. But these historical precedents I will also dispense with. And, moreover, the first shot of the present war between Japan and Russia was fired by a Russian gunboat at Chemulpo. But that fact, too, I will not touch. I will simply proceed to deal with M. Clunet's discourse.

M. Clunet says that even those writers who do not regard a preliminary declaration as an absolute necessity maintain, with exception of the English, the obligation of, to use his phrase, "une mise en demeure expresse."

Here he recites, as an example, the precedent of the Franco-German War of 1870. He says:—

"On that occasion a note was handed to the Prussian Foreign Minister by the French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin terminating in the words: "En conséquence le Gouvernement français se considère dès à présent en état de guerre avec la Prusse."

Was not exactly the same thing done by the Japanese Government before the commencement of the present war? True it is that the Japanese did not say: "Now and henceforward we are enemies," but she did say—setting forth her reasons for the step fully—that henceforth she must feel free to take "independent action" as she may deem best for the maintenance of her interests. The difference is only a matter of degree of politeness. But, to M. Clunet, I would say, Japan has been always taught by her Occidental masters that nothing could be too polite in diplomacy. And, besides, when the Japanese note of January 13 was given to Russia it was clearly made known to the latter that it was the maximum concession Japan could make, and subsequently it was made clear that Japan expected to get Russia's answer at latest in the course of the first two days of February. It was

virtually an ultimatum which M. Clunet speaks of. He says that a simple rupture of diplomatic relations does not amount to "une mise en demeure." He gives two reasons for this assertion, which are to the effect: first, that a rupture of diplomatic relations does not necessarily prevent its revival; secondly, that it is not sufficient to make the adversary know the exact satisfaction the other party wishes to have. This argument may hold good in many cases, but is it, I ask M. Clunet, applicable to the case we have before us? In other words, was the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan such a mere rupture as that M. Clunet speaks of?

Russia, besides those fleets and army which she already had in the Far East, had been sending out warship after warship, pouring in her men, regiment after regiment, to the Far East. Everything tended to show in an unmistakable way that a war was deemed to be imminent, not to speak of the persistent arrogancy displayed in her diplomacy throughout, despite the most moderate attitude maintained by Japan, whose concessions actually went so far that they were recently characterized by the *Times* of London as "exceedingly near a surrender." Whether it was for the purpose of intimidating Japan, or that war was really there and then intended, we do not know; but one thing is certain, that Russia cannot plead that she was unprepared or that she was taken by surprise. I may here mention an incident in point. The Russian fleet at Port Arthur left the Port and steamed out south-eastward just two days after the days on which we understood that we were to get Russia's final reply and two days before the actual rupture of diplomacy took place. It was most certainly a warlike demonstration. When intelligence to that effect reached Japan, it caused most intense anxiety to large numbers of Japanese, who were speculating on its destination. It might be intended to attack some important point of our islands. It might be escorting Russian army transports, or it might be covering the flanks of the advancing troops of Russia into Korea. The final rupture of diplomacy took place amidst all these uncertainties. Previously to that, Japan had repeated her protests against being trifled with by her adversary throughout the whole course of the negotiations, and she had expected that her note, which she had

given Russia on January 13, might at least be treated in earnest. But it was not treated so, and thereupon the very last note, *i.e.* an intimation of Japan's last decision as to "the independent action," was given to the Russian Government through the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg as well as the Russian minister in Tokio on February 6. It was only after that that our fleets were ordered to proceed to their objective points. They might have encountered the Russian squadrons proceeding south-eastward, as many thought. The Russian squadrons, however, had returned to Port Arthur, the *Variag* and the *Corietz* having been left in Chemulpo as before. The ships which went back to Port Arthur lay in perfect battle array outside the entrance of the port in front of the batteries on the shore at the moment of the commencement of fighting. We do not know for what purpose the Russian squadrons once left Port Arthur and returned there again, but the fact is as above described. Can any one say under these circumstances that Russia was unprepared, or that she was taken by surprise? True it is the officers might have been unprepared at the moment, but that should be looked upon as an "unguarded moment." If so, it must be accounted a matter of negligence on the part of her commanders or a proof of their misconception of the strategy which the situation demanded. Some say that the Russian officers were on land for the purpose of celebrating the birthday of their admiral. It may be true, but Japan cannot be made responsible for that. M. Clunet says:—

> It was very regrettable that Japan, after she had attached so much value to the rules and customs of modern international law, after she had adhered to the Declaration of Paris in 1856, relating to the laws of maritime warfare and also to the Convention of Geneva, and after having participated in the works of the international Conference at Hague, July 1899, should have behaved in such a manner as she did on the night of February 8, and 9 last."

I must say in reply that Japan respects the Declaration of Paris and Convention of Geneva; she is earnest in her desire for promoting the work of the international tribunal of the Hague; she strives to be behind none in adhering to all the essential points of modern international law. I am glad to see that M. Clunet largely recognizes this fact, but

sorry to hear him say that the Japanese, in spite of it all, are still guided by principles of sudden aggression, based solely on the justification of a tension of diplomatic relations; for it is not a fact. Japan acted, he continues, in the same manner as in her war with China in 1894, when one of her cruisers sunk an English ship the *Kowsching*, chartered by China, before any declaration of war was made or any ultimatum was sent.

Here again the fact differs considerably from what he has set forth. The fact relating to the *Kowsching* was as follows. She was conveying some Chinese troops to Korea for the purpose of augmenting those forces that were there already. She was escorted by a number of Chinese warships. Our fleet met them off the Korean coast, and there a battle ensued in which the *Kowsching* was sunk, and several Chinese war-vessels were sunk or damaged. It was not the sinking of a single merchantman by cruisers, as is so often wantonly done by Russia. At that time, too, the first shots were fired at our vessels by the Chinese, and, moreover, a few days before that a note of warning had already been given by the Japanese Government to the Chinese Government to the effect that the dispatch of any more troops for the purpose of augmenting the army already sent to Korea would be deemed by the government of Japan as a *casus belli*. The *Kowsching* was engaged in a task which was precisely identical with that which was alluded to in that warning. Technically speaking, the warning of Japan fully justified the sinking of the *Kowsching* and that was enough. But Japan did not base her justification on that ground alone. It was I who, representing the Government, went down to Sasebo, where the captives and a captured ship were brought, with all haste from Tokio, and made a thorough investigation of the affair. I took full statements from the foreign captives, who were officers of the *Kowsching*. I was quite satisfied that there was nothing wrong on the part of our fleet. We had full ground for justification without taking into account the fact of our warning having previously been given to our adversary. I settled everything, and sent the foreign captives to Nagasaki and set them free. I wrote a full report of the affair without mentioning a word about previous warning, as I thought that part of our justification might

well be used by the Minister for Foreign Affairs if needed. That report was made public, and it was subsequently inserted in several books written in foreign languages, French and English, and I believe, from the fact that M. Clunet knows so much about books written by the Japanese on that subject that he must have seen it. It seems, therefore, very unfair on the part of M. Clunet to quote the case of the *Kowsching* in the way he does, placing Japan in such an unfavourable light. M. Clunet finishes this part of his argument in these words :—

> Ils (les Russes) savaient qu'en cas de désaccord manifeste, le Japon se réservait d'estimer sans mot dire, qu'il était en état de guerre et qu'il jugeait légitime de recourir à la violence sans autre forme de procès.

This is really too harsh an accusation to have emanated from such an eminent jurist as M. Clunet, he having, in truth, no facts to sustain it. It is the more to be regretted that he is reported to have brought this accusation after he had seen the official reply of the Government of Japan to the Russian charges.

The next point discussed by M. Clunet is whether or not Japan is justified in disembarking her troops on Korean territory. On this point I have not much to say, because M. Clunet makes it clear that the right of neutrality is a right given to a neutral country itself, not to the belligerents. Korea is inclined to side with Japan. The disembarkation of the Japanese troops was effected with her full consent, and she has even become Japan's open ally. There is nothing left for Russia to complain of. I only wish to add a few words to the effect that in the present case of war, from the very nature of the difference between Russia and Japan, and also of the situation of Korea, she, Korea, occupies a position materially different from that of a third Power, in ordinary cases of war; but on this point I need not go any further because the very fact of her becoming Japan's ally, as M. Clunet says, settles everything.

The third point discussed in the article is whether or not Japan has the right of establishing a prize court by herself. On this point I have no desire to refute what M. Clunet says; on the contrary, I welcome it. He says that not only has Japan the right, but that she is even bound to establish

her prize court. He goes farther, and says that the organization of the Japanese prize court is, at least in theory, superior to that of his own country, on the ground that, while a French prize court is purely administrative, the majority of the members of the Japanese prize court consists of judicial functionaries. It is not my business to speak about the French prize court, but I appreciate M. Clunet's fairness on this point.

The fourth point discussed in the article is, whether or not Japan has any right to embarrass Russian warships in Korean ports or territorial waters. On this point also M. Clunet applies his theory of the right of neutrality as in the preceding case and with such exactness that I have not a particle of wish to refute him. He says :—

> La neutralité et ses règles sont établies ici dans l'intérêt du neutre et non dans l'intérêt du belligérant.

If Korea had remained a neutral, Russia would have had no right to complain of us ; still less so, *à fortiori*, has she this right, when Korea has become Japan's ally.

The last point discussed in the article is whether or not Japan was justified in expelling the Russian Minister from Korea. M. Clunet says that no belligerent has a right to expel a representative of his adversary who is accredited to a third state from the latter's territory, and he assumes that "Japan, under the circumstances, has committed an abuse of power and a violation of international law." An accusation like this might be made were there any facts to sustain it. But no such thing has been done by Japan. The Russian *Chargé d'Affaires* himself wished on his own account to withdraw with his suite from the capital of Korea, and this intention was communicated to the Japanese Minister in Korea, upon which an escort was furnished for him, in accordance with his desire, to Chemulpo. This fact is most plainly set forth in the reply of the Japanese Government, of which M. Clunet ought to have had full knowledge.

## CHAPTER VI

### EAST AND WEST AFTER THE WAR [1]

IMMEDIATELY the question of peace between the warring parties in the Far East is seriously mooted, and long before the Treaty of Peace is actually signed, the question of the future relationship between East and West leaps into a new and suggestive prominence. A normal state or equilibrium of international relationship will have to be settled, and when that is accomplished, how will affairs as between East and West be likely to stand?

In the first place, I am confident that the day will come when the Yellow Peril cry will be viewed, out and out, as having been merely a passing fantasy. There can be no Yellow Peril in the form of a military expedition, that is to say, an attack by the Asiatics, combined under the leadership of one or another of the Asiatic Powers, upon the Western nations. This I can state positively from the very nature of the Eastern civilization, from the characteristics of the Chinese, the effacement of the ancient martial spirit amongst the Tartar and Mongolian races, and also from the aspirations of the Japanese on the lines of Western civilization. And, moreover, the condition of the world has changed very greatly from the time when great nomadic leaders were able to carry on distant expeditions. All these points I hope I have fully elucidated in my chapter on "Chinese Expansion historically reviewed." China will be as peaceful a nation as she has been hitherto; Japan will be doing her best in advancing her civilization which will tend more and more to assimilate her with the West. It is possible China might introduce some reform into her military system, but it would only be for her self-protection, and would amount to nothing

[1] *Deutsche Revue*, May 1905, written in the form of a letter.

more than the policing of her own land. China will not pick a quarrel with any other nations. She knows that she wants no expansion of her territory; she needs no colony. If she were to engage herself in any foreign enterprise with a political view, she would emerge from it in only a worse condition than she was before. Japan might give advice to China in some matters which would be beneficial for the development of her industry and commerce, or even in regard to some of her public institutions, but Japan knows well the nature and characteristics of the Chinese, so that she can judge where to stop. If Japan were too officious in such matters, she would only meet with resistance on the part of the Chinese in one way or other, and thus she would be viewed rather in an unfavourable light than a favourable one. The case would somewhat resemble that of a man meddling with the domestic affairs of his neighbour. This will show that there is no fear of a Yellow Peril in the way of a military attack, but these same people might say, could you guarantee that Japan would not develop in her industry and commerce. This, of course, I cannot guarantee. Then they would say there would be an economic Yellow Peril; in other words, Japanese industry and commerce would destroy the markets of the West in the East. I wish Japan had such potentiality, but, alas, it would take many, many centuries before Japan could present even the semblance of such manufacturing prosperity as this. It is true the foreign commerce of Japan has made very rapid progress during the last twenty or thirty years, and we have confidence that it will increase to some extent in future, though not perhaps in the same ratio as hitherto. But what is, after all, Japan's economical capacity when compared with that of the great nations of the West? The volume of the total commerce of Japan represents in reality but a very small percentage of theirs. It would take Japan a long time to reach the same plane, but supposing that Japan really had some sort of potentiality in the matter, why need it make outsiders cry out about the Yellow Peril? Has not any nation or any individual the right, I may say the duty, of ameliorating their livelihood as much as possible, so long as the process is carried on by peaceful and orderly methods? What is the use of the Westerners talking about Christian morality, and where is the justice of the Occiden-

tals speaking of their civilization and enlightenment, if they think that the peaceful and orderly amelioration of the condition of an individual or a nation is to be censured as a matter of misconduct and wickedness? The time has, I think, gone by when one can talk in such a way as that. It seems to me that a thing which is wrong for a part is also wrong for the whole, so that anything wrong for an individual is also wrong for a nation. We the Easterners cannot uphold the theory that there can be no morality in international intercourse. In the East also more than twenty centuries ago there was a school of philosophy which supported a theory in politics almost identical with Machiavelism. That theory, however, was altogether demolished in the East soon after it was propagated, and we still believe in the necessity of morality in state-dealings as much as in individual dealings. Some may think it foolish, perhaps, but, if so, we are satisfied with being foolish in such matters.

As a matter of fact, however, I believe that after this war, commerce between the Far East and the West will make further progress. The West is beginning to understand the Far East better, and conversely the Far East is also beginning to understand the West better; and this cannot but tend to make the mutual relationship closer and closer. With it naturally commerce will also increase. Besides, if the Orientals are allowed in the Far East to develop their industry, they will acquire more purchasing power, the result of which will of course be an increase of trade. Some Westerners appear to think that all the articles which they export to the Far East at present may in the future be manufactured out there. This I consider to be a mere chimera. The world is wide enough for all. The Far East cannot set up its factories in such rapid fashion as to crowd out the West from its markets in such a short time as seems to be anticipated. Besides, human demands change from time to time; new materials can be made to supply new demands. Then, also, it is economically true that some goods may be manufactured or produced in some particular country cheaper or better than others, and thus there is always plenty of room for exporting the goods of one country to another because the things, produced or made where they can be produced or made cheaper or better, or can only be obtainable in one particular country on account

of the providential will of nature, can always find their way into other countries where they are not obtainable so cheaply or so good or could never be produced. Then again, it is needless to state that human beings are swayed by various caprices: in many instances they like to possess things made in a foreign country, even when the same things could be made as well or better in their own land. The American ladies like to get French drapery, the consequence is that American-made drapery is often sent to France and re-imported to America after merely having been re-labelled there. I ask again, does not Germany fabricate a great quantity of Oriental goods, especially Japanese, and sell them in England and elsewhere? This will demonstrate the tendency toward a liking for foreign goods, and therefore while it continues the genuine ones will as a matter of fact always be in demand. My first conviction is that Occidental goods will always find their way into the Far East in one way or other, and conversely, though not perhaps to the same extent, Oriental goods also will find their way to the West, in the future just as much as they have done in the times gone by, only in a greater proportion. There may be some rise and fall observable in particular branches of commerce, but taken as a whole there would be no diminution. Nay! we may even look for an augmentation.

Some people fear that complications might arise between the Occidentals and Orientals on account of differences of race and religion. I have, however, very little fear on this score. The Orientals by nature have very little liking or dislike on the score of racial differences or resemblance. The very nature of their ethical training makes them indifferent to those matters. It is especially the case with the Japanese. Of course they dislike arrogancy and resent injustice, but, so long as their pride or susceptibility be not violated, they are most friendly with other peoples. Besides, we know how to respect the Occidentals: and the more we feel our responsibility, the more this will be the case. Rightly or wrongly, Japan is spoken of as having become a great nation. On this account Japan feels more responsibility, and she will ever try to keep up her good relationship with the Occidentals, and in doing so will seek to traverse, more and more, the same paths of civilization. Consequently, there need be very little fear of Japan hating the Occidentals.

China cannot but follow in Japan's footsteps, so far as she is able to do so. The question of the difference of religion is to be disposed of in the same way. The Orientals have very little prejudice against any religion. They will never show any animosity to Occidentals on account of religious differences. Therefore, so long as the Occidentals do not affect to despise the Orientals on account of racial or religious differences, there will be no complications. The responsibility in these matters falls on the shoulders of the Westerners. It behoves Occidentals not to despise the Orientals too much as an inferior race, nor to make any misrepresentation based on the assumption of their own religion differing from what it ought to be, nor to inflict injustice in the name of religion. If these courtesies are observed, the East and the West can get on very well together.

I must, however, say one thing, if you wish me to be candid, and it is as follows :—

Rightly or wrongly, the true aspect of Oriental civilization, whatever value it may possess, seems to have become better known to the West. After this war the West may to some extent have to change its estimation of the East. The Occidentals can no longer be justified if they continue to regard themselves as the only privileged peoples under Heaven, and imagine that they may do anything against the Orientals which they could not do amongst themselves against one another. It must be regarded as a matter of iniquity if they still strive to exact from the East without giving anything in return, as they used to do in the times gone by. They would, I consider, find it more advantageous, and it certainly would be more equitable, that they should respect the integrity of China and put aside any lurking intention they may have of cutting her in pieces, because in doing so there are many dangers and risks which they profess a desire to avoid. People going out to the East would be wise to give up the old habit of giving themselves too many airs. Our antagonists in the war did their best to persuade all the Western nations that they ought all to combine in crushing a poor small country like Japan, on the ground chiefly that their religions were akin, and had a similar designation. But the religions of the West are not necessarily identical; and besides deeds are more important than words. The ethical notions of the Japanese may be defective in many

ways, but in many things the Japanese practice more strictly conforms to the rules which it behoves any one belonging to any religion to obey. This fact, we are glad to say, seems to have been recognized by many impartial people in the Occidental nations, so that I think Russia has utterly failed in her attempt to excite popular animosity against my country on account of a difference of religion. This fact, I think, is also to be taken into consideration in future by the world at large. It is, as it seems to us, a most cruel thing to inculcate hatred of us in the minds of the people at large, especially amongst the school-age population of any nation. Our earnest desire is that any such method, if it exists, should be discarded, and that a good friendship should be upheld between East and West on just and equitable lines. If things were done in this way Japan would be only too glad to follow any examples that she might discover worth following, and then there would be no conflict between the Far East and the West to disturb the tranquillity and prosperity of the whole world—a harmony which must be deemed to be in accordance with the will of the divine Power above.

My statement may be open to many a criticism; if so, criticize or condemn as you like;—but these are my convictions, founded upon my own candid and I hope impartial views of the future,—and my only desire is that they may be of some service in promoting and cementing the utmost goodwill between my country and yours.

# Epilogue[1]

ADMIRAL TOGO signalled to his fleets :—

The destiny of our Empire depends upon this action ; you are all expected to do your utmost.

Under such auspices was the battle of Tsushima, one of the most momentous sea battles in history, fought and won. One of its consequences is that the position of Japan as one of the Powers has been made secure. It seems that I may now make this communication to you as you wish, containing as it does an appeal to the Western public at large to reflect calmly upon the proper estimation in which the Japanese deserve to be held. We Japanese have suffered countless calumnies at the hands of Western public men and writers. We have endeavoured to some extent to refute them, yet some persons' persist in propagating the same calumnies as they have done hitherto. The most significant example of this is an article which has just appeared in the *Deutsche Revue* (June 1905) from the pen of a writer alleged to be a French diplomatist. The whole of its contents reproduce the familiar Yellow Peril cry, and in my view, a worn-out, exploded argument. It speaks of we Japanese as barbarians and savages. The way it expounds such a view is amusing. To me it appears that the very fact that the Russians and their partisans are so arrogant, and at the same time so incompetent to form an estimate of other nations, is the key which discloses the causes whereby they are suffering so many difficulties both abroad and at home.

The article says the Japanese have no self-respect to lose, and therefore, like the Jesuits, do not hesitate in adopting

[1] Originally a letter to and published in the *Courrier Européen*.

any means they find to hand, so long as they serve to attain their object. I should like to ask the author if he has not made a mistake in the substantive and put the Japanese instead of some other people, for instance, the Russians; for the whole world has now become familiar with the fact that the various epithets which the Russians and their partisans have been pleased to bestow upon the Japanese since the outbreak of the war, are far more appropriate if applied to our opponents. At all events I should like to know the exact definition of the terms barbarians and savages, and to examine them in relation to certain known facts about the Russians and Japanese. I have already seen many comparisons of this kind made by impartial observers. If the Russians or their partisans hope to take in the world by such mischievous calumny as this, their diplomacy is, I think, too hackneyed and obsolete. I can excuse the Russians in a measure for adopting such steps, but it surprises me when I see a Frenchman (if he really is a Frenchman who writes this article), who calls himself a diplomat, degrade himself by putting forth such an article as this.

Not long ago, Sir F. Treves, who had been to Japan and to the very seat of the war, speaking on a public occasion, wherein he paid a very high tribute to the surgical art of Japan, said in the course of his speech that

> British troops entered into a war with many determinations. One, was to have 10 per cent. sick. It was what they were accustomed to, and they got it. Now the Japanese were quite content with 1 per cent. sick, and they got it. I am perfectly confident that not many years hence we shall find in Japan one of the most remarkable schools of surgery that the world has ever seen. You will understand why. There is the infinite patience of the people; their infinite tenderness—a kinder, a more sympathetic people do not exist—and then, "nerves" as known in this country is, so far as I am aware, an untranslatable term in the Japanese language.

On the same occasion Lord Redesdale said:—

> The valour of the army and navy of Japan has been phenomenal, but perhaps what has been more noteworthy is the way in which they have treated their enemy. Every soldier and sailor of the Mikado has proved himself a Bayard.

About the same time the *Times* of London published a long letter from its correspondent in Tokio comparing the

characteristics of the Japanese and Russian troops. I quote here a part of it :—

To grand courage the Japanese have added refined chivalry. They have almost succeeded in investing the barbarism of battle with the attributes of civilization. Onlookers hard to convince that any good thing could come out of the East have sought to discount Japan's merits by accusing her of playing to the gallery. An impossible, incredible feat. Half a million of soldiers cannot be converted at a moment's notice into a theatrical troupe ; cannot be inspired with the skill of consummate actors. Wherever the Japanese armies have passed or sojourned they have left behind them an unspotted reputation. Not one accusation has been preferred against them of pillage, of rapine, of cruelty, or of insobriety. Towards the wounded they have been full of merciful helpfulness ; towards prisoners they have been kindly comrades. In the heart of hundreds of thousands of men taken from every rank in life materials for such displays cannot be artificially manufactured.

In a leading article of the same paper of the same day, a remark is made as follows :—

There is the foolish notion, surviving all that we have seen during the war, that the Japanese, not being a Christian nation, cannot possess what some Russian writer loftily describes as "certain fundamental principles of morality and justice" upon which the West plumes itself. If Christianity has any connexion with the teaching of its Founder, the Japanese might well claim to be the best Christians of us all.

I do not make these quotations for the purpose of self-glorification, but merely as serving to show how utterly one-sided are the views expressed by the writer in the *Deutsche Revue*.

The writer also speaks of the Mongolian raids of the time gone by. Well ; there is no fear of such raids coming from the Far East, as I have had on several occasions to show in my writings and addresses. Should there be, however, any such fear, is not Russia the very country which has been constantly practising the same sort of thing for many centuries, and is still bent upon doing so ? Are not the Mongolian and Tartar elements of the population predominant in the Russian communities rather than any other nations ? Is not the very locality where the great Mongolian leader, Genghis, arose, i.e. the banks of the river Onon, situated in a Russian province ?

On the whole, it is a mean and miserable policy on the part

the Russians and their partisans to try to arouse the suspicions of different Powers against Japan by such means as those adopted by the writer of the article to which I refer. Only a little time ago a similar calumny was published in America by some Russian agents. The American answer, the summary of which was telegraphed to London, was very short and to the point, and it ran thus: "So long as Japan does not imitate Russian diplomacy, American sympathy for Japan will never diminish one iota."

We have not the least idea of giving ourselves airs, nor do we like to run down our opponents, especially at a time when they are suffering from repeated defeat; it is merely on account of the large amount of prejudice which exists against us that I cannot help making a protest of this kind.

In the natural course of events it is necessary that friendly intercourse should be established between the East and the West. Nevertheless, so long as this absurd kind of prejudice exists, it is impossible that any such friendship should be established. To me it seems that it is already time that the Western people, especially our adversaries and their partisans, should put away such prejudices. We have always recognized the superiority of the Western nations, in respect of modern, and especially mechanical civilization, and we regard them as our teachers and seniors, but this does not, for all that, mean that the Japanese have hitherto been such barbarians or savages as the writer asserts. Even before we began our intercourse with the Western nations, we had our own civilization. True it is that the style of that civilization was different from that of the West, but it cannot on that account be held in contempt. As a matter of fact, we are not really parvenus. We have changed styles and modes of our own and adopted those of the Western countries in many ways; but if the Occidentals say, because the old civilization of the Far East was different in kind, that therefore the people who owned its sway were barbarous and savage, they are much mistaken.

We Japanese have arts, for instance, which are very different from those of Europe, but they are very old. Artistic taste also is widely spread among the Japanese. Can any one affirm that Japanese arts are barbarous and savage? Can any nation possessing that kind of art and artistic taste permeating every rank of society, be barbarous and savage?

In the West, I admit, there are a vast number of people who are very rich. There are also a vast number of big buildings, but do they necessarily imply that European society is perfect? One can see easily enough that the majority of Western people have a very small share indeed in whatever enjoyment is to be derived from inhabiting these big buildings. Some families, of course, live in large houses, but many only live in flats or small houses, without good accommodation or a bit of ground attached to them. Are people in that way necessarily happier and more prosperous than those who live in houses which are smaller but cleaner, and which mostly belong to their occupants, with grounds as well? Are there not in the West a vast number of families who are far more miserable than any among the Japanese? It is commonly assumed that the moral notions of the West are far superior to those of an Eastern people; but is this literally true, I ask. Are there not a vast number of people whose morality is detestable, especially in the eastern parts of Europe? I do not like to enlarge any more in this strain. We are quite prepared to regard Western nations as being our superiors, but we are obliged now and then to make this kind of protest when calumnies are made against us by Occidental critics who seem able so strangely and signally to ignore the conditions by which they themselves are actually surrounded.

# Index


Abe-no-oshi, 212
Akasaka, 256
Akashi, 212
Ai-gun, 52
Alexeieff, Admiral, 22, 28, 31, 33, 52, 53, 65, 80, 82, 84, 85, 95, 100
Alexis, Grand Duke, 95
Alpine Club, the, 225
Alps, the, 225
America, United States of, 3, 111, 207, 249, 294, 316, 339, 345; relations with Great Britain and Japan, 6, 11, 12, 309; her policy in China, 18–25 and 43–88
Amur, the, 45, 46, 50, 52, 85
*Amur Gazette*, the, 51
Anderson, Dr., 209, 219
Angelo, 218
Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty, the, 83
Anglo-German Agreement, the, 17, 61, 63, 76
Anglo-Japanese Agreement, the, 72, 73, 77
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the, 3, 6, 7, 316
Anglo-Japanese Convention, the, 22
Anglo-Russian Agreement, the, 85
Annam, 279, 289, 303, 310
Antung, 24, 83, 87
Aoki, Viscount, 40
Aoki Bunzo, 108
Ararat, Mount, 226
Aristotle, 195
Arisugawa, Princess, 162
Armenians, the, 226
Arnold, Sir Edwin, 229
Ashikaga, 217, 218
Aston, Mr., 215, 229, 234
Austria-Hungary, 62

Baba Sajiuro, 109
Bakin, 233, 234
Bakufu, 239
Bankoku-Zusetsu, 108
Barrow, General, 61
Baudin, M., 111
Beckendorff, Count, 23, 26
Belgium, 57, 72
Benkendorff, Count, 84
Berlin, 44, 330
Besobrazoff, M., 80, 82, 84
Bigham, 46
Black Sea, the, 4
Blagovestchensk, 25, 45, 46, 51 85
Bodhi-Dharma, 191
Bodhisattva, 200
Bokhara, Russian Resident at, 18
Boxer rising, the, 6, 16, 34, 39, 43, 56, 71, 294, 314
Britain, *See* Great Britain
British Association, the, 224
British East India Company, the, 105, 117
Buddha, 134, 190, 200; Buddha of Kamakura, the, 210, 217; Buddha of Vara, the, 209, 210
Buddhism, 119, 138, 141, 177–207, 286, 327
Bülow, Count von, 77
Bunchio, 220
Burmah, 179, 289

Bushi, 137, 186, 189–193
Bushido, 119, 186–193, 206, 312, 317, 325
Buttes Chaumont, the, 227

Calais, 301
Cambodia, 303
Cambridge, 224, 232
Cassini Convention, the, 65
Cathay, 276
Celestial Empire, the, 20
Central Asian Society, the, 269
*Centurion*, H.M.S., 53
Chan-kue, 272
Charity Hospital, the, 162
Chemulpo, 38, 92, 330, 332, 335
Chickshi, Lord Lieutenant of, 214
Chihli, 16
Chikudan, 220
China, 10; (relations with Japan), 13–91; (Great Powers in), 131, 146, 177, 191, 193, 217, 269–297; (expansion of), 303–311; (Franco-Japanese relations in), 333, 337, 346
Chinchow, 68
Chin dynasty, the, 273, 274, 282
Ching dynasty, the, 126
Ching, Prince, 22, 24, 64, 74, 77, 78, 81, 82, 86, 87
Chin-huang-ti, 273
Chiujio-no-Meifu, 212
Chino-American Treaty, the, 83
Chino-Japanese Treaty, the, 87
Chino-Japanese War, the, 5, 14, 65, 256
Chiushingura, 238
Cho-densu, 217
Cho-Koran, 155
Chokunin, the, 116
Chosiu, 107, 110, 111, 167
Chow dynasty, the, 267, 271, 272, 279
Chowsen, 279, 280, 281
Christianity, 194, 196, 325; era of, 134, 184
Chu, 272
Chunchu, 272
Chunchuses, the, 82
Clunet, M. Edouard, 3[illegible]
331, 332, 334, 335
Cochin China, 271, 301
*Commencement of Stu[illegible] Dutch, the*, 106
Confucianism, 119, 177–[illegible]
Confucius, 177, 272
Conger, Mr., 74, 75, 77
Convention of Greece, the, 332
*Corietz*, the, 332
*Correspondence regarding the Russian occupation of Manchuria and Newchang*, 13
*Courrier Européen*, the, 342
Cowen, Mr., 317
Coxinga, 278
Cradock, Commander, 38

Daigensui, 251
*Daily Telegraph*, the, 228
Daini-no-Naishi-no-suke, 12, 213
Dalny, 14, 100
De Bazan, Don Caesar, 169
De Staal, M., 21
Declaration of Paris, 332
*Deutsche Revue*, the, 336, 342, 344
Denzen, 109
Detring, Mr., 61
De Witte, M., 80
Dual Shintoism, 200
Dutch, the, 105
Dziandjiem of Mukden, the, 66

East Chinese Railway, the, 14, 27, 29, 37, 84, 85, 86
East India Company, the, 105, 117
*Echo de Paris*, the, 299
Educational Imperial Rescript, the, 120
Emperor of Japan, the, 239, 242, 243, 248, 265
England, *See* Great Britain
Entente Cordiale, the, [illegible]
Ethological Society, the, 130

Feng-tai, 54
Feng-tien, 17
Feng-whang-cheng, 24
Ferry, M. Jules, 310

Fokien, 30
Formosa, 123*n*, 156, 172, 248, 300, 301, ; insurrection in, 5
*Fortnightly Review*, the, 239
France, 3, 14, 62, 73, 110, 236, 339 ; relations with Japan, 11, 298–311
Franco-German War, the, 330
Freshfield, Mr. Douglas, 224, 225, 226
Fuji-Yama, 206, 226, 227
Fukko, 200, 239, 246
Fushimi, Castle of, 218
Fukuchiyama, 321, 322

Garibaldi, 316
Gaselee, General Sir A., 60, 321
Gen family, the, 169*n*, 188, 190
Geneva Conference, the, 317
Genghis khan, 277, 288, 294, 344
Genji, 211, 212, 214
Genji Monogatari, 155, 211, 215, 230
Gennai, Hiraga, 108
Gensan, 29
German-Japanese Treaty, the, 113
Germany, 11, 56, 61, 62, 66, 67, 76, 77, 111 ; policy in China, 16–22 *passim*
Gidayu-bon, 234
Glover, Mr., 5
Gon-Chiunagon, 211, 214, 215
Great Britain, 81, 85, 110, 184, 236, 316; relations with Japan, 1–12 ; policy in China, 14–91, *passim*
Great Liau, the, 276
Great Wall of China, the, 22, 46, 79, 271, 273, 274, 284, 290
Greece, 131
Greeks, the, 128
Gribsky, Lieutenant General, 46, 51
Gundan, the, 236
Gunjai Imperial Rescript, the, 124

Hagiwara, Mr., 88
Hague, The, 329
Hague Conference, the, 317, 332
Hama, 256
Han dynasty, the, 274, 282, 293
Hanotaux, M., 38
Harai, 199
Hara-Kiri, 109, 163, 165, 168, 170
Hara Saihin, 155
Harbin, 14, 65, 84, 282
Hardinge, Sir Charles, 55
Harima, 321
Harma, the, 109
Hay, Secretary, 73, 74
Hayashi, Viscount, 110
Hearn, Lafcadio, 116
Hei, 188, 190
Hei Naishi-no-suke, 212
Hei-Lung-Chiang, 18, 21, 78, 86
Heian, 210, 213, 229, 230, 234
Hei-naishi, 213
Hetta, 4
Hia, empire of, 277
Hideyoshi, 278
Hieuntsang, 191
Higashiyama, 219
Highlands, the, 225
Himalayas, the, 289
Himeji, 321, 322
Hindhead, 225
Hindoos, the, 130, 131
Hioye, Lord, 213
Hioye-no-Meifu, 212
Hirado, 117
Hitotsubashi, 243
Hogen Monogatari, the, 168*n*
Hokkaido, 13
Ho-koka, 127
Hokusai, 219
Hong-Kong, 305
Hope, Sir James, 14
Horai, Mount, 216
Hsi-An-Fu, 71
Hsin-Mintsun, 78
Hsuan-tsung, 287
Hung-nu, 274
Huns, the, 274, 286, 282

Idzu, 4
Ili, 68
Ilinsky, 46

*Imperial Asiatic and Quarterly Review*, the, 13
Imperial Educational Rescript, the, 194
*Independent Review*, the, 195*n*
India, 131, 177, 191, 286, 295; British, 305, 306, 307; British residents in native states of, 18; Dutch, 305; French 305, 306, 307, 309.
Indo-China, Franco-Japanese policy in, 298–311
Ino-Chiukei, 109
Inouye, Count, 110
Ise, the, 202
Ishé, 213, 214
Ishin, 200, 239, 246
Iswolsky, 66, 70, 71
Italy, 62
Ito, Marquis, 110, 167
Iwakura, Prince, 249, 250, 254
Iyesato, 254, 255
Iyeyasu, 243

Japan, *passim*
*Japan by the Japanese*, 171*n*, 208*n*
Japanese Diet, the, 300, 301
Jen Cheng, 290
Jesuits, the, 342
Jigoku, 302
Jijiu-no-Naishi, 212
Joi, 240
Jonson, Ben, 50
*Joruri-bon*, the, 234, 235, 236
*Journal de St. Petersbourg*, the, 73
Journal Official, the, 77
Jusha, the, 196

Kai-chau, 38
Kaiko, 239, 240
Kaikoku, 240
Kaikoku-Heidan, 108
Kaiku-li, 282
Kakuya, 212
Kamakura, 134, 193, 216, 217, 236
Kamei Shokin, 155
Kamimura, 315
Kan-li, 28
Kau-li dynasty of Korea, the
Kana, Mr., 110
Kanagawa, 110
Kanaoka, 210
Kaneko, 315
Kanin, Princess, 162
Kano, 219
Kansu, 271
Kari, 244
Karma, 203
Kashgar, 68
Kataoka, Mr., 9
Kato, Mr., 66, 70, 71
Katsu, Count, 110
Katsura, General Count, 10, 299, 300
Kau-ku-li, 280, 281
Kawamura, 315
Keiki, 243, 244, 254, 255
Kelung, 300, 301
Khotea, 68
Ki family, the, 280
Kiao-Chau, 16
Kido, Marquis, 167
Kikuchi, Baron, 110
Kimmochi, 214
Kimura, 110
Kin, dynasty, the, 136, 277, 278, 283
Kinchau, 68; battle of, 236
Kinchow, 100, 101
Kinder, Mr. Claude W., 53, 55
Kinno, 239, 250
Kiogen, 232, 233
Kiokwai, the, 201
Kioto, 161, 188, 209, 210, 216, 217, 230, 240, 241, 248, 321
Kirin, Province of, 18, 21, 78, 86
Kitabatake Chikafusa, 186
Kitaiski, 276
Kitsu, 279, 280
Kittar dynasty, the, 276
Kiu-lien-cheng, 281
Kiushiu, 280, 315
Kobe, 161
Kobu, 241
Kobu-gattai, 239, 241
Kodama, Baron, 299, 300, 301
Koizumi Yakumo, 116
Kokiden, 212
Kokiden, Lady, 214

Kokonor, 275
Kokusenya, 278
Kokwan, 220
Komo-Zatsuwa, 108
Komura, Baron, 26–33, 93–98, 315
Konoploff, High Priest, 46
Korea, 5; Japanese policy in, 14–35, 36–101, 177, 245, 275, 278, 279–283, 293, 298, 302–306, 331, 333–335
Korin, 220
Korostovitch, General, 65
Koseki, Sanyei, 109, 167
Koshe-no-omi, 213
Kowsching, the, 333, 334
Kublaikhan, 277, 288
Kuramochi, Prince, 213
Kurile Islands, the, 13
Kurino, Mr., 26–33, 93–98
Kuroki, General, 315
Kuropatkin, 80, 84, 325
Kuruhara Rioza, 167
*Kusazoshi*, 234
Kwan Tung territory, the, 85
Kwanin, 190
Kwannon, 190
Kwanto, 186, 188
Kwanting Peninsula, the, 37, 38, 39
Kwotei, 248

*La Revue*, 298*n*, 317*n*
Lamaism, 278, 288, 289
Lamsdorff, Count, 19, 25–32, 44–71, 80, 83, 84, 93–98
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 21, 23, 24, 26, 56, 66, 72, 79, 89, 85
*Le Memorial Diplomatique*, 329
Lespedeza, 238
Lessar, M., 84
Liao dynasty, the, 126
Liao River, the, 78, 81
Liao-che, 21
Liaotung peninsula, the, 15, 36, 37, 68
Liaoyang, 300, 323, 282
Lian, 283
Liau dynasty, the, 276, 277, 278
Liau River, the, 276, 280, 283
Liautung, 276
Liautung Bay, 283
Liautung peninsula, the, 279
Li-Hung-Chang, 59, 60, 64, 77
Linévitch, 57
Liuchiu, 156
London, 72, 130, 222, 237, 322, 323, 343
Lopatka, Cape, 13
Louchou, 172, 179
Lowther, 5

MacCaul, Mrs., 135
Macdonald, Sir Claude, 24, 45, 67, 72, 228
Macdonnell, Sir John, 92, 93, 100
Machich, 282
Mackey Treaty, the, 86
Maguire, Dr., 144*n*
Makura-no-soshi, 215, 230
Makurano-soshi, 155, 230
Malay peninsula, the, 289
Manchu territory, the, 51
Manchuria, *passim*; Manchuria Agreement, the, 64, 72; Manchurian Convention, the, 72, 74; Manchurian Railway Agreement, the, 68
Manyoshiu, 229
Maritana, 169
Marugame, 321, 324
Masampho, 16
Masanoba, 217
Matsiu, Mr., 40
Matsuyama, 321, 322
Matureef, Dr., 326
Meiji, the, 119; era of, 200, 220, 221, 238, 245, 246, 248, 300
Mencius, 185
Mergen, 85
Mesopotamia, 270
*Messager Officiel*, the, 52
Meyer, Messrs., 57
Michi-kaje, 213
Mikado, the, 248, 343
Military Education, 148
Ming dynasty, the, 278
Mito, Prince of, 343
Mitsukuri, Mr., 107, 108
Mitsukuri, Professor, 107
Mongolia, 68, 80, 81, 271, 277, 278, 285, 288, 289

Mongols, the, 128
Mongoria, 155
Mononofu, 186
Mononofuno-michi, 186
Mormons in Japan, 9
Morse, 38
Motonobu, 217, 219
"Mountains and Mankind," 224
Mouravieff, Count, 39, 46
Mukden, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 52, 65, 67, 82, 83, 86, 87, 325; battle of, 236; province of, 78, 79; Russian Resident at, 18
Mung-tien, 273
Murasaki Shikibu, 155
Murata, 110
Mutsuhito, Emperor of Japan, 248

Nagai Uta, 167, 168
Nagasaki, 105, 107, 108, 109, 116, 117, 167, 333
Nagoya, 161
*Niakwa-Senyo*, the, 109
Nanking, 278
Nanshan, battle of, 236
Napoleon I, 144, 218
Napoleon III, 244
Nara, 209, 210, 218, 222, 229
Narihira, 213
*National Service Journal*, the, 144*n*
Negishi, 252
Negotiations between Japan and Russia, 1903–1904, the, 13
Newchwang, 18, 21, 22, 23, 46–86 *passim*
New Testament, the, 181
*New Treatise on Anatomy, the*, 108
New York, Central Park of, 227
New York Steamship Company, the, 114
Newton, Lord, 144*n*
Nijio, 212
Nile, the, 270
*Nineteenth Century and After, The*, 92*n*, 119*n*, 163*n*, 257*n*
Ninjio-bon, 234
Niphon, 321
Nirvana, 204
*Nirvana of Shakyamune*, th
No, the, 232, 233
Nobuzane, 210
Nogi, General, 137
*Novoye Vremya*, the, 38, 46
Nozu, 318
Nuchen, 283
Nuchih, 283

Oda, 218
Oda Toyotomi, 218, 232
Odoli, 278
*Official Messenger*, the, 19, 69
Ogawa, 315
Oku, 315
Oliphant, Mr., 14
Onon, the, 277, 344
*Ornamental Art of Japan, The*, 210
Osaka, 166
Osako, 161
O-shio-Kun, 212
Otsuki Gentaku, 108, 109
*Outlook, The*, 223*n*, 312*n*
Oyama, Marchioness, 156
Oyama, Marshal Marquis, 156, 315

Paris, 111, 222, 227, 301, 317*n*
Parker, Miss, 162
Parkes, Lady, 227
Parkes, Sir Harry, 5, 227, 245
Pechili, Gulf of, 37, 39
Pechili, province of, 19, 37, 39, 47, 56, 57, 71, 79, 276
Peiho, the, 57
Peking, 6, 25, 34, 37, 42–85 *passim*, 256, 271, 278
Peking Agreement, the, 38
Peking Protocol, the, 20, 71, 72, 83
Peking Relief Expedition, the, 16, 46
Persians, the, 287
Petropavlosk, capture of, 4
Philippine Islands, the, 305
*Pictorial Arts of Japan*, the, 209
Pingyang, 29, 280, 281
Plançon, M., 81, 82, 83
Plato, 195

Platonic School, the, 119
Plum, Lady, 211
Pohai, 282
Pohai Bay, 283
Police and Prison College, the, 175
Poppé, M., 57, 59
*Posudnik*, the, 14
Port Arthur, 6, 14, 16, 28, 36–39, 53, 55, 58, 65, 68, 80, 81, 85, 99, 100, 129, 189, 236, 329, 331, 332
Port Hamilton, *v.* Port Lazareff.
Port Lazareff, 5, 14, 29
Port Nicholas, 83
Portuguese, the, 105

Rangaku-Kaitei, 108
Raphael, 218
Red Cross Society of Japan, the, 8, 320
Redesdale, Lord, 343
Reichstag, the, 77
*Revue Russ*, the, 329
Rin-Shihei, 108
Rockhill, Mr., 76
Rome, 131, 286
Ronins, the, 166, 238
Rosen, Baron, 28–31, 93, 98
Russia, 110, 253, 277, 296, 301, 303, 309, 310, 313, 314, 323, 330–336; policy in China, 13–101 *passim*; relations with Great Britain and Japan, 3–7
Russo-Chinese Bank, the, 23, 76, 78, 80, 86
Russo-Chinese Convention, the, 66
Russo-French Memorandum, the 73, 74
*Russo-Japanese War, The*, 317

Sabaku, 239, 240
Saghalien, 13
Saigo, 254
Saigo Takamori, 145
St. Cloud, 225
St. Petersburg, 20, 24, 26, 29, 30, 33, 37, 52, 56, 60, 66, 69, 70, 72, 74, 77, 81, 83, 93, 299, 325, 332
Sakai, 166
Sakalin, 46, 52
Sako, 240
Sakoku, 239, 240
Salisbury, Marquis of, 40–43, 48, 55, 62, 70
Salvation Army in Japan, the, 9
Sameshima, 111
Samurai, the, 135, 136, 164–166, 168, 170, 186, 192, 231
San Francisco, 110
Sanetomo, 193
Sanjio, Prince, 249, 250, 254
Sanraku, 218
Sasebo, 33, 333
Satow, Sir Ernest, 5, 67, 186
Satsuma, 110, 111, 145
Satsumo revolution, the, 254
Scott, Sir Charles, 19, 47, 50, 51
Seishonagon, 155
Seladon, apples of the, 57
Semitic religious notions, the, 131
Sendaihagi, 238
Sendai, 238
Seoul, 14, 15, 38, 88
Sessiu, 217, 218, 219
Sesson, 217
Seymour, Admiral, 41
Shakespeare, 234, 237
Shanghai, 86
Shanhai-Kwan, 21, 27, 55, 56, 58, 60, 78
Shanhai-Kwan Railway, the, 52, 53
Shantung, 16
Shiba-Kokan, 109
Shiba, Lieutenant Colonel, 45
Shigemosi, 185
Shikoku, 231, 322
Shimonoseki, 15, 107
Shin Butsu, 190
Shing King Province, the, 80
Shinto, 282, 287
Shintoism, 119, 138, 177–207, 255
Shio Sammi, 213

Shioshio-no-Meifu, 212
Shogun, the, 5, 105, 107–110, 117, 187, 193, 217, 239, 240, 242–245, 251, 254
Shushen, 283
Siam, 159, 279, 287, 305, 306
Siberia, 279, 282, 283, 285, 305
Siebold, Herr Von, 111
Sin dynasty of China, the, 275, 281, 293
Sino-American Treaty, the, 87
Sino-Japanese Treaty, the, 83
Siubun, 217–219
Singetsu, 217
Society of Arts, the, 177*n*
Socrates, 128, 195
Sotan, 217, 219
South West Province of China, the, 78
Spanish, the, 105
Sron-btsan-Sgampo, 275
Sufu, Baron, 110
Sufu, Mr., 110
Sugawara Michizane, 199, 287
Sugita Gempaku, 108
Suma, 212, 215
Sung dynasty, the, 217, 276, 277, 289
Sungari, the, 85
Switzerland, 225

Ta-Yang River, the, 38
Tai-Shogun, the, 240
Taikosama, 218
Taira-no Kiyomori, 185
Tajiks, the, 287
Takano, 109
Takano Choyei, 167
Takasaki, Baron, 140
Takasahi, Captain, 140
Takeo Hirose, 129, 189
Takushan, 38
Talien Wan, 16, 37, 39
Tamerlane, 294
Tametomo, 168*n*, 169*n*
Tan period, the, 191
T'ang dynasty, the, 275, 276, 281, 286, 287, 293
Tannu, 219
Taotai, 8, 82, 86, 87
Tarbagati, 68
Tartar dynasty of Manchuria, the, 278
Tatung River, the, 280
Tatungkan, 24, 83, 87
Temmagu, 199
Tenno Heika, 248
Thang dynasty, the, 217
Tibet, 271, 275, 278, 279, 287, 288, 289
Tientsin, 15, 46–61 *passim*, 171, 83, 86
*Times*, the, 17, 69, 331, 343
Timur, 294
Ting, Admiral, 169
Togo, Admiral, 4, 99, 315, 342
Tokio, 24, 25, 28, 32, 40, 42–44, 66, 70–72, 94, 107, 117, 143, 158, 160–162, 171, 172, 175, 222, 228, 231, 240, 300, 316, 332, 333, 343
Tokio Jio-gakkwan, the, 160
Tokugawa family, the, 109, 145, 155, 196, 218, 231, 238, 239, 243, 254
Tokugawa Yoshimune, 105
Tolstoi, Count, 46, 265
Tongkin, 305, 310
Tongking, 279, 289
Tongku, 53, 54, 56, 60
Tong-shan, 58
Tosa, 219
Toshikage, 213
Tower, Mr., 75
Toyotomi Hideyashi, 218
Trans-Manchurian Railway, the, 65
Trans-Siberian Railway, the, 14, 38, 65
Trans-Zeya, the, 51, 52
Treves, Sir Frederick, 343
Tsar of Russia, the, 25, 28, 30, 34, 83
Tseng, General, 17, 65
Tsing dynasty, the, 278
Tsitsihar, 25, 85
Tsunenori, 213
Tsung-li Yamen, 37
Tsurayuki, 213
Tsushima, 14; battle of, 342; seizure of, 4
Tu-Chueh, the, 275, 276

Tufans, 275, 287
Tuku-Hun, the, 275

Udagawa Genzai, 109
Ukikoye, 219, 233
Unyokan, the, 15
Uraga, 167
Uriu, Admiral, 156
Utagawa Gensin, 109
Utai, 232

*Variag*, the, 332
Versailles, 225
*Vestnik*, the, 325
Vladivostock, 14, 65, 99, 100

Wafangu, 101
Waldersee, Count von, 47, 54, 55, 60, 61
Wang-An-Shi, 289
Washington, 21, 74
Watanabé Kwazan, 109, 167
Wei-Hai-Wei, 6, 36, 37, 39, 69
*Westminster Gazette*, the, 144*n*
Whitehead, Mr., 41, 42
*Wiener Tageblatt*, the, 105*n*, 112*n*
Wistaria, Princess, 215
Witte, M., 38
Wogack, General, 60, 61

Yalu River, the, 24, 25, 28, 29, 38; battle of, 236, 317
Yamamoto, 315
"Yang-tse Convention," the, 77
Yang-tse River, the, 77, 271, 272
Yang-tse Valley, the, 84
Yang-tsun, 54, 56
Yarkand, 68
Yasui, Miss, 159
Yeawase, 211
Yedo (Tokio), 107, 231, 240, 241
Yeitoku, 218
Yellow Peril, the, 292, 336-338
Yema Saiko, 155
Yengi, Emperor, 214
Yenomoto, Viscount, 110
Yeso, 13
Yezo, 156, 172
Yi-ju, 38
Ying-Kow, 52, 55, 280, 282
Yokioku, 232
Yokohama, 161, 252
Yongampho, 25, 82, 88
Yoritomo, 187, 190, 217
Yo-sute-bito, 198
Yuen dynasty, the, 126, 277
Yumi-ya-no-michi, 187

Zen, the, 190, 191
Ziusha, 231

Butler & Tanner, The Selwood Printing Works, Frome, and London.

00036052

Digitized with financial assistance from

HT Parekh FOUNDATION

An Initiative by HDFC

WITH YOU, RIGHT THROUGH

on 27 November, 2018